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ABSTRACT 
Author: Philip H . Gafga. 
Title of M .A. thesis: The Instability of the Demand for Money. 
The demand for money plays an important role in the 
assessment of the efficacy of monetary policy. Prior to the early 
1970s, there was a consensus among the empirical literature that a 
stable demand for money function existed. During the early 1970s, 
most empirical studies indicated that the demand for money had 
shifted about in an unpredictable manner, making the assessment of 
the efficacy of monetary policy hazardous. 
This thesis investigates the causes of the instability of the 
demand for money by going back to first fundamentals of the theory 
of the demand for money. Two main possible causes are identified, 
viz: financial innovation, and frequent changes in taxation regimes. 
With regard to financial innovation, which may take on the 
form of lower transaction costs, improved cash-management 
techniques and the increased proliferation of new substitutes for 
money, the following propositions are made: that a change in 
transactions costs affects the demand for money, and that improved 
cash-management techniques and new substitutes for money will lead 
to increased interest-elasticities for the demand for money. The use 
of divisia monetary aggregates as a possible replacement for 
simple-sum aggregates is also considered. 
With regard to frequent changes in taxation regimes, the 
theoretical relationship between expected inflation and interest rates 
as embodied in the Fisher hypothesis is analysed. Two neoclassical 
monetary growth models are discussed in which each model has a 
different method of capital financing by the f i rm, viz: all-debt, and 
debt-equity financing. The Fisher hypothesis is then refined to take 
into account the different features of each taxation regime. Whilst 
the original Fisher hypothesis predicts that the nominal interest rate 
will adjust pari passau in response to expected inflation, the refined 
hypothesis predicts that nominal interest rates will adjust by more 
than the expected rate of inflation. The refined Fisher hypothesis is 
then incorporated into the steady-state demand for money, and it is 
suggested that frequent changes in taxation regimes can lead to the 
instability of the steady-state demand for money. 
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C H A P T E R O N E 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 1.1. The purpose of this study. 2 
1.2. Plan of discussion. 9 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Purpose of this study 
Prior to the early 1970s, it was a commonly held belief that 
the demand for money was essentially a stable function, and policy-
makers came to depend on it for assessing the efficacy of their 
monetary policies which was, then, a comparatively simple matter 
since it could be assessed in terms of a basic IS-LM model. In 
that case, a stable demand for money function was linked with a 
stable LM locus.i 
However, during the early 1970s, the picture changed quite 
dramatically as several econometric studies of the demand for money 
began to proliferate, indicating that there had been an apparent 
breakdown in the empirical demand for money function. Perhaps 
the most typical manifestation of such a breakdown was the 
tendency for estimated coefficients of the empirical demand for 
money function to take on nonsensical values which were at 
variance with theoretically specified values. It was usually the case 
that the estimated demand for money function exhibited a tendency 
to make large forecasting errors as the 1970s progressed which 
essentially meant that the empirical demand for money consistently 
overpredicted narrowly-defined money balances. 
One could enter upon a full survey of all empirical studies 
of the demand for money that used conventional specifications of 
the function, and easily come to the conclusion that there has 
indeed been a breakdown. Rather than to enter upon a f u l l survey 
of such studies, i t w i l l be sufficient for present purposes to take a 
look at a typical study by Gafga (1985b) which used a conventional 
specification of the demand for money which took on the following 
form: 
5nM 
where M denotes nominal M l balances (consisting of currency and 
demand deposits), Y denotes GNP at current market prices which is 
used to proxy the volume of transactions, r denotes the nominal 
rate of interest which is a proxy for the opportunity cost of holding 
money balances, and (3j {i = 0,...,3) are constants that have to be 
estimated. The specification contained i n equation [1] includes a 
lagged dependent variable which is used to take account of partial 
adjustment. 
Table 1.1. presents some selected results f rom the study by 
Gafga (1985b) which used U K data for the period 1963-1983. The 
main objective of the study was to examine the stability of the 
empirical demand for money, and to assess the plausibility of the 
explanation put forward by Artis and Lewis (1976) that there was a 
state of disequilibrium in the 'money' market owing to large 
money-supply shocks of the early 1970s. Two M l demand for 
money functions were estimated; in each case, a different rate of 
interest was used, viz: a short- and long-term rate. In the first 
regressions for each case, the long-run income- and 
interest-elasticities are not very far off f rom theoretically-plausible 
values for the first part of the sample period. In the second part 
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of the sample period, the statistics improve slightly, but that 
does not necessarily show that the demand for money performs 
better i n that period.2 It is the consistency of the estimated 
specification with the theoretical specification that should serve as a 
basis on which judgements can be made. It is clear f rom Table 
1.1. that the interest-elasticities have fallen i n absolute terms so that 
they are not consistent with theory which normally specifies a value 
of -0 .5 . Furthermore, the income-elasticities have fallen below 
unity indicating that there are now economies of scale in holding 
money balances. However, the long-run elasticities are dependent 
on the value of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
which indicates implausibly long adjustment processes so that the 
results need to be interpreted with some caution. The formal 
Chow-text procedure revealed that the null hypothesis of parameter 
stability could be rejected at the 5% significance level for the 
second specification containing a long-term interest rate, but almost 
could not be rejected for the one containing the short-term interest 
rate although i t was rejected at the 1% significance level. The 
conclusions are rather mixed, but i f considered i n conjunction with 
other studies, the overall conclusion is that there had been a 
breakdown in the demand for money during the early 1970s. 3 
Similar conclusions are also reported for the US, and are discussed 
fu l ly in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
Having ascertained that there indeed exists some form of 
instability of the demand for money, one would be concerned to 
explain why an apparently stable demand for money should suddenly 
turn out to be unstable. Before addressing such a question, it is 
important to enter upon a brief discourse regarding exactly what is 
meant by 'stability'. The most common interpretation of stabiUty is 
based on parameter stability in which a function exhibits a tendency 
to shift about rather unpredictably. This is the narrowest concept 
of stability that have been employed by traditional demand for 
money studies such as that reported in Table 1.1. The other aspect 
of stability is functional stability i n which i t is generally assumed 
that the function need not be static, but should not behave 
unpredictably or i n an erratic manner." This thesis takes the view 
that too much emphasis has been placed upon parametrical stabihty 
since i t is totally unreasonable to assume that functions would 
remain static over the long-run in spite of many exogenous 
developments. The idea is that the concept of functional stabiUty 
should be upheld because theories can be formulated to explain how 
a function behaves i n response to exogenous changes. 
In order to investigate the causes of the instability of the 
demand for money, two possible causes are considered i n this thesis. 
The first one concerns the impact of financial innovation which has 
taken on various forms such as lower transactions costs, improved 
cash-management techniques, and the increased proliferation of new 
substitutes for money. The main object of this thesis is to go back 
to first fundamentals of the theory of the demand for money, and 
to try and discover f rom a theoretical standpoint why there could 
be instability i n the demand for money. A careful and systematic 
consideration of the theories of the demand for money wi l l indicate 
that lower transactions costs do have a potentially important role to 
play i n explaining why there has been a reduction in money 
balances. Furthermore, the effect of improved cash-management 
techniques is considered so that some a priori predictions regarding 
8 
the behaviour of the demand for money can be made. Regarding 
the proliferation of new substitutes for money as a consequence of 
finaancial innovation, a criticism is made in this thesis of existing 
aggregation procedures which implicitly allocate identical weights to 
each component of the monetary aggregate. Alternative aggregation 
procedures are considered i n which weights are based on the 
'moneyness' of an asset so that any monetary aggregates wi l l not 
tend to overstate the amount of liquidity services available. This is 
done by going back to first fundamentals of economic aggregation 
theory. Such an examination of the effects of financial innovation 
on the demand for money w i l l have served a useful purpose if it 
sheds more light on the mystery surrounding the instability of the 
demand for money. 
Another possible cause of the instability of the demand for 
money is that frequent changes i n taxation regimes may have 
exerted their influence on the behaviour of the relationship between 
expected inflation and nominal interest rates as embodied in the 
Fisher hypothesis. The basic idea behind the Fisher hypothesis is 
that the nominal interest rate adjusts pari passu i n response to 
changes i n expected inflation rates so that the approximate 
relationship would be 
R ^ r + X . • • [ 2 ] 
where R denotes the nominal rate of interest, r denotes the real 
rate of interest, and x denotes the expected rate of inflation. 
According to the analysis i n this thesis, the presence of taxation wi l l 
modify the above relationship such that the nominal interest rate 
would have to change by about one-and-half times in response to 
changes i n the expected rate of inflation i n the case of a model in 
which the f i r m is assumed to finance its capital entirely by issues of 
debentures, and somewhere in-between in the case of debt-equity 
financing. This relationship is incorporated into the steady-state 
demand for money, and an analysis reveals that changes in taxation 
regimes may even be another factor responsible for the instability of 
the demand for money. 
1.2. Plan of discussion 
This thesis is divided into two parts, the first part being 
concerned wi th financial innovation, and the second part being 
concerned with the Fisher hypothesis. With regard to financial 
innovation, Chapter Two is devoted to a f u l l discussion of the 
concept of financial innovation as i t is rarely defined in any 
discussion of financial innovation. Several problems of defining and 
classifying financial innovations are considered, and it does appear 
that such a definition and a classification scheme is really dependent 
on the main objective of the study of financial innovation. Several 
theories of financial innovation are then considered. The first one 
is essentially a Schumpeterian approach in which changes in the 
financial sector are predominantly responses to impulses emanating 
f rom the real sector. Financial innovation is seen as a way 
whereby further change in the real sector could be promoted. The 
second theory concerns those innovations that occur i n response to 
changing constraints imposed upon the financial f i r m , either 
externally or internally. A linear-programming model is used to 
illustrate how rising shadow prices of changing constraints could 
reflect a rise i n complianace costs with a particular constraint. The 
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third theory is embodied within a regulatory dialectic framework in 
which financial innovation may occur i n response to the growing 
burdens of regulation imposed in restrictive monetary arrangements. 
This is quite consistent with the constraint-induced innovation 
hypothesis, but it goes further i n defining time lags in explaining 
the rate of diffusion of an innovation throughout the financial 
system. The final theory is what may be termed a hybrid theory in 
which elements f rom the previous three theories are drawn together 
to form a more general theory of financial innovation. The 
experience of the U K in the realm of financial innovation is then 
considered. It begins by looking at the scenario of the British 
banking system in the 1960s, and outlines some innovation-inducing 
developments that led to a spate of financial innovation in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Particular emphasis is placed on the problems posed by 
liability management by the banks for the conduct of monetary 
policy. A brief review of the effects of high and volatile interest 
rates on innovative activity then follows. Chapter Two finishes with 
a review of technological developments that have served to reduce 
transactions costs. 
Chapter Three is mainly concerned with the right-hand side 
of the transactions demand for money equation. A f u l l examination 
is undertaken of the theory of the demand for money using both 
deterministic and probabilistic inventory-theoretic models as originally 
formulated by Baumol (1952) and Miller and Orr (1966) 
respectively. The analysis is specifically geared to the consideration 
of the effects of changes i n transactions costs on the demand for 
money, and particular effort has been made to analyse the effect of 
a change in the structure of transactions costs on the 
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interest-elasticity of the demand for money. The effect of 
uncertainty about interest rates is also considered. Several empirical 
studies are then considered which attempt to capture the effect of 
financial innovation on the demand for money. Firstly, studies that 
use a simple time-trend term in addition to the conventional 
specification are considered. It is seen that the use of time trends 
is not particularly recommended because of the restrictive assumption 
that financial innovation takes place at a steady rate over time. 
Then the use of improved cash-management ratios is analysed using 
the M i l l e r - O r r model and it is shown that such cash-management 
techniques will lead to an increase in the interest-elasticity of the 
demand for money. The various proxies for cash-management 
techniques used by empirical studies may include previous-peak and 
ratchet variables for interest rates, and it is shown that the use of 
such variables lead to an improvement i n the performance of the 
empirical demand for money function after 1973. The explicit use 
of 'brokerage fees' is strongly recommended by the theory of the 
demand for money as a means of capturing the effects of lower 
transactions costs which have normally been incorported into the 
costant term. The main difficulty inherent i n such a strategy is the 
paucity of data on brokerage fees. Therefore, Porter and Simpson 
(1984) consider a highly unorthodox method of deriving a brokerage 
fee series by indirect means by solving for the brokerage fee in the 
money demand and debits equations. However, this leads to a 
serious circularity problem, and the results of Porter and 
Offenbacher have to be decisively rejected because of this. Some 
tentative suggestions for overcoming the problem of brokerage fees 
are then offered. Such suggestions indicate that a study of the term 
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structure of interest rates may prove insightful i n resolving the 
problem of brokerage fees. 
Chapter Four considers money substitutes and their 
aggregation. Firstly, the definition and identification of money is 
considered because that is the natural thing to do before one goes 
on to aggregate over monetary aggregates. A brief survey of a 
priori definitions of money reveals a lack of consensus regarding 
which assets should be included in the definition of money. The 
empirical definition of money is then considered with reference to 
various statistical methods, and it is concluded that such empirical 
methods are, at best, methodologically unsound. Addressing the 
aggregation problem, a brief review is made of various methods of 
measuring the substitutability among various assets since weighted 
aggregates may use the substitutability among assets as a basis for 
determing the weights to be used for each asset. It is then argued 
that simple-sum aggregates are not very appropriate because of their 
tendency to allocate equal weights to each asset included in the 
aggregate so that the amount of monetary services expressed by 
simple-sum aggregates may be seriosly overstated. Weighted 
aggregates attempt to measure the amount of monetary services 
available by allocating weights which are dependent on the 
•moneyness' of an asset. It should be clear that cash and non-
interest bearing demand deposits can be allocated weights of unity 
because their function is wholly monetary and not do not function 
as a store-of-wealth. On the other hand, equities would be 
allocated weights of zero because their function is entirely as a 
store-of-wealth. Applications of economic aggregation theory in 
deriving such weighted monetary aggregates are considered, with 
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special reference to the seminal work of Chetty (1969). Such 
aggregates are dependent upon the type of aggregator function (that 
is, utili ty functions in this c o n t e x t ) T h e main drawback is the 
problem of having to estimate the parameters of arbitrarily-specified 
util i ty functions i n deriving monetary aggregates. A n alternative 
approach is therefore considered which makes use of index-number 
theory which only depend on observable prices and quantities for 
index number aggregates. The use of Divisia monetary aggregation 
procedures are considered. Empirical results are then considered 
which compare the relative performance of Divisia aggregates to 
conventional sum aggregates. 
In the second part of this thesis, the Fisher hypothesis is 
analysed. Chapter Five places the Fisher hypothesis into historical 
perspective v^th a view to clarifying some of the concepts inherent 
i n the relationship between inflation rates and interest rates. The 
basic concepts, as formally formulated by Irving Fisher in 1896, are 
considered with regard to the behaviour of the theoretical 
relationship between inflation and interest rates when perfect 
foresight is assumed. Then a discussion of various early analyses on 
interest rates and prices is made according to the early works of 
Thornton (1802) and Wicksell (1896). Fisher's analysis of the 
transition period is then considered which makes it clear that 
interest rates do not adjust pari passu with inflation rates. Finally, 
a Wicksellian perspective is introduced which attempts to link 
Wicksell's natural rate of interest v^th the nominal and real interest 
rates. 
Chapter Six is largely devoted to a refinement of the Fisher 
hypothesis i n which taxes are introduced. Firstly, some early 
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attempts at refining the Fisher hypothesis are considered. Taxes 
then are introduced in two neoclassical monetary growth models 
which each have different assumptions regarding how the f i rm 
finances its capital, viz: all-debt and debt-equity financing. The 
effects of taxes on the Fisher hypothesis are then analysed i n detail. 
A distinction between the short- and long-run is then made which 
is important i n explaining why short-run relationships between 
inflation and interest rates may not be clearly defined, but could be 
more clearly defined i n the long-run steady-state. 
Chapter Seven derives a steady-state demand for money 
funct ion, and the modified Fisher hypothesis is then incorporated 
which indicates that there may be some a priori evidence to 
suggest that there may be some form of parameter instability in the 
steady-state demand for money. Some empirical results and their 
consistency with theory are considered. 
Finally, there are two appendices at the end of this thesis. 
The first appendix concerns index numbers and their desirable 
properties which is essential for the discussion of Divisia index 
numbers i n Chapter Four. The second appendix explains the f u l l 
derivation of the aggregate production function which is used in 
Chapter Six. Notes to the chapters are found at the end of this 
thesis, just before the list of references. A l l notes start on a fresh 
page for each chapter. 
P A R T O N E 
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CHAPTER T W O 
R E G U L A T I O N A N D F I N A N C I A L I N N O V A T I O N 
Unt i l the early 1970s, the idea that the demand-for-money 
function was inherently stable had come to be taken for granted. 
However, during the 1970s, i t transpired that most monetary 
relationships, notably the demand for money, exhibited a tendency 
to disintegrate. This episode served to exacerbate the evident 
difficulties of the authorities i n the conduct of their monetary 
policies. A vast and prolix literature then emerged, purporting to 
explain the breakdown in monetary relationships. Among the 
several hypotheses put forward, i t is now becoming quite fashionable 
to attribute the disintegration of the demand-for-money function to 
institutional change in the financial sector as exemplified by the 
process of financial innovation. The study of financial innovation, 
unt i l recently, has been a relatively neglected subject in monetary 
economics, and i t has now got a well-deserved catalyst when the 
apparent difficulties of the monetary authorities have made 
themselves much more manifest. 
A t the outset, i t needs to be stressed that the study of 
financial innovation is important i n itself because, as Kane (1984, 
p . 4) has already suggested, there is a tendency amongst 
macroeconomic models to treat financial innovation as a purely 
exogenous development, and ' i f policy makers do not incorporate 
policy-induced innovation into their ex ante planning framework, 
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their efforts at control will be biased toward shortfall.' This would 
almost re-echo the work of Lucas in this field who, for example, 
says that 
'...given that the structure of an econometric model 
consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and 
that optimal decision rules vary systematically with 
changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision 
maker, it follows that any change in policy will 
systematically alter the structure of economic models.' 
(1981, p.l26) 
The main point being made in this chapter, which stems from the 
key phrase 'policy-induced innovation' in the above quotation from 
Kane, is that all policy-makers need to incorporate the effects of 
their policies on financial innovative activity into their policy-
making framework, that is, to put it another way, to endogenise the 
process of financial innovation. 
To tackle the various issues involved, the discussion in this 
chapter will be organised as follows. Firstly, some preliminary 
remarks will be made regarding definitional and taxonomic problems 
of financial innovation. Before any theory of financial innovation 
can be put forward, it is necessary to define the concept of 
financial innovation, and to decide on how the various financial 
innovations may be meaningfully classified. That is the main 
objective of section 2.1. In the same section, a distinction has to 
be made between the inducement to financial innovation and its 
diffusion as it has been claimed by Podolski (1986) that the latter 
is often of more economic significance than the former. 
Secondly, the various theories of financial innovation are 
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considered. The first theory (or approach) concerns the inducement 
to innovate in the financial sector as mainly a response to impulses 
in the real sector of the economy. Such a notion is implicit in the 
writings of Schumpeter. The second theory, mainly attributable to 
Silber (1975), considers how the financial firm might respond to 
various changes in its constraints which can take various forms, viz: 
governmental regulations, balance sheet constraints, market-imposed 
and internally-imposed constraints. Amongst the possible responses 
of the financial f i rm, one firm may be encouraged to undertake 
innovation. The third theory, attributable to the various vmtings of 
Kane (for example, Kane (1977, 1981, 1983, 1984)), to be 
considered purports to explain the rate of diffusion of a financial 
innovation, and places great emphasis on how govermnental 
regulations may affect the rate of diffusion. Such a theory 
presumes that the main cause of financial innovation stems from the 
regulations imposed by the authorities, and many critics have 
pointed out that there are also other causes. However, in the final 
sub-section of section 2.2., a hybrid theory will be put forward 
which should highlight the complex interrelationships between 
impulses from the real sector, financial innovation, and changing 
constraints that a financial firm has to face. 
Finally, section 2.3. considers the experience of the UK in 
financial innovation. The main approach is to offer an 
interpretation of the events in the monetary sector taking place since 
the 1960s and to show how financial innovative activity undermined 
the authorities' attempts at regulation. 
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2.1. Some preliminary remarks 
2.1.1. Definitional problems 
Many writers have noted a long-run parallelism between 
developments in the real and financial sectors. ^  As the study of 
financial innovations, until recently, has been a relatively neglected 
subject, there is often some difficulty in establishing an adequate 
analytical framework in which the process of financial evolution can 
be analysed. One possible starting point would be to note that 
similarities can be found between technological and financial 
innovations, and it would therefore be useful to analyse financial 
innovations along roughly similar lines to those for technological 
innovations in order to arrive at a working definition of financial 
innovations. 
Technological change, as visualised by Schumpeter in his 
extensive writings on the subject, may consist of three steps, viz: 
invention, innovation, and imitation or diffusion. ^ Invention can be 
regarded as the very act of conceiving a new product or process 
and solving the purely technical problems associated with its 
application. However, as stressed by Schumpeter (1939, p.84), 
invention does not always induce innovation. For any invention to 
have any economic significance at all, it is necessary that 
commercial methods be devised to exploit that invention. 
Schumpeter used the term 'innovation' in a very special way, 
relating it to the implementation of a new process or method that 
alters the production possibilities of a f i rm. Innovation comprised 
the entrepreneurial functions required to carry a new technical 
possibility into economic practice for the first time - identifying the 
market, raising the necessary funds, building a new organisation. 
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cultivating the market and so forth. An innovation may not 
become apparent until imitation or diffusion has taken place on a 
sufficiently widespread scale. Imitation or diffusion is the stage at 
which a new product or process comes into widespread use as one 
producer after another follows the innovating firms's lead. On the 
basis of the preceding analysis, one may like to conclude that an 
innovatin is deemed to have taken place i f , and only i f , it leads to 
a significant change in habits of, say, consumers.^ 
Some writers have made a distinction between product and 
process innovations.'' Product innovation is often understood to 
mean the setting up of a new production function and may be 
exemplified by the emergence of new products and new markets for 
them. In contrast, process innovations concern technological 
advances in production techniques which have the effect of 
increasing the marginal productivity of either one or some or all of 
factors of production which then, ceteris paribus, leads to an 
increase in the production of the firm concerned.s Some further 
distinctions within process innovation may be made, namely that 
between labour- and capital-deepening. Capital-deepening is a 
form of process innovation in which the marginal productivities of 
capital-related inputs increase relative to those of labour-related 
inputs, leading to an increase in the marginal rate of technical 
substitution between labour- and capital-related inputs.^ As will be 
argued later on in this sub-section, capital-deepening innovations are 
potentially relevant for describing some of the more recent financial 
innovations. 
In certain cases, as pointed out by Scherer (1980, 
pp .409-410), it is possible that the distinction between product and 
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process innovation may become blurred so that an innovation could 
simultaneously take the form of a completely new and novel product 
which may serve to improve the production process so that the 
marginal productivities of the factors of production may increase. 
The development of computers is an example that immediately 
comes to mind. 
The various distinctions noted in the preceding paragraphs 
can be carried over into the realm of financial innovations. 
Regarding product innovation, typical examples would include the 
introduction of new financial products such as certificates of deposit 
in the 1960s, and the setting up of various futures markets. The 
most prominent example of process innovation would be the 
computerisation of the customer-bank relationship by the major 
banks and building societies. It is not too hard to find many 
examples in which the distinction between product and process 
innovations becomes blurred. The first example would be the 
introduction of automated teller machines (ATMs) by banks and 
building societies since the A T M is a product innovation, but also a 
process innovation in that it lowers the cost of providing services 
that would otherwise have been labour-intensive (that is, the ATM 
may take over some of the functions normally done by bank 
cashiers). The second example would be the introduction of 
dedicated dealing and quotation systems in the stock exchanges of 
the world - they are product innovations since the dealing terminals 
are specifically dedicated for the dealer in securities and could not 
have been used for other purposes, and they are process innovations 
since they serve to reduce transactions costs by making it far easier 
to obtain the prices of securities, for instance.^ Such process 
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innovations are regarded as capital-deepening as it implies a move 
away from labour-intensive inputs to capital-intensive inputs. 
It has been noted by Silber (1975, p.63) and (impHcitly by 
Podolski (1986, p.107)) that there seems to be an objective criterion 
on which technical innovations may be defined. It is either a 
product or a process innovation that qualifies for patent protection, 
and patent data may be the first source of data. However, 
financial innovations are not subject to patent protection so that it 
would be very difficult to arrive at some objective criteria on which 
financial innovations may be defined. Thus, financial innovations 
may go largely unnoticed at the initial stage, and it is only until 
wide diffusion has taken place that everyone recognises that a 
financial innovation has taken place.^ The reason for defining the 
occurrence of an innovation may now become clear when it was 
argued previously that such innovations can be labelled readily as 
such when it leads to a significant change in habits. In the realm 
of financial innovation, the origins of a financial product or service 
may be very obscure, and such innovations become much more 
manifest when wide diffusion has taken place. This seems to have 
been recognised implicitly by Silber (1975, p.64) who suggests a 
definition of a financial innovation as '[a]n innovation is a change 
in techniques, institutions or operating policies that have the effect 
of altering the way an industry functions.' Unless financial 
innovations are systematically recorded at every stage (and most 
importantly at the initial stage), it may prove difficult to have any 
clear concepts about financial innovation. 
Podolski (1986, p. 108) has drawn attention to another 
dimension of the definitional problem. It is sometimes the case that 
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financial innovation does not stem from completely novel ideas or 
practices. What may appear to be a financial innovation in a 
market may simply turn out to be that the new product or practice 
has spilled over from another market into the market. Two 
examples are cited by Podolski. The first one concerns the 
adoption of variable interest loans as a means to reducing risk was 
mainly derived from the practice of UK building societies offering 
variable interest mortgages. The second one concerns the 
Eurocurrency market in which the principles involved in 
Eurocurrency transactions were known before the First World War 
in the City of London who carried out transactions involving 
currencies of a third country. 
Furthermore, Podolski distinguishes between 'creative 
responses' and 'adaptive responses'. ^ Innovation was seen by 
Schumpeter (1934, pp.65-66) to lead to 'new combinations of 
productive means', that is to say, a creative response consists of 
doing something outside the range of existing practice. However, 
i f , for example, in response to high and volatile inflation and 
interest rates, there occurs a change in practices such as shortening 
the maturity of loans to reflect increased uncertainty about future 
inflation and interest rates. Such a response may be termed an 
adaptive response which consists of doing something within the 
existing range of existing practices, and such changes may not be 
readily labelled as financial innovations. Therefore, a 'precise 
definition of financial innovation...is likely to be elusive' (Podolski 
(1986), p.l08). 
2.1.2. Taxonomic problems 
Owing to its varied nature, financial innovations certainly 
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present some considerable taxonomic problems. Given the existing 
state of knowledge in this subject, it is not proposed here that a 
general classification system be devised. Rather, it will be 
instructive to analyse the various classification systems used by 
several studies of financial innovation. In particular, it does seem 
that a suitable classification system is often dependent on what 
objectives are to be fulfilled by any study on financial innovation. 
For example, if one were to conduct an investigation into the 
effects of financial innovations on the conduct and efficacy of 
monetary policies, a basic classification system would be to divide 
financial innovations into two broadly-defined categories such as 
whether or not such innovations have a direct influence on the 
structure and controllability of monetary aggregates, and whether or 
not they have an indirect influence on the monetary aggregates. 
Consider Table 2.1. which presents a summary of some 
studies on financial innovations. In each entry, the author, the 
main objective of the study, and the classification system used by 
that study are all given. It should become apparent that the overall 
picture is that the classification system used is specific to the main 
objective of the study. Each classification system mentioned in 
Table 2.1. will be considered in turn now. 
Firstly, the study by Silber (1975) introduces a theory of 
financial innovation in which it is hypothesised that the financial 
firm seeks to maximise its utility subject to several constraints. 
When any of these constraints change substantially, the firm may 
respond by innovating a new financial instrument or practice (this 
hypothesis is discussed further in sub-section 2.2.2.) The firm is 
capable of making different responses depending on the type of 
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market it operates in , and on other factors. The classification 
system used is on the basis of the response made by the financial 
f irm in response to a change in any of its constraints. The first 
type of response to be distinguished by Silber (1975, pp.67 and 69) 
concerns the endogenising of a previously exogenous item in the 
balance sheet by the financial firm. In the U.S. at the beginning 
of the 1960s, there was some part-disintermediation away from 
commercial banks by large corporations who lent directly to each 
other in the commercial paper market whose rates of return were 
more attractive relative to those offered by the commercial banks on 
their deposits. Because the commercial banks' market share of 
intermediation among large corporations was threatened, the banks 
introduced the negotiable certificate of deposit (CDs) as a measure 
designed to protect their market share. There was also another 
reason for the introduction of CDs. Banks were subject sometimes 
to episodes of excess loan demand which drove up interest rates, 
and therefore could lead to sizeable deposit withdrawals by large 
corporations. The CD was a financial instrument designed to 
endogenise the previously exogenous flows of large corporate deposits 
because it required a deposit for a fixed term so that it could 
forestall any sizeable deposit withdrawals, and made it easier for 
banks to bid competitively for funds at a time when their buffer 
stock of U.S. govermnent securities began to be depleted after the 
war. In spite of the reserve requirements on CDs, the CDs market 
outgrew the market for commercial paper because it was more 
liquid and divisible than commercial paper. i o 
The second category to be distinguished by Silber (1975) 
concerns the introduction of an existing financial instrument or 
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practice from another market, or industry, or country. A specific 
example would be the use of repurchase agreements by the 
commercial banks towards the end of the 1960s. Repurchase 
agreements (RPs) were transactions in which one party agreed to sell 
U.S. Treasury securities to another party for a short period of time 
whilst simultaneously agreeing to buy back the same securifies at an 
agreed price. These RPs were originally used by non-bank 
security dealers as a means of financing their inventories of 
securities. When Regulation Q became binding in 1968, the 
commercial banks took on the practice of RPs as a means of 
circumventing Regulation Q because funds acquired through RP 
agreements were not subject to Regulation Q. ^ ^ This type of 
innovation was an introduction of an exisfing practice from another 
market. 
The third category given by Silber (1975) concerns the 
modification of an existing asset or liability in a firm's portfolio so 
as to generate fresh demand for its assets or liabilities. An example 
cited by Silber (1975, p.67) is the introduction of term loans by 
commercial banks in the 1930s. The final category noted by Silber 
(1975, p.73) are completely new items which may include the 
introduction of computers into banking, and the introduction of 
credit cards in the 1960s. 
There is an inherent difficulty in Silber's classification scheme 
in view of the discussion towards the end of the last sub-section. 
Podolski (1986) argued that some financial innovations may not be 
innovations in the strict sense because they may have spilled over 
from another market into the market where the 'innovation' is 
supposed to have taken place. Thus, some of the responses by a 
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financial firm that were classified by Silber (1975) may not be 
innovations in the strict sense, especially categories A and B in the 
relevant entry in Table 2.1. 
Secondly, Hester (1981), it ought to be stressed here, does 
not explicitly use a classification system. When discussing the effects 
of financial innovations on monetary aggregates, the most sensible 
approach to classification, as suggested by Podolski (1986, p . I l l ) 
would be to divide financial innovation into two broadly defined 
categories which takes into account how financial innovations are 
likely to influence monetary aggregates and their controllability. The 
first category concerns those financial innovations that have a direct 
influence on monetary aggregates. Examples that immediately come 
to mind would include the creation of new money substitutes, or 
more specifically, the creation of new assets that are capable of 
serving as a means of payments, but do not possess the theoretical 
construction of money as a zero-interest asset. In addition, such 
new money substitutes may initially lie outside the scope of official 
definitions of money. That is, until the monetary authorities have 
more or less fully perceived the effects of new money substitutes on 
existing monetary aggregates, monetary aggregates will not be 
re-defined immediately. According to the simple hypothetical 
example given by Hester (1981, pp.143-146), the introduction of a 
new financial product or process may alter the signs of money 
multipliers, and if poHcymakers do not, at an initial stage, possess 
sufficient knowledge about the financial innovation that has just 
taken place, it may very well turn out that the signs of the money 
multipliers will become indeterminate which has impUcations for the 
relative efficacy of monetary poUcy. The second category given by 
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Podolski concerns those financial innovations that have an indirect 
effect on the monetary aggregates. It has been suggested by 
Podolski (1986, p . I l l ) that such innovations are also relevant 
because they aid the understanding of influences shaping the 
structure of monetary aggregates. 
The use of a classification system such as that suggested by 
Podolski will serve as a useful aid in understanding how some of 
the financial innovations discussed in Hester (1981) and Podolski 
(1986) affect monetary aggregates. There are several examples of 
financial innovations that had a direct influence on monetary 
aggregates. Referring to the earlier example of CDs, the 
introduction of CDs had the effect of weakening slightly the 
restrictive effects of monetary policy because the CDs made it easier 
for the U.S. commercial banks to bid competitively for extra funds 
by offering higher rates of interest on CDs as long as Regulation Q 
was not binding. Thus, they were still able to satisfy loan demand, 
and this may indeed be the very first example of the banking 
technique of liability management which is discussed in more detail 
in Section 2.3. A further example is provided by the growth of 
overnight RPs in the U.S. These were regarded as a part of the 
transactions medium, but the Federal Reserve failed to appreciate 
the apparent importance of overnight RPs as these agreements were 
used by the commercial banks to reduce their deposits at the close 
of business each day and to get back these deposits at the open of 
business the foHowing working day. Thus, these overnight RPs had 
a distortionary effect on narrowly-defined aggregates such as M l so 
that it undermined the Federal Reserve's ability to control narrow 
aggregates. The final example concerns the proliferation of close 
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substitutes for current accounts in the U.K. It is a well-known fact 
that when interest rates varied, it tended to distort M l which was 
defined so as to include notes and coin in circulation with the 
public plus sight deposits. To take into account the new 
interest-bearing substitutes for non-interest bearing transactions 
balances, the Bank of England set up a new definition which 
encompassed a wider definition of transactions balances known as 
M2 (see Bank of England (1982b), pp .224-225). This will be 
discussed further in Chapter Four which concerns the definition of 
monetary aggregates. 
Several examples can also be given for those financial 
innovations that have an indirect influence on monetary aggregates. 
The first example concerns the setting up of one-bank holding 
companies (OBHCs) in the U.S. when Regulation Q became binding 
in 1966. The commercial banks underwent congeneric 
transformations into OBHCs in order to escape the various 
regulations imposed by the Federal Reserve, especially Regulation Q, 
and were thus able to issue their own commercial paper at market 
rates of interest in order to raise funds. Another advantage offered 
by OBHCs was that these were not subject to the same stringent 
reporting procedures laid down by the Federal Reserve for 
commercial banks and thus impaired the Federal Reserve's ability at 
monetary control. The development of international banking had 
similar causes. ^ 3 The final example concerns the development of 
government-sponsored credit agencies whose primary functions are to 
intervene in the capital market so as to be able to offer loans to 
specially designated sectors of the economy (e.g. housing and 
agriculture) at interest rates below market rates, or just to guarantee 
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loans. A typical example for the U.K. would be the National 
Enterprise Board set up in 1975. The main effect of such credit 
agencies is to blunt the effects of restrictive monetary policies in the 
specially-designated sectors or 'enterprise zones'. So if monetary 
policy is to achieve the same overall restrictive effects as would 
have been the case in the absence of such credit agencies, interest 
rates would .have to rise still further. 
The third classification system to be considered here is that 
put forward by Kane (1981). This is mainly based on an analysis 
of how the banking system has managed to circumvent traditional 
banking regulations by innovating substitutes for their existing 
financial instruments and substitutes. The main objective of banking 
regulation is to restrict to some extent the banks' expansion of their 
assets so that a single bank, or a small group of banks, may not be 
seen to be monopolisers. Thus, in the relevant entry of Table 2.1., 
there are three broadly defined categories of circumventive responses 
in specific areas of banking regulation. The first category concern 
regulations designed to restrict the expansion in banks' assets through 
geographical diversification, and how banks have responded to 
prohibitions on branching in more than one state, and to restrictions 
on the number and location of their branches in any one state. 
Typical examples of such responses might include the establishment 
of bank-affiliates of the parent bank-holding company, and the 
provision of automated teller machines (ATMs) at remote sites such 
as supermarkets and offices. Such responses are designed to 
undermine the effectiveness of regulations designed to restrict the 
expansion in banks' assets through geographical diversification. The 
second category concern responses to regulations that restrict the 
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expansion in banks' assets by merger activity or de novo entry into 
other related or unrelated lines of business. Mergers are governed 
in the U.S. by antitrust legislation, and there are regulations which 
may prohibit the types of activities that any bank-holding company 
may undertake. Typical examples of circumventive responses may 
include the process of affiliation between two bank-holding 
companies rather than an actual merger, and the setting up of 
non-bank affiliates of the parent bank-holding company. The final 
category concern regulations that restrict the expansion of banks 
through price competition. Such responses may usually take the 
form of non-price competition. An example, with regard to interest 
payments that were restricted under Regulation Q, would be to offer 
implicit interest payments by way of improved facilities at the 
bank's branches. Apart from implicit interest payments, other forms 
of non-price competition also exist in the form of the proliferation 
of substitutes to traditional financial instruments. For example, 
substitutes for cheques may take the form of automated electronic 
transfer schemes; and substitutes for traditional current accounts 
could take the form of special accounts that circumvent regulations 
forbidding payment of interest on current accounts such as 
automated-transfer-of-surplus-funds accounts which automatically 
transfer surplus funds from current accounts into interest-bearing 
a c c o u n t s . ! S u c h a classification system is designed to analyse 
regulation-induced financial innovations by considering how financial 
firms create substitutes for traditionally-regulated instruments and 
practices. 
The final classification system to be considered here is that 
used by Silber (1983) in his 'informal' test of the constraint-
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induced innovation hypothesis. The data is divided into four broad 
categories reflecting aspects of financial innovation, viz: cash 
management, investment contracts, market structures, and institutional 
organisation. The first category, which has some special relevance 
to the analysis of the transactions demand for money in Chapter 
Three, concern innovations that were mainly induced by the 
historically-high level of interest rates which increased the desire to 
economise on cash balances. A further change in cash management 
techniques was also prompted by the availability of technology which 
lowered transactions costs. Some innovations in investment contracts 
were caused by the increased volatility of interest rates, such as 
floating rate loans, and variable rate mortgages. The advent of 
electronic fund transfer and dealing systems also have affected 
market structures. 
The overall conclusion to be drawn from the preceding 
analysis of classification systems used by various studies of financial 
innovations is that it would be very difficult indeed to devise a 
general classification system that would be capable of fulfilling every 
objective of each study on financial innovation. The best one can 
do is to use a classification system that would be specifically suited 
to the main objective of a study on financial innovation. 
2.1.3. Inducement to innovation and its diffusion 
A distinction has to be made between the inducement to 
innovate and the diffusion of an innovation. Such a distinction is 
necessary to complete any analysis of the process of innovafion, and 
it can be argued that the diffusion of an innovation has much more 
macroeconomic impact than the mere occurence of an innovafion. 
Thus, the purpose of this sub-section is to review briefly some of 
36 
the factors that induce technological innovation and the rate of its 
diffusion. This will pave the way for the main theoretical 
discussion of financial innovation in the next section. 
For analytical purposes, it will be assumed that the firm is a 
util i ty- or profit-maximising entity which accepts several constraints 
on what it can do in pursuit of its goals. There is some debate as 
to whether a monopolistic or a competitive market structure is more 
conducive to innovation. On the one hand, a monopolistic f irm, 
by its very nature, is capable of earning super-normal profits which 
may create organisational slack in which case, at least, no externally 
imposed constraints are seen to be binding. The argument, as it 
goes, is that the monopolistic f i rm, by earning a rate of profit in 
excess of that required to cover all its costs, is capable of 
appropriating some of that profit to research and development 
activities (R&D) and adopt a more innovative strategy by following 
a balanced portfolio of R&D so that the cost of failure can be 
more than offset by its successes. Such innovations resulting from 
this view of R&D within a monopolistic firm may be termed 
'success-slack innovation.'i s On the other hand, the competitive 
f i rm, because of the nature of the market it operates in , is only 
capable of earning a rate of profit that just about covers its costs so 
that there is little scope for R&D whose benefits must be weighed 
carefully against the possible costs of failure which may tend to be 
higher because the competitive firm may not be able to diversify its 
R&D to reduce the risks involved. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the distinction 
between product and process innovation must still be maintained. 
By their very nature, process innovations have the main effect of 
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lowering marginal costs such that both the monopolistic and 
competitive firm are induced to increase their output - the latter by 
a larger proportion than its monopolistic counterpart. Because the 
competidve firm is able to expand its output more than its 
monopolistic ounterpart, it is able to realise a higher incremental 
quasi-rent contribution to its profits which should recoup its R&D 
outlay. 1 6 So, if the term 'innovation' is used in its generic sense, 
then there is some ambiguity as to whether a monopolistic market 
enviroment is more conducive to innovation than a competitive 
market environment, ff the term is used in a more precise sense, 
then the possible conclusions are likely to be more clear-cut, 
namely that a competitive market environment may be more 
conducive to process innovation whereas a monopolistic market 
environment may be more conducive to product innovation. The 
preceding discussion has some relevance to the analysis of financial 
innovation because it will become necessary to decide upon a 
market environment in which financial firm behaviour may be 
analysed. 
In some situations, one or more of the firm's external 
constraints may change such that it forces a reduction in its utility 
or profitability. This may create an atmosphere within the firm in 
which stress is endemic. In such a situation, extra R&D effort may 
be undertaken in order to innovate a new product or process which 
will aim to restore the firm's utility or profitability. Such 
innovations may be termed 'failure-distress' or 'adversity' innovations 
since they constitute responses by the firm to adversity. The 
distinction between 'success-slack' and 'adversity', innovations is an 
important one for the discussion of the constraint-induced innovation 
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hypothesis introduced by Silber (1975) in sub-section 2.2.2. 
To carry the preceding discussion even further, two main 
schools of thought on the inducement to innovate can be made out, 
viz: 'supply-push' or 'technology-push' and 'demand-pull' theories. 
In order to reinforce the concepts inherent in these theories of 
innovation, it will be useful to employ the marginal cost-benefit 
principle. It is assumed that the firm faces a cost-time tradeoff for 
its R&D programme in which any attempt to accelerate its R&D 
schedule will incur higher costs. However, if the firm spends too 
long in its R&D, there will tend to be diminishing returns beyond a 
point. Furthermore, the firm takes into account the possible 
benefits from innovating a product. It is assumed that the benefits 
which would most probably take the form of discounted sales 
revenue decrease as time passes because if the firm delays its R&D 
schedule, there is always a risk that it will lose its 'promised' 
market share if its rivals overtake it in their R&D effort and launch 
the innovative product before it does so. Indeed, one advantage of 
being able to accelerate the R&D schedule is that the firm would 
be able to launch the product earlier so tapping the market profits 
potential for much longer. Given this scenario, the firm will 
attempt to choose its optimum pace of R&D, and hence maximum 
discounted net revenues, by equating the marginal cost of 
accelerating its R&D schedule to its marginal benefit. 
Now, the main concern here is with the dynamics of 
technological innovation.^ ^  It is a reasonable assumption that as 
time passes by, there will be a tendency for the stock of technical 
knowledge to increase. As technological and scientific knowledge 
advances, what inay be impossible today will be feasible but costly 
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tomorrow and easy the day after tomorrow. The main effect of 
this advance in technological knowledge, given the preceding 
analytical framework, is to recalibrate the firm's cost-time tradeoff 
such that the cost of its R&D schedule will be lower at all points 
in time, and the marginal cost of accelerating its R&D schedule 
will also become lower. A l l other things being equal, the firm will 
now be encouraged to innovate a product earfier. Even if 
innovating a product was previously deemed to be downright 
unprofitable, the lowering of the marginal cost of the R&D required 
may even encourage the firm to start the R&D programme because 
it is now profitable to do so. Thus, in such 'supply-push' or 
'technology-push' theories, innovations are mainly seen to result 
from autonomous developments in technical knowledge. Ceteris 
paribus, this would suggest that suuply-induced innovations are 
'forced upon' the consumers by the innovating firms.'^ 
The second school of thought on factors inducing innovation 
concern 'demand-pull' theories. Over time, demand conditions in 
the market will definitely change. Among the possible reasons for 
such changes would be the extra demand created by a growing 
population, by growing per-capita incomes and so forth. Such 
changes would be likely to increase the benefits accruing to a firm 
who undertakes R&D effort in order to innovate a product. Again, 
what may have been deemed as being unprofitable to innovate, the 
firm may now find that the changing demand conditions warrant 
such an innovation because it is now profitable. So, the main idea 
in demand-pull hypotheses is that innovation is a response to 
expanding profit opportunities in growing markets. 
Of course, the preceding analysis was dependent on the use 
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of ceteris paribus assumptions. It is indeed most likely that a 
combination of supply-side and demand-side factors will interact to 
induce innovations over time. It ought to be stressed that the 
supply-push and demand-pull theories of innovation are not 
competing hypotheses, but complementary theories as suggested by 
Kamien and Schwartz (1982, p.36), namely that the former is useful 
as an explanation of technological change in the long-run, and the 
latter is useful in the short-run. The preceding discussion will have 
an important bearing when examining the process of financial 
innovation; in particular, the proposition made by Podolski (1986, 
p. 109) that financial innovations are partly in response to changes in 
the real sector so that such innovations would conform more to 
demand-pull hypotheses will be examined in sub-section 2.2.1. 
Now, Podolski (1986, pp.109-110) has argued that the 
diffusion of an innovation is more important than the mere 
occurrence of an innovation, and goes on to suggest that 
'[j]ust as the mechanics of the diffusion of technological 
innovation is potentially relevant to the study of industrial 
policy, the mechanics of the diffusion of financial 
innovations may well be relevant to the study of financial 
and monetary policies.' 
There are several factors that determine the rate of diffusion. 
These may include time lags which may be associated with 
uncertainty, the cost of adoption of an innovation, and the time 
taken for information to be systematically gathered on a wide scale; 
the time taken in learning; and the time taken for other firms to 
imitate the original innovation. Podolski suggests that, since 
financial innovations are not subject to patent laws or protection. 
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imitation may turn out to be easier and cheaper thus leading to 
'swarms' or 'epidemics' of secondary financial innovation after the 
original innovation has taken place. Therefore, it is indeed possible 
that the diffusion of financial innovations is more rapid than that of 
technological innovations. The rate of diffusion may be hampered 
by regulatory forces imposed by regulatory authorities so that there 
may be a tendency for the rate of diffusion to increase during 
periods of de-regulation as embodied in the 'regulatory dialectic' 
framework which will be discussed in sub-section 2.2.3. below. 
2.2. Towards a theory of financial innovation 
In this section, several hypotheses concerning financial 
innovation are considered. The first one embodies a Schumpeterian 
approach in exploring a possible link between changes in the real 
sector and changes in the financial sector. The second hypothesis 
concerns what may be termed as 'constraint-induced' innovation as 
discussed by Silber (1975, 1983). The third one concerns 
'circumventive' innovation which is embodied in a 'regulatory 
dialectic' framework by Kane (1977, 1981, 1983, 1984). At the end 
of this section, it will be argued that the above hypotheses can be 
regarded as complementary, and not as competing theories of 
financial innovation, so as to take into account the various complex 
interrelationships involved. 
2.2.1. A Schumpeterian approach 
There have been some occasions on which economists have 
considered financial innovation to be essentiafly a reaction to 
impulses from the real sector. For instance, Silber (1975, p.54) 
noted that '...the innovation of money responds to a stimulus in the 
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real sector and in turn influences the potential path of real 
economic activity.' The origins of such a notion may be traced to 
the writings of Schumpeter who is especially noted for his analyses 
of economic evolution instead of states of equiUbrium. 
In Schempeter's scheme, the financial sector plays an 
important role in the evolution of the real sector. Banks are seen 
to be the dominant financial intermediaries, chanelling funds from 
deposits placed by savers into loans required by firms to carry out 
their production. In addition, the banks are also seen to be 
creators of means of payment, and Schumpeter took great pains to 
distinguish 'credit creation' from savings. 1 9 Essentially, in a 
capitalist system, savings, on the one hand, is seen to be the 
withdrawal of some of the productive resources which are then 
re-appropriated to their new employment 'through a shifting of 
means of payment.' (1939, p . I l l ) On the other hand, credit 
creation is seen to be the process in which new means of payment 
are created and put at the disposal of the entrepreneurs by the 
banks, and a further shift in resources may be effected by shifts in 
the purchasing power of means of payment as a consequence of 
inflationary credit creation. In other words, economic expansion 
initiated by technological change is financed not by saving, but by 
credit creation which is considered to be '...the monetary 
complement of innovation...' (1939, p . I l l ) 
Now returning to the previous discussion in sub-section 
2.1.3. regarding the distinction between supply-push and demand-
pull theories of innovation, it should be noted that from the 
viewpoint of a financial f i rm, the creation of extra demand for 
funds by entrepreneurs seeking to finance their innovations would be 
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represented by increases in marginal benefit which may then induce 
the financial firm to innovate new sources of funds to satisfy that 
extra demand. It would seem, therefore, that technological progress 
in the real sector creates profitable opportunities in the financial 
sector by creating a demand for funds to support irmovating 
entrepreneurs. This would reinforce Podolski's view, cited above, 
that financial innovations conform more to demand-pull theories of 
innovation than to supply-push theories. 
It has been argued by Schumpeter (1939, p . I l l ) that the 
logical relation between technological innovation and credit creation 
by banks is '...fundamental to the understanding of the capitalist 
engine...' and '...is at the bottom of all problems of money and 
credit...' Given the complexities of innovationary processes and the 
factors which account for financial expansion, the connection 
between the logical source of credit and actual financial processes 
might not be apparent and might thus be overlooked. It is 'in no 
case easy to discern the element of innovation under the mass of 
induced, derivative, and adventitious phenomena that overlies i t . 
But in the sphere of money and credit the layer is so thick, and 
the surface so entirely at variance with the processes below, that the 
first impression of the reader may well be fatal.' (Schumpeter 
(1939), p.109) Schumpeter, himself, stressed the importance of not 
losing sight of the fundamental connection between changes in the 
real sector and its financial consequences by saying that 
'...whenever the evolutionary process is in full swing, the 
bulk of bank credit outstanding at any time finances what 
has become current business and has lost its original 
contact with innovation or with the adaptive operations 
44 
induced by innovations, although the history of every 
loan must lead back to the one or the other.'(1939, 
p.114) 
There, however, may be some instances when credit creation may 
lose its original contact with technological change. After a period 
of prosperity associated with innovational activity, there may follow 
a 'secondary wave'. Expectations of continuing prosperity are now 
no longer justified, but credit creation may continue unabated for 
some time, resulting in losses which may then put an end to the 
process of speculative and inflationary credit creation (see 
Schumpeter (1939), pp.148-149). 
2.2.2. Constraint-induced innovation 
The process of financial innovation is viewed by Silber 
(1975, 1983) from a microeconomic point of view of the financial 
firm. The starting point of Silber's analysis is the assumption that 
financial firms maximise utility subject to a number of constraints. 
The most fundamental constraint faced by the financial firm is that 
its balance sheet identity must hold. There may also be other 
explicit constraints built into the optimisation problem such as a 
target rate of growth for total assets, various regulatory requirements, 
or self-imposed liquidity requirements specifying a desired percentage 
of the total portfolio in some particular asset. 
With respect to utility maximisation by the firm, Podolski 
(1986, p.185) suggests that 'this is simply another way of saying 
that, fundamentally, financial firms seek to maximise profits.' There 
are some grounds for doubting the validity of such a comment here. 
By assuming that, fundamentally, firms strive to maximise profits, 
the perspective is made too narrow, and it does seem more reahstic 
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to assume that financial firms pursue a multitude of goals such as 
achieving a satisfactory rate of growth in its assets, a satisfactory 
distribution of risk among its assets, and so fo r th .20 Thus, it may 
be argued that in maximising its utility subject to several constraints, 
the firm is striving to do as well as possible in achieving the 
multitude of goals which it has set for itself; in other words, no 
generality can be lost in assuming that the firm maximises its utiHty 
subject to various constraints, whereas the assumption of profit 
maximisation can lead to a loss of generality. 
Now, the main essence of Silber's 'constraint-induced 
innovation' hypothesis is that new financial instruments or practices 
are innovated to lessen the financial constraints imposed on firms. 
Two types of changes in constraints are distinguished which induce 
financial firms to undertake the search costs required to modify its 
traditional policies. The first type concerns exogenous changes in 
constraints which lead to a reduction in the firm's utility and the 
firm innovates in an effort to return to its previous level of utility: 
such innovations are labelled 'adversity innovations' as noted 
previously in sub-section 2.1.3. above. The second case concerns 
what may be termed as an increase in compliance costs as a 
constraint becomes binding, leading to increases in shadow prices of 
the constraint in a linear programming context. For the purposes 
of analysis, it would be useful to label such innovations as 
'circumventive innovations' since, as will be seen later, they are 
quite distinct from adversity innovations. The firm will try to 
remove or modify such constraints. If the constraint is an internally 
imposed one, the firm can simply revise or suspend that constraint 
whereas in the case of externally imposed constraints, the firm will 
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try to circumvent such constraints. 
Silber (1975, p.66) argues that if such a hypothesis is to be 
operational, it requires further specification by distinguishing normal 
stimufi and responses from those of abnormal magnitudes. Thus, 
the approach is to define 'abnormal' magnitudes of change such that 
an abnormal reduction in the firm's utility or an abnormal increase 
in the shadow prices of any constraints will lead to innovation. It 
does seem that the definition of abnormal magnitudes of change is 
likely to be an arbitrary one as such changes are viewed in 
historical context vis-a-vis normal changes. 
It has to be emphasised that there are development costs 
involved in financial innovations so that an initial rise in the 
shadow prices of constraints may not necessarily lead to financial 
innovation. Thus, Silber introduces a time dimension in his linear 
programming approach to financial innovation by suggesting 'that 
only a sustained increase in shadow prices over time will stimulate 
new product innovation.' (1983, p.90). Also, as previously 
discussed in sub-section 2.1.3., lower development costs may 
encourage even more innovative activity over time. 
This hypothesis of financial innovation has been criticised by 
Podolski (1986, p.186) on the grounds that it '...is both too general 
and too specific' Podolski argues that it is too general in the 
microeconomic sense that the firm innovates in order to achieve its 
goals by circumventing existing external constraints so that the main 
emphasis is on what may be called 'adversity' innovation owing to a 
reduction in the firm's utility. Furthermore, it is too specific in the 
macroeconomic sense that it applies to existing firms and may, 
therefore, not explain why new markets, new institutions, and new 
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monetary standards are set up. However, this is quite correct to 
some extent in that firms may carry out adversity innovations in 
response to a reduction in their utility. But, it is important to 
recognise that there are some cases in which there is no reduction 
in the firm's utility. It is simply that a constraint may become 
binding as reflected in rising shadow prices so that the firm's 
compliance costs increase. That is why, it is felt that 
'circumventive innovation' would be a better term to describe those 
innovations that are in response to rising compliance costs, and to 
reinforce the distinction between circumventive and adversity 
innovations. The essential difference is that in adversity innovations, 
a firm seeks to restore its former utility by removing or modifying 
any of its constraints whereas in the case of circumventive 
innovation, the firm seeks to do away with compliance costs by 
circumventing existing constraints. Such a distinction is implicit in 
the study carried out by Ben-Horim and Silber (1977) who carry 
out two separate tests to investigate whether or not adversity 
innovations have an equal say in the process of financial innovation 
as circumventive innovations do. 
The hypothesis of constraint-induced innovation was formally 
examined empirically in Ben-Horim and Silber (1977) who 
investigated the proposition that commercial banks sought to innovate 
in response to changing constraints. This proposition was 
investigated with the aid of a linear programming model which 
consisted of thirteen variables, a profit function, and eighteen 
constraints. It was assumed that commercial banks maximise their 
utility subject at least to a balance sheet identity constraint as well 
as various constraints. Ben-Horim and Silber state that '[t]he 
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assumption is that banks are profit maximizers. While utility 
maximization would have been more realistic, for our purposes this 
seemed to be an unnecessary complication.' (1977, p.282) Further 
to the criticism of Podolski's comment above, it is clear that the 
authors of the linear programming study on financial innovation 
regarded utility maximisation as more realistic, but to implement this 
model empirically would make the model unnecessarily compHcated. 
Using historic data for the period 1952-72, the model was 
solved period by period and the various shadow prices of the 
constraints were derived as a by-product of optimisation. The 
hypothesis was that the time series of the shadow prices should rise 
prior to the introduction of financial innovations, signifying a rising 
cost of adhering to existing constraints, and then drop after the 
innovation. Table 2.2. shows a time-series of approximate shadow 
prices for deposits for the period 1953-71: these figures were 
derived from one of the time-series plots in Ben-Horim and Silber 
(1977). The figures do reveal an interesting pattern. Further to 
the discussion of the introducfion of CDs in sub-section 2.1.2. 
above, in the years up to 1963, prior to the introduction of the 
negotiable certificate of deposit, the shadow prices exhibited a quite 
marked increase, and then fell quite sharply thereafter. However, 
with respect to the development of an Eurodollar market as a 
means whereby the commercial banks could circumvent the existing 
regulations by conducting their transactions overseas, there was only 
a slight increase in the shadow prices. Furthermore, with regard to 
the introduction of repurchase agreements into the banking system 
towards the end of the 1960s, the increase in the shadow prices is 
certainly most marked. On the basis of the evidence just presented. 
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TABLE 2. 2: Time-seri es of shadow prices for deposits for 
the First National City Bank for the period 
1953-71. 
Shadow prices for 
Year 
Demand 
deposits 
Time 
deposits 
Certificates of 
deposit 
1953 - 0 . 15 0. 45 -0 . 40 
1954 0. 10 0. 40 -0 . 15 
1955 0. 30 0. 85 0. 15 
1956 1. 00 1. 60 0. 60 
1957 1. 35 2. 00 1. 20 
1958 1. 60 2. 00 1. 40 
1959 1. 60 1. 90 1. 45 
1960 1. 35 1. 55 1. 05 
1961 1. 25 1. 30 1. 40 
1962 1. 10 0. 95 1. 50 
1963 1. 20 1. 00 1. 40 
1964 1. 10 0. 15 0. 65 
1965 1. 30 0. 05 0. 30 
1966 1. 40 0. 10 0. 35 
1967 1. 70 0. 55 0. 85 
1968 2. 15 1. 15 1. 55 
1969 2. 55 1. 55 1. 95 
1970 2. 05 1. 40 1. 60 
1971 1. 35 0. 95 1. 15 
Source: Ben-Horim and S i l b e r ( 1977), p. 288, f i g u r e l a . 
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it is highly suggestive that the linear programming model was quite 
capable of identifying the pressures to innovate as exemplified by 
rising shadow prices of constraints that have changed, and seems to 
lend some support to the constraint-induced innovation hypothesis. 
In an effort to evaluate the extent to which 'adversity' 
contributed to innovations by New York City commercial banks, 
Ben-Horim and Silber assumed that a fully specified bank utiHty 
function includes stockholders' wealth as a major argument, and that 
stockholders form their opinion of the value of the bank's stock 
based on the bank's profit, growth, 'soundness' and so on. The 
behaviour of bank stock prices can then be regarded as a reflection 
of investor evaluation of bank utility (1977, p.292). Thus, they 
take a look at the relationship between price-earnings and 
price-dividend ratios of commercial banks and industrials which is 
documented in Table 2.3. The data does suggest that the 
commercial banks have suffered relative to industrials in investor 
valuations of the banks' management. Therefore, Ben-Horim and 
Silber argue that '[tjhis seems to qualify as as an adverse experience 
and helps explain the CD innovation.' This seems to be clear from 
Table 2.3. since the relative ratio of price-earnings ratios has 
declined down to 0.69 by 1960, and then increased quite abruptly 
thereafter. However, such an approach should not be construed as 
a definitive test on the extent to which adversity explains 
innovations by financial firms. Much more empirical work would 
be needed to examine this aspect even further. 
Unfortunately, such an approach for trying to identify those 
times when there is some pressure on financial firms to innovate 
cannot really be utilised by the monetary authorities for monetary 
51 
TABLE 2. 3: Price-earnings ratio and price-dividend ratio 
of large New York City banks and Moody' s 
industrials, and their relationship for the 
period 1952-72. 
NYC banks Industrials Relative ratios 
Year PIE PID PIE PID PIE PID 
1952 13. , 10 22. 73 10. 53 18. 02 1. 24 1. , 26 
1953 12. 90 22. 47 9. 86 18. 83 1. 31 1. 19 
1954 13. 35 22. 27 11. 43 21. 46 1. 17 1. 04 
1955 14. 93 24. 70 12. 43 25. 45 1. 20 0. 97 
1956 13. 13 23. 04 14. 44 25. 71 0. 91 0. 90 
1957 12. 01 21. 10 13. 99 24. 33 0. 86 0. 87 
1958 13. 31 22. 42 18. 03 26. 04 0. 74 0. 86 
1959 14. 25 26. 95 18. 91 32. 05 0. 75 0. 84 
1960 12. 43 25. 58 18. 00 28. 74 0. 69 0. 89 
1961 16. 77 31. 45 20. 80 32. 89 0. 81 0. 96 
1962 16. 29 30. 21 17. 11 29. 50 0. 95 1. 02 
1963 17. 29 21. 75 17. 55 31. 25 0. 99 1. 02 
1964 16. 95 33. 67 18. 01 33. 56 0. 94 1. 00 
1965 15. 00 25. 45 17. 31 33. 56 0. 87 0. 76 
1966 11. 76 24. 75 15. 90 29. 07 0. 74 0. 85 
1967 11. 93 25. 84 18. 40 32. 15 0. 65 0. 80 
1968 13. 24 29. 41 17. 97 31. 85 0. 74 0. 92 
1969 13. 03 26. 88 17. 86 31. 85 0. 73 0. 84 
1970 11. 38 24. 81 17. 70 27. 72 0. 64 0. 89 
1971 11. 52 24. 15 18. 17 33. 56 0. 63 0. 72 
1972 13. 62 29. 85 17. 87 37. 74 0. 76 0. 79 
Source: Ben-•Horim and S i l b e r (1977), P- 293, Table 4. 
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control purposes because of the enormous amount of detailed data 
that would be required - such reporting procedures, if ever at all 
implemented, would impose great costs on the financial institutions 
concerned. Whilst this study is a breakthrough in the analysis of 
financial innovations, its usefulness to the monetary authorities is 
limited, and certainly cannot predict when new markets, new 
institutions, and new monetary standards will be set up. 
2.2.3. The regulatory dialectic framework 
Kane (1977,1981,1983,1984) envisages an economic-political 
cycle in which the interests of regulators are in direct conflict with 
those of the regulatees. This is discussed within the 'regulatory 
dialectic' framework. 
Initially, one could envisage a Walrasian-type economy 
consisting of many markets. It is assumed that only economic 
forces alone determine the final outcome known as the general 
equilibrium solution. The tatonnement process is often used to 
explain how the Walrasian auctioneer guides all the markets towards 
a set of equilibrium prices in which all markets clear. A new 
variation of the Walrasian system is then introduced by Kane (1977) 
in which a 'political market' is added. A political market exists 
because politicians demand votes and supply regulation services in 
response to the electorate who supply the votes, and demand 
regulation services in those markets that they feel most 
disadvantaged! Kane explains in the following words how the 
existence of a political market affects the final outcome of the 
Walrasian economic system: 
'Modern economics takes the Walrasian multiple-market 
auctioneer as its paradigmatic representation of the 
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contemporary market economy. ...a supplementary 
"political" market for regulation services opens up for 
business as soon as the Walrasian auctioneer finishes his 
work. Transactions in this political market disturb the 
general economic equilibrium and force the auctioneer 
back into action again. Continuing interplay between the 
political and economic markets produces broadly 
predictable cycles in which controls are set, markets 
adapt, and controls are re-designed and set for yet 
another round.' Kane (1977, pp.67-68) 
The regulatory dialectic concept embodies an interpretative vision of 
cyclical interaction between economic and political pressures in 
regulated markets which is ever-continuing. Political processes of 
regulation and economic processes of regulatee avoidance are 
continually working against each other to determine the final 
outcome. 
Exactly, what makes regulated firms respond more quickly to 
changes in the economic environment than regulatory agencies? 
This question may be best answered by considering the objectives of 
firms and government agencies. Both do have pre-conceived goals 
which they seek to achieve. Firms usually seek to fulf i l l a variety 
of objectives, viz: profit maximisation, market-share, and long-term 
survival. Government departments usually have the objective of 
maximising their budget, and their influence over the general 
decision-making process. The difference between these objectives 
makes the firm generally more alert to changes in the economic 
environment, and the firm is likely to have a highly- rationalised 
structure in which information flows more easily than in a 
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bureaucratic structure. Firms are then able to evaluate the situation 
as soon as it occurs, and make decisions on what to do. The 
marginal cost - marginal benefit principle is a useful tool to apply 
in deciding if any avoidance action against the regulations wiU be 
profitable. Generally, the more burdensome the regulations are, the 
greater incentive there is to take avoidance action. In contrast, 
government departments are slow to perceive the latest changes in 
the environment because of their complex bureaucratic structure 
which hinders the free flow of information. The previous discussion 
on the diffusion of financial innovations is particularly relevant here. 
When the original financial innovation occurs, it will be on a small 
scale so that it is likely to escape the notice of the regulatory 
authorities. It is only until wide diffusion has taken place that the 
regulatory authorities become aware of the new financial innovation 
and its economic significance. Thus there is an asymmetry in 
information, which leads to a greater efficiency of adaptability for 
firms than government departments. 
Responses to changes in the environment are usually lagged. 
Two kinds of lags are distinguished by Kane (1981, p.358). The 
first lag is called the innovative lag and it defines the time taken 
by all regulatees, on average, to respond to new regulations by 
devising avoidance schemes in the form of innovations. The other 
lag, the regulatory lag, defines the time taken for the government 
agencies concerned to perceive a change in the environment and to 
contemplate the new unexpected problems posed by the new 
innovations, and to decide on what action (if any) to take. Due to 
differences in the efficiency of adaptability, these lags can differ in 
length. Generally, as innovative activity speeds up, the government 
55 
agencies are gradually overwhelmed so that the innovation lags get 
shorter, and the regulatory lags lengthen considerably. Thus, the 
differential between these two lags is often important enough in 
explaining the acceleration of financial change in recent times. 
It would indeed be possible to shed some more light on the 
process of financial innovation by dividing the two lags mentioned 
above into further 'sub-lags'. Kane (1983, p.98) seems to have 
divided the innovative lag into two sub-lags, viz: the average lag in 
innovation by less-regulated institutions behind changes in 
technological and market opportunities, and the average lag in 
innovation by fully-regulated institutions behind their less-regulated 
competitors. Kane attributes the first sub-lag, which will be called 
the innovative sub-lag, to project evaluation and gestation. Kane 
seems to suggest that only the less-regulated institutions are capable 
of innovating in response to exogenous developments such as 
technological and market opportunities, and that the fuUy-regulated 
institutions are incapable of doing so. However, there may be some 
instances in which exogenous developments may present the 
fully-regulated institutions with further economically-feasible 
opportunities so that they are induced to innovate. As long as the 
innovation does not Ue within the scope of existing regulations, then 
an innovative sub-lag would be observed. Thus the innovative 
sub-lag will be taken to refer to the average lag in innovation by 
all institutions behind exogenous developments. 
The second sub-lag is attributed by Kane to resistance by 
fully-regulated insfitutions to change. But, this is not the sole 
reason why fully-regulated institutions may lag behind their 
less-regulated competitors in innovative activity. As will be shown 
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in the following section on the UK's experience of financial 
innovation, the Lx)ndon clearing banks could not compete 
effectively with the unregulated secondary banks in the late 1960s 
because the clearing banks were seriously handicapped by existing 
conventions and regulations which were a feature of their cartel. In 
order to overcome this handicap, the clearing banks set up their 
own subsidiaries so that they could compete more effectively with 
the secondary banks. Such a reaction could be termed the 
catch-up sub-lag because the clearing banks had to do two things: 
first, to overcome their resistance to change, and second, to devise 
avoidance schemes in order to circumvent the existing conventions 
and regulations before they could compete with the secondary banks. 
This catch-up sub-lag may be essentially composed of two sub-lags: 
the resistance sub-lag, and the avoidance sub-lag. The resistance 
sub-lag concerns the average time taken by cartelised or 
fully-regulated institutions to overcome their resistance to change, 
and the avoidance sub-lag concerns the average time taken by any 
(i.e. both fu l ly- and less-regulated) insfitufions to devise avoidance 
schema in order to circumvent the existing conventions or 
regulations. 
As already argued by Kane (1983) the whole process of 
financial innovation may become more comprehensible if it is 
considered in terms of the various lags discussed above. Thus, by 
dividing Kane's originally defined lags into sub-lags, the process of 
financial innovation can be made even more comprehensible. This 
is particularly true if the diffusion of financial innovations is 
considered. The rate of diffusion of a financial innovation can be 
determined by both the resistance and avoidance sub-lags. That is, 
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the rate of diffusion may be lower, the longer are the resistance 
and avoidance sub-lags, and the converse also holds. 
The division by Kane (1983) of the innovative lag into two 
sub-lags could be carried over into the regulatory lag. It is 
proposed here to divide the regulatory lag into two sub-lags, viz: 
recognition and re-regulation sub-lags. The recognition sub-lag 
serves as a useful means of emphasising the importance of the 
diffusion of financial innovations. As pointed out earlier, financial 
innovations may occur on a small scale so that they may escape the 
notice of the regulatory authorities (or may even appear to be 
insignificant and of no consequence). A financial innovation is said 
to be recognised by the regulatory authorities when the economic 
significance of the innovation has been perceived. Then there is a 
further sub-lag in which the authorities contemplate the problems 
posed by the financial innovation, and they may decide on what 
action to take. It is important to recognise that 're-regulation' does 
not necessarily mean that additional regulations will be introduced. 
Rather, it is intended here that the term should be a generic one, 
namely that it wil l embody several possible courses of action, viz: 
de-regulation, no action, and further regulation. It should be made 
clear here that the re-regulation sub-lag should not be confused 
with the definition of the re-regulation lag given by Kane (1984, 
p.6) since the latter includes the recognition sub-lag. 
The process of financial innovation, as embodied within the 
regulatory dialectic framework, is shown schematically in figure 2.1. 
There are many ways of interpreting the diagram. If the diagram is 
interpreted along the lines of the discussion in Kane (1983), 
exogenous developments such as technological changes induce 
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FIGURE 2 . 1 : A schematic representation of the process of 
financial innovation within the regulatory 
dialectic framework. 
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less-regulated institutions to innovate, and the time taken for this 
innovation to be evaluated may be represented by the innovative 
sub-lag from 'exogenous developments' to 'innovation by un- or 
less-regulated institutions'. In order for the fully-regulated 
institutions to compete effectively against their less-regulated 
counterparts, they need to overcome their resistance to change, and 
then devise avoidance schemes which are designed to circumvent the 
existing conventions and regulations preventing the fully-regulated 
institutions from taking advantage of the innovation. This would be 
shown as a catch-up sub-lag from 'innovation by un- or 
less-regulated institutions' to 'innovation by fully-regulated 
institutions'. Since the innovation takes time to be recognised by 
the regulatory authorities, there are recognition sub-lags involved. 
Once the innovation has been recognised, the regulatory authorities 
will contemplate the problems posed by the innovation, and this is 
shown as a re-regulation sub-lag. If they decide to introduce 
further regulations, this may prompt further innovation as shown by 
the avoidance sub-lags, and the process known as the regulatory 
dialectic is initiated, and may repeat itself again. If the authorities 
decide to take no action at all , or to pursue a course of 
de-regulation, then there will be no avoidance lags as there are no 
new regulations to be circumvented - hence the reason for the 
broken lines showing the relevant avoidance lags. In such an 
outcome, the regulatory dialectic process may not repeat itself, 
unless there are further innovation-inducing developments. 
However, if exogenous developments induce an innovafion 
that lies well outside the regulatory net, then the ful ly- and 
less-regulated institutions are both able to innovate in response to 
60 
exogenous developments. Since both types of institutions innovate 
simultaneously, there is no catch-up sub-lag involved. However, 
the recognition and re-regulation sub-lags still exist as it takes time 
for the regulatory authorities to recognise the occurrence of an 
innovation, and they must decide on what (if any) action to take. 
Over time, one can observe some periods in which new 
regulations are introduced, and some periods of de-regulation. This 
leads to a distinction between two different types of innovation 
which are dependent on the prevailing regulatory climate. During 
periods of regulation, regulated firms become burdened with the new 
regulations in the form of compliance costs. 2 1 This leads them to 
examine ways of circumventing the new regulations by diversifying 
out in their product lines or services. This type of innovation is 
regarded by Kane (1981, p.358) as increasing the productivity in 
regulatory avoidance. In times of de-regulation, there may a 
tendency for competitive pressures to intensify (say, a squeeze on 
profit margins) so that there is an incentive for the firm to provide 
products and services at lower costs. This leads to the second type 
of innovation which is seen to increase technical productivity. A 
good example of this form of innovation is the growing provision of 
money transmission services by electronic means. In general, the 
increasing use of technological advances in communications, and 
computers opens up a whole new range of economically feasible 
options for the firm. 
Finally, it may be argued that the two hypotheses just 
discussed above should be regarded as complementary theories of 
financial innovation, rather than as competing theories. In the 
regulatory dialectic framework, it was suggested that financial 
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innovation occurred in response to regulatory and other external 
constraints, and this invariably re-echoes the hypothesis put forward 
by Silber (1983), although Kane (1983) either was not aware of 
Silber's contribution, or did not explicitly acknowledge it . Even 
during periods of de-regulation, there may still be some constraints 
(such as market forces) that will encourage financial firms to 
innovate. But, it can be argued that Kane's regulatory dialectic 
framework goes much further than Silber's constraint-induced 
innovation hypothesis since the latter is specifically concerned with 
the inducement to innovation, whereas the regulatory dialectic 
approach may be concerned both with the inducement to innovation 
and its diffusion. 
2.2.4. A hybrid theory of financial innovation 
The regulatory dialectic approach to financial innovation has 
been subject to some criticism on the grounds that it is a far too 
narrow explanation of the financial innovation process. This is 
especially true of Silber (1975, p.64) who believes that regulation-
induced financial innovation is just a subset of his more generel 
constraint-induced innovation hypothesis. Still, it must be argued 
here that the constraint-induced innovation hypothesis is still too 
narrow to explain the ful l process of financial innovation. It is 
rather doubtful if a single theory could be formulated to explain all 
aspects of financial innovation. In order to take into account the 
various complex interrelationships involved, a hybrid theory of 
financial innovation is put forward here which is a combination of 
all the previous hypotheses discussed in this section. Such a theory 
will take into account the link between the real and financial 
sectors of the economy, the changing constraints that induce 
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innovation, and the lags involved which explain the rate of diffusion 
of innovations. 
It is difficult to say precisely where the process of financial 
innovation began, but it will be assumed for the sake of argument 
that in the very long run, there are additions to the stock of 
knowledge which may then induce technological innovation in the 
real sector. It has been noted by Schumpeter (see sub-section 
2.2.1. above) that innovations are financed by credit-creation rather 
than by savings. Credit creation may tupically take the form of the 
creation of new means of payment which may then finance further 
expansion in the real sector; this is a point which Silber (1975, 
p.54) acknowledged. Thus, the hybrid theory proposes that financial 
innovations facilitate further expansion in the real sector which may 
then induce more demand for credit-creation in the very long run. 
The authorities may seek to keep the rate of expansion in the 
economy at a respectable pace, that is, to minimise deviations from 
the target growth rate. It has been argued by Sylla (1982, p.25) 
that the modern phenomena of regulation-induced financial 
innovation is a means whereby economic expansion could be 
accelerated by financial institutions that circumvented government 
regulations and restrictive monetary arrangements. K figure 2.1. 
above is re-considered, it will be seen that the real sector of the 
economy has been 'exogenised' in order to isolate the regulatory 
dialectic approach to financial innovation from the Schumpeterian 
approach. The hybrid theory 'endogenises' the real sector so that 
the complete model may be closed off. Figure 2.2. below shows 
the modified version of figure 2.1. in which the real sector is now 
explicitly included. Changes in the real sector may either be 
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FIGURE 2.2: A schematic representat ion of the process of 
financial innovat ion under the hybrid theory 
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attributable to exogenous developments such as advances in technical 
knowledge and population growth, or to 'credit-creation' in the 
financial sector as shown in figure 2.2. In the latter case, this is 
shown by what may be tentatively termed as 'feedback lags' from 
innovations by unregulated or regulated institutions to changes in the 
real sector. As Schumpeter has already emphasised, it is very 
important not to lose sight of the fundamental link between credit 
creation and change in the real sector, so the hybrid theory serves 
as a useful means in which such a link can be kept in sight in the 
very long run. 
One particularly novel feature of the model outUned in 
figure 2.2. is that the regulatory dialectic does not necessarily have 
to come into effect every time an innovation occurs. For instance, 
changes in the real sector may induce financial innovation which 
may then feed back directly into the real sector. Or, financial 
innovations may go through the regulatory dialectic framework, and 
then feed back into the real sector as a consequence of avoidance 
action. 
Among the possible topics for future research, one could 
investigate the possibility that government regulations also affect the 
real sector as well as the financial sector which would be an 
extension of the regulatory dialectic fromework, namely that 
regulations may have an effect on changes in the real sector which 
in turn may affect the propensity to innovate in the financial sector. 
The preceding paragraphs have tried to explain how financial 
innovation may occur, and at an accelerating rate. To shed more 
light on the various hypotheses, the UK experience over the last 
three decades will now be discussed with reference to monetary 
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control. 
2.3. The UK experience of financial innovation and monetary 
control 
The task of surveying financial innovations that have taken 
place is not an easy one because regulatory forces are not just the 
only forces that induce financial innovation. There are also other 
interrelated factors that are just as important in explaining the 
process of financial innovation. Amongst such factors are those 
relating to high and volatile rates of inflation and, therefore, interest 
rates, and technological advances which all do have important 
imphcations for the relative efficacy of monetary policy. Thus, the 
strategy adopted here is not to consider the regulatory dialectic 
approach to financial innovation in isolation. Rather, it will be 
considered in conjunction with other interrelated factors. 
2.3.1. The development of the financial sector during the 1960s 
(a) The scenario. The 1960s saw the beginning of a radical change 
in the UK money markets and the way the banks went about their 
business. At the beginning of the decade, the UK monetary scene 
was dominated by the clearing banks which operated exclusively 
through their branch networks in a way which had changed little 
since the beginning of the century. They supplied 95 per cent of 
the sterling deposits held by UK residents, as Table 2.4. shows. 
Most of these deposits were still on current account, interest rates 
on other deposits being linked via the 'Bank Rate' cartel 
arrangement to the Bank of England's rediscount rate. So, banks 
could only compete for deposits through non-price means; by 
expanding the size of their branch networks, for example. These 
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deposits were supported by bank holdings of cash and liquid assets. 
Treasury and commercial bills, and call money with the discount 
market, which were held to ratios set by the Bank of England. 
There were well-developed secondary markets in Treasury and 
commercial bills, bank liquidity being ultimately supported by the 
Bank's operations in these markets and the rediscount facility open 
to discount houses. Imbalances between different banks were 
reflected largely in the position with the discount market rather than 
through inter-bank transactions, and accounts were settled through 
the Bank of England. Markets in other short-term instruments were 
still in their infancy. The building societies were collectively small 
in relation to the clearing banks; according to available figures, in 
1955, these building societies numbered nearly 800 of which the top 
five societies accounted for 40 per cent of the total assets of the 
building society movement, and the top twenty societies accounted 
for 65 per cent (Bank of England, 1983, pp.368-369). Their 
activities were very narrowly defined by the then existing regulations 
which only permitted them to take deposits exclusively from the 
personal sector, and to make advances exclusively to finance 
owner-occupation of houses (i.e. mortgages). 
(b) Innovation-inducing developments. The scenario sketched out 
above had dramatically changed by the end of the decade. As 
Table 2.4. makes abundantly clear, the clearing banks had lost out 
significantly to the non-clearers, especially to the subsidiaries of 
American and other overseas banks in London. This reflected the 
fact that whilst entry into the cartel was in practical terms hardly 
possible, entering into competition with it was relatively simple. No 
licence or other supervisory requirement governed the taking of 
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deposits from the public by institutions outside the cartel. After the 
relaxation of foreign exchange restrictions in the late 1950s, these 
institutions had initially developed alongside the London markets in 
dollar deposits - the Eurodollar market - but had then found it 
profitable to take on business in sterling. These banks acted on a 
wholesale basis in the euromarkets, taking in large denomination 
deposits for a fixed period of time and lending them on in a 
similarly structured way, and the growth in foreign currency deposits 
as a proportion of total deposits is clearly shown in Table 2.5. In 
contrast to the retail banks, these institutions maintained the viability 
of their balance sheets by matching the maturity of their habihties 
to that of their assets rather than by holding balances of liquid 
assets. 
The overseas banks brought these techniques with them when 
they moved into their sterling habitat. They proved quite suited to 
this environment. Together with indigenous secondary banks such 
as the accepting houses, they helped establish the sterling inter-bank 
market during the 1960s, and in 1967, they were among the first 
institutions to issue sterling certificates of deposit (CDs). Together 
with the discount houses, they developed an active secondary market 
in CDs. This innovation allowed the issuing banks to take in 
money at a fixed interest rate and maturity (typically three months) 
whilst giving the holder the option of hquidating his deposit at any 
time by selling on to a third party. If the issuers of CDs took the 
view that interest rates were to rise, it encouraged them to issue 
CDs of longer fixed maturities so that they expected to deploy the 
funds provided by CDs profitably by taking advantage of arbitrage 
opportunities in the money markets. 
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Meanwhile, an active wholesale market in local authority 
deposits had grown up. These were held by banks initially, but 
non-bank holdings grew rapidly, avoiding the need for bank 
intermediation. These markets grew up alongside the established 
markets in Treasury and commercial bills and call money with the 
discount market, and for this reason, such markets are known as 
'parallel' markets.22 Table 2.6. documents the growth of the 
parallel markets during the pre-CCC years as well as their size 
relative to existing markets. 2 3 
The loss of market share experienced by the clearing banks 
over this period reflected the Radcliffe proposition that the main 
effect of controlling any set of financial institutions such as the 
clearing banks would be to cause their business to be lost to 
competitors. The clearing banks were clearly handicapped by the 
special-deposit and liquid-asset conventions which they obeyed. Yet 
the major handicap seems to have been the Bank-rate cartel 
arrangements which ruled out the issue of wholesale deposits. 
Under these arrangements, they could only take in 7-day deposits at 
interest rates linked to the Bank of England's rediscount or Bank 
Rate. They were, however, able to set up subsidiaries which 
operated outside these arrangements, and by the early 1970s, most 
of the major London clearing banks had done this. This illustrates 
the 'catch-up sub-lag' discussed in the previous section: initially the 
clearing banks were reluctant to compete with the non-clearing 
banks by making use of the new money markets because of their 
resistance to change (the resistance sub-lag) 2 ^ and then when their 
share of total deposits declined, it encouraged the clearing banks to 
take action by setting up their own subsidiaries which was a way of 
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operating outside the cartel arrangements (the avoidance sub-lag). 
Credit control by the Bank of England during the years up 
to 1971 rested mainly on two weapons, viz: liquidity controls, and 
quantitative and qualitative controls. The special deposits scheme 
was introduced during 1960 in order to control the volume of 
lending. 2 5 The main idea of the special deposits scheme was to 
mop up any excess liquidity by calling in special deposits which 
yielded a rate of interest, but were not included in the liquidity 
reserve ratio; in effect, it operated rather like a variable reserve 
ratio, so that the volume of lending could be controlled. The 
special deposits scheme was largely ineffective because the clearing 
banks found a way of circumventing it by disposing of government 
gilts to bring in more liquidity. Thus, the Bank of England 
resorted to direct quantitative controls which took the form of 
formal requests to the clearing banks to curb their lending. 
However, at this point, the Bank of England had not fully 
appreciated the ful l importance of the non-clearing banks and the 
new money m a r k e t s . i n response to a higher volume of lending, 
the Bank cast its regulatory net wider to include the non-clearing 
banks in 1965 by asking them to limit their lending. It was not 
until 1967 that the Bank was very concerned about the rapid growth 
in the non-clearing banks so that it wished to overhaul the existing 
system of ad hoc requests for lending to be curbed in favour of a 
more comprehensive system. (Grady and Weale, 1986, pp.48-51) 
This illustrates the operation of the recognition sub-lag in the 
regulatory dialectic framework: at this point the Bank became more 
or less fully aware of the economic significance of the non-clearing 
banks and the new money markets, and therefore wished to 
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re-regulate. However, at the end of the 1960s, there was a shift 
in banking, intellectual, and political opinion away from regulation 
towards a more competitive banking system in which the allocation 
of credit would become more efficient. In order to design new 
regulations, there followed a period of drastic de-regulation. In 
anticipation of the dismantlement of lending ceilings and other 
restrictions, there was a boom in merger activity in the banking 
sector. By the end of 1969,the number of clearing banks had been 
substantially reduced in anticipation of a more competitive banking 
envirorunent. 
2.3.2. The problem of liability management 
(a) The initial arrangements of CCC. The Bank of England's 
initial proposals for Competition and Credit Control (CCC) were 
published in May 1971. The underlying principle was that the 
Bank would act upon the banks' sterling deposit base rather than by 
directly guiding their lending to the private sector. In order to 
provide a 'firm base' for this policy, the banks were to observe a 
minimum reserve asset-ratio. In addition, they would place special 
deposits with the Bank when these were called for. This policy 
implied a greater reliance upon changes in interest rates as a way 
of controlling private sector lending and in order to facilitate such 
changes the Bank's tactical support of the gilt-edged market was to 
be limited. The idea was that this policy would be more flexible 
than the previous one, putting all banks on a common basis and 
allowing them to compete freely. In order to make way for this, 
the clearing banks agreed to abandon the bank rate cartel 
agreement. 
The operational arrangements were agreed with the banks 
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over the summer months, and in September 1971, the new 
arrangements took effect, ushering in a new era of competitive 
banking. The precise details were as follows (Bank of England, 
1971b, 1982). Basically, the banks were to maintain a minimum of 
12.5 per cent of their 'eligible liabilities' in the form of 'eligible 
reserve assets'. The definition of eligible liabilities encompassed the 
following items (Bank of England, 1982, p.76): 
(i) A l l sterling deposits of an original maturity of two years 
or under, from UK residents (other than banks) and from 
overseas residents (other than overseas offices), 
(ii) A l l sterling deposits, of whatever term, from the UK 
banking sector net of sterling claims (including 
non-reserve asset lending to listed discount market 
institutions). 
(iii) A l l sterling CDs issued, of whatever term, less any 
holdings of such certificates, 
(iv) The bank's net deposit liability, if any, in sterling to its 
overseas offices, 
(v) The net liability in currencies other than sterling, 
(vi) A reduction equivalent to 60 per cent of the net value 
of items in transit, 
and the eligible reserve assets included 
(i) Balances held at the Bank of England (other than special 
or supplementary deposits), 
(ii) Treasury Bills, 
(iii) Secured money at call with the London money market, 
(iv) Govermnent stocks with one year or less to maturity, 
(v) Local Authority bills eligible for rediscount at the Bank 
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of England. 
(vi) Commercial bills eligible for rediscount at the Bank of 
England up to 2 per cent of eligible liabilities. 
Clearing bank holdings of notes and coin were not eligible reserve 
assets under these arrangements. 
It is useful to consider the control mechanism envisaged by 
the authorities because it serves as a useful yardstick in measuring 
the circumventive powers of the banking sector in frustrating the 
initial CCC arrangements. An invaluable insight into the way the 
authorities expected these arrangements to work in practice is 
provided by an address by the Governor to a conference of 
international bankers: 
'It is not expected that the mechanism of the minimum 
asset ratio and Special Deposits can be used to achieve 
some precise multiple contraction or expansion of bank 
assets. Rather the intention is to use our control over 
liquidity, which these instruments will reinforce, to 
influence the structure of interest rates. The resulting 
changes in relative rates of return will then induce shifts 
in the asset portfolios of both the public and the banks . 
Of course, we do not envisage that there can be a nicely 
calculated relationship between the size of calls for 
Special Deposits and the achievement of a desired 
objective. We expect rather to achieve our objectives 
through market mechanisms. Special Deposits can be 
used not only to mop up any abnormal excess liquidity, 
but also to oblige the banking system to seek to dispose 
of assets not eligible for the liquidity ratio, for example 
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gilt-edged stocks of over one year's maturity. By using 
Special Deposits in this way we shall be able to exert, 
when appropriate, upward pressure on interest rates -
not only rates in the inter-bank market, but also rates in 
the local authority market and yields on short-term 
gilt-edged stock.' (Bank of England, 1971a, p.197) 
The Bank saw liquidity as being influenced both directly by the 
supply of reserve assets (via public sector borrowing form the banks) 
and indirectly by calls for special deposits. The banks would then 
respond to this reserve-asset pressure by selling secondary reserve 
assets such as short-term gilts and local authority deposits, increasing 
yields in the associated market as well as in the inter-bank market. 
This in turn would put upward pressure on bank lending rates and 
presumably lead to a reduction in private borrowing. 
(b) The early operational experience. The CCC system began its 
existence facing pressures of a large and unknown magnitude in the 
form of the frustrated demand for credit hanging over from the 
previous regime. The scale of these pressures quickly revealed itself 
as bank lending to the previously restricted sectors accelerated, 
especially in the commercial property sector. 
Another factor put forward for the rapid increase in lending 
was that the minimum lending rate (MLR) initially failed to keep 
pace with the money market rates so opening up a differential 
between the rates of interest. This led to the phenomenon of 
'round-tripping' in which corporate treasurers were induced to draw 
on their overdrafts and lend on the proceeds in the money markets 
at a higher rate of interest,thus leading to profitable arbitrage. 2 ? 
The consequence of such developments was an explosive rate of 
77 
growth in broad monetary aggregates; for example between 1971 and 
1973, the M3 measure grew by 61.5 per cent. This was coupled 
with the 'reintermediation' process in which the major clearing 
banks aggressively sought to win back business lost to other banks 
during the pre-CCC years. 
Meanwhile, towards the end of 1973, there was a collapse in 
the commercial property market which led to a secondary banking 
crisis. This crisis came about mainly because of the secondary 
banks' innovative use of the money markets, and their failure to 
diversify out their asset portfolios which had a disproportionately 
large proportion in the form of advances to commercial property 
developers. Thus, when the first defaults came through from the 
property developers, it had a domino effect on the banking system 
because of the close interaction of the money markets. The crisis 
was prevented from spreading out further afield in the banking 
system by a rescue operation - known as the 'lifeboat' - organised 
by the Bank of England. In retrospect, hard lessons were to be 
learnt from this experience. As the Bank of England put i t , '[a] 
principal lesson of these years has been that any system of control 
sets a premium on avoidance and circumvention; and that prudential 
regulation is not immune from this rule.' (Bank of England, 1983, 
p.368), and the Bank resolved to review the prudential arrangements 
for the banking sector as a whole which culminated in the 1979 
Banking Act. 
In any event, by the end of 1973 the authorities had 
decided to retreat from the initial CCC arrangements in favour of a 
more restrictive regime by the introduction of the Supplementary 
Special Deposits (SSD) scheme because they were alarmed at the 
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rapid growth in monetary aggregates. This scheme, known as the 
'Corset', operated by requiring banks to make non-interest bearing 
deposits with the Bank if their interest-bearing eligible Uabilities 
(IBELs) grew at more than a specified rate. Such a deposit 
imposed a penalty on any bank who took in too much business, 
and thus tended to restrain periods of rapid monetary growth. 
Fundamentally, it was a measure designed to counteract the banks' 
excessive use of 'liability management* techniques in which they 
meet any demand for credit by bidding for funds from the money 
markets rather than directly adjusting lending at a given level of 
liabilities as in the old regime; this is now discussed further below. 
(c) The impact of liability management. The main reason for 
considering liability management at some length here is that this 
new technique in the financial firm does have some serious 
implications for the relative efficacy of monetary policy. It needs to 
be stressed straightaway that liability is not just an important 
financial innovation, but rather the term 'liability management' is 
used in a very broad sense to describe what Podolski (1986, p.158) 
calls a 'swarm' of innovations whose cumulative effect is to show a 
shift in financial management techniques, and it is when the 
diffusion of such techniques has become sufficiently widespread that 
the efficacy of monetary policy becomes threatened. 
It will be useful at this stage to contrast 'liability 
management' with its exact opposite 'asset management'. 
Traditionally, a bank would adjust the asset-side of its balance sheet 
in response to a change in the liability- side of the balance sheet. 
So, in effect, the lending policies of the traditional banking sector 
would have tended to be passive in the sense that the volume of 
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lending could only be expanded (contracted) i f , and only i f , the 
volume of their liabilities (say, deposits) increased (decreased). 
However, it is the usual practice of banks nowadays to meet any 
demand for credit by adjusting the volume of their liabilities. 
Thus, the banks may respond to an increase in the demand for 
credit by bidding for deposits by offering, for example, attractive 
interest rates or enhanced withdrawal facilities. It may be noted 
that the scope for liability management would have been extremely 
limited for the major clearing banks during the 1960s owing to the 
restrictions imposed on price-competition by the Bank rate cartel. 
This is not to say that liability management would have been totally 
impossible, rather it would have been theoretically possible because 
the clearing banks would have been capable of competing for 
deposits by non-price means, but during the 1960s, liabihty 
management techniques were still in their infancy, having just been 
introduced by the more aggressive non-clearing banks as previously 
mentioned. Wide diffusion of liability management techniques 
coincided with the beginning of a more competitive banking system. 
As previously argued, one of the factors responsible for the 
rapid growth in broad monetary aggregates was the celebrated 
'round-tripping' episode. To understand more fully the 
developments behind this episode, it is necessary to look in some 
detail at the role of liability management in the explosive rates of 
growth in monetary aggregates, and the efforts of the authorities to 
come to terms with the new techniques in financial management. 
Basically, the importance of the demand for credit in the 
determination of the overall size of the banks' balance sheets arises 
in part because of an observed asymmetry in the flexibility of 
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interest rates on each side of the banks' balance sheets. This 
asymmetry mainly stems from the fact that, as a part of the initial 
CCC arrangements, the Bank Rate was determined by administrative 
decision so entailing a bias towards delay in its adjustment. 2 a 
Now, lending by the banks was done at interest rates which were 
still linked in some way to the Bank rate, and in order to finance 
the upsurge in the demand for credit, the banks bid aggressively 
against each other for deposits (i.e. liability manage) in the money 
markets. Thus, interest rates in the money markets tended to be 
more flexible than lending rates, and, as the increase in the demand 
for credit gathered momentum, interest rates in the money markets 
were bid up so that there were several occasions on which the 
Bank rate lagged behind these rates. Thus, the differential between 
these rates opened up the scope for profitable arbitrage so leading 
to the 'round-tripping' episode. 
The authorities initially attempted to respond to this episode 
by taking two steps. The first step, taken in October 1972, was to 
rename the Bank rate as the Minimum Lending Rate (MLR) which 
was linked to the Treasury Bill rate by a formula.29 This was 
presumably to make the MLR more 'passive', that is, more 
responsive to market forces so as to reduce any bias towards delay. 
The second step was taken in December after the authorities 
considered that the liquidity position of the banks seemed to be 
excessive. They called in special deposits in order to mop up any 
surplus reserve assets so that by the end of 1973, the banks' reserve 
asset ratios (as a proportion of eligible liabilities) were close to their 
minimum of 12.5 per cent. However, this was largely circumvented 
by the banks through skillful use of liability management techniques. 
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It is important to consider carefully the definitions of 'ehgible 
liabilities' and 'eligible reserve assets'. As previously noted, the 
former consisted partly of money market deposits, and the latter 
consisted partly of Treasury Bills. In the traditional system, the 
response by the banks to pressures on their reserve asset ratios 
would be to 'asset manage' such that they may run down their 
liquidity positions, leading to upward pressure on interest rates in 
these associated assets. Since MLR was linked to the Treasury Bill 
rate, this would have meant a rise in MLR. This was the 
mechanism envisaged by the authorities to slow down the growth in 
the broad monetary aggregates. However, this did not turn out as 
expected. Instead, the banks responded by bidding for more 
deposits, driving up the rates of interest in the money markets, and 
because the emphasis was more on liability management than asset 
management, there was a tendency for the Treasury Bill rate to 
adjust more slowly. Thus, 'round-tripping' continued to flourish. 
(d) The Supplementary Special Deposits scheme. The SSD 
scheme was a response to the formidable problems of monetary 
control posed by liability management and round-tripping. Before 
the SSD scheme was initiated, the authorities considered possible 
alternatives. Amongst such alternatives, they considered the 
possibility of imposing interest rate ceilings like those imposed by 
Regulation Q in the USA. Such ceilings were not adopted 
because of the ease of substitution between various assets, and 
would, therefore, not be effective against liability management. 
Also, it was felt that such ceilings were too distortionary. In the 
SSD scheme, the size of the deposits required to be placed with 
the Bank of England varied progressively according to the excess 
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growth of IBELs. Until November 1974, banks had to make a 
deposit of 5 per cent of any excess up to 1 per cent of IBELs. A 
25 per cent deposit was required on an excess of between 1 and 3 
per cent while an excess over 3 per cent required a 50 per cent 
deposit. After November 1974, the boundaries were raised from 1 
to 3 per cent and 3 to 5 per cent but the scheme was otherwise 
unaltered. By the imposition of such penalties, the scheme forced 
the banks either to accept lower profits on additional lending, or 
else to widen the margins they quoted to customers. The cost of 
placing non-interest-bearing SSDs with the bank was considerably 
greater than the opportunity cost of acquiring reserve assets, 
particularly in the second and third penalty tranches, so the 
financial incentive to widen margins was greatly increased. Thus, 
the scheme was designed to counteract any form of profitable 
arbitrage, and to deter the banks' aggressiveness in their competition 
for deposits. 
The efficacy of the SSD scheme, as pointed out in the 
Bank's obituary notice on the scheme (1982, pp.81-83), is 
particularly difficult to assess because the imposition of the SSD 
scheme was usually announced as a part of a package of economic 
measures so that it is difficult to disentangle the various effects of 
each measure. However, one thing seems to have been made quite 
clear: the scheme may have been partly successful in retarding the 
growth of IBELs, the efficacy of the scheme was seriously 
undermined by circumvention and avoidance. To make an effective 
assessment of the efficacy of the scheme, it would be necessary to 
analyse in detail the changes in the structure of clearing banks' 
balance sheets occurring between the pre-CCC years and later years. 
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Unfortunately, the regular banking statistics collected at that time did 
not offer the kind of detailed information required for such an 
analysis, distinguishing only between sight deposits, CDs, and other 
time deposits. However, some useful data can be gleaned from a 
breakdown of deposits on an annual basis for the years 1971-76 
provided by the London clearing banks (LCBS) as part of their 
evidence to the Wilson Committee. This is summarised in Table 
2.7. which shows the strong contrast between the growth of the 
retail and wholesale elements of the LCBs' deposits during 1972 and 
1973. Retail deposits increased by about £2.3 bilhon (21 per cent) 
during these two years whilst wholesale deposits, including those 
taken in through the branch networks, grew by about £5.8 billion 
(by a factor of about 13.4). These figures are no doubt swollen 
artificially by the episode of 'round-tripping'. Most interesting of 
all, after 1974, it does seem that the aggressiveness of the banks in 
competing for wholesale deposits has been curbed by the imposition 
of the SSD scheme since wholesale deposits actually declined by 
about £1.4 billion by the end of the period 1973-75 which 
coincided with a number of calls for SSDs ^ ° but seem to have 
risen once 'the corset' was taken off during 1976. 
Although the SSD scheme may have retarded the growth of 
IBELs, there is thought to have been considerable disintermediation; 
the most important means was the 'bill leak' whereby banks 
accepted bills of large firms and marketed them with the same ease 
as certificates of deposit. This leak grew to £2,700 miUion in the 
first quarter of 1980 when IBELs were around £35,000 million. 
There will also have been other forms of disintermediation such as 
a market in trade bills which had not been accepted by any bank. 
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but these were unlikely to have been so important. The 
abolition of exchange controls in October 1979 allowed banks to 
book all excess deposits offshore; it is not clear how much was 
driven offshore but in any case freedom of capital movement made 
the SSD scheme unworkable and it was abolished in June 1980. 
Thus, to sum up so far, the SSD serves as a useful 
illustration of the regulatory dialectic approach to financial 
innovation. Liability management by the regulated financial 
institutions was, no doubt, important in frustrating the authorities' 
attempts at monetary control. The SSD scheme was a response by 
the authorities when traditional tools of monetary policy (i.e. reserve 
asset ratios, and special deposits) had failed. The growth in 
wholesale money markets, and even the internationalisation of the 
British banking system via the relaxation of exchange regulations, 
will have served to increase the circumventive powers of the 
financial institutions. 
(e) Implications for monetary control. The discussion on the 
problem of liability management will now be concluded with some 
comments on the possible effects of liability management on the 
efficacy of monetary policy. The general picture is that the advent 
of liability management in wholesale money markets has adversely 
affected the authorities' ability to control the size of the banks' 
balance sheets. In the ancien regime, where banks were subject to 
interest rate constraints imposed by the Bank rate cartel, the 
authorities could enforce a shift in relative interest rates by varying 
the general level of market rates. When the authorities wished to 
be more restrictive, it was comparatively easy to induce a relative 
shift in interest rates by raising the general level of market rates. 
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Since rates payable on retail deposits were more or less constrained, 
this could induce an outflow of funds from the banks into other 
assets whose rates had risen relative to deposit rates. The banks 
responded, under asset management, to such outflows by disposing 
of their surplus reserve assets whereas under liabihty management, 
banks could respond by compensatory rises in interest rates on 
wholesale deposits. Thus, under liability management, the 
authorities have found it much more difficult to influence relative 
interest rates. So, as argued by Goodhart (1984, pp.154-155), the 
demand for funds by the private sector is a key determinant of the 
response to a general interest rate movement of the whole financial 
sector, and with liability management, this response is increasingly 
sluggish. 
The main effect of a shift away from asset management 
towards liability management is to make the demand for money less 
interest-elastic. Thus, put figuratively in terms of the IS-LM 
framework, the LM locus becomes more vertical. In such a case, 
pursuit of monetary control may lead to considerable interest rate 
volatility, and the nominal level of interest rates may, therefore, not 
serve well as an instrument of monetary control. It has been 
suggested by Goodhart (1984, pp.154-155) that, in spite of the fact 
that the interest-elasticity of the demand for money has declined, 
the demand for money has become more sensitive to changes in 
interest rate differentials so that there may be substantial shifts of 
funds between the various monetary aggregates at a particular 
general level of interest rates. Thus, one could observe a change 
in relationships between narrow and broad monetary aggregates. 
According to Goodhart (1984, pp.155 and 156), prior to liability 
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management, there tended to be a positive correlation between the 
growth rates of M l and sterling M3, whereas under liability 
management, there either tended to be either no, or even, negative 
correlation. In particular, it was reported by Goodhart that, for 
annual rates of growth in the monetary aggregates, the correlation 
coefficient between M l and sterling M3 during the 1960s was 0.95 
whilst during the 1970s, it was - 0 . 3 9 . U n d e r asset management 
(i.e. during the 1960s), a rise in the general level of interest rates 
would tend to lead to a fall in both narrow and broad monetary 
aggregates (hence positive correlation between M l and sterling M3), 
but under liability management, as broad monetary aggregates began 
to contain more wholesale deposits bearing market-related interest 
rates, there would now be a tendency for broad monetary aggregates 
to increase whilst narrow monetary aggregates may decrease (hence 
negative correlation). On a theoretical note, the greater tendency 
for funds to be shifted between the various monetary aggregates 
would lead to a more unstable demand for money which then poses 
problems for the authorities in terms of greater uncertainty. 
The phase of further de-regulation during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s has tended to increase competitive pressure on the 
financial sector so that there may be some further scope for more 
aggressive liability management techniques. This would, of course, 
exacerbate the difficulties experienced by the authorities in 
controlling the monetary aggregates. A notable development worthy 
of special mention here is the clearing banks' entry into the 
mortgage market as lenders on a large scale in direct competition 
with the building societies. The banks were unable to enter the 
mortgage market earlier because of the restrictive supplementary 
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special deposits. The intensifying of competitive pressure brought 
about by the erosion of the clearing banks' retail deposit base by 
the building societies offering better withdrawal facilities at attractive 
interest rates finally forced the issue of de-regulation. Once 
released from all restrictions, the clearing banks were able to gain a 
substantial share of the mortgage market very rapidly. The building 
societies were often criticised for their varying mortgage queues 
amongst individual societies because of their cartel arrangements in 
setting a 'recommended rate'. Their first response was to resort to 
numerous if expensive ways of offering premia over the cartelised 
rate for ordinary shares, usually by shortening the required period 
and easing the notice conditions, and they were then able to 
eliminate the differential in rates for larger mortgages already offered 
by the clearing banks. By 1982, when nominal interest rates had 
fallen, the building societies were now able to maintain their 
mortgage rates at levels which the clearing banks found it difficult 
to match profitably. 
The implication of increased competition between the banks 
and building societies is to make the interpretation of changes in 
monetary aggregates even more difficult, and Goodhart (1984, p.157) 
states that the overshooting of sterling M3 in 1981 was partly due to 
the banks' entry in the mortgage market. But, if bank deposits and 
building society deposits have become such close substitutes, then 
according to monetary liability interpretations, sterling M3 would 
have been distorted by the switch in deposits from building societies 
into banks. Such a distortion led to the adoption by the authorities 
in 1982 of the PSL2 definition which is a broad measure of private 
sector liquidity encompassing building society deposits. Thus, it is 
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particularly important to interpret changes in monetary aggregates 
with special care, and not in a mechanical manner. This aspect 
will be discussed further in Chapter Four on monetary aggregates. 
2.3.3. Other financial innovations 
As previously mentioned, liability management is indeed an 
important innovation, but, more precisely, it is a swarm of 
innovations which all reflect a change in traditional management 
methods of financial institutions. The switch to variable-rate 
lending, as an innovatory response to the onset of high and volatile 
interest rates, certainly falls within the purview of liability 
management in the sense just mentioned. However, as noted in 
Section 2.1.1. above, the switch to variable-rate lending may not be 
readily labelled as a financial innovation per se, but it needs to be 
recognised that the trend towards variable-rate lending in the last 
decade or so has had some important implications for the efficacy 
of monetary control; indeed one would do well to consider it here. 
A further aspect is also provided by technological change whose 
main effects have been to reduce transactions costs generally, 
(a) Effects of switch to variable-rate lending. In order to 
understand the importance of high and volatile interest rates in 
promoting the switch to variable-rate lending, it is necessary to take 
a look at the concepts underlying interest-rate risk. One of the 
main functions of financial intermediaries is to hold liabiUties to 
the account of depositors and claims on borrowers in the maturities 
preferred by the customers. In general, the preferred maturity of 
depositors and borrowers do not match, so the maturities of 
liabilities and assets on the balance sheets of financial intermediaries 
differ, i.e. financial intermediaries undertake maturity transformation. 
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In the case of the banking institutions, the usual preference of 
depositors is for the holding of short-term claims, or deposits, on 
the banking institutions,while borrowers have a preference for loans 
on more extended terms. In the UK, a large proportion of bank 
lending is undertaken in overdraft form, which is nominally 
repayable on call by the banks, but in practice is outstanding for an 
indefinite period. 
Thus, banks, and other non-bank financial intermediaries 
(NBFIs), engage in maturity transformation. This involves the 
intermediaries in various kinds of risk, particularly interest-rate risk, 
if interest-rates on their assets/liabilities are fixed for the duration of 
the maturity. THis risk arises because, with their liabilities 
generally on a shorter-term basis than their assets, a rise in the 
general level of interest rates would force them to refinance lending, 
undertaken earlier at lower fixed rates, on the basis of funds 
obtained later at higher interest, thus enforcing a running loss. 
With assets loner than liabilities, and both undertaken on a fixed 
rate basis, any unforeseen rise in nominal interest rates would bring 
about an unexpected loss to the banks, while any unforeseen fall in 
interest rates wold lead to a windfall gain. So, generally, an 
interest-risk arises whenever there is a mismatch in the periodicity 
over which interest rates on assets and liabilities are fixed. This 
interest-rate risk is obviously greater when nominal interest rates 
become more volatile and unpredictable. The volatility of nominal 
interest rates may tend to rise along with any increase in the 
volatility of the inflation rate (c.f. the Fisher hypothesis in Chapter 
Five). Over the last decade or so, the volatility of nominal interest 
rates has increased, and this has had serious effects on those 
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institutions which have traditionally used fixed-rate lending. 
Responses by financial intermediaries to such volatility in 
interest rates may be protective. In order to obtain protection from 
interest-rate risks, it is necessary to adopt some form of 
variable-rate lending in which lending rates are not fixed but 
change over time in response to changes in market conditions. 
There are many ways in which interest rates on longer-term loans 
can be varied over time in response to such changing conditions. 
Firstly, the rate can ve varied by administrative decision, as in the 
case of the building societies. However, in some circumstances, 
interest rates that have been varied by administrative decision may 
not be wholly acceptable as there would almost certainly be some 
scope for exploitation of the borrower by lending financial 
intermediaries. So, in order to be more pragmatic, an alternative 
could be adopted in which nominal interest rates are related to the 
rate of inflation plus a margin to allow for a real rate of return. 
Whilst such a practice has been widely adopted in Latin American 
countries with phenomenally high rates of inflation, it has not been 
widely adopted here for reasons that are not yet clear. Instead, it 
does seem that there is a tendency for nominal interest rates to be 
more closely related to wholesale market rates, and such lending 
rates are adjusted periodically. 
Such a step, therefore, has tended to reduce the interest-rate 
risk to lenders in general. Now, with variable-rate lending and 
given that there is an asymmetry in the adjustment of interest rates 
on loans in relation to rates on deposits, a rise in interest rates 
may lead to the 'endowment effect' in which profits of financial 
intermediaries rise because interest rates on a proportion of deposits 
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(especially sight deposits) remain fixed whereas lending rates rise. 
The endowment effect, of course, is subject to erosion over time as 
fixed-interest deposits are switched in favour of higher-yielding 
assets. From the viewpoint of borrowers, the switch to 
variable-rate lending can have a mixed reception. If it turns out 
that the cash-flow of the borrowers (say, companies) are positively 
correlated with changes in nominal interest rates, then borrowers 
stand to benefit. I f , on the other hand, changes in cash-flows of 
borrowers are negatively correlated with changes in nominal interest 
rates, then it may very well turn out that the risks for borrowers 
have increased. Such a situation actually came about as a 
consequence of the worsening of economic conditions in the 1970s, 
viz: pressure on corporate earnings coupled with high nominal 
interest rates. 
It may, with the benefit of hindsight, have been profitable 
for companies to continue issuing debentures since nominal interest 
rates had risen much further after the demise of the debentures 
market. However, in the early 1970s, the majority of opinion was 
that nominal interest rates were at an all-time high, and that it 
might be best to restrain any further issues of debentures until 
nominal interest rates fell back to 'normal' levels. Such 
expectations were subsequently proved to be incorrect and, in any 
event, the rising cost of medium- and long-term borrowing led to 
the eventual demise of the debentures market. 
The demise of the debentures market may have been 
accelerated in part by the lowering of the cost of bank 
intermediation. Compared with the enormous transaction costs 
involved in issuing debt, borrowing on a medium-term basis from 
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the banks was certainly cheaper and easier. Basically, the cost of 
bank intermediation refers to the spread between the variable rate 
charged on loans and the (relatively fixed) rate paid on short-term 
deposits. Thus, with high nominal interest rates, there was a 
tendency for the endowment effect to be particularly accentuated so 
that spreads became smaller. As noted previously, the response of 
lending to changes in general level of interest rates has tended to 
become more sluggish, and for interest rate differentials to play an 
increasingly important role. Thus, it follows that the cost of bank 
intermediation becomes an increasingly important determinant of the 
size of balance sheets of banks; as the cost of intermediation falls, 
the greater will be the volume of lending and deposits. And, this 
observation would almost certainly be confirmed when one considers 
the phenomenal increase in bank lending during the early 1970s as 
a consequence of 'round tripping' in response to negative costs of 
bank intermediation. The implications for the efficacy of monetary 
policy are similar to those discussed for liability management above. 
Now that inflation and nominal interest rates have fallen 
significantly in the course of the past few years, an interesting 
question is posed which may serve to shed some more light on the 
definition of financial innovations discussed in section 2.1.1. above. 
Recall that the switch to variable-rate lending may have been an 
adaptive response, i.e. not a creative response, to the increased 
volatility of nominal interest rates. It has been suggested by 
Goodhart (1984, pp.163-164) that if nominal interest rates fall , this 
could mean that the endowment effect would be eroded, and 
possibly lead to a higher cost of bank intermediation, thus driving 
borrowers back into the capital market. It does seem to suggest 
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that financial innovations could be characterised by their 
irreversibility. That is, according to Schumpeter above, innovations 
are said to occur if and only if it leads to a once-for-all change in 
habits. If subsequent experience shows that there is a tendency for 
banks to revert to fixed-rate lending with higher spreads, and that 
borrowers were forced back into the capital market, then perhaps 
the switch to variable-rate lending cannot definitely be labelled as a 
financial innovation, but as an adaptive response because it lacked 
the irreversibility characteristic. This question would be well worth 
pursuing. 
(b) Effects of technological change. Technological change in the 
provision of financial intermediation services is certainly one of the 
most obvious forms that financial innovation can take on. Although 
it is not too difficult to give a comprehensive catalogue of recent 
developments in technology applied to the financial sector, it suffices 
to paint a general picture, and to concentrate more on the relatively 
neglected question of the implications of technological change in the 
financial sector for the efficacy of monetary control. 
Over the past few years, technological change has been 
particularly acute in the retail banking sphere, with the growth in 
A T M (Automated Teller Machine) networks. Such ATMs are now 
increasingly capable of providing even more basic retail banking 
services in addition to the basic function of cash dispensing. Such 
networks are likely to have a profound influence on the supply of 
financial intermediation services. Firstly, if any institution wishes to 
enter the market for the provision of financial services, there is less 
need to undertake highly expensive outlays on setting up a large 
and diverse branch network since ATMs are capable of being placed 
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in locations well away from branches. Even so, setting up large 
A T M networks can still prove to be prohibitively expensive, and 
there remains some scope for networks to be shared among a group 
of financial institutions willing to bear a part of the costs involved. 
Secondly, ATMs are capable of effecting transactions at a much 
lower unit cost per transaction so that there is a possibility that the 
cost of bank intermediation will decline so leading to larger balance 
sheets of financial institutions. 
The interpretation of changes in monetary aggregates would 
have to be carried out with greater care because of the higher 
proportion of interest-bearing transactions balances in narrower 
definitions such non-interest-bearing M l (nibMl) and M l . This 
aspect will be looked at further in Chapter Four which deals with 
money substitutes, and aggregation. Furthermore, the higher 
proportion of interest-bearing transactions balances is likely to lead 
to a decreased sensitivity of response to changes in general levels of 
interest rates, and an increased sensitivity of response to changes in 
relative interest rates since the lower costs associated with supplying 
financial information is likely to heighten awareness of possible profit 
opportunities. Thus, the difficulties of the monetary authorities in 
their conduct of monetary policy may be further exacerbated as the 
difficulties are similar to those of liability management discussed 
above. Lower transactions costs are also likely to encourage 
individuals to hold less non-interest-bearing balances since it is now 
less costly to switch funds between interest-bearing deposits and 
their non-interest bearing counterparts. These aspects are discussed 
further in the next chapter which is primarily devoted to the effects 
of financial innovation on the transactions demand for money. 
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2.4. Conclusions 
The study of financial innovations, and the forces that bring 
it about, is hampered by many difficulties which include definitional 
and taxonomic problems. There is certainly no hard-and-fast 
classification system for financial innovations, and each financial 
innovation cannot be considered in isolation because most of the 
financial innovations are all interrelated with one another. Two 
hypotheses concerning financial innovation were considered. The 
first one concerned what may be termed 'constraint-induced' 
innovation in which financial institutions innovate in response to 
various constraints. Particular attention was paid to those constraints 
imposed by regulatory authorities: such innovations may be viewed 
as attempts to circumvent existing regulations. The second 
hypothesis embodying the 'regulatory dialectic' framework goes a 
stage further than the constraint-induced hypothesis in that it also 
seeks to explain the rate of diffusion of financial innovations. It 
was particularly noted that if regulatory authorities become 
overwhelmed by the pace of financial innovation, their responses 
may turn out to be slower, thus accelerating the diffusion of 
financial innovations. A hybrid theory of financial innovation was 
put forward which took into account the link between the real and 
financial sectors. The experience of the UK in financial innovations 
was considered. One of the most important financial innovations to 
be considered is the widespread use of liabihty management 
techniques which have tended to undermine the ability of the 
authorities in controlling broader monetary aggregates. Together 
with technological change and the increased volatility of nominal 
interest rates, the authorities have become increasingly unable to 
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influence relative interest rates due to liability management by 
financial institutions, and the response to changes in the general 
level of interest rates has tended to become even more sluggish. 
The increased sensitivity to changes in relative interest rates has 
tended to make the interpretation of monetary aggregates even more 
hazardous in that funds may be shifted between different levels of 
aggregates. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
T H E TRANSACTIONS DEMAND FOR MONEY 
The exploration of the transactions demand for money begins 
here by considering the right-hand side of the demand function in 
order to examine the effect that each variable has on the demand 
for money. There are several aspects of financial innovation that 
need to be borne in mind when analysing the demand for 
transactions balances because the various changes in variables that 
stem mainly from financial innovation are likely to have a 
pronounced effect. 
Firstly, as previously seen in the last chapter, financial 
innovation during the past decade or so has sometimes taken the 
form of technological change vi^ hich have the effect of lowering 
transactions costs. That is the main reason why relatively more 
emphasis is being placed upon transactions costs and their nature in 
the theoretical discussion of the demand for money in section 3.1. 
There are two basic types of inventory-theoretic models of the 
transactions demand for money. The first one, attributable to 
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), is a deterministic type in which it 
is generally assumed that all receipts and disbursements are 
foreknown with perfect certainty. The second type, attributable 
mainly to Miller and Orr (1966) and Whalen (1966), is a 
probabilistic model in which an element of uncertainty concerning 
one's receipts and disbursements is introduced. The Baumol-Tobin 
model will be analysed fully in order to highlight the effects of 
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changes in transactions cost structures on the demand for money. 
That is, analyses will be carried out for the cases in which 
transactions costs are fixed, proportional, and linear (i.e. a 
combination of the last two cases). It is intended to show that the 
interest-elasticity is indeed sensitive to changes in transactions cost 
structures. In the final part of section 3.1., uncertainty about future 
interest rates is introduced according to the analysis carried out by 
Niehans (1978) which combines parts of Tobin's (1958) portfoHo-
approach to the demand for money with parts of the inventory-
theoretic approach. One implication of the analysis is that as 
transactions costs approach zero, one must consider the distinction 
between cash balances that are demanded as an asset and those that 
are demanded as transactions balances. 
There have been many attempts to capture the effects of 
financial innovation on the demand for money by the inclusion of 
'innovation' variables as proxies in empirical studies. One view is 
that financial innovation was essentially a steady long-run process of 
change. The use of time trends as proxies for financial innovation 
in empirical studies of the demand for money (e.g. Lieberman 
(1977)) does reflect such a view, and this will be discussed in 
section 3.2. However, it will be seen that a major objection to 
such an approach is that consideration of recent economic history 
reveals that the process of financial innovation is far removed from 
the concept of steady long-run change, namely that one observes 
periods of rapid financial change (such as now) and periods in 
which financial change take place at a more sedate pace. 
The second aspect of financial innovation to consider is the 
presence of high and volatile rates of inflation and interest rates 
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which have made the opportunity cost of holding cash balances 
persistently high. Some financial innovations have taken the form 
of improved cash-management techniques. It is shown in the first 
part of section 3.3. that the long-run interest-elasticity of the 
demand for money is likely to be higher than its short-run 
counterpart. Porter and Simpson (1980) have incorporated a theory 
of development of cash-management techniques into the Miller-Orr 
model and it substantiates their claim regarding interest-elasticities 
made above. The last two parts of section 3.3. will be devoted to 
a discussion of empirical studies that use different proxies for 
improved cash-management techniques. 
Finally, problems regarding the derivation of a 'brokerage 
fees' time-series are considered. One particular approach was to 
estimate two separate equations, one for the demand for money, and 
one for the volume of debits, and then solve the two equations for 
the brokerage fee. However, it is pointed out that such a practice 
can lead to false conclusions in empirical studies such as that of 
Porter and Offenbacher (1984). 
There are also other aspects of financial innovation that 
affect the left-hand side of the demand for money function (such as 
liability management), but their discussion is best postponed until the 
next chapter when monetary aggregates are considered. 
3.1. Alternative theories 
Modern theories of a transactions demand for money 
originated in the seminal paper of Baumol (1952), and was also 
developed independently of Baumol in Tobin (1956). At first sight, 
the approaches used by the two economists in deriving the 
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transactions demand for money may look different, but as will be 
shown later on, these two approaches are certainly equivalent. It 
often appears to be the case that many researchers, when entering 
into a theoretical discussion of the transactions demand for money, 
they often base their discussion on the exposition in Baumol (1952) 
whereas the exposition in Tobin (1956) has been relatively neglected. 
In order to do a little more justice to the latter paper, the 
discussion will be biased more on Tobin's paper than Baumol's 
paper. Essentially, they both utilised an inventory-theoretic 
approach which is based on the fact that a time lag exists between 
disbursements and receipts. It is assumed that there is a two-asset 
world in which the only two assets are money which earns no 
interest and bonds which do earn interest. The main objective of 
these inaugural inventory-theoretic models was to explain why the 
demand for transactions balances should be related to interest rates 
and transactions costs. Before proceeding further with the 
discussion, it will be noted that there are two basic types of 
inventory-theoretic models. The first type is what may be termed a 
deterministic model in which the pattern of disbursements and 
receipts are known with absolute certainty in any time period, 
whereas the second type, mainly due to Miller and Orr (1966), is a 
probabilistic model in which the pattern of disbursements and 
receipts are not known with perfect certainty. The latter model will 
be considered in sub-section 3.1.2. The following sub-section is 
devoted to a full discussion of the deterministic inventory-theoretic 
model of the transactions demand for money. 
3.1.1. Deterministic inventory-theoretic model 
As previously mentioned, the individual is assumed to know 
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the pattern of disbursements and receipts with perfect certainty in 
every time period. At the beginning of each period, the individual 
is assumed to receive his receipts which is equal to Y. Over the 
period, the individual will be making disbursements at a steady rate 
until he has run down his balances completely. This simple case 
will give a 'sawtooth' appearance to the assets function as shown in 
figure 3.1. which also shows some cash-management strategies. 
(a) Zero transactions costs. For the sake of argument, it will be 
initially assumed that there are no 'transactions' costs and that the 
number of transactions between cash and bonds is limited to two: 
the first one being to purchase bonds, and the second one to sell 
bonds. In the first case, the individual receives his receipts at the 
beginning of the period, t = 0 , but does not choose to invest the 
receipts in bonds immediately. Later on, at time t, , B , bonds are 
purchased and then sold off at time t^  before the individual has 
even run down his cash balances. The shaded area shows the 
proportion of the individual's portfolio held in bonds. This is 
clearly not an optimal strategy because the individual could have 
earned more interest by buying bonds immediately upon receipt of 
his receipts. Furthermore, by seUing bonds before the individual 
actually has run down his cash balances, he has incurred an 
opportunity cost in terms of lost interest that would otherwise have 
been earned by holding on to bonds a little longer until his cash 
balances need to be replenished. 
Now consider the last two cash-management strategies given 
in figure 3.1. above. Both of these strategies do conform to the 
principles of good cash-management laid down in the first case, but 
the last strategy during the period tg - tg is not quite an optimal 
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FIGURE 3.1: The Baumol-Tobin 'sawtooth' pattern of 
disbursements and receipts with different cash-
management strategies. The optimal strategy is 
during the period t^ - t^. 
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one because too many bonds were bought immediately and therefore 
the individual's cash balance is run down sooner than necessary so 
that an opportunity cost is incurred in terms of lost interest by 
having to sell bonds and holding cash for longer, given that the 
number of transactions is constrained to only two per period. The 
second strategy during the period 13 - t^  is the optimal 
cash-management strategy to follow because the right amount of 
bonds {Y12) were purchased and then held for a period of 
(t^ - i^)l2 in order to maximise revenue. Given that the rate of 
interest on bonds is r and that the average amount of bonds held is 
(y /2) /2 = y/4 , it follows that revenue is given by {YIA)r. 
The argument can be generalised to the case where n 
transactions are permitted. Let a time period be sub-divided into n 
sub-periods, t, ,...t/,...t^ where t, = 0 and t^  = 1 . Thus the 
optimal strategy is to buy [ (n - l ) / n ] y bonds at time t, and to 
sell them in equal instalments of Yin at times tj = (/ - I ) In. 
Since the average number of bonds held is [ (n - l ) /2n]y , it 
follows that revenue is given by [ (n - l ) /2n]yr . From the above 
reasoning which is due to Tobin (1956, pp .243-244), it can be 
argued that the average cash balances, denoted by M, is given by 
1 - [ (n - l)ln] Y 
M ^ — • y = 2^ . . . [ 1 ] 
It is clear that as the number of transactions allowed becomes 
infinitely large, it follows that M will approach zero and revenue 
will approach kYr, that is 
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Lim M = 0 and Urn R = ^Yr 
n ^ CO n <x> 
where R stands for revenue. It should be noted that in the 
absolute absence of transactions costs, the long-run demand for 
money is totally interest-inelastic because, at any given number of 
transactions, the same cash-management strategy would still be 
followed, leading to lower revenues though. However, if individuals 
were allowed to choose their optimum number of transactions, then 
zero transactions costs would dictate that an infinite number of 
transactions would take place such that hardly any cash was 
demanded. The implication of transactions costs approaching zero 
for the transactions demand for money as a consequence of financial 
innovation will be discussed later on. 
(b) Fixed transactions costs. As suggested by Baumol (1952, 
p.545 and p.546, footnote 5), fixed transactions costs may take the 
form of a 'brokerage fee' which is payable every time a transaction 
involving cash and bonds is undertaken. Such a brokerage fee may 
reflect both objective and subjective costs involved in carrying out a 
transaction. Typical examples may include the price of a 
teleophone call to a broker to execute an order and the time spent 
at the bank cashing cheques from the broker. Of course, in the 
presence of fixed transactions costs, an individual would have to 
modify his cash-management strategy since an infinite number of 
transactions would incur disproportionately large costs which may 
well lead to a net loss. According to the analysis carried out by 
Baumol (1952), total costs of a particular cash-management strategy 
are composed of two main elements. The first element is, of 
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course, the fixed cost of a number of transactions. The second 
element concerns the opportunity cost of having to hold some cash 
balances which do not earn any interest at all. 
According to Niehans (1978, p.29), any model that exhibits a 
perpetual regular pattern of disbursements and receipts is called an 
infinite stationary motion model. It just happens that the 
Baumol-Tobin 'sawtooth' type model falls into the category of 
infinite stationary motion models. Thus, for the sake of argimient 
again, given that there are no transactions costs involved and that 
the individual is allowed an infinite number of transactions, it was 
previously shown that the maximised revenue would be lYr which 
would be the same for each period throughout time. Given that 
transactions costs now exist, it is only sufficient that the individual 
minimises total costs in order to arrive at an optimal 
cash-management strategy. This is so because there is really no 
need to work out the the maximum revenue in each period if it is 
known that it will be the same for each period. However, one 
must be warned against generalising too soon from simple cases. If 
the assumption of infinite stationary motion was to be relaxed, it 
would follow that maximum revenue would not be the same for 
each period throughout time so that cost minimisation is a necessary 
but no longer a sufficient condition for an optimal cash-management 
strategy. In fact, as a little reflection will show, it is now necesary 
to maximise net revenue which should be a necessary and sufficient 
condition for an optimal strategy. This is presumably the main 
reason why Tobin (1956, p.247) was critical of Baumol's cost 
minimisation assumption. So, to avoid any loss of generality here, 
maximisation of net revenue will be used to arrive at any optimal 
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cash-management strategy. 
Following a reasoning similar to that of Baumol, but 
embodying Tobin's concept of an optimal number of transactions, it 
can be shown that net revenue is given by gross revenue less the 
opportunity cost of holding cash balances and any fixed costs. As 
previously noted, gross revenue is given by 2Yr, and since the 
average cash balance held is y/2rt, the opportunity cost is (YI2n)r. 
Given that the fixed brokerage fee is b, it follows that total fixed 
costs for n transactions equals nb. Hence net revenue for n 
transactions , denoted by r^, is given by 
= iYr[l - (1/n) ] - nb ...[2] 
It is now required to find the optimal number of transactions, n*, 
such that net revenue is maximised. This may be found by taking 
the partial derivative of with respect to n and setting the 
resulting expression equal to zero: 
= ^Yr(l/n') - b = 0 
which may then be solved for n to give 
n* = A_L . . . [ 3 ] 
2b 
According to Baumol (1952), the number of transactions is given by 
YIM which equals n. Therefore, the optimal demand for money is 
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given by substituting for n* from equation [3]: 
« : = L = / ! £ . . . [ 4 1 
J * 
n 
which is the widely-quoted 'square root' formula given in Baumol 
(1952, p.547). The optimal cash-management strategy in the case 
of fixed transactions costs is shown in figure 3.2(a) below. Here, 
the individual is seen to be holding MJ cash balances for an 
interval of 1/n* which are then run down before selHng bonds to 
repleiush his cash balances which are then held for a further 
interval of 1/n*. The process continues until all assets have been 
used up in the process of transactions. It is interesting to note that 
the imposition of fixed transactions costs has a similar effect to that 
of imposing a given number of transactions in the absence of 
transactions costs which has already been analysed in sub-section 
3.1.1(a). 
Consider the properties of the demand for money function 
just derived above. It can be verified that 
This leads to the implication that if the interest rate increases, the 
demand for transactions balances decreases. Furthermore, this would 
be reinforced by a secular decline in brokerage fees brought about 
by innovations in cash-management techniques. Also, if income or 
the volume of transactions increases, the demand for money will 
= Mf/2, it follows 
I l l 
{2kl r) t ime 
FIGURE 3.2; The Baumol-Tobin model of the transactions 
demand for money with fixed and proportional 
costs. 
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that the long-run demand for transactions balances is 
"f = • • • [ 5 1 
The demand for real transactions balances (i.e. nominal balances 
deflated by the price level) is 
^ = aY°-'r~°-' 
where a = i(2b)2 which is a 'constant'. The term 'constant' is 
in inverted commas because transactions can vary over time, leading 
to shifts in the demand for money function as most empirical 
studies in the 1970s showed. Taking natural logarithms of the 
preceding expression, the following equation is the theoretical 
logarithmic demand for money function: 
5nA/^  = ^na + 0. SdnY - 0. 5(>nr + ^nP . . . [ 6 ] 
From the above equation, it will be seen that there are economies 
of scale in holding money balances. This stems from the fact that 
given a percentage change in income or transactions, the percentage 
change in money balances will only be half of that for income or 
transactions. Thus the income-elasticity is equal to +0.5. 
Furthermore, given a change in interest rates, the demand for 
money will change less than proportionately in response, implying an 
interest-elasticity of -0.5. With respect to the price level, there is 
unit elasticity such that there will be an equiproportionate change in 
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the demand for money in response to changes in the price level. 
(c) Proportional transactions costs. What can be said about the 
demand for money when there are proportional transactions costs 
instead of fixed costs? In such a case, transactions costs are 
directly proportional to the value of the transaction involved. First 
of all, consider, as Niehans (1978, pp .43-47) does, a general 
situation in which there are some observed periods in which the 
individual accumulates his assets and other period in which they are 
decumulated. It is also important to bear in mind that the 
assumption of perfect foresight still exists so that the individual 
knows what the pattern of transactions will be. The individual's 
problem is to decide on how long for should he accumulate his 
assets in the form of bonds from the beginning of the period, and 
then accumulate his assets in the form of cash balances. This 
problem may be tackled by employing the concepts of marginal 
revenue and marginal costs. When the individual buys and sells 
bonds, he has to incur the cost of a 'round trip' to the bond 
market which in effect means that two transactions costs are 
incurred. Letting k denote the proportional transaction cost, it 
should be clear that the marginal cost of holding a bond is 2k.'' 
Against such costs, the individual will also take into account the 
marginal revenue from holding a bond. Letting T represent the 
marginal holding period for a bond, it can be shown that marginal 
revenue is rr . It will be profitable for the individual to accumulate 
his assets in the form of bonds as long as marginal revenue exceeds 
marginal cost, that is when rr > 2k. Given that k and r are 
constant, further purchases of bonds as time passes by will lead to a 
lower marginal revenue. The point will come when rr = 2k in 
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which case the individual should stop accumulating his assets in the 
form of bonds, and accumulate them in the form of cash balances 
instead as long as rr < 2k. The individual may continue to 
accumulate cash balances until he enters a phase in which he has 
to decumulate his cash balances. Of course, he can decumulate 
them until they are run down to the point of exhaustion and then 
continue to finance his transactions by continuous sales of bonds 
until the next receipt arrives. 
Returning to the Baumol-Tobin type pattern of transactions, 
the individual does not accumulate his receipts over time, but is 
assumed to have his receipts in one lump at the beginning of each 
period. In order to decide upon an optimal cash balance at the 
beginning of the period, the individual will be evaluating the 
marginal revenues and marginal costs involved by holding bonds. 
At the point where rr = 2k, the individual will then know how 
many bonds to purchase and therefore how much of his receipts 
should be witheld in the form of cash balances. These cash 
balances will then be decumulated until they become exhausted, and 
then the individual can finance the rest of his transactions by 
continuous sales of bonds. Such a situation is depicted in figure 
3.2(b). It should be noted that there is a rectangle marked 'cost' 
in the figure: it does not really represent the costs of holding 
bonds, but rather indicates the period in which revenues from 
holding bonds are more than offset by the transactions costs. 
It was shown previously that average cash balances are 
equivalent to YI2n where n is the number of transactions. It can 
be shown that the holding period for cash balances is given by 
YI(Yln) in which case T = 1/n, Thus, revenue may be defined 
115 
as the revenue that would have been obtained if aU receipts were 
immediately ploughed into bonds in the absence of transactions costs 
less the opportunity cost or loss of revenue caused by the holding 
of average cash balances which is equal to i{Yln)Tr or 
iYr{lln'^). Since the amount of bonds held is equal to 
y [ 1 - (1/n) ] , it follows that total transactions costs are 
2kY[\ - (1/n) ] . Thus net revenue is given by 
= hYr[\ - {\ln')] - 2kY{\-{\ln)] . . . [ 7 ] 
The optimal number of transactions and, therefore, the optimal 
holding period can be obtained by taking the partial derivative of 
the preceding expression with respect to n and setting it equal to 
zero: 
^ = hYr{2ln^) - 2kY{lln') = 0 
an 
which is then solved for n to give 
n = rl2k • • • [ 8 ] 
The optimal marginal holding period is therefore T * = (2fc/r) and 
is shown in figure 3.2(b). Since it is known that n = YIM, it 
follows that the demand for money in the presence of proportional 
transactions costs is 
* 2k 
r 
. . . [ 9 1 
( c . / . [4]5 
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where it is required that 2k Ir < 1. The reason for such a 
requirement is that if brokerage costs exceed revenues from holding 
bonds, it wil l simply not pay to hold bonds at all. Therefore, all 
receipts will be held in the form of cash balances which should not 
be greater than Y. As the rate of interest increases or transactions 
costs decline, there will be a reduction in receipts that are witheld 
as cash balances at the beginning of the period. Furthermore, other 
1 
things being equal, the amount of receipts witheld as cash balances 
varies in direct proportion to income or the volume of transactions. 
Niehans (1978, p.46) has defined the long-run demand for 
money as = \M*pT* where T * = (2k/r). Thus the long-run 
demand for money in the case of proportional costs is given by 
2k ' ' Y . . . [ 1 0 ] 
The properties of the above demand for money function may be 
noted as follows. First, it is proportional to income, and there are 
no economies of scale in holding cash balances. Furthermore, it 
varies with the square of transactions costs, and is inversely related 
to the square of the interest rate whose interest-elasticity is much 
greater at -2.0. Such a function is only valid if r > 2k. This is 
so because if r < 2k then this would imply that the demand for 
transactions balances is greater than the total assets available for 
holding as cash. So if the model is to hold at all, it is vital that 
the total revenue from interest earnings in any one period must be 
equal to or greater than the transactions costs of a round trip to 
the bond market. 
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So far, it has been possible to make statements regarding the 
various elasticities for the demand for money. On the one hand, it 
has been shown that, in the case of fixed transactions costs, the 
interest-elasticity is likely to be -0.5 and, in the case of 
proportional transactions costs, it is likely to be -2.0. It was also 
observed that the income-elasticity is likely to be between +0.5 and 
+1.0 in the respective cases. It would seem intuitively plausible 
that in the presence of linear transactions costs, both elasticities 
would be somewhere between their two extreme values. This aspect 
is now the subject of the following paragraphs. 
(d) Transactions costs as a linear function of transactions. 
Consider the case in which transactions costs are both fixed and 
proportional, namely that transactions costs are a linear function of 
the volume of transactions involved, say, C = b + kY where C 
denotes total transactions costs. 
Before proceeding any further with the analysis, it is 
particularly important to appreciate the notation used for the 
demand for money so far. It can be seen that the use of subscripts 
/ and p is designed to distinguish between the components of the 
demand for money that are due to fixed and proportional 
transactions costs respectively. If no subscript is given, it will be 
understood that this refers to the demand for money under both 
fixed and proportional costs. 
According to the analysis of Baumol (1952, pp.547-549) and 
using a similar methodology to that used by Tobin (1956), it can be 
shown from figure 3.3. that, out of an available asset balance of Y, 
YT will be witheld from investment at the beginning of the period 
due to proportional transactions costs where, as before. 
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1. 
* 1-
- l ) / n ] y ( l - r ) 
t ime 
1/n 
FIGURE 3.3: The Baumol-Tobin model of the transactions 
demand for money with transactions costs as a 
linear function of the volume of transactions. 
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T = {2klr). This now leaves an asset balance of y ( l - T ) 
which is available for distribution among bonds and cash. 
According to Tobin (1956), the optimal strategy would be to 
allocate {lln)Y{\ - r ) as cash and invest the rest into bonds. It 
has been shown by Tobin (p.245-247) that net revenue in this case 
is given by 
n = [ (n - l ) / n ] y r ( l - T ) ' - nb . . . [ H ] 
which can be maximised by taking the partial derivative with respect 
to n and setting it equal to zero: 
^"n = ^ Yr {\ - T)^ - b = 0 
dn 2n 
so that the above equation can be solved to give the optimal 
number of transactions for the rest of the period (1 - T ) as 
follows 
n* = / I L ( 1 - r) . . . [ 1 2 ] 
2b 
It may be recalled that n = Y/M so that 
( 1 - r) Mj = . . . [ 1 3 ] 
which may be seen as the demand for money that has been 'scaled 
down' for a shorter period from / = T to the end of the period. 
It can be shown that the long-run demand for money is given by a 
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weighted average of the cash balances at times t = 0, t = T , and 
t = 1. Between the beginning of the period and time t = r , the 
average cash balance held is (Mp + My-)/2 which is held for a 
period of T ; between time t = T and the end of the period, the 
average cash balance held is only (My^)/2 which is held for a 
period of (1 - T ) . Furthermore, the weights to be allocated are 
{M*p + MJ)/Y and [Y - (M*p + M*f) ]IY respectively so that the 
long-run demand for money is: 
2Y 
whence 
M d bY 
2r 
1 + 2k + 1 2k ' 
. r 2 . r 
Y . . . [ 1 4 ] 
which may be written more succinctly as = Mj{\ + T ) + 
after making the necessary substitutions from equations [4] and [10] 
respectively. This result is the same as shown by Brunner and 
Meltzer (1967, p.426, equation 4). 
(e) Income and interest elasticities. It will be of considerable 
interest to examine the income and interest elasticities for the 
demand for money under both fixed and proportional costs, and it 
may even turn out to be possible that some tentative comments 
could be made regarding the effect of changes in the structure of 
transactions costs on interest-elasticities. 
First consider the interest-elasticity of the demand for money 
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where transactions costs are assumed to be a linear function of the 
volume of transactions. Taking the partial derivative of equation 
[14] with respect to r gives 
^J^ = - ^ (1 + r) + Mi 
dr 2r J 
2k + Y 2k 2k 
. . r 
and multiplication of the preceding expression by ( r / M ^ ) gives the 
interest-elasticity of the demand for money 
2 
. . . [ 1 5 ] 
It is particularly interesting to note that in the absence of 
proportional transactions costs, the interest-elasticity is equal to - 2 
(remember that T contains the proportional cost term k in which 
case T = 0 ) , and in the absence of fixed costs, is -2 . Under 
proportional and fixed transactions costs that are a linear function of 
the volume of transactions, the value of the interest-elasticity is a 
little more complicated to determine because it all depends on the 
ratio of marginal proportional costs to the interest rate. It will be 
recalled that such a ratio can only take on certain values, namely 
that 0 < T < 1. The value of T cannot be zero under Unear 
transactions costs because, if it were the case, it would imply the 
absence of proportional costs. The value of r can exceed unity but 
if that were the case, there would be no demand for money at all 
since it would be utterly unprofitable to invest surplus cash balances 
in bonds. By taking on different values for T , it would be possible 
to make some tentative comments on the likely value of the 
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interest-elasticity. First of all, consider a value of T equal to unity. 
In such a case, equation [14] reduces to -2 ( M ^ + M^)/M<^. It 
is clear that ( M ^ + M<j)/Md must equal unity so that the 
interest-elasticity in the case when marginal proportional costs are 
equal to the interest rate is equal to -2.0. Next, consider a value 
of T equal to 1 / 3 in which case equation [14] reduces to 
-2{MpMd) - {MjiMd). In such a case where the 'one-way' 
marginal cost {k) is one-sixth of the interest rate, the interest-
elasticity will take on a value somewhere between -2.0 and -0.5. 
which is dependent on the proportions of and to M^. 
To summarise so far, an interest-elasticity of -0.5 may occur 
in the case where there are only fixed costs, and an elasticity of 
-2.0 may occur in two cases: either when there are only 
proportional costs or when there are linear costs but the ratio of 
the marginal proportional cost to the interest rate is unity. In other 
cases, when there are linear costs, and the ratio of the marginal 
proportional cost is between zero and unity, an interest-elasticity of 
somewhere in the range of -2.0 and -0.5 is obtainable. Apart 
from the emphasis on the value of T here, such observations are 
consistent with those made by Niehans (1978, p.51). 
It would be most instructive if the behaviour of the interest-
elasticity could be analysed as a response to changes in the structure 
of transactions costs. Such an exercise is attempted here in the 
hope that some light may be shed on the underlying causes of shifts 
in interest-elasticities that have been a feature of empirical demand 
for money studies since the 1970s. A change in fixed transactions 
costs wiU be analysed first as it is the simplest case. Taking the 
partial derivative of equation [15] above with respect to b gives an 
expression of the form 
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-\^^d) db 
( l+3r) - M ^ ( 1 + 3 T ) 
9 / 
- 2 M' d 
d\ 2 
which is readily simplified to 
dr, 
r = 
db 
HY/2br)' [ K l + 3r ) + + r) ] ^ I g j 
d 
It is clear that in the absence of proportional transactions costs, 
T = 0 and that r?^ = so that drif/db = 0. Thus a change in 
fixed transactions costs in the absence of proportional costs will not 
change the interest-elasticity of the demand for money. Now 
consider the introduction of proportional transactions costs. The 
picture is a little more difficult to analyse since the sign of dr^fldb 
depends on the ratio of marginal proportional transactions costs to 
the interest rate, r . It was previously argued that when r = 1, 
T?;. = - 2 , so that the term within the square brackets in the 
nummerator of equation [16] evaluates to -2 which makes the sign 
of dr]f/db unambiguously positive. Thus a fall in fixed transactions 
costs would increase the interest-elasticity of the demand for money 
(remember that r]r is negative so a fall in b will lead to a decrease 
in rjr or an increase in its absolute value). This, of course, leads 
to the happy conclusion that falls in fixed transactions costs, as a 
consequence of financial innovation, would increase the interest-
elasticity of the demand for money which is intuitively plausible. 
Considering values of T between zero and unity, assume that 
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T = W 3 SO that the sign of the expression in square brackets in 
the nummerator of equation [16] above will depend on the value of 
the interest-elasticity. For values of ij^ between -0.5 and -1.5, 
drjfl^b will be negative whereas for values less than (greater in 
absolute value) -1.5, drij-Idb will be positive. At an empirical 
level, one would need detailed knowledge of the structure of 
transactions costs to be able to make predictions regarding the effect 
of changes in fixed transactions costs on interest-elasticities. It is 
not really possible to give general a priori predictions. 
Changes in proportional costs are now analysed by taking the 
partial derivative of equation [15] with respect to k which gives 
- 2(M^)i^Mp^k) - 'I ^{M^){Mj){2lr) 
^ = -[-2{Mp - i (A/^)(l + 3r)](a^^/afc) 
Bk ^^d^2 
which after simplification gives 
= - ( 2 + v ) [ ( ^ ^ ) ( 2 / f c ) ] - C/^ + 3r,^)[iMj){2/r) ] 
dk ^d 
[17] 
Here, when fixed transactions costs are absent, it is clear that 
Mj: - 0 and that -qr = -2 so that drjf/dk = 0. When there are 
both fixed and proportional costs and that the ratio of marginal 
proportional costs to the interest rate is unity (i.e T = 1), the 
interest-elasticity will be -2 so that the first term in the 
nummerator of equation [17] is zero and the second term will be 
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unambiguously positive. Given such an outcome, it is clear that the 
sign of drif/dk is positive, implying that a fall in proportional costs 
will lead to an increase in the absolute value of the 
interest-elasticity of the demand for money. For values of T 
between zero and unity, it is not really possible to determine the 
sign of d r ] f / d k , but at the very least, the interest-elasticity is likely 
to vary in response to changes in proportional costs. 
Thus, one possible interpretation of shifts in 
interest-elasticities of the demand for money is that there was a 
underlying shift in the structure of transactions costs brought about 
by financial innovation. 
With regard to the income-elasticity of the demand for 
money, this can be found by taking the partial derivative of 
equation [14] above with respect to Y to give 
^ = Hb/2rY)'{l + r ) + i r 
dY 
Multiplication throughout by (Y/M^) gives the income-elasticity of 
the demand for money under transactions costs that are a linear 
function of the volume of transactions. 
ny = i ( M ^ / W ^ ) ( l + r ) + ( M p M ^ ) . . . [ 1 8 ] 
In the two extreme cases where fixed or proportional costs are only 
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absent, the income elasticities are equal to +0.5 and +1.0 
respectively. Between these two extreme cases, the income-elasticity 
is likely to be somewhere between +0.5 and +1.0. 
How does this analysis compare with the analysis of Brunner 
and Meltzer (1967, pp .426-427)? The income- or transactions-
elasticity derived in equation [18] above is essentially the same as 
that derived by Brunner and Meltzer (equation 5).^ For a given 
transactions costs structure, Brunner and Meltzer argue that as the 
volume of transactions approach infinity, r j y will apprach unity 
which substantiates their argument that the demand for money 
function in equation [14] above is not inconsistent with the quantity 
theory of money which postulates that there are no economies of 
scale in cash holdings. This is only valid if the relative importance 
of fixed transactions costs is comparatively minor. 
3.1.2. Probalistic inventory-theoretic model 
(a) The basic concept. By relaxing the assumption that the pattern 
of disbursements and receipts are perfectly foreseen, one has a 
probabilistic model of the transactions demand for money in which 
the pattern of disbursements and receipts are subject to uncertainty. 
It has been argued by Miller and Orr (1966, p.415) that 
deterministic inventory-theoretic models of the transactions demand 
for money applies well in the case of households who earn a salary 
on a regular basis, but is inherently unsatisfactory in the case of 
professional households and business firms whose cash flows exhibit 
random behaviour. According to Orr (1970, pp.54-55), the basic 
idea behind a probabilistic inventory-theoretic model is that in large 
business firms, the cash balance fluctuates irregularly and 
unpredictably over time in both directions. An accumulation in 
127 
cash balances occurs when receipts exceed disbursements and a 
decumulation occurs when the reverse is true. When the 
accumulation in cash balances becomes particularly prolonged, there 
will come a point when the firm decides that its present level of 
cash balances is excessive, and chooses to invest a sizeable chunk of 
the cash balance in interest-bearing assets, or to facilitate loan 
retirement. Conversely, when a decumulation in cash balances 
becomes prolonged, there will come a point when the firm will 
decide that its present level of cash balances are inadequate, and 
will therefore choose to replenish its cash balances to some 
acceptable level by liquidating some of its interest-bearing assets or 
further borrowing. 
(b) The model. Some of the more trivial assumptions of the 
Miller-Orr model (1966, pp.417-419) are quite similar to those of 
the Baumol-Tobin model in that a 'two-asset' world is assumed in 
which non-interest bearing cash balances and interest-bearing assets 
form the two main assets. Furthermore, there also exists a fixed 
brokerage fee, similar in its concept to that employed in Baumol 
(1952), which is levied on each transaction taking place. It is also 
assumed that there are negligible delays in the effecting of a 
transaction, namely that an exchange of interest-bearing assets for 
cash balances or vice-versa takes place simultaneously. 
Further assumptions were also made in which the Miller-Orr 
model becomes substantially different from the Baumol-Tobin model. 
Regarding the nature of the banking system, it is assumed that 
overdrafts of any kind are strictly prohibited so that the minimum 
balance is virtually zero. The next assumption, which is the most 
important one of the model, is that cash flows are stochastic, and 
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that during a working day, the cash balance is assumed to change / 
times by either +Y or -Y. The variations in cash balances follow 
a Bernoulli-type process in which there are two possible outcomes 
denoted either as a success or failure with probabilities p and 
1 - p = q respectively. A success is said to occur if the cash 
balance increases by y or a failure occurs when it decreases by Y. 
Miller and Orr (1966, p.419) specifically consider the simplest case 
of 'zero-drift' in which the probabilities of a success or a failure 
are equal, that is p = q = z so that the distribution of changes 
in cash balances will have zero mean and a finite variance equal to 
(J 2 = Y^t. Finally, it is assumed that the firm seeks to minimise 
its steady-state costs of managing its cash balances. Miller and Orr 
assume that a firm sets itself upper and lower bounds of cash 
balances in which cash balances can wander freely within the two 
limits. However, if the cash balance reaches the upper limit of 
hY, the firm will initiate a transfer of cash into interest-bearing 
assets so that the cash balance is reduced by (h - z)Y to 
M — zY. Furthermore, if the cash balance reaches the lower limit 
of zero, some interest-bearing assets will be liquidated in order to 
restore the cash balance to M . It is particularly important to stress 
that, in order to simplify their notation. Miller and Orr (1966, 
p.422) make the distinction between h and h' = hY, and 
z = z' = zY = M. The definition of h' and z' is that these 
level of cash balances are denominated in single currency units 
whereas h and z are normalised variables such that they denote the 
level of cash balances denominated in Y currency units. Given the 
firm's policy of cash-management, the firm aims to minimise its 
expected average costs. The composition of costs is quite similar to 
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that of Baumol (1952), namely that there are transactions and 
opportunity costs. Given that the brokerage fee is set at b and 
that the probability of a transaction (in either direction) occuring 
during a day is P{T), it follows that the expected average 
transactions costs will amoimt to bP{T). Furthermore, the expected 
average cash balance is denoted by E{M). Given that the rate of 
interest on interest-bearing assets is r, the opportunity cost is 
expected to be rE{M) so that the expected total average cost of 
the firm's daily cash-management strategy is given by 
£ ( c ) = bP{T) + rE{M) • • • [ 1 9 ] 
where E{c) denotes expected average cost as defined in Orr (1970, 
p.58). 
The firm's optimisation problem is to find optimal values of 
h and z that will serve to minimise expected average costs. Before 
equation [19] can be optimised to arrive at minimum expected 
average costs, it is necessary to derive expressions for P{T) and 
E{M) in terms of h and z. It has been shown by Orr (1970, 
pp .58-61, equations 9 and 10) that 
E{M) = {h + z)/3 . . . [20] 
and that 
P(T) = tl[z{h - z)] . . . [21] 
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which may be substituted into equation [19] so that 
£ ( c ) = + - z) + 2 z ] ^ 2 2 ] 
z{h - z) 3 
remembering that the second term has to be multiplied by Y to 
reflect the ful l opportunity cost of holding cash balances. The 
preceding expression can now be partially differentiated with respect 
to {h - z) and z, and the resulting expressions set equal to zero 
as a necessary condition for a minimum in which case 
a £ ( c ) ^ -bt rY ^ Q 
d{h - z) 
and 
{h - z)'z 
dE{c) _ -bt , 2rY + ^ '^ = 0 
az z'(h - z) 
The above two equations can be solved to give the optimal values 
of h and z as follows 
z* = / ^ ^ ' 
y 47y 
and 
* * 
h = ?>z 
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The above two expressions need to be multiplied by Y in order to 
convert the unit of measurement from Y currency units into single 
currency units: 
M* = . . . [ 2 3 a ] 
4r 3 
and 
h*Y = 3M* • • • [ 2 4 ] 
However, from the previous discussion, it can be recalled that the 
variance of cash balances is = so that equation [23a] 
becomes 
M* = / . . . [ 2 3 b ] 
3 / 4J. 
which is the same as that one derived by Orr (1970, p.62, equation 
16), It has been argued by Orr (1970, p.64) that the long-run 
average demand for transactions balances is given by {h*Y + M*)/3 
so that substitution for h*Y and M* from equations [24] and [23b] 
respectively gives an expression for the long-run demand for 
transactions balances: 
= 4 . . . [ 2 5 ] 
3 A / 4r 
The properties of this demand for money function will now be 
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discussed. 
(c) Properties of the derived demand for money function. It is 
clear that the demand for money function derived above in equation 
[23b] is an increasing function of transactions costs and a decreasing 
function of the interest rate. Furthermore, it also exhibits the 
property that it is an increasing function of the variance in cash 
balances. Miller and Orr (1966, p.425) have suggested that such a 
term reflects the degree in which there is a lack of synchronisation 
between disbursements and receipts. So, if there was an increase in 
uncertainty regarding the future expected pattern of disbursements 
and reciepts (as reflected in a higher variance of cash balances), the 
demand for money would increase. 
It is easily seen that the interest-elasticity of the demand for 
money is slightly smaller at - W 3 , compared with - i for the 
Baumol-Tobin model. One possible reason for this difference is the 
existence of uncertainty in the pattern of disbursements and receipts 
so that if a firm unexpectedly found itself short of cash, it would 
have to go through the process of initiating a transfer of funds 
between interest-bearing assets and cash which would cost something 
more than just the brokerage fee per se. Such extra costs may be 
subjective in that being caught out with a lack of cash is likely to 
cause financial embarassment for the f i rm. Thus, there is always a 
greater incentive to hold on to larger cash balances than in the case 
of perfect certainty. Given, for example, a rise in interest rates, 
the firm will be particularly careful not to transfer excessive cash 
balances into interest-bearing assets simply because the opportunity 
cost of holding cash balances has risen. Thus, the firm's response 
to changes in interest rates will tend to be more sluggish in the 
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case of uncertainty so that the interest-elasticity would tend to be 
lower. 
The presence of a term for the variance of cash balances 
naturally raises the question of how equation [25] is to be 
interpreted whenever discussing the question of the income- or 
transactions-elasticity of the demand for money. Orr (1970, 
pp.64-65) offers two possible extreme cases in which the rate of 
transactions may change. First of all, it needs to be recalled that 
the variance in cash balances is given by a ^ = Y ^t. This means 
that the variance can change in two ways or a combination of both: 
either by a change in the size of the average receipt and 
disbursement (change in Y^) or by a change in the number of 
transactions (change in / ) • On the one hand, if the average size of 
a transaction changes, then the variance in cash balances will change 
proportionately in response to a change in Y ^ . In such a case, it 
is clear that the transactions-elasticity will be equal to ^ / ^. On 
the other hand, if the number of transactions increase, the variance 
in cash balances will change in response to a change in t so that 
the transactions elasticity would be W 3 . Given a combination of 
such changes, the range of possible values for the transactions-
elasticities becomes even larger. 
3.1.3. Uncertainty in interest rates 
Apart from falling transactions costs brought about by 
financial innovation, there is also another possible factor that may 
lead to a decline in the demand for transactions balances. In the 
last chapter in section 2.3.3(a), it was mentioned that the existence 
of high and more volatile rates of interest had an important role in 
the process of financial innovation during the last decade or so. 
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Would it not be appropriate to treat the existence of more volatile 
interest rates as an increased uncertainty in the rate of interest? 
It is also shown that Niehan's model can serve as a useful vehicle 
for analysing changes in transactions costs. 
Under the influence of the Keynesian liquidity preference 
theory, the transactions demand is frequently distinguished from the 
asset demand for money; the former being often presented in the 
context of inventory-theoretic models as those discussed above, and 
the latter following Tobin's (1958) mean-variance analysis of 
portfoho balance. Niehans (1978, pp. 52-59) offers a model for 
analysing the demand for money by combining elements of 
inventory-theoretic models that stress transactions costs with Tobin's 
mean-variance model that stresses uncertainty about interest rates. 
Tobin's model did not consider transactions assets, but 
long-term investment portfolios. The basic idea was that the 
demand for cash balances was attributed to the risk that the holding 
of bonds might involve a capital loss in excess of interest income. 
A common objection raised against Tobin's liquidity preferecne 
theory is that there are some interest-bearing assets that are virtually 
immune from any capital losses so that there would virtually be no 
demand for cash balances. Niehans (1978) therefore argues that 
Tobin's theory has little to ofer by way of explanation of the 
demand for cash balances - it only explains the diversification of 
investment portfolios. 
However, such an objection is overruled when transactions 
costs are introduced into the model so that cash balances will 
always be held even when there are interest-bearing assets that are 
immune from capital losses. The following paragraphs will consider 
135 
Niehan's analysis of the transactions demand for cash when 
uncertainty in interst rates is introduced. 
It is important to realise at the outset that the analysis is an 
extension of deterministic inventory-theoretic models, namely that it 
is still being assumed that the pattern of disbursements and reciepts 
are foreseen with perfect certainty although interest rates are now 
subject to some uncertainty. This is, of course, a simplifying 
assumption. It is assumed that future rates of interest are 
distributed with mean equal to E{r) and standard deviation equal 
to Of Niehans (1978, p.53) also assumes that the individual 
attempts to maximise a utility function depending on both the mean 
and standard deviation of net revenue instead of attempting to 
maximise expected returns. The main questions that Niehans seeks 
to answer are: 'What is the effect of introducing uncertainty into the 
[inventory-theoretic] model...? Will cash balances unambiguously 
increase or may they conceivably decline?'(1978, p.53) 
To set about answering such question, the analysis will be 
confined to the case of proportional transactions costs, and some 
tentative comments will be offered on the case when transactions 
costs are zero. The foUwoing definitions are applicable. Let 
average assets be denoted by A which equals zY and is also equalt 
to the sum of the average cash blance and average bond or 
interest-bearing asset holding, denoted by M and B respectively. 
The following ratios are defined as follows: 
, = ^ and p = ? 
A A 
where /x + |3 = 1 . Proportional costs will be considered first of 
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all. 
It can be recalled from equation [7] above that net revenue 
under proportional transactions costs was defined as 
= iYr[l - (1/n') ] - 2 k Y [ l - ( l / n ) ] 
. . . [ 7 repeated] 
It can be noted that the average cash balance i s M = 2Y(l/n^) 
and that the average bond holding is B = iY[l - (l/n^) ]. The 
second term in the preceding expression can be re-arranged slightly 
as 4k(7Y)[l - (1/n) ] . Dividing [7] throughout by A yields the 
net revenue per currency unit (dollars or whatever) of assets: 
1 = - 4k 
A A 
which reduces to 
1 - M 
A 
, = pr - 4k[l - (1 - ^)^] . . . [ 2 6 ] 
where ir denotes net revenue per currency unit of assets. Since the 
rate of interest is subject to uncertainty, the expected net revenue 
per currency unit of assets is therefore 
E{.) = (3E{r) - 4A:[1 - ( 1 - p)'' ] 
while the risk attached to the portfolio with a bond component /3 is 
assumed to be a linear function of the standard deviation of the 
rate of interest, namely that = in which case (3 = o^/or-
Thus, the preceding expression, after substitution for |3, becomes the 
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opportunity locus analogous to that of Tobin (1958): 
£ ( . ) = £ ( 0 
a 
2L - 4k 1 - / I -
a 
"r 
[27] 
This opportunity-locus shows the combinations of expected return 
and risk for a given portfolio of cash and bonds. It can be 
verified that d£(ir)/dCT^ > 0 and that d^E{ir)/dol < 0 which 
indicates that the opportunity locus is non-linear with a maximum 
for E(Tr) at, say, a*. Such a locus is shown by, for example, 
OPQ in figure 3.4. below. 
Consider now the indifference map as exemplified by the 
indifference curves I ^ and I , which are drawn such that the 
individual is assumed to be a 'risk-averter'. The reason for the 
upward sloping indifference curves is that the individual's marginal 
risk premium tends to rise as risk increases. There are also other 
cases in which an individual may either be a 'risk-lover' with 
downward sloping indifference curves or be 'risk-neutral' with 
horizontal indifference curves. In the absence of uncertainty, the 
individual (in any risk category) will choose a portfoHo that 
maximises expected net revenue such as E(ir)j^^x figure 3.4. 
above. When uncertainty is introduced, a risk-averting individual 
will choose his optimum portfolio such that a proportion /3 will be 
held in the form of bonds whereas n* will be held in the form of 
cash balances - this is shown by point in figure 3.4. It does 
follow that a risk-averter will hold more cash balances in the 
presence of uncertainty than would have been the case in the 
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£ ( . ) 
0 
I ^ 'max 
0 
FIGURE 3.4: The demand for money given uncertainty in 
interest rates and proportional transactions 
costs. 
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absence of uncertainty. By analogous reasoning, a risk-loving 
individual would hold less cash balances in the presence of risk 
whereas a risk- neutral individual will not adjust his cash balances 
in any way. 
Two changes will now be considered, the first change being 
an increase in uncertainty, and the second being a fall in 
transactions costs. When uncertainty about the future rate of 
interest increases, this is reflected by an increase in or so that for 
any given level of E{-n), will be larger. 3 This would be 
represented by a pivoting of the opportunity locus from OP^ to 
OP, such that £(ir)jnax is unchanged, but at a higher as shown 
in figure 3.5. below. It has to be stressed that the effect on the 
demand for money is not at all that unambiguous because it 
essentially depends on the income and substitution effects. Given 
the individual's indifference map, the demand for money could 
either increase or decrease. If equilibrium moves from point in 
figure 3.5. to point E , , this reflects a substitution effect from point 
Eg to, say, point S on indifference curve I ^ and then a weak 
income effect from point S to point E , . Alternatively, there could 
be a strong income effect from S to E j . In the former case, an 
increase in uncertainty actually leads to an increase in the 
proportion of the portfolio held as cash, whereas in the latter case, 
it could lead to a decrease. These changes are equivalent to a fall 
and a rise in the proportion of the portfolio held as bonds, denoted 
by |3* and respectively. Thus there is some ambiguity regarding 
the effect on the demand for money of an increase in uncertainty 
about future interest rates although there is certainly a reduction in 
the individual's utility. 
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£ ( x ) 
F I G U R E 3.5: Effect of a change in uncertainty of the interest 
rate on the demand for money. 
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Now consider a change in transactions costs whose effect is 
to move the opportunity locus towards a straight line such as OP^ 
in figure 3.6. below. The reason for this is quite clear: consider 
equation [27] and let proportional transactions costs approach zero. 
The opportunity locus will then reduce to a linear form such as 
E(r) = E ( r ) ( a j a ^ ) 
Furthermore, will also increase in response to falling transactions 
costs, approaching Of as k approaches zero.'' In figure 3.6., the 
initial opportunity locus is given by OPg, with = a^, and the 
individual is at an optimum at point such that the individual 
wil l hold a proportion /3* in bonds. When proportional transactions 
costs fal l , the opportunity locus will pivot towards the straight 
opportunity locus - this is shown in figure 3.6. by a shift of O?^ 
to O P , , and will increase to a , . Here, it is being assumed 
that a strong income effect is in operation so that the individual is 
now optimising at point E, where the proportion held as bonds has 
risen from |3* to p*. If proportional transactions fall to zero (if 
ever), then the opportunity locus will become O P j which is linear 
itself, and will be equal to g^. Again, assuming a strong 
income effect, the individual will now optimise at point and the 
proportion held as bonds will rise further to (3*. As figure 3.6. is 
drawn, there is a decline in the demand for transactions balances 
with an increase in utihty for the individual. 
In the last case, it will be seen that the opportunity locus 
OP 2 is indistinguishable from Tobin's opportunity locus. The 
implication would be that cash balances would only be held as an 
142 
£ ( x ) t 
0 
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FIGURE 3.6: Effect of a fall in proportional transactions 
costs on the demand for money given 
uncertainty about interest rates. 
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asset and not for transactions balances. Given that there were 
interest-bearing assets in existence that were immume from capital 
loses, one would have to consider carefully if any cash balances 
would be held ever at all (Podolski (1986), pp .205-207). 
Having discussed the alternative theories of the demand for 
money which have been extended to include uncertainty in the 
pattern of disbursements and receipts, and uncertainty in interest 
rates, the overall picture seems to be that faUing transactions costs 
and increased uncertainty in interest rates may lead to a reduction 
in the demand for transactions balances, although such an outcome 
is of course dependent on the relative strengths of the substitution 
and income effects as the analysis in the last few paragraphs has 
already demonstrated. The rest of this chapter will now be mainly 
concerned with the empirical work that has already been undertaken 
in order to investigate whether or not financial innovation has been 
largely reponsible for the instability of the demand for money. 
3.2. Innovations as a time trend 
3.2.1. A priori justification 
It has been argued by Lieberman (1977, p.308) that it is 
possible to mis-specify a standard empirical demand-for-money 
function simply by ignoring the effects of technological change. 
Even if interest rates and the volume of transactions were held 
constant, there would still be strong a priori reasons why the 
demand for money would decline over time. Consider again 
equation [6] which was given in sub-section 3.1.1(b) above. This 
equation depicts a theoretical demand for money function in which 
a denotes the constant term. On closer inspection, it will be seen 
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that a is equal to i(2b)^, and one can hardly call the term a a 
'constant' if brokerage fees are allowed to change over time. When 
brokerage fees decline, this, ceteris paribus, would be reflected in 
a downward shift in the demand for money function. By the 
explicit exclusion of brokerage fees in the empirical specification of 
the demand for money function, one is likely to come up with 
biased estimates of its coefficients. 
In order to overcome such difficulties, several approaches 
have been proposed in order to try and capture the effects of 
innovation on the demand for money. One possible approach 
would have been to include brokerage fees explicitly in the 
specification, but, as will be seen in section 3.5. below, such an 
approach suffers from the major drawback that there is a relative 
paucity of data on brokerage fees. 
One alternative approach suggested by Lieberman (1977, 
p.309) would have been to include variables that measure the level 
of activity in an innovative process or technique. Thus, for 
example, one could use the volume of credit card credit to reflect 
the trend away from making payments with conventional transactions 
balances into payments by credit cards. This was an approach that 
was utilised by Johnston (1984) for the United Kingdom. Such 
variables included the number of bank current accounts per head of 
population, the number of building society accounts per head of 
population, the total number of credit cards issued, and the number 
of ATMs in operation. Unfortunately, such variables only reflect a 
small sub-set of the vast range of financial innovations that have 
taken place so far. Even if one were to include all variables 
showing the level of activity in the most significant financial 
145 
innovations, there are many problems that have to be contended 
with. Firstly, how are significant financial innovations to be 
defined? The difficulties inherent in such a definition are quite 
clear. Secondly, there is the problem that a large number of 
financial innovations would not be very amenable to econometric 
analysis since a large number of variables in an empirical 
specification of the demand for money would be likely to reduce 
the number of degrees of freedom on which to base statistical tests. 
The inclusion of a large number of variables, according to Judd and 
Scadding (1982, p.993), would be likely to violate the criterion of a 
stable demand for money function on the grounds that a relationship 
that requires a large number of variables to order to pin it down 
is, in effect, not predictable. 
The approach suggested by Lieberman (1977, p.309) is to use 
a simple linear time trend as an additional variable. In justifying 
such an approach, Lieberman has made a subtle distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous innovations. He argues that interest 
rates not only reflects the opportunity cost of holding conventional 
transactions balances, but also the 'induced improvements in 
technology which tend to reduce money demand.' As will be seen 
later on in section 3.3., this is an idea not far removed from that 
of Porter and Simpson (1980) regarding the effect of high interest 
rates on the rate of investment in new improved money-management 
techniques which are designed to economise on conventional 
transactions balances in face of persistently high opportunity costs. 
Lieberman goes on to argue that 'a separate technological change 
variable is necessary to measure the effects of exogenously produced 
technological change.' One of the simplest ways of capturing the 
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effect of technological change on the demand for money would be 
to include an exponential decay term whose parameter measures the 
mean rate of technological change per annum. Such a variable, of 
course, reflects the view that technological change over the post-war 
period has been characterised by a steady process of change. 
Thus, in addition to conventional specifications of empirical 
demand for money functions given in Chapter One above, a time 
trend variable may be included such that 
^M^IP) = poY^'r^'e^'^'^^^e . . . [ 2 8 ] 
As mentioned in Chapter One, a partial adjustment process of the 
form sirv{MIP)i - fin(M/P)^-i = 7[ 5n(M^/F)^ - 5 n ( M / P ) j _ i ] 
may be included after taking the logarithms of equation [28] above, 
in which case it becomes: 
Q.r\{MlP)^ = 7^n^o + Y^i^nF^ + yPiinr^ + yp^-t 
( 1 - 7)^n(A//P)^_, + . . . [ 2 9 ] 
where is a stochastic term which is equal to ^ne^ , and each 
variable as used by various empirical studies are defined in Table 
3.1. which will be discussed in detail in the next sub-section. 
3.2.2. Empirical evidence and analysis 
Table 3.1. presents a selection of empirical results derived 
from a comparison of two studies that actually used a time-trend 
variable to represent technological innovation. To facilitate 
comparison with the standard specification of the empirical demand 
for money function, results of regressions for the standard 
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specification are also shown. The first two equations of Table 3.1. 
show the results of regressions run by Lieberman (1977) using 
annual data for the U.S. f rom 1947 until 1973.^ Equation 3.1.1 
shows a conventional specification with a lagged dependent variable 
to take account of the fact that money balances do not adjust fuUy 
to desired levels within a year. As the coefficient to the lagged 
dependent variable shows, it implies an implausibly long adjustment 
period at a rate of about 18.3% per annum. The long-run 
elasticities of the demand for money can be calculated as 0.869 and 
-0.415 for real GNP and the interest rate respectively. The value 
of the income-elasticity implies that there would be no economies 
of scale i n holding transactions balances, and the interest-elasticity 
seems to fa l l fairly close to the accepted theoretical value of -0.5. 
When a time-trend term is added, as shown in equation 
3.1.2 of Table 3 . 1 . , there is some slight improvement in that the 
adjustment period for money balances is now shorter at a rate of 
about 22.8% per annum. However, all but the real GNP and 
lagged dependent variables are now statistically insignificant at the 
5% significance level. Thus, the addition of a time-trend variable 
does not have much of an effect. 
Equations 3.1.3 to 3.1.7. of Table 3 .1 . give some of the 
results reported by Porter and Simpson (1980) which used quarterly 
data f rom 1959 to 1980. Equations 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 show 
regressions for a standard specification of the demand for money 
funct ion. Two regressions were carried out; the first being for the 
period 1959:4-1974:2 and the second being for the period 
1959:4-1980:2. The results are a typical example of the story of 
the breakdown in the demand for money function during the early 
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1970s. Equation 3.1.3 shows that the long-run income elasticity of 
the demand for money is 0.474 which is not far off from the 
theoretical prediction of 0.5. A further feature may also be noted 
in which two interest rates are included in the empirical 
specification; one reflecting the Treasury Bi l l rate, and the second 
reflecting the commercial bank passbook savings rate. It is not 
clear f r o m Porter and Simpson (1980) why two interest rates were 
included, however, i t would probably reflect the nature of U.S. 
banking regulation up to 1980 in which there were a set of 
regulated interest rates that could be paid by commercial banks, and 
another set of open-market interest rates on short-term instruments 
which were unregulated. Thus, the long-run elasticity would be 
given by the sum of the two short-run elasticities divided by the 
coeffcient to the lagged dependent variable: the calculations show a 
value of -0.112 which seems rather small considering the theoretical 
prediction of -0 .5 . The coefficient to the lagged dependent variable 
shows an adjustment rate of about 34% per quarter which indicates 
that complete adjustment w i l l not take place within a year. 
Equation 3.1.4. shows the second regression for the period after 
1974, and i t does indicate that this estimated demand for money 
function is very far off f rom its theoretical counterpart in that there 
is a nonsensical coefficient to the lagged dependent variable in 
excess of unity, leading to nonsensical values for the long-run 
elasticities. 
Equations 3.1.5 to 3.1.7 show the results of regressions that 
include a t ime-trend variable. The most interesting result to come 
f rom equation 3.1.5 is that the coefficient for the time trend 
variable is actually significantly different f rom zero at the 5% 
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significance level, and i t implies that the demand for M I A balances 
during the period 1959-1974 declined at a rate of 0.34 per cent per 
quarter. The coefficient to the lagged dependent variable has now 
increased i n comparison with equation 3.1.1. implying that the 
period of complete adjustment is now longer and still over a year. 
Another interesting feature to note is that the long-run 
income-elasticity has now risen to 0.86 which indicates that there 
are now less economies of scale in holding conventional transactions 
balances. However, the long-run interest elasticity is still rather 
small at -0.123. 
Equation 3.1.7 shows the same period of f i t as for equation 
3.1.4 of Table 3 .1 . It w i l l be noted that the coefficient to the 
lagged dependent variable implies an implausibly long adjustment 
period, and this is reflected i n rather dubious values for the 
income- and interest-elasticities of the demand for money. The 
coefficient to the interest rate on passbook savings has actually 
become positive, although i t is insignificantly different f rom zero at 
the 5% significance level. Thus, overall, it is concluded that the 
addition of a time trend does not have much improvement on the 
emprical demand for money function. 
A major objection against the use of time-trend variables to 
represent technological change has been raised by Porter and 
Simpson (1980, p.176) who say that the use of such variables 
reflects the view that innovations i n cash-management occur at a 
steady rate over time. Such a view is difficult to justify when 
recent economic history is taken into account which indicates that 
there have been observed periods i n which innovations have occured 
at an accelerated pace. There is certainly a case for trying to 
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endogenise innovations in cash-management techniques as they are 
very much influenced by the behaviour of interest rates. Thus the 
fuUowing section considers i n some detail how cash-management 
innovations have been endogenised within the demand for money 
funct ion, and empirical results w i l l , of course, be presented. 
3.3. Innovations i n cash-management 
3.3.1. Outline of theory 
The main proposition put forward by Porter and Simpson 
(1980, p . 165) is that, i n the short run, '...the demand for traditional 
monetary assets is somewhat insensitive to changes in opportunity 
costs but i n the long run the response tends to be much stronger as 
more substitutes are developed and used.' Porter and Simpson 
argue that the presence of record-high interest rates i n the late 
1970s led to record-high opportunity costs for holding ordinary 
transactions balances. The public dis not only try to economise on 
existing cash balances, but they they invested i n new money-
management techniques that were designed to lower the amount of 
transactions balances required for a given amount of spending in a 
climate i n which i t was generally expected that high opportunity 
costs would persist. 
The main reason for the distinction between short-run and 
long-run responses to high opportunity costs of holding transactions 
balances is that when individuals expect persistently high 
opportunity costs, they have an incentive to actively seek ways to 
modify their cash-management systems in order to reduce their 
conventional transactions balances permanently. Porter and Simpson 
(1980, p . 166) contrast this long-run response witht eh short-run 
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response i n which an indiviudal is confronted with a set of given 
cash management techniques by which the individual can economise 
on his conventional transactions balances. Thus, it is contended 
that the short-run demand for money schedule is drawn for a set of 
given money-management techniques whereas the long-run demand 
schedule is drawn so as to allow for variations i n cash-management 
techniques. Owing to the relative unpredictability of financial 
innovations, the short-run demand for money would be relatively 
more predictable than its long-run counterpart. 
It needs to be emphasised that the preceding analysis was 
carried out i n the context of a monetary system in which explicit 
interest payments on demand deposits was expressly prohibited (such 
as was the case i n the U.S. prior to 1980). If expHcit interest 
payments on demand deposits were allowed, would the above 
analysis hold true? A n answer can be provided if one considers a 
banking system in which reserve requirements are operational. 
From the experience of the banks, i t w i l l be seen that individual 
customer accounts are subject to a uncertain cash-flow pattern, and 
one advantage of the bank is the ability to pool such cash-flow 
disturbances such that the aggregate cash-flow disturbance is 
minimised. If it is assumed that such cash-flow disturbances were 
exactly offsetting each other in the aggregate, there would really be 
no need for the bank to undertake management of its reserve assets 
i n order to f u l f i l reserve requirements. Thus, Porter and Simpson 
(1980, p.168) argue that i n the special case where reserve positions 
do not fluctuate, the costs of reserve management by the bank wi l l 
approach zero. Thus, a bank would be able to offer rates of 
return on its demand deposits equivalent to those offered on short-
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term market instruments. However, i n spite of much diversification 
by the bank, there always exists the possibility that the bank's 
reserve position w i l l be subject to some form of fluctuation because 
cash-flow disturbances for each of the bank's customers do not 
exactly offset each other i n the aggregate. In such a case, the bank 
has to undertake the costs of managing its reserve position, and 
such costs w i l l be passed on to its demand deposit customers in the 
form of lower yields. Thus, there wi l l exist a differential between 
rates of return on demand deposits and those on short-term market 
instruments so that such a differential would be equivalent to the 
opportunity cost of holding conventional transactions balances. Of 
course, such opportunity costs would be lower in this case where 
interest is being paid on demand deposits than i n the case where 
no interest is being paid, but the incentive to invest i n improved 
cash-management techniques is still there, albeit in a weakened 
f o r m . Even i f one were to consider a banking system in which no 
reserve requirements are operational, the bank still has to maintain 
some reserves as a prudential measure in meeting some of its 
customers' daily withdrawal patterns so that the bank still incurs 
costs of managing its reserves. Thus, the higher the opportunity 
cost is, and the longer i t is expected to persist, the greater wi l l be 
the incentive to invest i n new cash-management techniques. 
There are also other factors which may serve to strengthen 
the incentive to invest i n new cash-management techniques in face 
of persistently high opportunity costs. The increasing proliferation of 
close substitutes to conventional transactions balances is Likely to 
increase the incentive to invest i n cash-management techniques that 
are designed to transfer surplus funds f rom those demand deposits 
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that have a relatively high opportunity cost to those short-term 
l iquid assets that bear a relatively lower or even zero opportunity 
costs. The ever-continuing pace of technological innovations wi l l 
also serve to reduce even further the transactions costs involved in 
switches between conventional transactions balances and short-term 
l iquid assets. 
3.3.2. The Porter-Simvson model 
In order to give their theory of improved cash-management 
techniques affecting the demand for money a firmer foundation, 
Porter and Simpson (1980, pp.193-198) have developed a model 
that endogenises cash-management techniques into the Mi l le r -Orr 
model of the demand for money. It was seen in sub-section 3.1.2. 
that the main assumption of the Mi l l e r -Or r model is that cash flows 
of the f i r m are subject to some uncertainty, and Porter and Simpson 
argue that this is tantamount to assuming that such cash flows are 
exogenous. They point out that by adopting improved cash-
management techniques, the f i r m is able to reduce the uncertainty 
about its future cash flows. In other words. Porter and Simpson 
have partly endogenised the firm's cash flow by endogenising cash-
management techniques. 
Porter and Simpson denote a unit of cash-management 
services by the variable x, and they assume that the cost of such 
services is fu l ly variable such that the cost of cash management 
services is equal to xe where e denotes the variable cost of cash-
management services. However, they still assume that the 
'brokerage fee' is stiU a fixed cost. Furthermore, a function g ( x ) 
is defined by Porter and Simpson which reflects a factor, taking on 
a value between zero and unity, that reduces the variance of the 
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firm's cash flow. Thus, i f a f i r m purchases x units of cash-
management services, then the variance of its future cash flows is 
reduced f rom o ^ to a ^g(\). It is quite clear that i f the firm does 
not invest i n any cash-management services, then the variance of 
the firm's future cash flows remains unchanged, namely that 
g ( 0 ) = 1 . As the firm purchases even more cash-management 
services, g ( x ) wiH faf l at a decelerating rate so that beyond a 
certain point , diminishing marginal returns w i l l set i n , that is, 
g ' ( x ) < 0 and g " ( x ) > O.e 
Following the same exposition as given i n Miller and Orr 
(1966, p.423), Porter and Simpson (1980, p.193) have shown that 
the expected cost function is given by 
= ^ ^ ^ g ( ^ ) + ^ ( ^ ' + + xe 
l i t -3 
z {h - z ) 
where all the variables have the same definitions as those given 
prior to equation [22] i n sub-section 3.1.2. above, except for x and 
e which were defined i n the preceding paragraph. Note that primes 
have been added to the variables h and z to make it clear that 
they are denominated i n single currency units where, as before, 
h' = hY and z' = zY. Recalling that = y^^^ the preceding 
expression can be re-arranged into a form that w i l l be directly 
comparable wi th equation [22]: 
^(^) = btgjx) ^ rY[ih - z) + 2z] + ^30^ 
z(h - z) 3 
which is a form based on the exposition of Orr (1970). As can be 
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seen quite readily, the only difference between equations [22] and 
[30] is the presence of the factor g ( x ) and the cost of cash-
management services, xe. As before, the firm is assumed to 
minimise its expected costs so that the necessary conditions for a 
minimum are that 
,E(c) _ - ^ ^ g ^ ^ ) + £ = 0 . . . [ 3 1 ] 
3 d(h - z) (h - z ) ' z 
and 
^E{c) ^ -btg{\) + 2rY ^ Q . . . [ 3 2 ] 
z \ h - z) 
There is also a further condition to be satisfied i f x is to be chosen 
so as to minimise E{c): 
^ ^ ( ^ ) = ^ ^ g ' ( ^ ) + e = 0 . . . [ 3 3 ] 
dx z(h - z) 
The above equations can be solved to give the following 
expressions, after remembering to convert back z and h into single 
currency units: 
hY = 3M . ..[34] 
where i t is to be recalled that zY = M, and 
-M g ' ( ^ ) = ^ . . . [ 3 5 ] 
g ( x ) 2r 
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and 
^ 3 ^ 36a g ( x ) . . . [ 3 6 ] 
4A-
It is now required to show that under cash-management innovation, 
the interest-elasticity for the demand for money wiU be greater in 
absolute value than - W 3 , namely that 
diitiM ^ _ 1 
JInr 3 
It is first necessary to take logarithms of equation [36] above, and 
then differentiate i t with respect to Unr: 
dQnM ^ _ 1 ^ 1 d f i ng (x ) 
a^nr 3 3 a^nr 
The reason for the second term in the above expression is that as 
interest rates change, g ( x ) wi l l change via a change in x. The 
interest-elasticity of the demand for money is therefore 
a^nM ^ _ 1 ^ 1 . a^ng(x ) ax ^3^^ 
a^n7 3 3 ax a^nr 
According to the definitions given by Porter and Simpson (discussed 
above) of the function g ( x ) , it can be seen that g ' ( x ) < 0, and 
the second term w i l l be negative if and only i f ax/a^nr > 0. 
Such a requirement is not too difficult to justify on a priori 
grounds i f one considers that the f i rm varies its investment i n cash-
management techniques i n direct response to changes i n interest 
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rates. Thus, f rom equation [35], the interest-elasticity is 
unambiguously greater i n absolute value under conditions when 
cash-management techniques are allowed to vary rather than for 
given cash-management techniques. 
Porter and Simpson (1980, p.193, equation A - 4 ) have 
derived a ' fourth-root ' demand for money function for the case 
where cash-management techniques are allowed to vary for a 
specific form of the function g ( x ) . Their procedure, i f carried 
over to the general form of the function g ( x ) , would have given 
= -9bo^e[g(^)r j3g^ 
8 / - ^ g ' ( x ) 
which is achieved by multiplying equation [36] above throughout by 
M and substituting for M on the right hand side f rom equation 
[37] . As argued in sub-section 3.1.2(c) above, the long-run 
demand for money is given by = {hY + M ) / 3 = 4M/3 so 
that f rom equation [36] above, the long-run demand for money 
when cash-management innovations have been endogenised is 
3 
-9ba'e[g(x) y 
8 r ^ g ' ( x ) 
. . . [ 3 9 ] 
This expression w i l l only be valid i f g ' ( x ) < 0. Consider for 
example a specific form of the function g ( x ) = 1/(1 + x) where 
g ' ( x ) = - 1 / ( 1 + x ) 2 . Therefore the long run demand for money 
would be given by = a[ (ba ^e)/8r ^ ]^ where 
K = ( 4 / 3 ) ( 9 / 8 ) i . 
There are two ways of capturing the effects of high interest 
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rates on cash-management innovations; firstly by using past-peak 
variables, and secondly, by using ratchet variables. Their a priori 
justifications wiU be discussed i n the next sub-section along with 
empirical results. 
3.3.3 .The use of ratchet variables as proxies 
One justification for the use of previous-peak interest rates 
in empirical demand for money specifications is that there may be 
termed as an 'awareness threshold' in which a greater awareness of 
higher opportunity costs of holding conventional transactions balances 
may come about as a result of interest rates surpassing their 
previous peak. (Porter and Simpson (1980), pp.179-180) When 
awareness of higher opportunity costs has become accentuated in 
times of high interest rates, i t creates a favourable climate for 
arousing greater interest in new cash-management techniques in the 
anticipation that interest rates wi l l continue to be higher in the 
future. So, what was originally deemed to be unprofitable, new 
cash-management techniques w i l l now become profitable, and once 
investment in such techniques has already taken place, it tends to 
have a permanent effect on the demand for money, even after 
interest rates have fallen beyond their previous peak. Thus, 
previous peak interest rates that are included in empirical demand 
for money functions may serve well to capture the effects of 
innovation. 
However, it has to be recognised that investment in new 
cash-management techniques does not simply take place overnight; in 
fact, i t would be more reasonable to postulate that such investments 
take time to implement. As previously discussed i n Chapter Two, 
there are numerous factors that determine the rate of diffusion of 
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financial innovations. For instance, the technology required to 
implement the new cash-management techniques may have to be 
developed, and there are also 'learning periods' in which firms and 
individuals seek to familarise themselves with the new technology 
before adapting i t on a wider scale. Given that there are delays 
inherent i n the implementation of new cash-management techniques, 
i t is reasonable to take the view that such innovations wiU take 
time to have a significant effect on the demand for money. Thus, 
Porter and Simpson (1980) suggest the use of a ratchet variable (as 
opposed to previous-peak variables) would be more appropriate 
under the circumstances. 
Porter and Simpson (1980) then go on to define the ratchet 
variable which is the cumulative sum of positive terms, each term 
being the differences between an opportunity cost variable, vj, and 
a n-per iod moving average of the most recent opportunity cost 
variables, vi for / = j - (n - 1 ) , . . . , ; so that 
1 
J n i=j-n+l ^ 
. . . [ 4 0 ] 
The notation ( )"*" is used by Porter and Simpson to denote the 
fact that i f the current opportunity cost variable is greater than the 
moving average, then the positive difference is added to the 
cumulative sum; otherwise a negative difference adds nothing. 
As previously discussed i n the last sub-section, i f interest 
rates rise beyond a certain threshold effect, then the Porter-Simpson 
model predicts a rise i n the interest-elasticity of the demand for 
money during the long run. Thus, Porter and Simpson (1980, 
p . 183) consider different functional forms for the ratchet variable in 
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order to capture the variability i n interest-elasticities as interest rates 
rise beyond a threshold level. In particular, they consider three 
functional forms, viz: linear, linear times logarithm, and power 
transformation. The linear functional fo rm, s^, w i l l give an interest 
elasticity of c^ ^ where c is the coefficient to the ratchet variable in 
the regression, and the linear times logarithmic functional fo rm, 
Sixi^n(si), will give an interest-elasticity of c j f [ 1 + iln{si) ]. As 
w i l l be seen i n the following analysis of empirical results, it seems 
that Porter and Simpson (1980) regard this functional form for the 
ratchet variable as giving the best overall performance, and this is 
confirmed by Porter and Offenbacher (1984, p.92, footnote 5) who 
say that this form has been 'used exclusively'. The final funcfional 
form to be considered is the power transformation fo rm, s\. It is 
not explicitly clear f rom Porter and Simpson what the parameter x 
does represent. It would be plausible to assume that this stood for 
the number of units of cash-management services purchased, as 
previously defined i n the last sub-section. Thus, i f x were to 
increase, then s} would increase, leading to a rise in the interest-
elasticity of c\s}. Porter and Simpson also included another 
functional form of the ratchet variable which is ^ n ( 5 f ) , that has the 
property of constant elasiticity. 
Porter and Simpson used a ShiUer distributed lag estimafion 
technique i n which they use a four-quarter lag for the Treasury Bi l l 
rate, a three-quarter lag for real GNP, a six-quarter lag for the 
money management ratchet variable, and the passbook savings rate 
entered the regression contemporaneously. Except for the ratchet 
variable, the regression equation was entered i n double logarithmic 
form: 
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3 
j=0 •' j=0 •' •' 
. . . [ 4 1 ] 
No lagged dependent variable was specified. Some selected results 
of the above regression are shown in Table 3.4., and will be 
discussed later on. 
Consider Tables 3.2. and 3.3. which summarise some 
selected empirical results from regressions that include previous-
peak {not ratchet) variables as proxies for innovation. Table 3.2. 
shows two regressions selected from Goldfeld (1976) which show the 
effect of the addition of the previous-peak in commercial paper 
rates, Tp. Equation 3.2.1. of Table 3.2. shows a typical regression 
for a standard specification of the demand for money. Whilst it is 
not possible to say anything about the overall improvement in the 
fit to the data resulting from the addition of the previous-peak 
variable in equation 3.2.2. as figures for were not reported by 
Goldfeld (1976), it is possible to discern some improvement in the 
properties of the specification contained in equation 3.2.2 from those 
of the standard specification. For example, the coefficient to the 
lagged dependent variable has decreased from 0.822 to 0.767, 
implying that the adjustment period has shortened somewhat, but 
still rather long. Furthermore, a test of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient to the previous-peak variable is insignificantly different 
from zero indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 
5% significance level, implying that the previous-peak variable is 
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TABLE 3.3: Post sample errors resulting from dynamic 
simulations for conventional demand for money 
functions and those containing previous-peak 
variables. 
Annual errors 
Aggreg-
at e 
Specific-
at ion 
Samp Ie 
period 
Simulation 
period 
Mean RMSE 
GMl Conv. 52: 2-
73: 4 
74: 1 
76: 2 
n. a. 4. 8 
GMl P.P. 52: 2-
73: 4 
74: 1-
76: 2 
n. a. 3. 6 
DD Conv. 55: 4-
74: 2 
74: 3-
80: 2 
-4 . 58 6. 31 
DD P.P. 55: 4-
74: 2 
74: 3-
80: 2 
-3 . 76 4. 20 
MIB Conv. 59: 4-
74: 2 
74: 3-
80: 2 
-2 . 56 4. 27 
MIB P.P. 55: 4-
74: 2 
74: 3-
80: 2 
- 1 . 68 2. 43 
Source. 
Notes. 
Tables 5 & 6 in Goldfeld (1976, pp.696 & 701), and 
Tables B - 1 , B-2, B-6, & B-7 in Porter and Simpson 
(1980, pp .206-207, 208-209, 224-225, & 226). 
Conv. = Conventional specification, 
that includes previous-peak interest 
definition used in Goldfeld (1976) 
M I A , DD = Demand deposits in 
(1980), and M I A and MIB are 
defined in Table 3.4. below for 
(1980). 
P.P. = Specification 
rate, GMl = M l 
but is equivalent to 
Porter and Simpson 
those aggregates as 
Porter and Simpson 
Figures for annual mean errors and RMSEs are given in 
percentages. 
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another important explanatory variable. Further insight into the 
empirical results can be obtained by considering Table 3.3. which 
presents a summary of selected results showing mean annual errors 
and root mean square errors arising from dynamic simulations of 
demand for money functions based on equations 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. of 
Table 3.2. for Goldfeld (1976), and similar specifications for Porter 
and Simpson (1980).^ The results do indicate an overall reduction 
in both annual mean errors and root mean square errors for those 
specifications that include previous-peak variables. 
Consider now Tables 3.4. and 3.5. which show some 
selected results of the empirical work of Porter and Simpson (1980). 
The period of simulation was 1974:3-1980:2 which is the same 
simulation period for the conventional specifications of the demand 
for money function and those containing a previous-peak variable.^ 
It will be seen from Table 3.5. that the demand for money function 
that contains a logarithmic-times-linear functional form for the 
ratchet variable seems to have the best overall performance in terms 
of the smallest RMSE for both quarterly and annual errors. When 
the annual RMSEs are compared with those given in the last four 
rows of Table 3.3., it will be seen that the use of a ratchet 
variable instead of a previous-peak variables gives superior results, 
except for the case of constant-elasticity ratchet variables which 
seems to substantiate the theory put forward by Porter and Simpson 
that the interest-elasticity increases over the long-run when 
cash-management techniques are allowed to vary. 
Having established that Porter and Simpson arrived at the 
'best' demand for money which includes the linear-times-log 
specification for the ratchet variable. Table 3.4. shows a summary 
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TABLE 3.5: Post sample errors resulting from simulations 
for demand for money functions containing 
ratchet variables. 
Quarterly errors Annual errors 
Aggreg-
at e. 
Sped f i c -
ation of 
ratchet 
variable. 
Mean RMSE Mean RMSE 
DD Linear -2 . 73 5. 91 -2. 84 3. 46 
DD Log -3 . 98 6. 32 -4 . 16 4. 81 
DD Logxl inear - 2 . 40 5. 69 -2 . 49 3. 22 
DD Pover t r a n s -
format ion 
-0 . 05 6. 46 -0 . 11 3. 68 
MIB Linear -0 . 95 4. 44 - 1 . 00 2. 30 
MIB Log - 1 . 76 4. 75 - 1 . 86 2. 97 
MIB Logxl inear - 0 . 73 4. 43 -0 . 76 2. 31 
MIB Pover t r a n s -
f ormat i on 
-0 . 95 4. 45 - 1 . 00 2. 31 
Source: Table 5 in Porter and Simpson (1980, p.184). 
Notes: Sample period is 1955:1-74:2, and period of simulation is 
1974:3-80:2. 
Specifications of ratchet variables: Linear = Si, Log = 
5n(5 ' f) , Logxlinear = 5fx5n(5f), and Power 
transformation = s\. 
DD = Demand deposits in Porter and Simpson (1980), 
and M I B is the aggregate as defined in Table 3.4. above 
for Porter and Simpson (1980). 
Figures for quarterly and annual mean errors and RMSEs 
are given in percentages. 
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of the regression results for the linear-times-log specification. A 
study of the 't'-ratios in Table 3.4. for the ratchet variables in all 
equations indicate that the inclusion of such variables should be 
encouraged on the grounds of their statistical significance at the 5% 
significance level, and it does seem that their statistical significance 
increases as the sample period is extended beyond 1974 to 1980. 
In judging the stability of their demand for money functions 
for various aggregates, Porter and Simpson (1980, p.202) compare 
income- and interest-elasticities for each specification over two 
sample periods. Thus, for example, equations 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 of 
Table 3.4. indicate that the long-run income-elasticity has fallen 
from 0.506 to 0.448 for the demand deposits aggregate, whereas for 
the M I B aggregate, it has fallen from 0.527 to 0.512 as the sample 
period is extended to 1980 from 1974. Furthermore, the elasticity 
for the Treasury Bill rate with respect to demand deposits has fallen 
in absolute value from 0.030 to 0.027, whereas for M I B , it has 
fallen in absolute value from 0.027 to 0.026. Thus, it could have 
been concluded that such demand for money functions exhibited 
remarkable stability. However, the picture becomes rather doubtful 
when the passbook savings rate elasticities are considered: all 
equations in Table 3.4. indicate a sharp fall in absolute value. It 
has been suggested by Porter and Simpson (1980, pp .201-202) that 
this may be due to the fact that the passbook savings rate is a 
primitive form of proxy for cash-management techniques, and that 
the sharp fall in the passbook savings rate elasticity may be more 
than offset by the change in the elasticity for the ratchet variable so 
that there would tend to be a small fall in the absolute value of 
the combined 'cash-management impacts' elasticity. On the facr of 
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such evidence, Porter and Simpson conclude that such equations for 
the M I B aggregate are 'remarkably stable.' 
However, in a later study, Porter and Offenbacher (1984, 
pp .54-55) admit that such a specification containing ratchet variables 
cannot be expected to hold up well. The reason is that, even 
increasing interest-elasticities caused by innovations in cash-
management has a basis in theory, in practice, there are any 
number of functional forms for the ratchet variable which would 
exhibit increasing elasticities so that the choice of the best functional 
form for the ratchet variable is essentially an arbitrary one. 
Secondly, the specification that includes ratchet variables assumes 
that all cash-management innovations are purely endogenous. It is 
not too difficult to recognise that there are also other forms of 
cash-management innovations which are exogenous, namely that pure 
technological change (such as improvements in information 
technology) have no relationship to interest rates when they rise 
beyond a threshold level. In light of the discussion on the 
distinction made by Lieberman (1977) between endogenous and 
exogenous innovations (discussed in Section 3.2. above), it would be 
well worth while to try the inclusion of a time-trend variable in 
Porter-Simpson equation in future empirical work, in spite of the 
fact that exogenous technological innovations are assumed to occur 
smoothly over time. If such an approach fails, then one must try 
to consider new ways of allowing for the effects of exogenous 
technological change on the demand for money. 
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3.4. The problem of brokerage fees 
A considerable part of this chapter was devoted to the 
discussion of the importance of transactions costs in the first section. 
It was clear that a fall in transactions costs, however defined, will 
invariably lead to a decline in the demand for cash balances. 
Virtually all empirical studies of the demand for money were unable 
to include any form of 'brokerage fee' variable in their specifications 
of the demand for money simply because there was no brokerage 
fee series available. Even if a brokerage fee series existed at all, 
there still would be some formidable difficulties of trying to quantify 
such transactions costs, because, as pointed out in sub-section 
3.1.1(b) above, the brokerage fee also includes some subjective costs 
which may include, for instance, the premium on time an individual 
may place by having to queue up at the cashier's window in a 
bank, or even the time and effort required by the individual in 
communicating with his stockbroker. Even if there was no 
subjective component in the brokerage fee, there is still the problem 
of finding a 'representive' asset on which to base a brokerage fee 
series: this problem is not too far removed from that one of 
deciding upon the appropriate interest rate to be included in an 
empirical specification of the demand for money. 
In order to overcome such problems, Porter and Offenbacher 
(1984) present a highly unorthodox way of deriving a brokerage fee 
series, which if taken too literally, would have led to some highly 
spurious empirical results when analysing the stability of the demand 
for money. The reason why such an unorthodox method of 
deriving a brokerage fee series is being discussed here is to warn 
against the adoption of such unorthodox methodology. 
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3.4.1. The methodology of Porter and Offenbacher (1984) 
(a) The derivation of the debits equation. Porter and Offenbacher 
(1984, pp .55-66 and pp .92-93, footnote 8) have shown how a 
brokerage fee series could be derived by solving for the brokerage 
fee, b, from the money demand and debits equations. In order to 
derive the debits equation. Porter and Offenbacher use the 
Miller-Orr probabilistic inventory-theoretic model, discussed in 
sub-section 3.1.2. above. First, it can be recalled from equation 
[21] in sub-section 3.1.2, above that the probability of a transaction 
occuring in either direction was defined to be:^ 
P{T) = t l [ z { h - z ) ] .[21 repeated] 
where h denotes the 'ceiling' cash balance which triggers off a 
transfer of (h - z) into interest-bearing assets, and z denotes the 
level of the cash balance that the firm will return to after a 
transfer, and t denotes the number of times which the cash balance 
changes either by +Y or -Y; in other words, it may be regarded as 
the 'turnover' rate. However, Porter and Offenbacher (1984, p.92) 
argue that the probability of debiting the current account (i.e. cash 
balance) is quite distinct from the probability of a transaction 
occuring in either direction. Thus, they define the probabihty of a 
debit occuring, P{D), as: 
P{D) = t/[h{h - z) ] . . . [42] 
and it is argued that expected debits, E(D) are given by 
P(D) (h - z) so that 
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E{D) = tlh = tIZz 
after recalling from sub-section 3.1.2(a) that h = 3 2 . Now, the 
preceding expression is denominated in Y currency units, so in 
order to convert to single currency units, the preceding expression 
has to be multiplied throughout by Y to get 
d = E{D)Y = tYfSz 
It wil l be recalled from the discussion of the Miller-Orr model that 
the optimal demand for money was given by 
3b t 
2 = - 3 / 47y 
SO that when substituted into the preceding expression for expected 
debits, 
(3d) ^ = ^^^^ = 4y^f2A- ^ 4(7 
(3bt/4rY) 3b~ ~3b~ 
after noting that (Y^t)^ = (o^)^ = a"*. A final re-arrangement 
gives the debits equation:' 0 
d = I / t : i . . . [ 4 3 ] 
3 /</ 3b 
It is interesting to note that as the interest rate rises, the number of 
debits will increase, and as brokerage fees decline, the number of 
debits will also increase. 
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(b) The derivation of the brokerage fee series. Having derived 
the debits equation, Porter and Offenbacher proceed to derive an 
indirect brokerage fee series. They show that the turnover of non-
financial debits is given hy t = dIM so that 
t = 
1 4cT r 
3b~ 
2 / 3 
. . . [ 4 4 ] 
where M has been substituted from equation [23b] in sub-section 
3.1.2(b) above. The preceding expression is then solved for the 
brokerage fee: 
,(0 = 4 
3 
1 
3 
2 / 3 
a^r-
t 3 
. . . [ 4 5 ] 
where the superscript (t) on the brokerage fee indicates one of the 
methods of deriving a brokerage fee series, namely through equation 
[44]. By using debits data, Porter and Offenbacher estimated 
equations for d and M , and then solved them for the brokerage 
fee. A brokerage fee series was then constructed by substituting for 
the transactions and interest rate variables. The resulting brokerage 
fee was then plugged back into the empirical demand for money 
equation which takes the form: 
£n{M/P) = + /3 ,£n(y /P) + p,{in(r) + p^2nib(i)/P) 
+ (>n(M/P)-^ 
Porter and Offenbacher then presented a large amount of statistical 
evidence purporting to show that brokerage fees were responsible for 
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shifts in the demand for money function. However, it would be 
meaningless to analyse their empirical results as the following 
critique of their methodology will indicate. 
3.4.2. A critique of Porter and Offenbacher 
Porter and Offenbacher provide extensive evidence that the 
coefficient to Z)(0 is always positive and highly significant. 
However, their empirical results for the US cannot be commented 
upon in detail simply for the reason that these results are suspect to 
circularity. Let equation [23b] in sub-section 3.1.2(b) above 
re-written so that 
M = a, y ^ . . . [ 4 6 ] 
where a, = ( 3 / 4 ) ^ / 3 . To see how the possibility of circularity 
could come about, suppose that, according to Hein (1984), there 
was an exogenous downward shift in the demand for money so that 
it leads to a reduction in the coefficient a,. Again, let equation 
[42] be re-written so that 
d = a, / . . . [ 4 7 ] 
where = (1/3) (4/3) ' ^ ^. If the Porter-Offenbacher procedure 
of estimating the brokerage fee is followed, the brokerage series so 
derived would show a shift at that point where there was an 
exogenous downward shift in the demand for money. This is 
clearly shown if equation [45] is re-arranged to show the 
coefficients and a2' 
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.(0 
2 / 3 
^ . . . [ 4 8 ] 
t 3 
It is therefore clear that as a, changes, ft(0 will shift. Thus, it 
would have been misleading to conclude that the brokerage fee was 
responsible for the money demand shift, when in fact, it was due to 
an exogenous shift. The results presented by Porter and 
Offenbacher therefore force the conclusion that brokerage fees 
explain the shift in money demand. 
To overcome the circularity problem. Porter and Offenbacher 
(1984, p.63) suggest the inclusion of financial debits as a proxy for 
the brokerage fee which the Miller-Orr model suggests is inversely 
related to the brokerage fee - this may be seen if equation [47] is 
solved for b to give 
bid) = ' 
d 
a^r • • • [ 4 9 ] 
where the superscript (d) on the brokerage fee denotes that this is 
the brokerage fee derived from a debits equation. So, it is seen 
that Porter and Simpson include financial debits as an additonal 
explanatory variable in the empirical demand for money equation. 
However, Hein (1984) has pointed out another weakness in such an 
approach. When the conventional demand for money is estimated 
again with financial debits as an additional variable, the coefficient 
to this variable has negative sign which could lead to further 
misleading conclusions. Consider writing equations [46] and [47] in 
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logarithmic form so that 
M = £n a, + ( l / 3 ) 5 n b + (2 /3 )5n o - ( l / 3 ) 5 n r 
and 
in d = + ( l / 3 ) ^ n r + (4 /3 )5n a - ( l / 3 ) ^ n b 
The logarithmic debits equation can then be solved for the 
brokerage fee so that 
6n b = -36n d + 3<in + ^n r + 4.en a 
which is then substituted into the logarithmic demand for money 
equation to give 
i^n M = (i^n a, + in a^) + 25n a - Q.n d 
From this equation, it should be clear that if financial debits are 
included on the right-hand side of a money demand equation, then 
the specification suggested by Porter and Offenbacher would say that 
interest rates have no e f f e c t , and that the long-run elasticity with 
regard to financial debits would be unity. Their results reject the 
above conclusions suggested by the above equation, and it is on 
these two points that their model has to be rejected. Therefore, 
the hypothesis that lower brokerage fees cause a shift in money 
demand remains unverified. 
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3.4.3. Some tentative suggestions for tackling the problem of 
brokerage fees 
In spite of the efforts of Porter and Offenbacher (1984) to 
overcome difficulties posed by the paucity of data on brokerage fees, 
the hypothesis that the demand for money shifted in response to a 
fall in brokerage fees still remains untested. However, there is an 
interesting question regarding the comparative performance of 
different specifications of the demand for money function. As the 
preceding discussion in sections 3.2 and 3.3. has made it clear, the 
conventional specifications exhibited a tendency to break down when 
the sample period was extended beyond the early 1970s. In 
contrast, a specification that excluded short-run interest rates, but 
included long-run interest rates, such as that given in Hamburger 
(1977) showed a tendency to perform very well in dynamic 
simulations. The main difference was that whilst conventional 
specifications consistently overpredicted money demand. Hamburger's 
specification either tended to overpredict or underpredict money 
demand with only relatively small errors. This question was 
addressed in Hamburger (1984, pp. 112-114) who attempted to 
explain why his specification held up well whilst others had failed. 
Hamburger (1984), in explaining why the conventional 
specification broke down, suggests that financial innovation taking 
the form of lower transactions costs for short-term assets have 
tended to increase the net rate of return on such assets so that less 
money was being held. This is a view of financial innovation 
shared by many researchers on the demand for money, but, 
unfortunately. Hamburger does not explain exactly why his particular 
specification, containing long-term instead of short-term interest 
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rates, did not break down. A highly tentative explanation was put 
forward by Meyer (1984, pp. 122-125) in his discussion of 
Hamburger (1984) which almost certainly gives the idea that a 
careful study of the term structure of interest rates may prove to be 
useful in analysing financial innovation and its effect on the demand 
for money, and may even turn out to be a fruitful avenue for 
future empirical research. 
Meyer (1984), for the sake of argument, introduces a very 
simple term structure equation relating net long-term interest rates 
to net short-term interest rates. Such a relationship, in its most 
basic form, may take the following form: 
(/•/ - bi) = a{rs - bs) . . . [ 5 0 ] 
where the subscripts, / and s, to the interest rates and 'brokerage 
fess' indicate long-term and short-term respectively, and a is a 
constant of proportionality. The above term structure equation is 
seen by Meyer (1984) to be the link between conventional 
specifications of the demand for money and that of Hamburger 
(1977, 1984). In periods prior to the early 1970s, it was a 
reasonable assumption that transactions costs remained constant (or at 
least changed in the same proportion) so that the same relationship 
could exist between gross long-term and short-term interest rates, 
namely that r/ = ar^ without actually having to include transactions 
costs in the term structure equation. Thus, it explains why both 
specifications of the demand for money performed equally well in 
the period prior to the early 1970s, namely that there would not 
have been much difference if gross long-term interest rates were 
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included in the empirical demand for money equation as proxies for 
gross short-term interest rates instead of including the latter rates 
explicitly. 
The picture changes considerably when one relaxes the 
assumption of constant transactions costs. If it is supposed that 
short-term transactions costs have fallen relative to long-term 
transactions costs, then short-term assets would be relatively more 
attractive to hold so that long-term gross and net interest rates must 
rise relative to short-term gross interest rates. Therefore, Meyer 
argues that the explicit inclusion of short-term gross interest rates in 
the empirical demand for money equation will fail to capture the 
effects of financial innovation whereas the inclusion of the long-term 
gross interest rate as a proxy for short-term net interest rates will 
capture such effects, leading to the superior performance of 
Hamburger's money demand equation in the period after the early 
1970s. 
Thus, in conclusion, a careful study of the term structure of 
interest rates may provide some further insights regarding the effects 
of financial innovation on relative net interest rates, and there is 
really no need to base such a study on equation [50] above, as 
there are other term structure equations that are much less 
restrictive. 
3.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has examined in some detail the right hand side 
of the demand for money equation in order to ascertain that 
financial innovation may be reponsible for a reduction in the 
transactions demand for money. In the first section, it was shown 
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that if financial innovation was exemplified by lower transactions 
costs, the demand for money would decline. Given that 
transactions costs are a linear function of the volume of transactions 
(as discussed in sub-section 3.1.1(d)), it is possible to argue that a 
change in the structure of transactions costs is likely to affect the 
interest-elasticity, giving the impression of a unstable demand for 
money function. Various ways of capturing the effects of financial 
innovation were considered. The simplest approach was to use a 
time-trend variable to represent a steady decline in transactions 
costs. However, when one considers how the pace of financial 
innovation has become more rapid in recent years, the use of 
time-trend variables has to be ruled out. The second approach 
considered was the inclusion of previous-peak and ratchet variables 
in empirical demand for money equations. Their inclusion was 
justified on the grounds that there may exist a threshold level 
beyond which interest rates may rise, which may then induce 
investment in cash-management techniques in order to economise on 
cash balances in face of persistently high opportunity costs, and such 
investments are irreversible. The empirical evidence presented 
indicated that a specification including ratchet variables was superior 
to those that proxied innovations by either previous-peak variables 
or time-trends. However, the use of ratchet variables reflects the 
assumption that all innovations were endogenous. It is not too 
difficult to find examples of exogenous innovations that will also 
affect the demand for money so that some effort must be devoted 
to finding ways in which the effects of exogenous innovations may 
be captured in addition to those of endogenous innovations. A 
controversial method of explicitly including brokerage fees in the 
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empirical demand for money was considered. The main essence of 
the approach was to derive an indirect brokerage fee series by 
solving for the brokerage fee from the money demand and debits 
equations. However, such a specification will have circularity 
problems in that an exogenous shift in the demand for money 
would also be reflected in a shift in the brokerage fee series so 
forcing the conclusion that brokerage fees were responsible for the 
shift in the demand for money. When an attempt was made to 
overcome the circularity problem by including financial debits as a 
proxy for the brokerage fee, the interest rate disappeared from the 
demand for money equation which is inconsistent with the theory of 
the transactions demand for money. As long as there is a paucity 
of data on brokerage fees, the problem of capturing adequately the 
effects of financial innovation on the demand for money are hkely 
to persist. Finally, a potentially promising avenue for future 
research was briefly considered in which shifts in the term structure 
of interest rates may reflect a underlying change in relative 
transactions costs of long- and short-term assets. It is suggested 
that a careful study of the term structure of interest rates may 
provide some further insights into the effects of financial innovation 
on the demand for money. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MONEY SUBSTITUTES AND AGGREGATION 
The previous chapter considered the effects of financial 
innovation on the right hand side of the demand for money 
equation, namely, on transactions costs, and cash-management 
techniques. There is, however, still another aspect of financial 
innovation that needs to be considered. It is the increasing 
proliferation of new close substitutes for traditional forms of money 
that has had an important influence on the behaviour of monetary 
aggregates which are often used as dependent variables on the left 
hand side of the demand for money equation. 
In recent times, concern has been expressed regarding the 
validity of conventional simple-sum aggregation procedures for the 
aggregation of monetary assets since such procedures implicitly 
allocate equal weights to each component of the monetary aggregate, 
which often implies that there exists perfect substitutability among all 
assets contained in that aggregate. Especially in the case of broad 
aggregates, such a presumption is hardly justified. Before addressing 
the aggregation problem, it is most natural that the definition of 
money be considered first in section 4.1. This discussion will draw 
upon the extensive literature of a priori and empirical definitions of 
money. 
After having discussed the identification and definition of 
money, the aggregation problem, in its most fundamental form, 
involves deciding upon which monetary assets are to be included in 
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the monetary aggregate. This is usually done with reference to the 
substitutability among assets by the use of conventional demand for 
money studies. However, such approaches are rather unsatisfactory 
because it can lead to an 'all-or-nothing' criterion in the case of 
simple-sum aggregation because, if on the one hand, such assets 
were not deemed to be sufficiently close substitutes to those assets 
contained in the aggregate, then they would be excluded. Thus, 
there is always a possibility of understating the amount of monetary 
services which is the information that a monetary aggregate is 
supposed to provide. On the other hand, if such assets were found 
to be sufficiently 'close' substitutes, then their inclusion in the 
monetary aggregate would be 'justified', but only at the peril of 
overstating the amount of monetary services available. Thus, the 
second part of section 4.2. considers the derivation of weighted 
monetary aggregates by the application of economic aggregation 
theory which fundamentally involves the specification and estimation 
of utility functions. 
In spite of the many attractions that economic aggregation 
theory has to offer, there still exists an element of arbitrariness in 
the specification of utility functions and 'budget' constraints and 
their estimation. To overcome such difficulties, an alternative is 
proposed which utilises index-number theory. This latter approach 
has its merits because the construction of quantity indices only 
depends on the existence of observable prices and quantities. The 
Divisia quantity index has been proposed as the basis on which 
monetary quantity indices can be constructed. Such an approach is 
considered in section 4.3. which also presents a critique of monetary 
quantity indices. One of the biggest problems likely to be faced by 
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the monetary authorities in the use of Divisia monetary indices is 
that there is a need to forecast each separate quantity and price of 
each component of the index which may pose some particular 
difficulties such as information-processing capabilities, and so forth. 
Section 4.4. considers some empirical evidence which looks at the 
relative performance of Divisia aggregates vis-a-vis conventional sum 
aggregates. 
4.1. The definition of money 
Before considering the problem of aggregating over monetary 
aggregates, it is first necessary to consider some approaches to the 
definition of money in order to see whether or not any generally-
accepted definition of money exists. To attempt an aggregation of 
money, however defined, before the conceptualisation and definition 
of money takes place would be tantamount to 'putting the cart 
before the horse.' Fundamentally, there are two basic approaches 
to the definition of money, viz: a priori and empirical approaches. 
The former approach strives to arrive at a working definition of 
money by resorting to a priori considerations of its essential 
functions and qualities, and the latter approach attempts to do the 
same but by resorting to empirical means such as dual correlation 
and stability of demand for money criteria. 
4.1.1. 'A priori' approaches 
Money is usually viewed in terms of its functions, viz: a unit 
of account, a store of value, a means of payment or medium of 
exchange, and a standard of deferred payment. But, for the 
purposes of aggregation over monetary assets, the main emphasis is 
on money functioning either as a means of payment or medium of 
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exchange since a monetary aggregate serves to measure the amount 
of monetary services available. The term 'monetary services' is 
taken here to refer to the main function of money as a means of 
payment or medium of exchange, and special care has to be taken 
to separate this function of money from its store of value function 
because, as will be seen later, this function is what makes money 
into an asset in the conventional sense which is quite distinct from 
a monetary asset, namely that the latter offers a flow of liquidity 
or monetary services whereas the former functions as a store of 
wealth. 
The following theoretical discussion is, therefore, organised as 
follows. Firstly, the function of money as a unit of account and as 
a store of value wdll be briefly touched upon. Then, the rest of 
this sub-section will be devoted to money functioning either as a 
means of payment or as a medium of exchange, with some 
reference being made to the effects of financial innovation on the 
distinction between a means of payment and a medium of exchange. 
(a) Money as a unit of account. Money functioning as a unit of 
account is an abstract form of money which serves as a common 
denominator, in terms of which the exchange value of all other 
goods and services can be expressed. It has been argued by 
Brunner and Meltzer (1971, p.787) that the introduction of a unit 
of account reduces the number of exchange ratios that need to be 
known to only N-1 ratios, where N is the number of commodities 
in existence in the economy.^ This may be contrasted with the 
case of a barter economy in which it is necessary to have a 
knowledge of the exchange ratio for each separate pair of 
commodities so that the total number of exchange ratios is equal to 
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[(N - l)N]/2. Thus, the introduction of a unit of account serves 
to reduce the costs involved in collecting and processing the 
information contained in the exchange ratios. Money, as a unit of 
account, must have the essential quality that each unit is identical 
to each other in terms of quality. 
(b) Money as a store of value. The means of payment represents 
generalised purchasing power, so that it may be held and act as a 
store of value or wealth until the point in time at which the 
individual wishes to exercise his purchasing power. Thus, it could 
be argued, for analytical purposes in this chapter, that such assets 
may be seen to have two main attributes, viz: means of payment, 
and store of wealth. Of course, such attributes can come in 
varying proportions for each different asset. At the one end of the 
spectrum, currency possesses the full attribute of means of payment, 
whereas a very negligible proportion may be a store of wealth 
attribute.2 At the other end of the spectrum, there exists some 
assets that possess the fuH attribute of store of wealth (such as 
equities, or to take an even more extreme example, residential 
properties), but hardly fulf i l the function of a means of payment. 
Somewhere along the spectrum of assets, there will exist a certain 
class of assets that are capable of being realised as means of 
payment at relatively small cost, such as inconvenience, the levying 
of transactions costs, the loss of interest if no notice of withdrawal 
is given, and so forth. Whether or not such assets can be readily 
included in the definition of money is dependent on the relative 
importance of such conversion costs. Thus, the higher such 
conversion costs are, the less likely that such assets will be included 
in the definition of money. 
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It is precisely the store of value function which is 
emphasised by Friedman (1964) in his definition of money. He 
argues that money is a 'temporary abode of purchasing power' 
because it enables individuals to separate the act of purchase from 
the act of sale. However, the time period to which the term 
'temporary' applies is not fixed, and consequently a range of assets, 
and not merely the means of payment, may act as temporary abodes 
of purchasing power. If such assets are to be included in the 
monetary aggregate, then it is imperative that the store of value 
function be excluded as far as possible in order to avoid the risk of 
overstating the amount of 'monetary services' available. 
(c) Money as a means of payment or medium of exchange. The 
unit of account may have a physical counterpart which is money in 
its more 'concrete' or tangible form. By 'concrete', it is not meant 
that the money necessarily exists in a physical form (though it may 
do so), but that ownership of it is capable of being transferred and 
that there is a supply of it which, to a greater or lesser extent, is 
capable of being quantified. This is money acting as a means of 
payment and, as such, money is also a medium of exchange. That 
is, it is an intermediary that comes between final exchanges and 
thereby obviates the need for establishing a 'double coincidence of 
wants' before an exchange can take place. The means of payment 
is accepted by in return for goods and services because the recipient 
knows that it can, in turn, be used in exchange for the goods and 
services that the recipient requires. The essential characteristic of 
the means of payment is that it is generally acceptable and 
re-usable almost immediately. Currency or legal tender is an 
example that immediately comes to mind. 
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(d) The distinction between means of payment and mediums of 
exchange. So far, it has been assumed that the terms 'means of 
payment' and 'medium of exchange' can be used interchangeably, as 
is certainly the case of currency, but there are certain classes of 
assets in which such terms cannot be used interchangeably. Some 
researchers have defined the means of payment to be anything that 
enables goods and services to be acquired without the need to 
supply other goods and services in exchange. For example, Clower 
has argued that 
'[t]he essential issue here is whether the tender of any 
given financial instrument permits a buyer to take 
delivery of a a commodity from a seller. On this 
criterion, trade credit qualifies as money - trade credit 
being interpreted to include credit card and overdraft 
facilities, department store credit and travellers' cheques, 
as well as commercial paper and book credits.' (1971, 
P-21) 
However, it has been pointed out by Shackle (1971) that while a 
means of payment is also a medium of exchange, it does not 
necessarily follow that all mediums of exchange are means of 
payment. A medium of exchange is anything that enables a 
transaction to take place in the absence of a 'double coincidence of 
wants', but the receipt of a medium of exchange does not 
necessarily mean that it can be used immediately by the recipient in 
return for other goods and services. Therefore, there is a time-lag 
involved between the receipt of a medium of exchange and the 
effective settiement of the associated debt. Shackle says that 
'[p]ayment has been made when a sale has been 
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completed. Payment has been made when the creditor 
has no further claim. Payment is in some sense final.' 
(1971, p.33) 
On this basis, it can be argued on the one hand that currency or 
legal tender is both a means of payment and a medium of exchange 
because the time-lag involved between the receipt of the currency 
and the effective settlement of the associated debt is zero. In other 
words, the recipient of the currency can use it immediately if 
desired in exchange for other goods and services. On the other 
hand, demand deposits at clearing banks operated by cheque are 
certainly not a means of payment, but rather a medium of exchange 
since the recipient of a cheque drawn on a demand deposit has to 
present it for clearing first, and cannot immediately use it in 
exchange for other goods and services. Thus, there is a time-lag 
involved between the receipt of the medium of exchange and the 
effective settlement of debt in which the account of the payer is 
debited in favour of the payee. Certainly, there are also other 
assets in existence that fulf i l the function of a medium of exchange 
but not of a means of payment. Typical examples include credit 
cards, and in more recent times, certain categories of building 
society deposits. 
(e) The effects of financial innovation on such a distinction. 
There are good a priori grounds to argue that the definition of 
money, based on its means of payment function, is capable of 
changing during times of financial innovation. One of the most 
manifest forms that financial innovation has taken on is technological 
change in the way payments are being processed. The bank-
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customer relationship has undergone somewhat of a revolution in 
that increasing use of technology is being made to improve the 
efficiency in which banks relate to their customers at the most basic 
level of services. Consider the example of the possible widespread 
use of EFTPOS (Electronic Funds Tranfer at Point Of Sale) 
terminals operated by debit cards as a possible replacement for 
cheques.3 It has been envisaged that the use of EFTPOS terminals 
will reduce the time-lag between the receipt of the medium of 
exchange (in the form of the debit card) and the effective settlement 
of the associated debt which should take a few minutes rather than 
days. Thus, an interesting dimension is added to the definition of 
money. Would the use of EFT technology change the definition of 
money such that demand deposits operated by debit cards, instead 
of cheques, could be eligible for a classification as means of 
payment? Of course, currency is the perfect theoretical construct of 
a means of payment, but whether or not demand deposits can be 
regarded as a means of payment in the future owing to EFT 
technology is essentially dependent on the time-lag involved between 
the receipt of the medium of exchange and the effective settlement 
of the debt. Even if this time-lag is only a few minutes, there are 
good grounds for regarding that time-lag as being negligible, and 
the distinction between means of payment and mediums of exchange 
would then collapse. 
It must be stressed that the use of automated teUer machines 
(ATMs) as quite distinct from EFTPOS terminals does not make 
demand deposits or even building society deposits means of 
payments because the act of withdrawing cash is essentially a 
conversion process from a medium of exchange to a means of 
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payment. If money is regarded in terms of its function as a store 
of value, then the existence of ATMs must make demand deposits, 
and even building society deposits, temporary abodes of purchasing 
power as a consequence of financial innovation. 
( f ) Theoretical approaches to the definition of money. In the 
final part of this sub-section, various approaches to the theoretical 
definition of money will be considered, and if it is deemed that 
financial innovation will have an effect on such a definition, they 
will also be discussed. The discussion is organised such that the 
narroest definitions of money are considered first before moving on 
to consider the next component in the definition of money. To 
help with the discusion, the various theoretical definitions of money 
put forward by several studies are summarised in Table 4.1. below. 
The inclusion of assets in the original definition of money will be 
indicated with a tick ( y ) , whereas the suggested inclusion of 
additional assets to the original definition of money as a 
consequence of financial innovation will be indicated by a plus ( + ) . 
Currency and demand deposits can both be eUgible for 
inclusion in the tradiitional definition of money on the grounds 
that they both serve as mediums of exchange since other assets may 
not serve as a medium of exchange equally well as currency and 
demand deposits. Pesek and Saving (1967, 1968) 
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TABLE 4 . 1 : Summary of theoretical definitions of 
money and the possible e f f e c t s of 
financial innovat ion on such defini t ions. 
Study 
Included assets 
DD TD NBCD NBFID ACL 
Pesek and Saving 
( 1967, 1968) / / 
Morgan (1969) / / 
Friedman (1964) / y 
Nevlyn (1964) y y 
Yeager (1968) y y 
Gur1ey and Shav 
(1955, 1960) y y 
R a d c l i f f e Committee 
(1959) y y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
+ 
y 
y 
y 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Notes: C = currency, DD = demand deposits with clearing 
banks, TD = time deposits with clearing banks, NCBD 
= non-clearing bank deposits, NBFID = non-bank 
financial intermediary deposits, and ACL = all credit 
lines. 
A tick ( y ) denotes an asset that is included in the 
original definition of money suggested by that study, 
whereas a plus (+) denotes those additional assets that 
could be included in the definition of money as a 
consequence of financial innovation. 
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agree with the inclusion of currency and demand deposits in the 
definition of money and the exclusion of all other forms of assets, 
but for very different and controversial reasons. 
Pesek and Saving attempt to distinguish between money and 
other assets by using a net wealth principle. Money consists of 
items used as means of payment which are assets to their holders 
but are not a liability to others. 
Money, Pesek and Saving argue, is a net resource of the 
community, a constituent part of the net wealth of that community. 
A l l money renders services in facilitating the exchange of goods, and 
thereby promoting the division of labour and increases output and 
productivity. Money is not a debt of its issuer, but a service-
providing product which is produced and sold by the money and 
banking industry. The criterion used by Pesek and Saving to 
establish whether an item is money or just a debt is the absence or 
presence of interest: ' [ i ]n any business transaction, if a loan exists, 
the lender will demand interest from the borrower: if production 
and sale exist there will be no such payments.' (1967, p.173) 
State-issued fiat currency, for example, given the large difference 
between its exchange value and costs of production (seignorage), is 
clearly part of the community's net wealth; it is an asset to its 
holders without being a liability to its producers. 
In the case of bank deposits, Pesek and Saving argue that 
there is a clear theoretical difference between the role of banks as 
producers of demand deposits transferable by cheque and their role 
as financial intermediaries borrowing funds at one rate of interest 
and lending at another. Demand deposits are regarded as a 
product of the banking industry, sold by the banks for currency or 
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for financial claims (e.g. government securities), or sold for credit. 
Bank money, like fiat currency, is seen as being resource-cheap in 
the sense that the real resources used to produce a unit of bank 
money are extremely small; in other words, bank money has low 
costs of production. Because of this, bank money cannot be 
produced under conditions of free entry into the industry. 
Production is restricted to a limited number of producers so that the 
price per unit of bank money is kept appreciably above the cost 
per unit of producing i t . According to Pesek and Saving, the fact 
that banks do produce and sell demand deposits is quite clear 
because no interest is given on them: 
'If bank money were a debt of the banks and not a 
product sold by the banks, we would see the borrower 
(the banks) paying interest to the holders of bank money. 
If the bank money was purchased for cash we do not 
see any interest payments: on the contrary, many of us 
pay service charges to the banks.' (1968, p.184) 
Time deposits do bear interest, and are, therefore, a debt of the 
bank and and do not add to the community's net wealth. So 
according to Pesek and Saving, there is a clear theoretical 
demarcation between the means of payment and other items, the 
distinction being whether interest is or is not paid. Thus, on the 
basis of the criteria proposed by Pesek and Saving, only currency 
and demand deposits are eligible for inclusion in the definition of 
money. This is shown in the relevant entry of Table 4.1. 
One problem arising from the approach of Pesek and Saving 
concerns the case of payment of interest on demand deposits. If 
some demand deposits bear some interest, they are considered by 
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Pesek and Saving to be joint products, part money and part a 
liability of the bank issuing them. This problem could be further 
exacerbated by the payment of implicit interest on demand deposits 
in order to offset some bank service charges. What proportion of 
interest-bearing demand deposits constitute money and what 
proportion debt depends, according to Pesek and Saving, on the 
ratio of the demand deposit rate (or notional interest rate in the 
case of implicit interest payments) to the market rate of interest. 
The 'moneyness' of demand deposits declines as the interest rate 
paid approaches the market rate of interest, until the point where 
the deposit equals the market rate whereupon the demand deposit 
ceases to be money and is wholly debt. But, there still exists the 
problem of defining the appropriate market interest rate. The 
absence of presence of interest on an asset does not appear to 
provide a sufficient means of distinguishing between money and 
other assets, particularly when some items both circulate as means 
of payment and pay interest so that the problem is that of deciding 
the amount of 'moneyness' they comprise. 
A further problem with the approach of Pesek and Saving 
was pointed out by Friedman and Schwartz (1969) who say that the 
analysis confuses price with quantity and marginal with average 
concepts. Pesek and Saving argue that if bank demand deposits pay 
interest at the market rate, their value as money must be zero if 
there is to be equilibrium on the demand side. That is, the means 
of payment services provided by the deposits are in effect available 
as a free good in the sense that no interest has to be foregone in 
order to enjoy them: their price is zero. But the value to which 
Pesek and Saving refer must be the marginal value of the money 
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services provided by the deposits and not the average or total value. 
Though the marginal unit of deposits provides no non-percuniary 
services, each of the intramarginal units may well do so as 
Friedman and Schwartz point out: 
'A zero price for the transactions services of demand 
deposits does not mean that the quantity of money in 
the form of demand deposits is zero. Alternatively, a 
marginal yield of transactions services of zero does not 
mean that the average yield is zero.' (1969, p.5) 
This argument is certainly repeated by Laidler (1969) who argues 
that 
'In the first place, it seems wrong to argue, as Pesek 
and Saving implicitly do, that the introductin of time 
deposits and other financial asets into an economy has no 
net effect on its welfare. If this were the case it is hard 
to see how these assets would ever come into being....it 
is only from the marginal unit of such assets that there 
is no net gain, for it is only the marginal unit that is 
held solely for the interest it bears.' (1969, p.513) 
Thus, the criteria proposed by Pesek and Saving have to be 
rejected. It should also be noted that the problems posed by the 
application of their criteria are likely to be exacerbated by financial 
innovation which has produced a bewildering array of 
interest-bearing deposits that have the abihty to circulate as a 
medium of exchange. This would be true of some deposits offered 
by non-clearing banks and building societies (which fall into the 
category of non-bank financial intermediaries). Thus, such assets 
would have to be incorporated into the definition of money, not to 
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mention the difficulties of deciding upon an appropriate 'benchmark' 
market rate of interest by which their 'moneyness' could be 
measured. This is shown by the pluses in Table 4.1. which 
excludes time deposits. 
The next stage of the discussion is to determine whether 
time deposits should be included in the definition of money. 
Morgan (1969) argues that currency and all clearing bank deposits 
should be included in the money definition. The classification of 
money is based on responses to excess demand/supply of assets. 
According to Morgan, it suggests that the essential characteristic of 
money is that the response to excess supply/demand for it will 
manifest itself as an excess demand/supply respectively of all other 
assets which, assuming their prices are flexible, would imply an 
increase/decrease respectively in the prices of these assets. Morgan 
suggests that two conditions are necessary for this response to occur. 
Firstly, the price of the asset must be fixed in terms of the unit of 
account, so that an excess demand/supply is not reflected in a 
change in the price of that asset. The second condition is that the 
asset supply should be exogenous: 
' [ i ]n the sense that the amount issued by any one issuer 
is not affected by the transactions of any transactor that 
is not itself an issuer of an asset qualifying as money.' 
(1969, p.242) 
The strict application of such criteria leads to a definition of money 
in which currency is only eligible for inclusion as it is not 
reasonable to assume that bank deposits are exogenous because the 
volume of such deposits could be changed by the actions of 
depositors. In order, therefore, to include bank deposits in a 
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money definition, Morgan is forced to introduce an additional 
condition, that the exists a mechanism by which the monetary 
authorities could offset the effects of actions by depositors on the 
volume of bank deposits. This condition would be met only by 
banks who keep operational reserves with the central bank, with 
non-clearing banks keeping their reserves with the clearing banks 
themselves. Therefore, Morgan's application of the above criteria 
leads to a definition of money in which all deposits of the clearing 
banks only are included, and is shown in Table 4.1. However, this 
definition is crucially dependent on the restrictive assumption that 
the monetary authorities can, and choose to, control the valume of 
bank deposits in this way. 
As previously seen, the function of money as a store of 
value leads Friedman (1964) to see money as a temporary abode of 
purchasing power. Such assets that are to be included in this 
definition of money must be capable of being converted into the 
medium of exchange itself at relatively little inconvenience to the 
holder of such assets. Such assets may include currency, demand 
and time deposits with the clearing banks, and all non-clearing 
bank deposits. In view of the discussion in section 4.1.1(e) above, 
it may be that the deposits of nbfi's may also have to be included 
in the definition of money as they are more capable now of serving 
as temporary abodes of purchasing power as a consequence of 
financial innovation. This is reflected in Table 4.1. by the 
suggested inclusion of such deposits to the original definition. 
There is also another argument for the inclusion of non-
clearing bank deposits, but for the exclusion of nbfi deposits which 
have been advanced by Newlyn (1964), and Newlyn and Bootle 
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(1978). Newlyn and Bootle identify two criteria for distinguishing a 
means of payment from other assets. Firstly, an asset used to 
finance payment is a means of payment if 
'a payment that will not involve any change in the 
asset/liability complex of the public other than that 
between the payer and payee.' (Newlyn, 1964, p.336) 
This is termed as the 'neutrality' criterion. The second criterion is 
that the payment should leave the aggregate of the asset unchanged. 
On the basis of their two criteria, Newlyn and Bootle 
classify as money currency and bank deposits (including those of 
non-clearing banks). Currency is seen as a means of payment 
according to the above two criteria since the transfer of currency in 
an exchange transaction leaves the total unchanged and has no 
further repercussions, the effects of the exchange are confined only 
to the two individual parties concerned. Both bank demand and 
time deposits also qualify as means of payment since the financing 
of payments using these deposits would only affect the payer's and 
payee's individual deposit totals; the total of bank deposits would 
remain the same, and there would be no changes on the asset side 
of the bank's balance sheet. 
The deposits of nbfi's do not, according to Newlyn and 
Bootle, satisfy the criteria stated above. If one were to take 
building societies as forming part of the nbfi category, it is possible 
to argue that such building societies hold their deposits with the 
banks. If it is assumed, for example, that building society deposits 
are withdrawn, this will only involve a transfer of bank deposits 
from the building society to the individual that is withdrawing the 
funds. Thus, the aggregate of bank deposits would remain 
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unchanged whereas the aggregate that includes nbfi deposits would 
fall . On the basis of the neutrahty criterion, it would follow that 
nbfi deposits are ineligible for inclusion in the definition of money. 
However, a major flaw in these criteria ensues when the 
individual concerned in the above example chooses to deposit his 
withdrawn funds in another building society account. In that case, 
the aggregate containing nbfi deposits would remain unchanged, and 
therefore, nbfi deposits would now be eligible for inclusion in the 
definition of money. Newlyn and Bootle regard such instances as 
being insignificant, but it is very doubtful indeed that such a view 
could persist in times of rapid financial innovation. In recent years, 
there has been an increased proliferation of financial instruments 
offered by the nbfi's with interest and withdrawal options in varying 
combinations. It is surely reasonable to see that, in view of 
increased competition among the nbfi's for deposits, there would be 
an increasing tendency for funds to be transferred among nbfi 
deposits in response to competitive bidding for funds. Thus such 
transfers would now have to be seen as being more significant such 
that one would have to seriously contemplate the inclusion of nbfi 
deposits in the definition of money. Thus, Table 4.1. shows the 
suggested inclusion of nbfi deposits in the original definition of 
money proposed by Newlyn and Bootle. 
Yet another argument for limiting the definition of money so 
as to include currency and all bank deposits was introduced by 
Yeager (1968). Yeager argues that there is an asymmetry in the 
outcome of changes in the public's asset preference between assets 
used as means of payment and non-money assets. It is this 
asymmetry which can be used to distinguish between money and 
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other assets. The means of payment does not have a specific 
market of its own, and its accounting price is set permanently to 
unity. As individuals can change the holdings of the means of 
payment by adjusting their expenditure relative to income, any 
general excess demand or supply will be felt as a deficiency of 
demand or excess of demand respectively for other goods and 
services. An excess demand/supply for the means of payment thus 
has widespread repercussions, affecting prices in the economy. 
With non-money assets, on the other hand, individuals can 
only change their holdings by entering the specific market in which 
that asset is traded and then either purchasing or selling i t . In the 
case of a market-clearing non-money asset market, the main impact 
of excess demand or supply for the asset would, according to 
Yeager, be largely confined to that specific asset market, producing 
a change in price or supply of that asset. In the case of 
non-money asset traded in a market which does not clear, the 
excess demand or supply would be diverted to other markets, but 
these repercussions are likely neither to be widespread or substantial. 
Thus, Yeager considers that an excess demand/supply for the means 
of payment asset has widespread repercussions in a way that an 
excess demand/supply for anything else does not have. 
Yeager's approach, however, does not provide a sharp line 
of demarcation between a means of payment and other assets. It 
should be seen that portfolio balance theory shows that adjustments 
to excess demand in one market are bound to have repercussions in 
other asset markets. Thus, the difference between means of 
payment and other assets would appear to be a matter of degree 
rather than of kind. At least, the general effects postulated by 
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Yeager can flow from currency and bank deposits. 
The final stage of the discussion concerns those arguments 
that favour a broadening of the definition of money to include other 
assets other than currency and bank deposits. In recent times, the 
role of non-bank financial intermediaries has grown increasingly 
important such that there existed serious problems for the monetary 
authorities because of the widespread practice of liability 
management as a means of circumventing restrictive monetary 
arrangements (see Chapter Two). According to Gurley and Shaw 
(1955, 1960), it would mean that the traditional demand for money 
was now getting more interest-elastic than formerly. Thus Gurley 
and Shaw favour a broad definition of money which incoroporates 
deposits held with nbfi's. This approach does have its merits 
because by broadening the scope of monetary aggregates, one 
internalises substitution effects amongst a wider range of assets. 
This aspect is discussed further in sections 4.2. and 4.3. below. 
Finally, a very broad definition of money is based on the Radcliffe 
Committee's concept of liquidity which is expressed as follows: 
'A decision to spend depends not simply on whether a 
would-be-spender has cash or "money in the bank" 
although that maximum liquidity is obviously the most 
favourable springvboard. There is the alternative of 
raising funds by seUing an asset or by borrowing; and the 
prospect of a cash flow from future sales of a product 
both encourages committment beyond immediately 
available cash and makes borrowing easier.' (1959, p.132) 
Such concept would have led to the inclusion of all lines of credit 
in the definition of money, but the major problem is that some of 
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it is unquantifable, and probably of little practical use from the 
viewpoint of the monetary authorities. 
What can be concluded from this survey of theoretical 
definitions of money? First and foremost, it is clear that there 
exists no clear consensus on what constitutes an acceptable definition 
of money, as Table 4.1. makes abundantly clear. It seems that the 
traditional definition of money would comprise mostly of currency, 
and demand and time deposits held with the clearing banks. 
However, as has already been pointed out on several occasions in 
the preceding paragraphs, there are good a priori grounds for 
supposing that financial innovation will lead to a change in the 
definition of money. From Table 4.1. , it would seem that a 
suggested modern definition of money would incorporate certain 
deposits held with the non-clearing banks and non-bank financial 
intermediaries. By 'certain deposits', it is meant that only those 
deposits that are capable of serving as a medium of exchange should 
be included in the definition of money, such as in the case of the 
aggregate M2 recently introduced by the Bank of England (discussed 
in section 4.6. below), and not just every financial instrument that 
can be put under the regulatory net. 
4.1.2. Empirical approaches 
In this sub-section, an alternative approach to the theoretical 
definition of money is considered briefly. It is not intended here to 
embark upon a fuU and comprehensive survey of the empirical 
literature regarding the definition of money because, to date, several 
empirical approaches have been shown to be methodologically 
unsound in that they attempt to arrive at a working definition of 
money before any form of conceptualisation can be made regarding 
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the meaning of money. Two main empirical approaches to the 
definition of money are considered here in two contexts, viz: the 
causality debate and demand for money stability. Fundamentally, 
whilst these two approaches attempt to contribute to the causality 
debate and the debate on the stabiUty of the demand for money 
respectively, it is quite common to see the definition of money by 
'best' results as a by-product of such studies. 
(a) In context of the causality debate. In a well-known study of 
the relative performance of a simple Keynesian macroeconomic 
model with a simple monetarist model, Friedman and Meiselman 
(1963) suggested that 'the precise empirical definition of variables 
should be selected so as to put the theory in quesfion in its best 
light.' (p.181) In outline, the study was mainly concerned about 
the causality between money and nominal GNP, and Friedman and 
Meiselman regressed the level of consumption (representing 
endogenous income) on the stock of money and the level of 
autonomous expenditure over a long period of history, interpreting 
the coefficients as money and expenditure multipliers. The 
regression equation took on the following form: 
C = a ^- VM ^ kA . • . [ 1] 
where C denotes the level of consumption, M denotes the stock of 
money, A deonotes autonomous expenditure, a. denotes a constant 
term, and V and k denote the money and expenditure multipliers 
respectively. The product of the regression was that Friedman and 
Meisleman could obtain the partial correlations between C and M , 
and C and A taking account of the correlation between M and A. 
The results suggested that the correlation between C and M is 
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greater than that between C and A with the single exception of the 
period 1929-1936. 
In order to select the 'best' definition of money which would 
give the best form of corroboration for the results of Friedman and 
Meiselman, two criteria were used. The first criterion was that 
money was to be that aggregate which had the highest correlation 
with nomey income, and the second criterion was that income must 
be more highly correlated with the aggregate than with each 
component of the aggregate. Friedman and Meiselman took into 
account only three components of the money supply (currency, 
demand deposits, and time deposits) and tried to determine whether 
time deposits should be included in the money aggregate. If the 
aggregate inclusive of time deposits were more highly correlated with 
income than that excluding i t , and if the correlation between time 
deposits alone and income were less than the correlation with the 
aggregate, then time deposits would be considered to be a close 
substitute for other components and would have to be included in 
the aggregate selected. The choice fell on the broad aggregate 
embodying all three components. This aggregate was then used to 
show that there was a close and consistent relation between the 
stock of money and income (or aggregate consumption).^ 
This approach was subjected to criticism by DePrano and 
Mayer (1965) who argued that the selection of data in this manner 
resulted in the circularity of argument: 'this practice of using the 
same data or roughly similar data, both to choose the definitions of 
variables (the definition being, of course, really part of the overall 
hypothesis) and to test the hypothesis is particularly suspect.' (p.532) 
This reiterates the comment made at the beginning of this 
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sub-section that such approaches are methodologically unsound in 
that it attempts to find the 'best' definition of money before actually 
conceptualising the meaning of money. The correct procedure, of 
course, would be to arrive at some preconceptions about the 
definition of money, and then to use data based on this pre-
conception to test any hypotheses.^ 
(b) Stability of demand for money criteria. An alternative 
approach to the empirical definition of money is to use demand for 
money stability criteria. As previously seen in the context of the 
causality debate, this approach seeks to put the theory of the 
demand for money in its best light by selecting the most appropriate 
empirical definitions of money. The notion of a stable demand for 
money is usually seen in terms of a monetary aggregate whose real 
value bears a relatively stable relation to a small number of 
variables, such as wealth or income, interest rates, and the rate of 
change in the prices.^ Meltzer (1963) took this issue even further 
when he suggested that 
'[t]he problem is that of defining money so that a stable 
demand function can be shown to have existed under 
differing institutional arrangements, changes in social and 
political environment, and changes in economic 
conditions, or to explain the effects of such changes on 
the function.' (p.222) 
The main difficulty inherent in such an approach is how to define 
stability. As previously discussed in Chapter One, the term 
'stability' is capable of having different interpretations. It is often 
the case in the empirical literature using traditional econometric 
methodology that the concept of stability is narrowly defined, that 
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is, it refers to parametric stability. Thus, some of the statistical 
tests for stability are geared specifically for parametric stability over 
different sample periods. Some tests for parametric stability are 
now discussed. 
The first , and most naive, approach is to base one's 
conclusions about the stability of the demand function on the basis 
of i?2 statistics alone. Strictly speaking, such statistics only measure 
the 'goodness of f i t ' of a particular specification as the sample 
period changes, and are not indicative of relative performance over 
different specifications using different dependent variables. This 
point was argued by Goldfeld (1973, pp .585-589) who demonstrated 
that constraining the income elasticity to some specified value led to 
an increase i n the statistics. Basically, his approach involved 
estimating an unconstrained form of the empirical demand for 
money function, and the resulting estimate of the income-elasticity, 
say, ^ was then used as a basis for constraining the value of the 
income elasticity such that the dependent variable was (M/^Y).^ 
The constrained form of the demand for money function produced 
essentially the same results as the unconstrained fo rm, except that 
the i?2 statistic changed. Given that both forms were estimated 
over the same sample period, one would have expected the 
statistics to remain unchanged. Thus, at best, the R^ statistics 
should not be used as the sole criterion for selecting the 'best' 
specifications f rom a range of specifications using different dependent 
variables. 
The second possible approach that could be utilised is to 
examine the behaviour of the estimated coefficients as the sample 
period is changed. What may have turned out to be a set of 
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theoretically-plausible estimated coefficients could change quite 
suddenly as the period changes so that one is faced with a set of 
estimated coefficients that is totally at variance with theoretical 
considerations. This problem is particularly apparent in those 
specifications that incorporate a partial adjustment process for money 
balances. There even have been recorded instances when the 
coefficient to the lagged dependent variable has exceeded unity so 
that one gets a set of 'nonsense' long-run elasticities which give the 
impression that the results are in total disagreement with theoretical 
predictions regarding the direction of change. ^ A formal test 
procedure is sometimes used which involves splitting the data into 
sub-periods, and the null hypothesis of parameteric stability can 
then be tested.^ 
The f inal approach, as previously discussed in the last 
chapter, is to run some dynamic simulations to determine whether 
or not a specification continues to 'behave well ' i n that i t does not 
systematically make forecasting errors. The basic approach is to run 
a simulation of the estimated demand for money function for the 
post-sample period. This criterion uses mean errors and root mean 
square errors, and the 'best' specification may be chosen on those 
errors that have the smallest magnitude. 
In a survey of the empirical literature on the demand for 
money prior to the 1970s, Boorman (1985) concluded that '...the 
evidence supporting the existence of a reasonably stable demand for 
money function would seem to be overwhelming.' (p.79) Given 
such a conclusion that the demand for money function is reasonably 
stable for most of the monetary aggregates, this criteria would be 
rather inconclusive i n pointing towards the 'best' definition of 
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money. It has been suggested by Laidler (1969, pp.523-524) that, 
i n spite of the inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence prior to 
the 1970s, the 'best' definition of money should be that aggregate 
which was the easiest to control. However, it did become very 
apparent that the demand for money function had broken down 
during the 1970s, and one should now seriously contemplate the 
possibility that the definition of money by best results is ceasing to 
be a feasible option. 
4.2. The aggregation problem 
Having discussed the definition of money which was favoured 
to include certain deposits of non-clearing banks and nbfi's in 
addition to the traditional definition of money, the main problem is 
now that of aggregating over various components to form a 
monetary aggregate which should convey information regarding the 
amount of monetary services available i n that aggregate. The main 
difficulty is to try and measure the degree of 'moneyness' in an 
asset. As previously argued at the beginning of this chapter, it is 
useful for present purposes to view each asset as ful f i l l ing two main 
functions (or having two main attributes), viz: monetary and 
store-of-value or wealth functions. The 'moneyness' of an asset 
depends primarily on the relative importance of its monetary 
function to its wealth function. The monetary function of an asset 
is essentially to provide a f low of liquidity or monetary services 
whereas the wealth function may be seen to provide an abode of 
purchasing power that would be capable of attracting a rate of 
return to the holder of the asset. It should be especially noted that 
the term 'abode of purchasing power' used here is quite distinct 
214 
f rom the term 'temporary abode of purchasing power' as used by 
Friedman (1964). The latter term, as previously seen in sub-section 
4.1.1(b) refers to a special class of assets that would be capable of 
being converted into the medium of exchange itself at relatively 
inconvenience or cost, whereas the former term is specifically 
designed as a generic term to refer to an even wider range of 
assets ( f rom currency to the most i l l iquid assets) that would be 
capable of being converted into the medium of exchange itself, but 
there exists a class of assets which do not fall within the category 
of 'temporary abodes of purchasing power' because of the sheer 
inconvenience and high cost involved in such conversions. Of 
course, each asset can f u l f i l l both functions but in varying 
proportions. The aggregation problem is stated as follows: i t is 
desired to aggregate over a variety of assets that are capable of 
fu l f i l l ing the monetary function to a more or less significant extent 
such that only the monetary component of each asset is only 
included i n the final monetary aggregate. 
There are two main approaches to the aggregation of 
monetary assets. The first one is based on traditional demand for 
money studies which use different interest rates on alternative assets 
in order to arrive at a set of interest cross-elasticities. The main 
idea behind this approach is to use the cross-elasticity estimates as 
a basis for deciding upon which assets can be regarded as 
sufficiently close substitutes for money; i f such assets are deemed to 
be 'close' substitutes for money, then these assets would be regarded 
as being eligible for inclusion i n the definition of money. However, 
as w i l l be seen below, this leads to an 'al l-or-nothing' approach so 
that certain assets could either be included or excluded from the 
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monetary aggregate, but only at the peril of overstating or 
understating respectively the amount of monetary services available. 
Thus, the second approach is considered which applies economic 
aggregation theory to the aggregation of monetary assets. This 
approach involves specifying a consumer utility function and a 
'budget' constraint, and the constrained optimisation problem is 
solved to obtain a set of asset demand equations whose parameters 
have to be estimated i n order to arrive at the parameters of the 
util i ty function. In effect, this approach is equivalent to deriving a 
weighted monetary aggregate whose weights depend on the 
'moneyness' of each asset included. 
4 .2 .1 . The 'all-or-nothing' approach 
In order to measure the degree of substitutability among 
alternative l iquid assets, the most common approach that has been 
utilised is to specify and estimate a demand function for narrowly 
defined money (say, currency and demand deposits) with the rates 
of return on one or more 'near-money' assets, plus an income or 
wealth measure, as explanatory variables. Interest cross-elasticity 
estimates, derived f rom the regression coefficients, are then used as 
a measure of the degree of substitutability among alternative liquid 
assets. There is, however, no intention here of embarking on a fu l l 
surevey of the empirical literature in this area as such a survey has 
already been undertaken by Feige and Pearce (1977). It wi l l be 
sufficient for present purposes to point out some of the pitfalls, 
apart f rom those general methodological problems of demand for 
money studies, inherent in such an approach. 
Firstly, the use of simple-sum monetary aggregates as a 
dependent variable in a demand for money study is highly suggestive 
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of the implicit assumption that the components of that aggregate are 
perfect substitutes for each other. This is so because the simple-
sum aggregation procedure allocates equal weights to each 
component of the aggregate. In the particular case of narrowly 
defined monetary aggregates that only include currency and demand 
deposits, such an assumption of perfect substitutability between 
currency and demand deposits would appear to be only justified by 
the additional assumption that the rate of interest on demand 
deposits is identical to zero. This is a commonly-used device of 
doing away with some of the problems posed by money having its 
'own' rate; i n other words, the 'own' rate of money is quietly 
disregarded f rom the analysis, or the observations are simply 
relegated to a footnote. However, there are indeed some serious 
grounds for questioning such an assumption because of what may be 
termed as ' implicit ' interest payments on demand deposits as a 
means i n which, say, bank service charges could be partly or wholly 
offset, or as a means whereby additional benefits of being a 
customer of the bank could be passed on i n the form of, say, 
concessionary interest rates on overdrafts or loans. It is particularly 
important to recognise the importance of 'own' rates because they 
are capable of affecting, to a greater or lesser extent, the degree of 
substitutability between money and 'near-money' assets. In order to 
f ind a proxy for the own rate, some studies have used the negative 
of the ratio of service charges to demand deposit totals, and others 
have experimented with the ratio of the differential between 
operating costs of the bank attributable to demand deposits and 
service charges to the ratio of demand deposit totals. It has, 
however, been argued by Boyd (1976) that such proxies are 
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determined by the forces of demand and supply for demand 
deposits, and the exogneity of such variables would be put into 
considerable doubt since a condition for unbiased OLS (ordinary 
least squares) estimates is that the explanatory variables should be 
exogenously determined. 
Digressing briefly f rom the discussion, it should also be 
noted that as a monetary aggregate is gradually broadened to 
include, say, time deposits, it becomes even more important to 
include an own rate. Artis and Lewis (1976, pp.150-151) suggest 
the use of a weighted average of interest rates which is based on 
the rate of interest for each component of the aggregate, and the 
weights are determined primarily by the relative value of each 
component i n that aggregate. This is particularly seen as a device 
for overcoming the problems of multicollinearity (to be discussed 
below), but the particular interest rate for demand deposits is 
assumed to be zero, thus avoiding some of the difficult problems of 
measuring the implicit rate on demand deposits. Artis and Lewis 
(1976) do admit that '[t]he procedure implies that changes in the 
service yield and the rebating rates to defray charges on current 
account are ignored and is subject to further error where the proxy 
rates give an inefficient reading of changes in the true rates of 
interest offered.'(pp.150-151) 
Returning to the original discussion, once a decision has 
been reached on a measure of the rate of return on demand 
deposits, an attempt must then be made to select suitable interest 
rates on 'near-money' assets so that the estimated coefficients to 
such variables may serve to measure the degree of substitutability 
between money and 'near-money' assets. On theoretical grounds. 
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one would like to include all relevant interest rates such as those 
on time deposits, savings and loan shares, etc. But the introduction 
of a large number of of rates may pose some serious problems of 
multicoUinearity as interest rates on various assets may be related to 
each other. The effect of multicollinearity is essentially to increase 
the sample variance, or equivalently, to reduce the precision of the 
estimated coefficients, leading to a higher likelihood of mis-
specification through the discarding of relevant explanatory variables. 
A t best, only a limited number of interest rates could be included, 
and some studies have experimented with the use of interest-rate 
differentials as a way of reducing multicollinearity. ' ^ 
Finally, the most serious problem is the apparent lack of 
agreement as to what value of cross-elasticity is to be taken as 
indicating a close substitutability. One can, of course, adopt the 
price-theoretic convention that those elasticities which have an 
absolute value of less than unity should be regarded as 'inelastic', 
and those that are greater than unity, as 'elastic'. It would then 
seem that the issue of measuring the degree of substitutability 
between money and 'near-money' assets is a comparatively straight-
forward one. However, as wi l l be seen below, this convention has 
not been systematically adhered to. 
Commenting on the results of their survey, Feige and Pearce 
(1977) say that '...linguistic characterizations of empirical findings 
often convey the impression of dramatically diverse and conflicting 
results, even when the underlying arithmetic magnitudes described 
are statistically indistinguishable f rom one another.' (p.443) The 
following exchange between Lee and Hamburger is a particularly 
illustrative example of the 'disagreement' that exists in interpreting 
219 
the results. Both Hamburger (1969) and Lee (1967, 1969) use a 
narrow definition of money which encapsulates currency and demand 
deposits only, and the dependent variable is per-capita real 
balances. Lee (1967) included a variety of interest rate variables in 
his specification and, according to Feige and Pearce (1977, Table 
1(b), p.453), the cross-elasticities for savings and loan shares were 
i n the region of -0.371 to -0.637.^2 On the basis of his evidence, 
Lee (1967) argued that savings and loan shares were close substitutes 
for money, i n spite of contravening the price-theoretic convention 
regarding the labelling of elasticities as 'inelastic' or ' e l a s t i c ' . I n 
a comment by Hamburger (1969) on Lee (1967), he argued that the 
use of interest rate level rather than differential variables led to 
lower cross-elasticities, and estimated cross-elasticities for savings and 
loan shares to be in the range of -0.137 to -0.374. This was 
interpreted by Hamburger (1969) as evidence that savings and loan 
shares were not good substitutes for money, and saw no reason why 
there should be concern over the effects on monetary policy of the 
growth of non-bank financial intermediaries ^ ^ In his reply to 
Hamburger, Lee (1969) essentially confirmed Hamburger's findings 
that the use of interest rate level variables led to lower cross-
elasticity estimates. For savings and loan deposits, these estimates 
were i n the region of -0.185 to -0.517. However, Lee continued 
to maintain that this was still evidence that non-bank financial 
intermediary deposits were good substitutes for money, thus lending 
some support the Gurley-Shaw hypothesis.' ^ The study by Cagan 
and Schwartz (1975), designed to test the Gurley-Shaw hypothesis 
that the demand for money was getting more interest-elastic as a 
result of an increasing number of money substitutes, found that, on 
220 
the contrary, that i t was becoming less interest-elastic, which would 
have implied an even greater impact of monetary policy on 
economic activity. 
In concluding their survey, Feige and Pearce (1977) state that 
' . . .point estimates of cross-elasticities between money and 
near-monies are surprisingly consistent and display 
relatively weak substitution relationships. This conclusion 
emerges despite the fact that the studies surveyed often 
reveal heated semantic differences, which on the surface 
give the impression that the studies are grossly at odds 
with one another... .it is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that there does indeed exist an unacknowledged empirical 
consensus on the inelasticity of responses of the demand 
for money to changes in the rates of return on "money 
substitutes".' (p.463) 
However, one should be warned against interpreting the above 
findings i n terms of the insignificance of the effects of financial 
innovations on either the demand for money or monetary policy. 
Multicollinearity amongst interest rates, and the incorporation of only 
the readily available interest rates in empirical demand for money 
functions might understate the impact of financial changes or factors 
such as transactions costs, on which there are no readily available 
data. Feige and Pearce argue that 
' [ f ju ture research on the issue of substitutability wi l l 
therefore require not only the creation of more relevant 
data bases, but also a growing attention to institutional 
detail, which wi l l hopefully enable us to take account of 
qualitative changes i n asset characteristics i n addition to 
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our current measures of quantitative changes in asset 
holdings.' (p.464) 
However, this approach has been criticised by Chetty (1969, p.271) 
on the grounds that it leads to an 'al l-or-nothing' criteria (hence 
the title of this sub-section) because it is exceedingly difficult to 
f ind assets that would be perfect substitutes for currency and 
demand deposits, and yet there are very few assets that would be 
totally unrelated to money. Thus, the 'al l-or-nothing' approach is 
capable of producing simple-sum aggregates which may not 
accurately convey the information regarding the amount of monetary 
services available. The application of economic theory to the 
derivation of weighted monetary aggregates is now the subject of the 
following sub-section. 
4.2.2. Applications of economic aggregation theory 
This sub-section w i l l discuss some applications of economic 
aggregation theory to the derivation of economic monetary aggregates 
which may be regarded primarily as a set of weighted monetary 
aggregates whose weights are dependent upon the degree of 
'moneyness' that each component asset has. Fundamentally, this 
approach involves the explicit specification of a utility function and 
a 'budget' constraint. The constrained optimisation problem is then 
solved to derive a set of asset demand functions which form the 
basis of a regression model whereby the parameters can be 
estimated. The estimated coefficients form the basis of the weights 
used i n aggregator functions. '^ The literature is technically 
demanding, and the discussion is organised as follows. 
Firstly, the seminal work of Chetty (1969) is considered, and 
then the study by Moroney and Wilbratte (1976) is discussed. The 
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latter study is mainly based on concepts used by Chetty, but 
supposedly uses 'duality theory' in which the utili ty function is used 
as a 'technological transactions' constraint, and households are 
assumed to maximise wealth subject to this constraint. A critique 
of both studies is then given which is based mainly on Donovan 
(1978). Finally, some recent developments i n this literature are 
considered which includes the specification of a GES (generalised 
elasticity of substitution) utility function by Boughton (1981), and the 
translog (transcedental logarithmic) utili ty function by Ewis and 
Fisher (1984). 
(a) Chetty's model. In an innovative paper, Chetty (1969) 
suggested a more direct measure of substitution between financial 
assets than the interest cross-elasticity discussed i n the previous 
sub-section. His general approach was to regard money as a 
weighted average of monetary assets with weights being related to 
the substitution parameters. It w i l l be useful to consider the two-
asset case first because some useful insights can be gained into the 
most fundamental parts of an economic monetary aggregate before 
going on to consider more general cases. Chetty initially started his 
analysis by considering just two assets taking the form of money 
(defined to be currency and demand deposits) and time deposits. 
In order to derive the asset demand equations, a CES (constant 
elasticity of substitution) utility function is specified such that 
u = [ p , M - P + p , r - p ] - i / p . . . [ 2 ] 
where U denotes utility which is ordinal ut i l i ty, that is, changes in 
uti l i ty are referred to i n relative terms rather than absolute terms 
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(as would be i n the case of cardinal ut i l i ty) , M denotes money, T 
denotes time deposits, /SQ and ( 3 , are both parameters, and p is 
defined such that a = 1/(1 + p) where a is the elasticity of 
substitution. The parameter /3g is set equal to unity as ordinal 
util i ty is being used i n this analysis; this normalisation wi l l not be at 
the expense of any gnerality. The next step is to define a t w o -
period 'budget' constraint i n which an individual is assumed to 
allocate currency units between money and time deposits. 
Chetty (1969, p.273) assumes that T is the value of time deposits in 
the next period so that, i f the current interest rate is taken to be 
r, the current discounted value of time deposits would therefore be 
7 / ( 1 + r ) i n which case the 'budget' constraint is 
M, = M + 7 / ( 1 + r) . . . [ 3 ] 
The main object of the constrained optimisation problem is to 
maximise utili ty subject to the above constraint. The marginal 
conditions are thus derived: 
dU dU X 
— = X, — = ' 
dM a7 (1 + r) 
and 
= M + T / ( l + r) 
where dU/dM = ( - l / p ) [ t / ( l+p) ]• (-p/3 ^M-Cl+p)) , and similarly 
for dU/dT. Division of a t / / a M by dU/dT gives the following 
expression 
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^1 
M - ( P + 1) 
= ( 1 + 0 
which, after taking logarithms and some manipulation, gives a 
regression model: 
5n 
M 
T 
1 
( 1 + P) 
1 
( 1 + p) 
an 
1 
1 + r 
+ 
[ 4 ] 
where e is a disturbance term that simply has been added to the 
regression model. Chetty estimated the above equation using OLS 
for the period 1945-1966, and came up with the following estimated 
equation: 
{MIT) = 1.510 + 34. 69 5n[ 1 / ( 1 + /•) ] 
( 1. 509) 
= 0. 9 8 1 , D.VI. = 0. 57 
where the number i n brackets denotes the standard error. From 
this equation, i t can be deduced that a = 34.69, p = -0.971, and 
= 0.957. 
Before proceeding further with the analysis, one would do 
well to take a little time to consider the concept of economic 
monetary aggregates. Chetty (1969, p.274) has defined the adjusted 
monetary aggregate as 
Ma = [M P + P ] -p , - 1 / p . . . [ 5 ] 
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where a 'hat' over a parameter denotes an estimate. If money and 
time deposits were perfect substitutes, their elasticity of substitution 
would be infinitely large such that p = - 1 . If one defines 
= e x p ( a / a ) where a denotes the negative constant term in 
equation [ 4 ] , then as a -> oo, -> 1 i n which case the indifference 
curve w i l l be perfectly linear. This is shown by the line M ^ in 
Figure 4 .1 . which is also coincident with the 'budget' constraint. In 
such a case, a simple-sum aggregation procedure would be perfectly 
valid to use. Now suppose that one were to f ind that money and 
time deposits became less perfect substitutes so that the elasticity of 
substitution falls. This could be shown in Figure 4 .1 . by a more 
convex indifference curve such as M ^ which wi l l approach a 
L-shape (not shown) as a approaches zero. Consider the point of 
equilibrium at which the 'budget' constraint is tangent to the latter 
indifference curve. Here, the monetary aggregate wi l l contain M , 
of money and 7 , of time deposits, but it can be noted that the 
same level of utili ty can be obtained by simply having of 
money. In effect, the addition of 7 , units of time deposits to M , 
is equivalent to the addition of ( M ^ - M , ) units of money to 
M , . If one were to start with only units of money, and were 
to use a simple-sum aggregation procedure which treats money and 
time deposits as perfect substitutes, i t is easy to see that the 
inclusion of time deposits could lead to the monetary aggregate 
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M /^ 
M 
M 
M 
F I G U R E 4 . 1 : The concept of economic aggregation. 
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overstating the amount of monetary services available. This is 
shown in Figure 4 .1 . by the broken line M ^ which is clearly 
above the indifference curve. Therefore, the most fundamental 
concept of an economic monetary aggregate is that a change in its 
components should leave that aggregate unchanged whereas 
simple-sum aggregates may give the misleading impression that there 
has been a change i n ut i l i ty. 
Having discussed the basic concept of economic aggregation, 
the analysis of Chetty (1969) can now be carried further. Given 
the estimated values of the parameters for the definition of money 
i n equation [5] above, Chetty came up with the following adjusted 
monetary aggregate: 
Ma = [M~°-''' + 0.957T~°-]~'-°' 
which Chetty approximates as 
Ma M + T 
on the grounds that the substitutability between money and time 
deposits was so high that i t confirmed the contention of Friedman 
and Meiselman (1963) that money and time deposits can be 
regarded as 'perfect' substitutes. 
The approach is basically the same for the more general case 
of (n + 1) assets. The second stage of Chetty's analysis was to try 
and measure the degree of substitutability between money and 
mutual savings deposits (MS), and between money and savings and 
loan shares (SL). The main objective of such an analysis was to 
test the Gurley-Shaw hypothesis that such assets were becoming 
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even closer substitutes for money so that it would be necessary to 
include 'near-money' assets in the definition of money. Chetty 
(1969, pp .276-277) uses what he calls a 'generalised CES utility 
function' i n which the elasticity of substitution between two assets is 
variable. Boughton (1981, p.377) has pointed out that Chetty's term 
'generalised CES utility function' is not quite accurate in that it 
actually refers to the case i n which the elasticity of substitution 
between any two assets is constant; a condition that Chetty sought 
to avoid. 1 8 Boughton therefore suggested the term 'variable 
elasticity of substitution' (VES) utility function. The VES utility 
function specified by Chetty is 
U = 
n 
i = 0 ^ ' 
- 1 / p , 
[ 6 ] 
where Xf denotes the ith asset ( / = 0 , , , , , n ) . Asset is, of 
course, money wi th parameter (3 ^ set equal to unity. The above 
util i ty function is maximised subject to the following 'budget' 
constraint: 
= f ( Y , r „ , . . . , A - „ ) = 
n 
1 
i = 0 ( 1 + ri) 
. . . [ 7 ] 
which lead to the following marginal conditions: 
( 1 + rO 
f o r 1 = 0 , 1 , . . . , n , 
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and 
M, = i { Y , r „ . . . , r n ) 
n Xi 
1 
1 = 0 ( 1 + ri) 
The system of equations contained i n the first + 1 marginality 
conditions is then solved to give a system of equations: ^ ^ 
- 1 
Pi + 1 ^ i p i i P i + 1 
-an 
1 + r , 
+ 
1 + P, 
1 + Pi 
f o r i = 1, 2,. . . ,n . . . [ 8 ] 
which is estimated by Chetty using OLS for four assets, viz: money, 
time deposits, savings and lown shares, and mutual savings deposits. 
It can be shown that the elasticity of substition between the i th and 
j t h assets can be derived f rom the following expression 
1 ( p i - Pi) 
= ( 1 + p j ) + — ^ 
^ 0 ' 1 + <pijiXi/Xj) 
. . . [ 9 ] 
where ( p f j denotes the marginal rate of substitution, and is given by 
PiPi^i 
- ( P ; + 1) 
- ( P / + 1 ) 
PjPjXj J 
Chetty was able to f ind the following values of elasticities of 
substitution betweem money and alternative assets: 30.864 for time 
deposits, 35.461 for savings and loan shares, and 23.310 for mutual 
savings deposits (1969, p.278). This is interpreted by Chetty as 
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evidence that these assets are all good substitutes for money, and 
this leads Chetty to derive the adjusted money stock: 
= [ M ° - + 1.020T°-+ O.SSOMS°-
+ 0. 6165L°- y - ° ' ' 
which is approximated by 
Ma M + T + 0.S80MS + 0. 615SL . . . [ 1 0 ] 
where all the variables have already been defined previously.. This 
is the basis on which a weighted monetary aggregate can be 
derived. 
Feige and Pearce (1977, p.460) have noted that, in the 
two-asset model, a low interest cross-elasticity would imply a high 
elasticity of substitution. In particular, they showed that 
1 + rj 
Or i = I ' ' i , / ~ V J • • • [ 1 1 ] 
where rjj j denotes the interest cross-elasticity between the i th and 
j t h assets, y]j denotes the ; th asset's interest own-elasticity, and rj 
denotes the rate of return for the ; t h asset. For example, Feige 
and Pearce chose the values i j / j = -0 .4 , ijy = 1.0, and r j = 
0.04 which wi l l give a value of 36.4 for the elasticity of 
substitution. Thus Feige and Pearce (1977) claim that this value is 
'very close' to the actual elasticities reported by Chetty, and go on 
to conclude that '...a cross-elasticity representing an inelastic 
response is consistent with a large elasticity of substitution.'(p.460) 
However, a number of technical difficulties were discovered with 
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Chetty's study, and these are discussed in section 4.2.2(c). 
Meanwhile, the study of Moroney and Wilbratte (1976) wiU be 
considered. 
(b) The 'dual' problem that wasn't. The study by Moroney and 
Wilbratte (1976) differs f rom that of Chetty (1969) in three main 
aspects. Firstly, they assume that households maximise their wealth 
subject to , what is called, a 'technological transactions' constraint 
(Moroney and Wilbratte, 1976, p.183). Secondly, they incorporate 
permanent income and an explicit dynamic adjustment process in the 
model, and f inal ly, the range of assets included has been extended 
beyond those deposits of commercial banks and nbfi's to include 
short-term government bonds and long-term corporate bonds. 
The model of Moroney and Wilbratte assumes that 
households seek to maximise wealth, which is attributable to a mix 
of money and various interest-bearing assets, subject to a 
technological transactions constraint. Wealth is defined to be 
W, = . I ^ X , . , ( 1 + r . , ) . . . [ 1 2 ] 
where VK^  denotes wealth in period t , (i = 0,. . . ,n) denotes 
the nominal value of the i th asset, and denotes the effective 
nominal rate of interest. The asset, X^, denotes money whose rate 
of return is set equal to zero, and the other assets Xi 
(i = l,...,n) are interest-bearing assets. The technological 
transactions constraint is defined as 
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- P , • • 1 / ^ ' 
1 = 0 
. . . [ 1 3 ] 
Moroney and Wilbratte (1976, p.185) view T as the anticipated 
volume of transactions that can be accomplished during a given 
period with the use of money and its various substitutes. The non-
negative parameters, /S/^, are associated with the productivity of 
various assets i n executing transactions, and, as w i l l be seen below, 
are capable of varying over time. The pj's are substitution 
parameters. It has been suggested by Moroney and Wilbratte (1976, 
p.186) that the coefficients need not remain constant over time, 
and this is attributed to financial innovations which may enhance 
the convertibility of assets into money or improvements in the 
effectiveness of money to facilitate exchange. It is proposed by 
Moroney and Wilbratte, as a working hypothesis, that the |3's are 
functions of permanent income: 
(3.^ = f o r i = 0 , . . . , n . . . . [ 1 4 ] 
where is permanent income, and the e's are parameters not 
constrained to be equal. This is justified on two grounds. Firstly, 
permanent income is used as a proxy for wealth. Growth in 
permanent income and wealth may affect the marginal rate of 
substitution between money and other assets. Secondly, permanent 
income is expected to reflect the effects of gradual changes in the 
transactions demand for money. 
The first order marginal conditions for the constrained 
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optimisation problem in equations [12] and [13] are 
1_ ( P o + 1) 
^t 
Po 
-^i^i^t^it 1 + ' i t = 
f o r a l 1 / , and i = 0, . . . ,n 
e. - ( p - . + l ) 
and 
n e. - ( P . . + 1 ) 
f o r a l l t. 
The first + 1 first-order marginal condition equations (i.e. not 
including the technological transactions constraint) are then solved by 
Moroney and Wilbratte to obtain a set of 'asset-demand' 
equations: 
&nX.^ = a^. + a^.^nY^ + ag.^nA/^ + a^^<lng^^ + £ , - , . . . [ 1 5 ] 
vher e 
li 
^2i 
«3f 
M. 
Hi 
[ - 1 / ( 1 + p.) ] 5 n ( ^ „ p „ / ^ . p . ) , 
- s - ) / [ - (p , - + 1) ] , 
(p„ + l ) / ( p . + 1 ) , 
^Ot 
- l / ( p . + 1) 
iit = 1 / ( 1 + ^ - P ' 
and = a d i s t u r b a n c e t e r m . 
I t 
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There were five groups of assets that were included in the study, 
viz; M = currency and demand deposits, X^ = commercial bank 
time and savings deposits, X^ = U.S. government securities with 
less than one year to maturity, X^ = bonds issued by private 
corporations, and X^ = an aggregate of savings-and-loan liabilities 
and mutual savings bank deposits. The data period used was from 
the last quarter i n 1956 to the last quarter of 1970. The above 
equation was estimated by Moroney and Wilbratte using OLS, and 
after substantial autocorrelation was detected, the Cochrane-Orcutt 
correction procedure was applied. The estimated elasticities of 
substitution are shown in the first column of Table 4.2. which is 
derived f rom various tables presented i n Moroney and Wilbratte 
(1976). 
One feature that can be noted immediately is that short-
and long-term bonds should be included in the definition of money 
because of the relatively high estimated elasticities of substitution for 
such assets. However, Moroney and Wilbratte (1976, p.190) have 
said that the 'aset-demand' equation for savings-and-loan liabilities 
and mutual savings deposits was pathological i n that substantial 
autocorrelation still existed even after the correction procedure, and 
the coefficient to the interest rate variable was of the wrong sign, 
and Moroney and Wilbratte say that ' [ f ]or reasons that are not 
clear, savings-and-loan shares plus mutual savings deposits do not 
seem compatible with the wealth maximizing framework apparently 
suitable for analysing the other assets.'(1976, p.190) One possible 
reason that can be offered here for this result is that the simple-
sum aaggregation of savings-and-loan shares with mutual savings 
deposits may not be entirely warranted since this would have 
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TABLE 4 . 2 : Estimated elasticities of substitution between 
money and alternative assets derived from the 
study by Moroney and Vlilbratte (1976). 
Estimated elasticities of subst i tut ion 
based on equation 
Asset [ 1 5 ] [ 1 7 ] [ 1 9 ] 
Time and sav ings 
d e p o s i t s . 8 .59 22 .48 24 .84 
S h o r t - t erm g o v t . 
s e c u r i t i e s v i t h 
l e s s t h a n 1 year 
t o m a t u r i t y . 28 .57 23 .96 3 4 . 6 1 
L o n g - t erm p r i v a t e 
c o r p o r a t i o n bonds. 34 .26 27 .53 34 .86 
S a v i n g s - a n d - 1 oan 
1 i a b i 1 i t i es + 
mutua l s av ings 
d e p o s i t s . 2 .79 19 .12 22 .60 
Source: Moroney and Wilbratte (1976), Tables 1, 2, and 3, 
pp.189, 193, and 194 respectively. 
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implied that both of these assets had an identical elasticity of 
substitution. Such a restriction is likely not to be supported by the 
data, and Moroney and Wilbratte should have included such assets 
separately. 
Another particularly serious problem with the approach is the 
alleged duality which, Moroney and Wilbratte (1976, p.183) argue, 
would lead to identical asset-demand equations as those derived in 
the primal problem (such as that of Chetty (1969)). This would 
only have been true i f the first N + 1 first order marginal 
conditions were solved in both the primal and dual problem, but 
this would not hold true if all ( i . e . A^  + 2) first-order marginal 
conditions were solved to derive the A^  + 1 asset demand 
equations.2 1 This problem also exists with Chetty (1969). The 
correct asset demand equations should have included wealth or the 
anticipated volume of transactions respectively as additional 
arguments i n Chetty (1969) and Moroney and Wilbratte (1976) 
respectively. 
The last two columns of Table 4.2. report alternative 
estimates of elasticities of substitution. In order to test for 
homotheticity of the technological transactions constraint, it was 
necessary to test statistically the null hypothesis that all the p's in 
equation [12] above were insignificantly different f rom each other. 22 
Moroney and Wilbratte were unable to reject this hypothesis, and 
therefore proceeded to carry out the next stage of their study by 
using a generalised CES function which is similar to that one 
defined i n footnote 18 of this chapter, and is given below: 
T = 
n 
i = 0 ^ ^ 
l y - p 
it 
- 1 / 
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[ 1 6 ] 
and the elasticity of substitution would simply he a = l / ( l + p). 
Wealth is then maximised subject to this constraint to obtain a set 
of alternative 'asset demand' equations; 
vhe r e 
h i = u^'o - ^•) 
and 
^3i = "i 
The above system of 'asset-demand' equations were estimated using 
OLS and the estimates were corrected for autocorrelation. The 
estimated elasticities of substitution are shown in the second column 
of Table 4.2. It w i l l be seen f rom equation [17] that the elasticity 
of substitution estimate is derivable directly f rom the coefficient b^i 
so that they were able to provide some statistical tests regarding the 
properties of the estimated elasticities of substitution. They f ind that 
they are all significantly different f rom zero, and that they are not 
able to reject the null hypothesis that the elasticities of substitution 
are insignificantly different f rom each other. Moroney and Wilbratte 
(1976, p.193) concede that this is 'an unusual result' since they 
contradict a widely held view that short-term assets are more 
substitutable than long-term assets for money. The results still 
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confirm that both short- and long-term bonds should be included in 
the definition of money. 
It w i l l have become apparent i n the discussions of empirical 
demand for money studies that it is necessary to incorporate an 
explicit adjustment process into the demand for money equation 
when quarterly data is being used. Moroney and Wilbratte (1976, 
p . 191) do the essentially same thing by specifying an adjustment 
process of the form: 
2n 
fMt 1 
- 2n 5n 
* 
\Mt 1 - £n 
f t - l 1 
= 6. 
Ixitl 
. . . [ 1 8 ] 
where s is the coefficient of adjustment. The adjustment process is 
then substituted into the system of 'asset demand' equations given in 
[17] . If the resulting equation were to be estimated by OLS, the 
existence of a lagged dependent variable may give rise to 
autocorrelation. A n alternative is suggested by Moroney and 
Wilbratte i n which maximum likelihood estimation techniques are 
used. They lag the system of 'asset demand' equations by one 
period and multiply it by 7/. The resulting product is then 
subtracted f rom the original system of 'asset demand' equations so 
that 
+ ^ 4 i [ ^ " ^ , f - l - ^ i ^ " ' " / , / - 2 ] + Ut 
. . . [ 1 9 ] 
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vhe r e 
^li = &iOiS>nipJp.) 
= ^ • ^ • ( ^ - ^•) 
C 3 . = 5.a. 
and 
C4,. = (1 - s-) 
Moroney and Wilbratte (1976, p.194) have reported that the 
coefficient 04/ is insignificantly different f rom zero for the asset 
demand equation for savings-and-loan shares plus mutual savings 
deposits. Thus, they believe that complete adjustment takes place 
within a quarter for money relative to this class of assets, but takes 
longer for other assets. Moroney and Wilbratte say that the 
estimated elasticities of substitution, given in the last column of 
Table 4.2., show little relative dispersion and are quite similar to 
those estimates based on equation [17] above. They f ind it difficult 
to escape the conclusion that short- and long-term bonds are close 
substitutes for money, and much closer substitutes than time 
deposits. But , these results should, of course, be interpreted with a 
good measure of caution because Moroney and Wilbratte did not 
fol low the correct procedure for deriving the asset demand 
equations. Another criticism that can be levelled against Moroney 
and Wilbratte, as well as Chetty (1969), is the specification of 
wealth and the 'budget' constraint respectively. This is the subject 
of the following critique by Donovan (1978) 
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(c) Donovan's critique. The main difficulty with the work of 
Chetty (1969) concerns the nature of the 'budget' constraint given in 
equation [7] above. The arguments i n the utility function 
fundamentally represent the flows of monetary services yielded by 
each asset. It is sometimes assumed that the monetary services 
yielded by each asset are proportional to the average stock of held 
of that asset. Thus, i t is quite correct to regard the demand for an 
average stock as being equivalent to the demand for the associated 
service flows. It is important to recognise that, in formulating the 
'budget' constraint, the relevant prices must be the prices of the 
service flows yielded by the l iquid assets which is referred to by 
Donovan (1978, p.680) as the rental prices of the assets. The 
b'budget' constraint should, therefore, express the condition that the 
sum of the expenditure on the serviced flows yielded by each asset 
be less than or equal to the total expenditure on monetary services. 
The concept of rental prices of money has some direct relevance in 
the construction of Divisia monetary aggregates, and one would do 
well to consider this concept i n sub-section 4.2.2(d) below. It 
suffices for the time being that the 'budget' constraint specified by 
Chetty is no more than an accounting identity, namely that the 
stocks of the assets are constrained to equal wealth. Furthermore, 
the analysis carried out by Moroney and Wilbratte (1976) would 
have had more meaning if their wealth function had been 
re-specified as the expenditure function so that the dual problem 
noted at the end of footnote 21 to this chapter would make more 
sense, namely that households seek to minimise their expenditure on 
monetary services with respect to the technological transactions 
constraint. 
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Another problem that was also touched upon by Donovan 
was the possibility of introducing simultaneous equation bias. As 
noted previously, the studies by Chetty, and Moroney and Wilbratte 
failed to take into account the last first-order marginal condition 
when solving the system of equations to derive a system of 'asset-
demand' equations. It w i l l have been noticed that the so-called 
asset demand equations included the demand for money as a 
function i n every demand equation (see equations [8 ] , [15], [17], 
and [19] above). If one were to try to estimate such asset demand 
equations, i t would only be at the peril of inducing simultaneous 
equation bias which could lead to inconsistent estimates. This 
problem has apparently been noted by Chetty (1969, p.277) who 
suggested the two-stage least squares procedure which involves 
specifying an asset demand equation for money (currency and 
demand deposits) and then estimating i t . The resulting instrumental 
variable is then used i n the second stage of the two-stage least 
squares procedure. But Chetty refrained f rom using this procedure, 
preferring to use OLS on the grounds that income and interest rates 
may not be strictly exogenous, and claimed that 'the ordinary least 
squares may be no worse than the two-stage least squares 
[procedure]... '(1969, p.277) Moroney and Wilbratte (1976) also did 
not use the two-stage least squares procedure. 
(d) The concept of rental prices of money. It was previously 
seen that the correct prices for inclusion i n a budget constraint must 
be able to reflect the rental price of monetary services. This is 
necessary because the variables of direct interest in a utility function 
are the service flows yielded by each asset. But, for convenience 
i n collecting empirical data, it is sometimes assumed that the service 
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flows of an asset is proportional to its average stock so that there 
sometimes exists a confusion between the two concepts in the 
literature. 
In order to derive the rental prices of money and its 
substitutes, i t is necessary first to make some simplifying assumptions 
and init ial definitions. To keep the notation within manageable 
proportions, it w i l l be assumed that the factor of proportionality 
between the stock of an asset and its service flows is equal to 
unity. Furthermore, define the nominal value of the i th asset in 
period t as M^, and define the consumer price level in period t as 
p*. Now, i n period t , the real value of the i th asset is given by 
mit = (Mit/p*), that is the real value of the i th asset is derived 
by deflating the nominal value by the consumer price level. 
In order to define the rental price of the i th asset for 
period t , which is denoted here by i r / ^ , it should be noted that the 
individual must pay p* currency units to be able to hold one unit 
of a 'basket of real commodities' which is used as the basis for 
calculating the price index. In period t , the rental price of the i th 
monetary asset w i l l be equal to p*. 
If one were to assume that the price level w i l l not remain 
constant i n the next period, and is expected to rise to p*^j i n the 
next period, then the real value of the i th asset held in period t 
w i l l be expected to decline to M / ^ / p * ^ ; . Letting the rate of 
depreciation be denoted by 6f, then it can be shown that the rate 
of depreciation can be derived by solving the following equation for 
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— = ( 1 - 5 ^ — . . . [ 2 0 ] 
Pt+1 Pt 
which gives; 
* e 
Pt+1 
Thus, it can be seen that the expected rate of depreciation is 
analogous to the expected rate of change in the price level. If the 
nominal rate of interest on a 'benchmark asset' (to be defined in 
sub-section 4 . 3 . 1 . below) is denoted by JR^, then the rental price of 
the iih non-interest bearing asset is defined to be (see Donovan, 
1978, p .685, equation 9) : 
* 
^it = Pi 
( 1 - 5t)Pt+l 
( 1 + R^) 
If equation [ 2 1 ] is substituted into the preceding equation which 
then reduces to 
* 
* Pt 
= p - . . . 2 2 
^ ( 1 + R^ 
Thus, the rental price of the iih non-interest bearing asset is seen 
to be the price level in period t minus the discounted price level. 
But, when the rate of return on the i\h asset, the interpretation of 
equation [ 2 2 ] will become even clearer. Define the nominal rate of 
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interest that the ith asset earns in one period as r^. Then 
equation [20] can be modified such that; 
* g * 
Pt+1 Pt 
Substituting for 5 ^ into equation [23] and making all the necessary 
simplifications, equation [23] will reduce to; 
= ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . . . [ 2 4 , 
which is identical to that equation derived by Donovan (1978, 
p.686, equation 24) and also to that derived by Barnett (1981, 
p. 197)2 3 It will be seen that the differential (i?^ - r^) may be 
seen to represent the opportunity cost of holding a liquid asset. In 
the case of currency, this opportunity cost will be equal to Rf, but 
will become lower as one obtains a higher rate of return for 
relatively less liquid assets. Fundamentally, the rental price of the 
ah asset is the discounted one-period holding cost of the ith asset. 
This is precisely the prices that should be used in a budget 
constraint whenever analysing the substitutability between money and 
alternative assets. One should refrain from specifying budget 
constraints that are simply accounting identities for the stock of 
assets. This concept of the rental price of an asset will be used 
extensively in section 4.3. below, but before departing from this 
section, an attempt will be made to outline some of the recent 
literature in the application of economic aggregation theory to the 
derivation of economic monetary aggregates. 
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(e) Recent developments. The model originally suggested by Chetty 
(1969) was subjected to further criticism by Boughton (1981). The 
essential criticism is that Chetty's model is excessively restrictive, but 
can be generalised by making the utility function homothetic and by 
relaxing the strong separability restrictions which implied that the 
determinants of utility were completely independent of each other. 
B relaxing the assumption that the marginal rate of 
substitution between financial assets is independent of income, 
Boughton proposed a model which modified the strong separability 
assumption, and restored homotheticity with respect to income. 
He was concerned about the 'temporal Constance of relationships' 
over the period 1953-1975 which witnessed 'frequent and substantial 
innovations in the market for financial assets.' (1981, p.378) 
Wishing to take them into account, but without modelling them 
explicitly, he incorporated some modifications such as an impUcit 
interest rate on demand deposits, filtered data to reduce the effects 
of common trends, and deflated values of assets. To allow for 
shifts caused by regulations, a dummy variable was employed. 
The substantial finding contradicted Chetty's results. 
Elasticities of substitution between money (narrowly defined) and 
other liquid assets were lower than those in Chetty, and 'there has 
been a significant trend away from money in favor of the substitute 
assets that is not otherwise explained by the hypothesized relations 
in the model.' (1981, p.385) The existence of low elasticities of 
substitution would therefore point to a narrower empirical definition 
of money. 
An experimental work by Ewis and Fisher (1984) used the 
translog utility function in their study of the demand for money in 
246 
the U.S. over the period 1969-1979. The results are of a 
provisional nature, but are of interest in the context of asset 
substitutability. 
The assets considered were M l (narrow money), time and 
savings deposits, short-term Treasury securities, and foreign assets. 
While, with the exception of foreign assets, no strong substitutability 
between monetary assets was found. M l was a weak substitute for 
domestic assets except time deposits. Evidence of strong 
substitutability between domestic and foreign assets was also found. 
Stressing the tentative nature of their results, Ewis and Fisher assert 
that only the narrow definitions of money would be satisfactory 
policy targets, and that the low substitutability between domestic 
financial assets suggests that the simple-summation into broader 
aggregates would be unwise. 
Thus, the results on substitutability of assets are sensitive to 
model specifications and the use of data. In general, the evidence 
seems to suggest low substitutability between narrow money and 
liquid asets. There is unease about high level simple-sum monetary 
aggregates which implicitly assign to their component assets equal 
weights. 
4.3. Divisia monetary aggregates 
4.3.1. The Divisia aggregation procedure 
In 1977, the staff of the Federal Reserve Board began to 
work intensively to identify the definition of money that is most 
useful to the implementation of monetary policy. One outcome was 
the construction of a monetary measure using a rigorous application 
of aggregation theory (discussed in the previous sub-section) and 
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index-number theory. 'Moneyness', or a measure of monetary 
transactions services, is expressed as an index number based on the 
Divisia quantity index. 2 5 
(a) Basic concepts. The traditional money aggregates, as previously 
noted, are simple sum totals which imphes that their components 
receive equal weights (of unity) and are thus implicitly considered to 
be perfect substitutes. The other implicit assumption is that those 
assets not entering a monetary aggregate have zero substitutability 
with the assets included. The preceding discussion revealed that 
there tended to be a low degree of substitutabihty between money 
and alternative 'near-money' assets which have been included in 
very broad monetary aggregates, but it is doubtful if simple-sum 
aggregation procedures are appropriate. 
The basic point is that an aggregation of monetary 
components, whose object is to try to identify 'money' in terms of 
the 'flow of services that constitute the output of the economy's 
monetary-transactions technology'(Barnett and Spindt, 1982, p.4), 
could be accomphshed if one knew the parameters of relevant utiUty 
functions. But, such functions are not known and there is an 
element of arbitrariness in their specification and estimation. Thus, 
aggregation could be approached on the basis of index-number 
theory, where there are no unknown parameters, but where prices 
of component quantities are required in addtion to the quantities 
themselves. 
The use of the quantity index dispenses with the use of an 
aggregator function, but cannot be compiled without both observable 
prices and quantities. To determine a change in aggregate service 
flows resulting from changes in component quantities, a quantity 
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index must have prices as its weights. This reflects the fact that, 
in equilibrium, prices are proportional to marginal utilities. ^  s 
The price of the services of a durable good is its rental 
price or user cost. Analogously, user costs of financial assets must 
be derived. According to Barnett et al (1981), the user cost is 
derived which leads to the same expression as given in equation 
[24] or the tax-adjusted user cost given in footnote 23 to this 
chapter. But, in computing the monetary quantity index, the user 
cost formula reduces to 
^it = - 'it • • • t 2 5 ] 
as f{Rt,rt,P*) = P*(^ - r t ) / { l + Rt){l - rt), being 
independent of the selection of the ith asset, is cancelled out.^? 
The user cost defined in equation [25] above is the simple 
differential between the expected maximum available yield, R, on 
any monetary asset during the holding period and the own rate of 
return, r, on asset / during that period. Unless services are 
accrued from a monetary asset /, the asset would not be held. The 
user costs are thus the equivalent of the price paid for the 
monetary services. But, it must be stressed that these user costs are 
not the weights used in Divisia monetary aggregates; rather they are 
the prices on which the weights can be computed. 
Before going on to define a suitable quantity index, it is 
necessary to take a brief look at some of the desirable properties of 
index numbers. The full discussion is contained in Appendix One 
to this thesis, but the more salient points can be mentioned here. 
A quantity index number is said to be exact if it exactly equals the 
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aggregator function whenever the data is consistent with 
microeconomic maximising behaviour. Since the aggregator function 
depends only upon quantities, the index number is a quantity index 
number despite the existence of prices in its formula. Given a 
quantity index, the corresponding price index then can be computed 
from Fisher's (1922) weak factor reversal test (see Appendix One). 
Although no always-exact index numbers are known, Diewert 
(1976) has constructed a theory of superlative index numbers. 
Diewert defines an index number to be superlative if it is exact for 
some aggregator function, f, which can provide a second-order 
approximation to any linearly homogeneous aggregator function. 
Fisher (1922) advocated the following quantity index number, 
called the Fisher Ideal index: 
n 
-l^'^it'^it 
n 
1 -
i=\ i ^ t - f ' i t 
n 
11 
n 
1/2 
. . . [ 2 6 ] 
TOrquinst (1936) advocated the following quantity index number, 
called the TOrquinst-Theil Divisia index: 
(Pt-\\ ( " " i f ' " , - , ; - ! ) 
n 
. . . [ 2 7 ] 
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where 
n 
I t I t I t y ^ j ] t ] t 
Taking the logarithms of both sides of equation [27], observe that 
. . . [ 2 8 ] 
where 
Diewert (1976) has proved that both the Fisher Ideal and Torquinst-
Theil Divisia indices are 'Diewert-superlative' (see Appendix 
One). But, Barnett (1980, p.39) has argued that, as a quantity 
index, the TOrquinst-Theil Divisia index is more widely used than 
the Fisher Ideal index since equation [28] permits an easier 
interpretation of the index. This equation states that the growth 
rate of the index is a weighted average of the growth rates of the 
components. The weights are share contributions of each 
component to the total value of the services of all components. 
Because of that 'transparently clear' interpretation, Barnett (1980) 
advocates the use of the Divisia index to measure the quantity of 
money at all levels of aggregation. 2 s 
Simple-sum aggregates would be the same as Divisia 
aggregates only if the own rates of return on all component assets 
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were identical, suggesting that the components would be perfect 
substitutes. This, however, is not likely to be the case, especially 
with broad aggregates. If the rate of interest on a component 
changes, then in the case of the Divisia index, all 'substitution' 
effects will be internalised (by definition) and the aggregate will not 
change; it will change only if the rate of interest has an 'income 
effect' (that is, when the level of utiUty,or monetary service, 
changes). A traditional aggregate cannot internalise the effects of 
substitution following a change in interest rates on a component.29 
The weights in the monetary quantity index will change, as 
interest rates entering the calculations of the weights (and user costs) 
will indicate. A rise in the general interest rate (indicated by R) 
will increase weights on hquid or transactions balances and will 
induce holders to reduce the proportion of such assets in their 
portfolio. However, if interest rates were to be paid on some 
hitherto non-interest bearing assets, then this would lower their user 
costs and increase their holding and they would receive less weight 
(relatively to remaining non-interest bearing assets, whose holding 
would decline). Substitution by wealth-holders would terminate 
only when the marginal return on each asset becomes equal. The 
weights are likely to be more reliable in the absence of restrictions 
on interest rates such as ceilings or cartel arrangements. 
Comparisons of the simple-sum aggregates with the 
corresponding Divisia aggregates show that narrow aggregates (Ml ) 
do not differ a great deal, but that the difference between 
aggregates increases as they are broadened by the inclusion of new 
components. Thus, one would expect that the simple-sum totals 
are higher than the Divisia for the higher level aggregates, for 
252 
example M3. ^ ° This is because of the low degree of substitutability 
between narrowly-defined money and other assets, and thus, as 
noted previously, broad simple-sum aggregates have a tendency to 
overstate the amount of monetary services available in relation to 
Divisia monetary aggregates. 
(b) The optimal aggregation procedure. Barnett (1982) outhned a 
procedure to identify the 'best' or the optimal level of monetary 
aggregation. 
A three-stage selection process is proposed by Barnett. The 
first stage is the selection of 'admissable component groupings' to 
classify assets in the monetary set into separable component subsets. 
A measure of substitutability between assets is sought through the 
properties of utility functions with monetary assets as arguments. 
Stringent conditions of separability must be met in the selection of 
the admissable component groups (Barnett, 1982, pp.695-696) 
The components of each aggregate must include currency 
(legal tender), but must exclude non-monetary assets. A prior 
definition of monetary assets is assumed. 'In attaching a name to 
an aggregate, such as food or money, a prior definition of the 
components' domain must be selected.' (Barnett, 1982, p.697) It is 
in the realm of the conditions for grouping the components that 
research programmes are incomplete (Barnett, 1982, p.707; Goldfeld, 
1982, p.717) Problems are encountered most frequently in trying to 
isolate sets of assets in aggregates intermediate between the 'narrow' 
and very broad aggregates. 
The second stage proceeds after the selection of admissable 
asset groupings, and refers to the selection of an aggregation 
formula. As mentioned previously, Barnett's choice is the Divisia 
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index. When the aggregation is completed, the result is a hierarchy 
of aggregates nested about money. 
Stage three is concerned with the choice of 'best' aggregate 
out of the available hierarchy. The theoretical choice falls on the 
highest-level aggregate, which internalises substitution effects between 
assets. It is also preferred by virtue of the fact that, in choosing a 
lower-level aggregate, 'we are omitting factors of production from 
the economy's transactions technology.' (Barnett, 1982, p.699) Thus, 
the broadest aggregate does not leave out any important 
informationabout the economy's flow of transactions services. 
Methodologically, the identification of the real-life counterpart of the 
'money' of economic theory, by using the three-stage approach, is 
superior to the empirical approaches discussed earlier and to the 
alternative approach which follows. 
There is, however, an alternative third-stage procedure. 
This refers to the empirical approach to the selection of the optimal 
monetary aggregate using the criteria discussed in sub-section 4.1.2., 
namely that the 'best' definition is selected on the basis of whether 
it works best in meeting macroeconomic policy objectives. It is 
suggested that, provided that the first two stages in the selection 
procedure are completed, the choice by 'best results' is acceptable, 
for it only completes the sole criterion of the definition of money. 
The empirical results will be discussed briefly in sub-section 4.4.2. 
below. 
4.3.2. A critique 
The index number approach to monetary aggregation, 
suggested by Barnett and his colleagues, is very appealing and is 
being experimented with in other countries. Its theoretical 
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arguments are convincing, but there are some practical issues that 
must be considered. There is the difficulty of trying to accont for 
financial assets that may yield different services to different holders 
such as households and firms. Barnett admits that this cannot be 
done because of the relative paucity of sectoral data. The next 
problem to consider is the specification of the 'benchmark' asset 
from which the maximum rate of return could be obtained in order 
to compute the user costs. 
At this stage of development of Divisia monetary aggregates, 
a general crtical evaluation is particularly difficult. But it can be 
said that the use of Divisia monetary aggregates in demand for 
money studies will not go some way to tackling some of the 
persistent specification problems involved in estimating an empirical 
demand for money function. Furthermore, it is on the supply side 
that the difficulties might be considerably more forbidding. 
(Goldfeld, 1982, pp.719-720) For instance, what is the supply 
function of the very broad Divisia monetary aggregate? How does 
one approach the control of a monetary quantity index which 
incorporates numerous assets of financial institutions which exhibit 
different behavioural characteristics? Barnett's answer to the 
problem concerning the control of money follows the traditional 
monetarist prescription: use the monetary base control. This is 
substantiated by evidence that the long-run monetary base multiplier 
for Divisia L (the very broad monetary aggregate in the U.S.) is 
stable (Barnett, 1982, pp.692-693). The final problem to consider 
is on how to present the concept of Divisia monetary aggregates to 
the general public. 
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4.4. Empirical evidence and analysis 
4.4.1. A demand for money study using Divisia aggregates 
The study by Porter and Offenbacher (1984) which may be 
recalled for their inclusion of the brokerage fee in the demand for 
money by a controversial method (discussed in the last chapter) 
went on to specify a demand for money function in which the 
arguments are Divisia monetary quantity and user cost indices 
instead of the conventional-sum aggregates and interest rate 
opportunity costs. 
Porter and Offenbacher estimated two demand for money 
equations in which the Divisia monetary aggregate was postulated to 
be a function of a scale variable and the divisia user cost index. 
They also estimated a conventional specification of the demand for 
money using conventional-sum aggregates and interest rate 
opportunity costs. The sample period used in both cases was from 
1959:3 to 1982:2 based on quarterly observations. The sample 
period was sub-divided into two sub-periods, viz: 1959:3-1974:2 and 
1974:3-1982:2 for the purpose of carrying out a Chow test of 
parameter stability. The regressions were run for a number of 
definitions of money in order to determine the most appropriate 
definition of money. This approach, by using demand for money 
stability criteria, is reminiscent of the empirical approach to the 
definition of money discussed in sub-section 4.1.1. Tables 4.3. and 
4.4. report the results based on quarterly and annual mean errors 
and RMSEs, along with the relevant Chow F-statistics. The full 
regression results are too numerous to be fully reported here. 
Table 4.3. refers to the use of Divisia aggregates and user 
costs in the demand for money specification, and Table 4.4. refers 
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to the conventional sum aggregates and interest rates. ^ ' A 
comparison across aggregates in each pair of corresponding tables 
reveals that the broad transactions Divisia aggregate (BROAD 
TRANS) yields the best overall results. The summary statistics of 
predictive ability suggest that this Divisia aggregate can be predicted 
about as well as any other. Its Chow test F-statistic value of 1.1 
indicates that the stability hypothesis cannot be rejected both at the 
5 and 1 per cent significance levels. 
4.4.2. Other empirical evidence 
The empirical evidence presented by Barnett (1982) indicates 
that, by the criteria of macroeconomic performance, the broadest 
aggregate -Divisia L - is superior to the lower-level aggregates 
(Barnett, 1982, pp.702-706). This was done by counting the 
number of occasions on which each particular aggregate performed 
best of all in each statistical test. Table 4.5. confirms the finding 
of Barnett (1982). 
However, this was somewhat at odds with Cagan's (1982) 
study, which, using the criterion of minimising the variabihty of the 
velocity of circulation about a time period isolated the Divisia MIB 
aggregate as the 'best'. This is certainly shovm as the only best 
performer for this type of criterion by Barnett (1982) in Table 4.5. 
Existing evidence in the USA suggests that, on the whole, 
Divisia aggregates perform better (have better predictive capacity) 
than the simple-sum aggregates. 
The protoganists of the "Divisia money' have little doubt that 
the Divisia money targets should replace the present targets. 
Barnett (1982, pp.706-707) could not conceive of any further 
potential use for any simple-sum aggregates. The replacement of 
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TABLE 4. 5: The number of times that each aggregate was 
best performer in stati stical tests in 
Barnett (1982) 
Component Divi sia Simp I e-sum 
Group Aggregat es Aggregates 
MIB 1 0 
M2 6 4 
M3 5 1 
L 14 0 
Source: Barnett (1982), p.705, Table 5. 
Note: Definitions of money (except) for MIB) are given in 
Table 4.4. The definition of M I B is given in Table 3.4. 
in Chapter Three. 
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M l by Divisia M l could be useful, though he considered that the 
replacement of higher-level aggregates by the Divisia L would offer 
the best solution for targeting purposes. 'The components of Divisia 
L should permanently be defined to include all of the money 
market. Then new money market assets would be incorporated 
immediately by the defintion of the aggregate.' This provision was 
made to account for financial innovations, but this may not be such 
a simple matter in practice (see the discussion in Chapter 
Two,especially sections 2.1. and 2.3.) 
4.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, the definition of money was considered. 
Two approaches were examined regarding the definition of money. 
The first approach made use of theory to arrive at a priori 
definitions of money. Of particular interst, it was argued that the 
effect of financial innovation is that the definition of money would 
be most likely to be modified in favour of broadening the definition 
to include liabilities of non-bank financial intermediaries in addition 
to the traditional definition of money. The empirical approach was 
then considered which is fundamentally defining money by 'best 
results'. However, there are some methodological weaknesses 
inherent in such an approach in that an attempt is being made to 
define money before it is actually conceptualised on a priori 
grounds. The relative stability of the demand for money prior to 
the 1970s made it difficult to reach any consensus on the 'best' 
definition of money, and the breakdown in the demand for money 
made the definition of money by the demand for money stabihty 
criteria an infeasible option. An attempt was made to define 
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money by measuring the 'moneyness' of various assets by reference 
to the degree of substitutability between narrow money and 
alternative 'near-money' assets. The evidence surveyed by Feige 
and Pearce (1977) would not be inconsistent with the view that 
savings and loan shares and mutual savings deposits were rather 
poor substitutes. If one were to choose to include them in 
simple-sum aggregates, it would have to be at the peril of 
overstating the amount of monetary services available. Chetty (1969) 
found evidence to support the Gurley-Shaw hypothesis, and 
Moroney and Wilbratte (1976) found some rather surprising evidence 
that short-term government debt and corporate debt should be 
included in the definition of money. Their results are somewhat 
suspect owing to their failure to use rental prices of money as 
defined by Donovan (1978). The use of index-number theory is 
advocated because it enables one to dispense with the problems of 
specifying and estimating aggregator functions. The Divisia quantity 
index was particularly favoured by Barnett in his extensive work for 
its ease of interpretation, namely that the growth rate of the index 
was equal to the weighted average of the growth rates of its 
components. The empirical evidence reagrding the relative 
performance of Divisia monetary aggregates to simple-sum aggregates 
is highly suggestive that Divisia monetary aggregates are to be 
preferred, and Barnett (1982) favours the Divisia L aggregate as a 
target. However, at this stage, there still remain formidable 
problems, mostly of a practical nature, and a plea is made here for 
better data sources to enable further research to be undertaken in 
what proves to be a most promising development in monetary economics. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FISHER HYPOTHESIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
As the title of this chapter implies, the main emphasis is 
putting the Fisher hypothesis in historical perspective with a view to 
clearing up a few misconceptions that surround the Fisher hypothesis. 
The main justification for including such a chapter in this thesis is 
that there is a great deal of misinformation concerning the Fisher 
hypothesis and the concept of real interest rates. That misinformation 
mainly stems from the failure of the majority of the empirical 
literature to recognise Irving Fisher's key distinction between situations 
in which inflation is fully anticipated (full equiUbrium), and those 
situations in which it is not fully anticipated (the transition period). 
From this failure, two common misconceptions emerge. 
The first misconception concerns the 'neutrahty' issue in which 
it is believed that real interest rates are invariant with respect to 
changes in expected inflation. Such a presumption is only valid in 
those situations in which the nominal interest rate adjusts pari passu 
to changes in expected inflation, but would certainly not hold true 
during the transition period. For example, Gibson (1972, p.855) and 
Fama (1975, p.271) both assume that the real rate of interest remains 
constant over time, and it would indeed have been difficult to accept 
their results since their tests were conditional on the above 
assumption. 
The second misconception concerns the equivalence of two 
types of real interest rates. Gebauer (1986, pp.131-135) has drawn 
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attention to the importance of distinguishing between the real 
(deflated) rate of interest on financial assets, and the real rate of 
return on real (i.e. physical) capital; and has argued that a common 
misconception is that both real rates are always equivalent. This 
would only be true in a theoretical world of perfect foresight, absence 
of risk, and perfect competition since then the rates of return on all 
assets would be equal. However, with the introduction of imperfect 
foresight and uncertainty, the real (deflated) interest rate on financial 
assets and the real rate of return on real capital will both diverge 
from each other so that it becomes extremely important to state 
precisely which real rate is being referred to. 
In order to overcome these two common misconceptions, the 
discussion in this chapter will be organised as follows. The first 
section will introduce the basic concepts involved in the relationship 
between inflation and nominal interest rates as originally formulated by 
Irving Fisher in his Appreciation and Interest (1896). Then, the 
second section considers the circumstances in which this relationship 
would arise by making use of the analyses of Henry Thornton (1802), 
and Knut WickseH (1898). Although Wicksell recognised the 
importance of inflationary expectations, his treatment of them in the 
context of the relationship between interest rates and prices was not 
adequate in the sense that a further distinction was not made between 
nominal and real interest rates. Thus the final sub-section of the 
second section considers explicitly the effect of moving from an 
assumption of static inflationary expectations to one of perfect 
foresight in the formation of expectations as based on the analysis of 
Lutz (1974). Following the rejection of the ful l equilibrium model by 
Fisher, the third section considers his investigations of the 
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inflation-interest rate relationship during the transition period, and the 
analysis is then put into a Wicksellian perspective to allow for 
imperfect foresight. Finally, the last section (which mainly serves as 
a prelude to the theoretical discussion in the next chapter) contends 
that even if perfect foresight were to be assumed, there still would be 
a good reason why the nominal interest rate may not adjust pari 
passu to changes in expected inflation, and considers the usefulness of 
the distinction between the two real rates of interest in the context of 
Tobin's ^-theory of investment. 
5.1. Basic concepts 
Before any formal analysis can be carried out, it is first 
necessary to consider the basic concepts involved in the inflation-
interest rate relationship. Although the correlation between prices and 
interest rates was recognised well before Irving Fisher, he was 
certainly one of the first to treat this relationship in a comprehensive 
and systematic manner in his Appreciation and Interest (1896). In 
order to avoid any confusion, it will be made explicit at the outset 
that 'appreciation' is defined to be the appreciation in the purchasing 
power of money brought about by deflation. The converse also holds 
true. What follows is a discussion of Fisher's original formulation. 
5.1.1. Nature of Fisher's original formulation 
Fisher stressed that the effect of appreciation on interest rates 
depended fundamentally on whether or not the appreciation was 
foreseen and chose to present the theoretical relation in a model 
assuming ful l loan market equilibrium, i.e. perfect foresight. Thus 
Fisher began by saying: 
'We must begin by noting the distinction between a 
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foreseen and unforeseen change in the value of money... 
At present we wish to discuss what will happen assuming 
this foresight to exist.' (1896, p.6) 
He then went on to derive the formula linking nominal interest rates 
to inflation rates.^ His argument ran along the following lines: 
suppose that loan contracts can be written either in terms of money 
or in terms of goods. Let R be the nominal or money interest rate 
and r be the real or commodity interest rate. It is particularly 
important to distinguish between situations in which price changes are 
perfectly anticipated (i.e. ful l equilibrium) and those in which they 
are imperfectly anticipated. Thus, letting p/p be the actual 
proportionate change in prices, and ir be the expected proportionate 
change in prices, it follows that in full equilibrium,^ 
p/p = . . . . [ 1 ] 
By such an assumption, the difficult (and often subjective) question of 
how expectations are formed can be abstracted from for the time 
being. If prices rise at the expected proportionate rate ir over the 
year so that what costs one currency unit at the beginning of the 
year will cost (1 + r) currency units at the end of the year. 
Assuming that at the beginning of the year, one currency unit will 
buy a basket of commodities, an individual has the option of 
borrowing, say, one currency unit at money rate R for one year or, 
alternatively, one basket of commodities at real rate r for a year. It 
is assumed further that there are zero 'storage costs'^ for the goods 
so that if the individual chooses the former option, he must pay (1 
+ R) currency units principal and interest when the loan expires. If 
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the individual chooses the latter option, he must pay back (1 + r) 
baskets of commodities which he can purchase at a price of ( i + TT) 
currency units per basket when the loan becomes due. This price, 
when multiplied by the number of baskets required to liquidate the 
loan, results in a total outlay of (1 + ir)(7 + r) currency 
units. Therefore, the costs of liquidating the loans expressed in a 
common unit of account are (1 + R) and (I + i r ) ( i + r) currency 
units respectively. If perfect foresight is assumed so that there exists 
perfect arbitrage, equilibrium requires that these two money sums be 
equal, that is^ 
(I + R) = (1 + r)(I + x) . . . [ 2 ] 
This expression states that the maturity values of both loans are the 
same when expressed in terms of a common unit of account. 
The main reason for such a result is that i f , say, commodity 
loans were cheaper than money loans, i.e. the inequality 
(1 + R) > (1 + r)il + . ) . . . [ 3 ] 
holds, then a profit could be made by borrowing commodities, 
converting them into currency units to be lent out at the money rate, 
R, and subsequently using the proceeds received from the maturing 
money loan to purchase commodities with which to retire the 
commodity debt. The adjustment towards equality involves an 
increased demand for commodity loans, and an increased supply of 
money loans which in turn drives up the real (commodity) interest 
rate and brings down the nominal (money) interest rate, until equahty 
is restored in equation [2]. 
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Now expanding and re-arranging equation [2] gives the 
following expression relating the nominal interest rate to the real 
interest rate and expected inflation: 
R = r + ^ + r^ • • • [ 4 ] 
Thus, it can be seen that the nominal interest rate is defined 
precisely to be the sum of the real interest rate, the expected 
proportionate change in prices, and their product. A comparison of 
the above equation v^th that given by Fisher (1896, p.9, equation 3) 
may reveal, at first glance, that both equations are inconsistent. 
However, it is only necessary to consider Fisher's definition of 
equation [4] which is as follows: 
\..The rate of interest in the (relatively) depreciating 
standard is equal to the sum of three terms, viz., the 
rate of interest in the appreciating standard, the rate 
of appreciation itself, and the product of these two 
elements.' (1896, p.9) 
Thus by choosing his words carefully. Fisher made the above 
definition generally applicable, that is, the above definition is 
applicable to both deflationary and inflationary situations. So, in a 
deflationary situation (i.e. as in Fisher's original formulation), it is the 
commodity standard that is depreciating relative to the monetary 
standard, and in an inflationary situation, it is the monetary standard 
that is depreciating relative to the commodity standard, in which case 
equation [4] holds. 
The main implication of the perfect foresight assumption is 
that nominal interest rates adjust pari passu to changes in inflationary 
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expectations, and therefore it implies that real interest rates remain 
constant. This was made explicit by Irving Fisher who wrote in 1930 
that 
'If men had perfect foresight, they would adjust the money 
interest rate so as exactly to counterbalance or offset the 
effect of changes in the price level, thus causing the real 
interest rate to remain unchanged at the normal rate.' 
(1930, pp.414-415) 
As will be discussed in Section 5.3. below, the assumption of perfect 
foresight had to be rejected by Fisher on the grounds that the 
empirical evidence indicated that the computed (i.e. deflated) real 
interest rate was much more variable than the nominal interest rate. 
A further point to note is that Gebauer (1986, p.128) has 
emphasised that the relationship between nominal interest rates and 
inflationary expectations should not be construed as a theory of 
interest per se, but as being based on Fisher's 'desire to translate 
interest rates from one standard (unit of account) into another...'. 
Writing on this point, Fisher said: 
'These rates are mutually connected and our task has been 
merely to state the law of that connection. We have not 
attempted the bolder task of explaining the rates 
themselves. Such an explanation constitutes the "theory of 
interest" in the more usual sense...' (1896, p.92) 
With regard to the above quotation, inspection of the preceding 
equations should confirm that if one interest rate is known in one 
standard, then the other interest rate in the other standard can be 
determined, but the equations themselves do not say how one interest 
rate in one standard gets determined in the first place. That is. 
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equation [4] above is not a statement of the theory of interest, but a 
statement of how interest rates in two different standards are related 
in theory. Rather than to describe this theoretical relationship as the 
'Fisher relation' (as if this relation already existed), it does seem 
more appropriate to refer to it as the Fisher hypothesis for it sums 
up neatly the very essence of Irving Fisher's work, namely that it was 
originally hypothesised that nominal interest rates adjusted pari passu 
to changes in expected inflation, but that hypothesis had to be 
rejected by Fisher himself on the basis of the empirical evidence.^ 
5.1.2. Limiting values of the variables 
In this sub-section, the limiting values of the variables are 
derived, and then the behaviour of the theoretical relationship 
between the nominal interest rate and expected inflation under perfect 
foresight is considered. In Chapter V I of Appreciation and Interest, 
Fisher considers some theoretically plausible values for the various 
variables in equation [2] above. If the nominal interest rate equals 
the rate of inflation, then equation [2] implies that the real interest 
rate is zero; and by similar reasoning, if the rate of inflation is 
greater than the nominal interest rate, then the real interest rate will 
be negative. Here, the assumption of zero 'storage costs' for goods 
plays an important role in determining whether or not the real 
(commodity) interest rate can be negative. Given that there are zero 
'storage costs' for commodities, it would follow that rather than to 
lend out commodities at a loss equivalent to the negative rate of 
commodity interest, individuals could simply hoard their goods. 
However, by introducing some perishable commodities into the basket 
of non-perishable commodities, the assumption of zero 'storage costs' 
will no longer hold, and even if individuals chose to hoard their 
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goods, they would still earn a negative rate of interest as manifested 
in nonnegative 'storage costs'. Since the real interest rate can be of 
any sign in the presence of nonnegative 'storage costs', it follows that 
the rate of inflation can either be greater than, or less than, or equal 
to the nominal rate of interest. 
In common parlance, the nominal interest rate is often 
understood to be the rate of interest in the monetary standard. Since 
money is a durable good, it would follow that the nominal rate of 
interest can never be less than zero for reasons similar to those 
outlined above for real interest rates when zero 'storage costs' are 
assumed. Thus having established the fact that > 0, Fisher (1896, 
p.30) sought to find a constraint for the values of the real interest 
rate and the rate of inflation such that the nominal interest rate may 
always be positive. A slight re-arrangement of equation [2] gives: 
R = (1 + + r) - 1 
and since R ^ 0, the following inequality is implied 
( i + x ) ( i + r ) ) i 
whence 
1 
( i + r ) > 
(1 + .) 
Now, if the rate of inflation, T , is understood as the rate of 
appreciation in the commodity standard, and letting 6 ^ be the rate 
of depreciation in the monetary standard, it has been shown by 
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Fisher (1896, p.9) that 
1 
( i + x) = 
^ m^ 
so that the previous inequality becomes 
and 
r ) - 6 ^ . . . [ 5 ] 
/? >, 0 . . . [ 6 ] 
that is, the real rate of interest (in the commodity standard) must be 
greater than or equal to the rate of appreciation (i.e. - 6 / n ) in the 
monetary standard which is just what Fisher had said. This 'result 
will not seem mysterious' (1896, p.31) if the behaviour of the market 
for loanable funds is considered when the rate of appreciation in the 
monetary standard is greater than the real (commodity) rate of 
interest. The real rate of return on hoarded money will exceed the 
real cost of commodity loans so that there would be scope for 
profitable arbitrage in the market for loanable funds. Here, 
individuals will wish to secure more commodity loans for conversion 
into money balances. This behaviour registers itself as a rise in 
demand for commodity loans so that it bids up the commodity rate of 
interest until it is equal to the rate of appreciation in the monetary 
standard. Then equation [2] will hold once more again. 
Having discussed the limiting values of the variables, it is now 
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time to consider how the variables behave. Given the theoretical 
world of perfect foresight, the real rate of interest will be 
homogeneous of degree zero in expected inflation, that is, it does not 
vary with expected inflation. Thus, the nominal rate of interest has 
to do most of the work in adjusting to expected inflation. Now 
taking the total differential of equation [4], and multiplying 
throughout by l l d i r , this gives 
dR 
— = ( i + /•) + ( i + O 
dr 
dir 
. . . [ 7 ] 
The assumption of perfect foresight implies that the nominal (or 
money) interest rate wiW adjust pari passu to changes in expected 
inflation so that the real (or commodity) rate of interest remains 
constant. This does not necessarily mean that the real rate of interest 
is exogenously determined. Rather, the real rate of interest is 
endogenous because changes in expected inflation do potentially have 
an effect on the real (deflated) rate, but because of the perfect 
foresight assumption, the real rate is, by implication, assumed 
constant. Thus, by setting drld-w equal to zero, the rate of change 
in the nominal interest rate with respect to inflation is 
dR 
— = (1 + r) . . . [ 8 a ] 
dir 
but from equation [2], (1 + r) = ( i + i ? ) / ( i + x) so that 
dR {1 + R) 
d-K (1 + ir) 
. . [ 8 b ] 
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So, Fisher considered the case when the monetary standard is 
appreciating relative to the commodity standard, and noted in 
particular that in order '...to offset appreciation, the [nominal] rate of 
interest must be lowered slightly more than the rate of appreciation.' 
(1896, p.9) This conclusion is confirmed by equation [8] for the case 
when ir < R which is guaranteed by the constraint i? > 0. It can 
also be noted that from equation [8a] the value of dRIdir is constant 
given that the real rate of interest is a constant. 
5.2. Interest rates and prices 
Before the relationship between inflation and interest-rates 
under perfect foresight, sometimes referred to as the original Fisher 
hjfpothesis, can be put into its true perspective, it is first necessary to 
consider theories concerning the relationship between interest-rates and 
inflation. Prominent amongst the various theories is that one put 
forward by Henry Thornton in 1802, and re-expressed almost a 
century later by Knut Wicksell, 
5.2.1. Henry Thornton 
In his work entitled An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects 
of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802), Henry Thornton 
provided an analysis of the relation between interest rates and 
inflation. He made an important, but fundamental, distinction 
between the market or loan rate of interest and the expected yield or 
marginal rate of profit on new capital projects. He stressed that the 
two rates were separate and distinct phenomena, the former being a 
money rate determined in the market for loanable funds and the 
latter, a real rate determined in the commodity market by the supply 
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of savings and the investment demand for new capital. 
Using this two-rate distinction, Thornton developed a theory 
regarding the connection between interest rates and inflation. In his 
view, inflation results from a divergence between the two rates of 
interest, and substantiated his view by his detailed observations. He 
argued that, with an interest rate of 5 per cent, which the Bank of 
England was prevented from exceeding by the laws against usury, and 
supposing that the borrower could expect to obtain a rate of profit 
higher than 5 per cent, the volume of credit would expand 
excessively. The note circulation, he said, would grow faster than 
was desirable, and the price level would rise. He pointed out that 
this process would persist for as long as the loan rate remained below 
the rate of profit. In his own words: 
'It seems clear...that when the argumented quantity of 
paper shall have...produced its ful l effect in raising the 
price of goods, the temptation to borrow at five per cent 
will be exactly the same as before... [T]he amount of 
circulating medium alone will have altered, and it will 
simply have caused the same goods to pass for a larger 
quantity of paper.' (1802, pp.255-256) 
With this framework in mind, Thornton analysed the inflationary 
consequences of a central bank policy of pegging the rate of interest. 
If the Bank of England was constrained by usury laws to a ceiling 
loan rate of 5 per cent which was below the rate of mercanfile 
profit, the Bank would lose control over the volume of its loans and 
note issue, both of which would expand indefinitely, producing 
inflation. With the rate pegged, inflation could continue without limit 
because there existed no automatic corrective mechanism to bring it to 
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an end. This reasoning constituted the basis of his criticism both of 
the usury laws and of the Bank's practice of adhering to a fixed 
discount rate. He contended that the Bank should control the note 
issue by keeping its discount rate in line with the rate of profit, and 
if the usury ceiling should threaten to interfere with the operation of 
discount rate policy, then, the Bank should resort to other forms of 
credit-rationing to limit its loans. The essential thing was that the 
Bank should keep a firm rein on the monetary circulation and control 
the note issue. 
Thornton perceived still another connection between the 
interest rate and inflation. In 1811 he spoke in the House of 
Commons on the report of the Bullion Committee. According to an 
account which he gave of this speech, he said that a person who in 
1800 had borrowed £1,000 at 5 per cent and paid back the loan in 
1810 would, on account of the price rise which in this period had 
amounted to between 20 and 30 per cent, have paid a real rate (i.e. 
deflated) rate of two or three per cent.e Hence the borrower made 
an extra profit which provided an additional incentive to borrow. In 
Thornton's own words, the situation was perceived as follows: 
(referring to himself in the third person) 
'The temptation to borrow operated on their minds, as he 
believed, in the following manner:- they balanced their 
books once a year, and, on estimating the value of those 
commodities in which they had invested their borrowed 
money, they found that value to be continually increasing, 
so that there was an apparent profit over and above the 
natural and ordinary profit on mercantile transactions. 
This apparent profit was nominal, as to persons who 
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traded on their own capital, but not nominal as to those 
who traded with borrowed money, the borrower, therefore, 
derived every year from his trade, not only the common 
mercantile profit, which would itself somewhat exceed the 
. 5 per cent., interest paid by him for the use of his 
money, but likewise that extra profit which he had spoken 
of extra profit was exactly so much additional advantage, 
derived from the circumstance of his being a trader upon 
a borrowed capital, and was so much additional temptation 
to borrow.' (1802, p.336) 
Here, Thornton was trying to specify the mechanism through which 
an inflation premium becomes embodied in market rates. To do this, 
he could not have hypothesised the existence of inflationary 
expectations. So, according to him, it is profits and profit predictions 
rather than inflation predictions per se that drives up the equilibrium 
nominal interest rate. By analogy with the discussion in sub-section 
5.1.1. above, Thornton's analysis may be viewed in the context of a 
market for loanable funds. That is, unexpected inflation initially 
lowers the realised real rate on money loans below the real yield on 
capital assets. The outcome is a windfall gains for debtors and 
windfall losses for creditors. Assuming that debtors and creditors 
predict future profits by extrapolation from past realised profits, and 
that they adjust demands and supplies of loans accordingly, the rise 
in demand for loans and the fall in the supply of loans will bid up 
the nominal interest rate by the full amount of inflation, thereby 
eliminating the real rate differential between money loans and real 
capital investment. 
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5.2.2. Knut Wicksell 
According to O'Brien (1984, p.27), Wicksell borrowed from 
Tooke the observation that prices and the rate of interest were 
positively correlated both with respect to level and to changes, and 
also took a formal analysis of the natural rate of interest from 
Bdhm-Bawerk's capital theory. In his work entitled under the 
German original Geldzins und Guterpreise (1898) and later translated 
in 1936, Wicksell put forward his theory of the cumulative inflationary 
process resulting from a money rate of interest below the natural rate. 
This work was 'written in ignorance of Thornton' but his ideas are 
certainly quite similar to those enunciated by Thornton, and is the 
subject of the following paragraphs. 
The main element of Wicksell's analysis, like Thornton's, is 
the distinction between two interest rates, viz: the money or market 
rate and the natural or equilibrium rate. The former is the rate 
charged on loans in the money market. The latter, as Wicksell 
pointed out, can be interpreted in several ways. It is the expected 
marginal yield or internal rate of return on newly created units of 
physical capital. It is also the rate that would equilibrate desired 
saving and investment at the economy's full capacity level of output. 
Alternatively, the natural rate can be defined as the rate that equates 
aggregate demand for real output with its available supply. It 
follows, therefore, from this latter definition that the natural rate is 
also the interest rate that would be neutral with respect to general 
prices, tending neither to raise or lower them. According to 
Wicksell, as long as the market rate is equal to the natural rate, 
desired saving will just equal desired investment, aggregate demand 
will therefore equal aggregate supply, and price stability will prevail. 
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Any discrepancy between the two interest rates, however, will cause 
prices to change. 
If , for example, the market rate falls below the natural rate, 
opportunities now exist for entrepreneurs to make profits. The 
consequent rise in demand for factor inputs causes their prices to rise 
so increasing factor incomes. This is further manifested in an 
increase in aggregate demand which exceeds aggregate supply, and 
assuming that the excess demand is financed by bank loans resulting 
in the creation of new money, inflation will occur. Conversely, if 
the market rate rises above the natural rate, saving will exceed 
investment, bank loans and the stock of money wiU contract, there 
wiU be a deficiency of aggregate demand, and prices will fall. In 
order that prices fall in absolute terms, this would require the 
assumption that prices and wages are flexible downwards as well 
upwards (c.f. the Keynesian assumption that prices and wages are 
sticky downwards). Such an assumption will ensure that a deficiency 
in aggregate demand is manifested in lower prices rather than by a 
fall in production.^ 
The role of money in Wicksell's analytical framework is that 
the price level cannot change unless there is a corresponding prior 
change in the quantity of money. These money stock changes 
accompany changes in the volume of bank loans used to finance 
excess aggregate demand. Wicksell specifically states that these 
changes in the money stock are necessary to permit price level 
movements to occur, but he insists that such money stock changes are 
caused by the discrepancy between the two interest rates. By way of 
illustration, the above example is continued such that banks maintain 
the market rate of interest below the natural rate. Desired 
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investment will exceed desired saving. The demand for bank loans 
will expand, putting upward pressure on the market rate of interest. 
To prevent the market rate from rising, the banks must be willing to 
accommodate all borrowers at the fixed market rate. Assuming that 
the banks are so willing, then the volume of bank lending will rise. 
And since new loans are granted in the form of increases in the 
deposits of borrowers, the money stock also expands. The monetary 
expansion is thus a consequence of the divergence between the market 
and natural rates of interest, and is the foundation of Wicksell's 
rejection of the quantity theory of money, namely that the money 
stock is exogeneously determined, and that prices change in response 
to a change in the money stock. 
In Wicksell's model, any discrepancy between the two interest 
rates will set in motion a dynamic sequence of expenditure and price 
level changes that will continue as long as the gap persists; in 
Wicksell's own words: 
'...a fall in the rate of interest, even though it is causal 
and temporary, will bring about a perfectly definite rise in 
prices, which, whether it is big or small, will persist as a 
permanent feature even after the interest rate has returned 
to its former value. If the rate of interest remains at a 
low level for a considerable period of time, its influence 
on prices must necessarily be cumulative; that is to say, it 
goes on repeafing itself over equal intervals of time in 
precisely the same manner.' (1898, trans. 1936, pp. 94-95) 
The cumulative process, Wicksell argued, could either be stable or 
unstable depending upon the type of monetary system a nation 
possessed. He considered two extreme types of hypothetical monetary 
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arrangements, viz: a pure cash system embodying the classic 
characteristics of a gold standard and a pure credit system using no 
metallic money, any payments being made by means of bookkeeping 
entries. 
In anything other than a pure credit system, Wicksell maintains 
that the cumulative process plays an equilibrating role. During an 
inflationary period, for example, the rise in expenditure, prices, and 
the level of nominal national income results in a drain on the banks' 
specie reserves so that they are forced to ration credit by raising the 
market rate of interest until the inflationary process is brought to a 
halt. Contrariwise, during a period of price deflation, the steady 
accumulation of excess reserves will eventually induce banks to ease 
the availability of credit by reducing the rate of interest to stimulate 
borrowing so that prices will eventually stop faUing. Thus, anything 
other than a pure credit system contains a stabilising adjustment 
mechanism that brings the cumulative process to a halt. 
Having laid out the framework of Wicksell's analysis, it is now 
necessary to take a look at the role of inflationary expectations in a 
Wicksellian framework. 
5.2.3. Inflationary expectations and the Wicksellian model 
For the most part, Wicksell's analysis of the inflationary 
process is conducted on the assumption of the absence of inflationary 
expectations. No matter how much prices have changed in the past 
or are changing currently, all individuals expect them to remain 
unchanged over the indefinite future. This is made quite clear by 
Wicksell in two places: '...base his calculations on the current price.' 
(1898, trans. 1936, p.95) and 'If entrepreneurs are not reckoning for 
the moment on any rise in future prices,...' (p. 144), Here, it is 
284 
quite explicit that inflationary expectations are static, that is, all 
individuals expect current prices to remain as they are, and with the 
absence of any other kind of inflationary expectations, the distinction 
between nominal and real (deflated) interest rates cannot be made. 
The main distinction, however, is still that between natural and 
market rates of interest. 
Wicksell, of course, did not ignore inflationary expectations 
altogether. He noted that after the inflationary process has continued 
for some time (i.e. prices have been rising steadily for some time), 
the assumption that anticipated future prices are identical to present 
prices may have to be abandoned. Thus, Wicksell states that 
'The upward movement of prices will in some measure 
"create its own draught". When prices have been rising 
steadily for some time, entrepreneurs will begin to reckon 
on the basis not merely of the prices already attained, but 
of a further rise in prices.' (1898, trans. 1936, p.96) 
and 
'...once the entrepreneurs begin to rely on this process 
continuing - as soon, that is to say, as they start 
reckoning on a future rise in prices - the actual rise will 
become more and more rapid. In the extreme case in 
which the expected rise in prices is each time fully 
discounted, the annual rise in prices will be indefinitely 
great.' (p.148) 
In the face of such a development, stabilisation policy would have to 
be modified somewhat as follows: 
•To put an immediate stop to any further rise in prices, it 
would not be sufficient for the banks to restore the rate of 
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interest to its original level. This would have the same 
effect on the business world as would a somewhat lower 
rate of interest at a time when prices are not expected to 
alter.' (1898, trans. 1936, p.97) 
It is contended that the eradication of inflationary expectations 
requires that the market rate be raised temporarily above the natural 
rate associated with zero inflationary expectations. With the market 
rate established above the natural rate, anticipated price increases will 
fail to materialise and expectations will be revised downward. 
Eventually, the market rate will fall back into equality with the 
natural rate. I f , on the other hand, banks persist in trying to peg 
the market rate below the natural rate, 'two forces will be operating 
in the direction of higher prices, and the rise will be correspondingly 
more rapid.' (p.97). These 'two forces' are, of course, the gap 
between the natural and market rates of interest and inflationary 
expectations. 
However, Wicksell did not develop his analysis more fully by, 
for instance, making a further distinction between nominal and real 
rates of interest so that inflationary expectations could be incorporated 
more fully within the model. In view of this inadequate treatment of 
inflationary expectations, there have been several attempts to combine 
Wicksell's model with that of Fisher. Two examples of such analyses 
to be discussed in the following paragraphs are those by Lutz (1974) 
and Sargent (1969).^ 
The incorporation of inflationary expectations into the 
Wicksellian model makes it necessary to make a further disfincfion 
regarding the rates of interest, namely that between nominal and real 
(deflated) rates of interest. Their relationship to each other has 
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already been discussed in Section 5.1 above. It is also necessary to 
modify an assumption, as Lutz (1974, pp.105-106,109) has already 
done, regarding the money stock. It was previously argued in the 
last sub-section that it is the banks themselves who determine the 
market rate of interest, and they accommodate the money supply to 
the increased demand for loans at a lower rate so leading to the 
conclusion that any divergence between the natural and market rates 
causes the money supply to be endogenously determined. Before 
introducing the assumption that the money stock is exogeneously 
determined, it is first necessary to understand the concept of an 
'inflationary equilibrium' as described by Lutz (1974, pp.103-104). 
Here, it is assumed that an economy is growing at a natural 
exponential rate of n per annum, and it is further assumed that the 
money supply also grows at the same rate so that prices are said to 
be stable. If the rate of monetary expansion were to be increased to 
n + r then this excess rate of monetary expansion will produce an 
inflation rate equal to p/p which , assuming perfect foresight, is equal 
to the anticipated rate of inflation, T T . The market rate of interest is 
also higher by the rate of inflation. Such a state is known as the 
dynamic steady-state because all second-order rates of growth are 
zero, and the first-order rates growth in the variables are all 
constant. More will be said about the dynamic steady-state in the 
next two chapters. 
Now, it has been argued by Lutz (1974) that an inflationary 
equilibrium in the original Wicksellian model is impossible because 
inflation is essentially a disequilibrium situation in that the real market 
rate of interest is below the natural rate, and the endogenous 
expansion of the money supply 'validates' that disequilibrium. By 
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allowing the money supply to be exogeneously determined, the real 
market rate of interest becomes endogenously determined, and it 
becomes possible to achieve inflationary equilibrium by allowing the 
real market rate to converge on to the natural rate, and with the 
existence of inflationary expectations, the nominal rate of interest is 
approximately higher than the real market rate of interest by the rate 
of inflation. 
It is particularly useful to employ an identity used by Sargent 
(1969, p.130, equation 2.1) to link the various rates of interest, and 
is given as follows: 
R = r* + (r - r*) + (R - r) . . . [9 ] 
where R is for the nominal market rate of interest, r is for the real 
market rate, and r* is for the natural (or equilibrium) rate. Here, 
the nominal market rate of interest is identical to the natural rate of 
interest plus the differential between the real market and natural rates 
plus the expected rate of inflation which is approximately equal to 
R - r. 
Consider, first, the case of static inflationary expectations. 
Here, individuals will expect a zero rate of inflation so that the last 
term of equation [9] will vanish. I t , therefore, follows that the 
fundamental equilibrium condition in the original Wicksellian model is 
that the real market rate, r, equals the natural rate, that is, = r 
= r*. In disequilibrium, the real market rate will diverge from the 
natural rate so that 
R = r = r* + (r - r*) . . . [ 10] 
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If the market rate falls below the natural rate, this increases the 
demand for bank loans which leads to an increase in the money 
supply and then inflation. By pegging the market rate below the 
natural rate, the disequilibrium situation is validated. 
If the inflationary process continues for sometime, all 
individuals will come to expect a positive future rate of inflation 
which is likely to be incorporated as a premium over and above the 
market rate. It should be noted that perfect foresight will be 
assumed to exist so that the world be be characterised by the absence 
of risk and uncertainty. In such a world, the real rates of return on 
both financial (or monetary) and real (or physical) assets will be 
equal. If the natural rate is taken to be the marginal efficiency of 
physical capital goods, then equilibrium would be characterised by the 
equality of the real (deflated) rate of interest with the natural rate, 
and the nominal rate of interest would approximately exceed the real 
(deflated) rate by an inflation premium of T. Thus, the following 
two equations characterise an inflationary equilibrium in the modified 
Wicksellian model: 
r = r* . . . [ 1 1 a ] 
and 
R = r + ^ . . . [ l i b ] 
Sargent states that 
'Irving Fisher...noted that in equilibrium the nominal rate 
of interest must equal the sum of the marginal rate of 
return from holding real capital and the expected 
proportionate rate of change of prices. This condition 
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follows from the fact that in a riskless world, holding 
period yields must be equal for all assets.' (1969, p.128) 
Gebauer (1986, p.131) claims that '[t]o be sure. Fisher has never 
"noted" this expressly.' However, it is felt here that the above 
quotation from Sargent niakes it clear that in a world where perfect 
foresight exists, the real (deflated) market rate of interest must be 
equivalent to the real rate of return on real assets, and that the 
nominal market rate of interest exceeds the real market rate by 
approximately the rate of inflation. Such a conclusion takes into 
account the contribution made by Wicksell, namely that price stability 
occurs when the market rate of interest is equal to the natural rate. 
The incorporation of inflationary expectations gives way to an 
inflationary or steady-state equilibrium. Similar conclusions to those 
outlined above were arrived at by Lutz (1974, pp.106-108) using 
diagrammatic exposition. 
In his empirical investigation of the relationship between 
interest rates and inflation. Fisher (1896, 1930) had to reject the 
assumption of perfect foresight as the evidence pointed to long 
adjustment lags implying imperfect foresight. Therefore, the following 
section is concerned with the transition period. 
5.3. The transition period 
Empirical evidence presented by Fisher to test the theory of 
interest adjustment under perfect foresight revealed that market interest 
rates tended to be high during periods of inflation and low during 
periods of deflation. However, it was also revealed that interest rates 
responded slowly and incompletely to inflation. The real rate of 
interest was three-and-half times more variable than the nominal rate 
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of interest, and was often negative during periods of rapid inflation. 9 
Since lenders had the option of simply hoarding commodities - and 
earning a real rate of interest equal to zero - Fisher concluded that 
the evidence 'must mean that the price movements were inadequately 
predicted.' (1896, p.67) 
Forced to reject the perfect foresight model, Fisher presented 
an alternative model of the effects of inflation on nominal interest 
rates based on imperfect foresight. Such a model may be regarded 
as a disequilibrium model in which transitory changes in real variables 
(profits, investment, volume of trade) play an important role. Thus, 
the foHowing sub-section discusses the theory of the transition period, 
and the second sub-section considers Fisher's empirical work in this 
field, and the final sub-section places the analysis into a WickselUan 
perspective. 
5.3.1. Fisher's theory of the transition period 
The disequilibrium model put forward by Fisher was used for 
two purposes: firstly, to explain how the nominal rate of interest 
reaches its equilibrium level consistent with full adjustment to 
inflation, and secondly, to explain how price changes generate trade 
cycles. These uses of the model will now be discussed in turn. 
To explain how the inflation premium gets embodied in the 
nominal rate of interest. Fisher assumed that firms were net 
borrowers, and that borrowers forecast profits extrapolatively. From 
these assumptions. Fisher argued that unexpected inflafion and sluggish 
nominal interest rates produced falling real interest rates, and hence 
windfall profits to borrowers. Because borrowers base their profit 
forecasts on past extrapolation, a windfall profit 'raises an expectation 
of a similar profit in the future, and this expectation, acting on the 
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demand for loans, will raise the [nominal] rate of interest.' (1896, 
p.75) Anticipating the fact that nominal interest rates did not adjust 
fully, Fisher said 'If the rise is still inadequate, the process is 
repeated, and thus by continual trial and error the rate approaches 
the true adjustment.' (1896, pp.75-76) At this point, it would be 
useful to recall that in sub-section 5.2.1. of this thesis, Thornton 
could not make his analysis depend on inflationary expectations per 
se. Without being aware of Thornton's contribution, Fisher reiterated 
Thornton's insight that borrowers formed expectations of higher profits 
even though they may not be apparently aware that there was an 
inflation going on.^o 
Now regarding the second use of Fisher's disequilibrium model, 
it is particularly important to note the distinction between 
imperfection and inequality of foresight. Firstly, Fisher assumes that 
all individuals hold identical expectations regarding the future rate of 
inflation, that is to say that there is a consensus on the expected rate 
of inflation. In such a case, the nonadjustment of the nominal rate 
of interest would not affect the volume of loans demanded and 
supplied. Thus, Fisher (1896, p.77) argues that '[u]nder such 
circumstances the rate of interest would be below the normal, but as 
no one knows i t , no borrower borrows more and no lender lends less 
because of i t . ' Thus, imperfection and equality of foresight produces 
a transfer of real wealth from creditor to debtor. 
Now relaxing the assumption that there is equality of foresight 
among all individuals so that there now exists inequality of foresight 
(which is still imperfect), price changes can generate trade cycles. 
The abnormally low real rate of interest and the resulting 
over-investment led Fisher to regard it as a major determinant of the 
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trade cycle J ^ Based on his empirical judgement that borrowers are 
more apt to have superior foresight, a rise in prices will make 
borrowers more willing to pay a higher rate of interest on their 
borrowings whilst lenders are still willing to lend at the original 
interest rate so that the volume of loans and, therefore, investment 
increases. Fisher concluded that 'This constitutes part of the 
stimulation to business which bimetallists so much admire.' (1896, 
p.77). Thus, Fisher recognised that during the adjustment period 
changes in the rate of inflation will have important effects on real 
variables, real interest rates, the rate of investment, and the volume 
of trade, rather than a simple adjustment of the nominal rate of 
interest. In other words, 'inequality of foresight produces 
over-investment during rising prices and relative stagnation during 
falling prices.' (1896, p.78) 
Fisher's most comprehensive treatment of the transition period 
can be found in Chapter IV of his work entitled The Purchasing 
Power of Money (1911). Here, Fisher analyses the dynamics of 
interest rate adjustment. As prices start to rise, the money profits of 
businessmen tend to rise faster than prices because of the lag in the 
adjustment of nominal interest rates, and this increases the 
businessmen's desire to borrow. ^ ^ Since Fisher was concerned 
primarily with the relationship between inflation and the trade cycle, 
he paid particular attention to the effects of interest rate adjustment 
on real investment and the trade cycle. The sequence of interest 
adjustments, credit expansion, and inflation is quite similar to 
Wicksell's cumulative process. The extra borrovnng that occurs as a 
consequence of rising prices and lagged interest rate adjustment takes 
the form of short-term bank loans which are approximately equal to 
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the money stock. The increase in the money stock further increases 
the general level of prices, and leads to a further rise in profits of 
businessmen. There is now an increase in the demand for loans 
which may force up the nominal interest rate, but not sufficiently so 
that it continues to lag behind its normal level. Believing that higher 
interest rates are being offered, lenders are encouraged to expand the 
supply of loans so that the money stock increases still further, and 
leads to a further rise in p r i c e s . T h u s , Fisher summarises: 
'...a slight initial rise of prices sets in motion a train of 
events which tends to repeat itself. Rise of prices 
generates rise of prices, and continues to do so as long as 
the interest rate lags behind its normal figure.' (1911, 
p.60) 
Inevitably, the cumulative process must come to an end. As soon as 
the nominal rate of interest 'overtakes the rate of rise in prices, the 
whole situation is changed.' (1911, p.64) Demand for loans will 
eventually contract, and prices will begin to fall. Interest rates 
continue to lag behind falling prices so that the process repeats itself 
over again a few times until the rate of interest has fallen to levels 
at which borrowers are once more again willing to borrow, 
5.3.2. Fisher's empirical analysis 
Fisher argued that the transition period would be characterised 
by an increase in the nominal rate of interest, a decrease in the 
realised real rate of interest, an increase in real business profits, and 
an increase in the real value of investment. Fisher, in his books on 
interest rates, usually would discuss the steady-state properties of the 
inflation-interest rate relationship which already have been discussed 
in Section 5.1. The usefulness of discussing steady-state properties 
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rests on the premise that it gives some indication as to how, given an 
initial exogenous shock, the economy will diverge from its steady-state 
equilibrium path. If the initial exogenous shock was a once-only 
occurrence, and other exogenous variables remain constant, the 
economy would eventually converge by a series of oscillations back on 
to its steady-state equilibrium path. Unfortunately, the world is 
simply not kind enough to change slowly enough to allow the 
steady-state to be observed as there are a variety of random 
exogenous shocks that continually impinge upon the economy so that 
the economy is in a perpetual state of flux. i s Thus, according to 
Gebauer (1986, p. 130), in practice there are a series of transition 
periods following and overlapping one another. Therefore, Fisher 
stressed that the observable world is in a continual disequilibrium, 
and that the appropriate framework for analysing real world data is 
dynamic rather than static. 
Chapter XIX of Fisher's work entitled. The Theory of 
Interest, (1930) contains the empirical work deahng with the effects 
of inflation on interest rates. In Sections 1 to 5 of that chapter. 
Fisher gave qualitative evidence showing that interest rates expressed 
in different standards are different when those standards are diverging 
in value, inflation resulted in high interest rates, but the adjustment 
was very slow. This was attributed to money illusion: 
'...men are unable or unwilling to adjust at all accurately 
and promptly the money interest rates to changed price 
levels,...The erratic behaviour of real interest is evidently a 
trick played on the money market by the "money illusion" 
when contracts are made in unstable money.' (1930, p.415) 
Then in Sections 6 and 7, Fisher presented results of correlating 
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nominal interest rates with lagged inflation rates for both Great 
Britain and the United States. He argued that a distributed lag of 
past inflation rates should be employed rather than a discrete l ag , i 6 
and presented simple correlation coefficients which would have been 
equivalent to carrying out a regression of the form: 
= ^ + ^ /l ^ + . . . [ 1 2 ] 
where a and |3 are constants, Wj (i = 1,...,T) are distributed lag 
weights, T is the order of the estimated lag distribution, and u^ is a 
stochastic term. For ease in calculation. Fisher constrained the lag 
weights to decline arithmetically and to sum to unity. 
Fisher found that correlations between long-term bond rates 
and distributed lags of past changes were extremely high. 
Furthermore, the length of time required for complete adjustment was 
extremely long so that 
'. . .for Great Britain in 1898-1924, the highest value of r 
(+0.980) is reached when effects of price changes are 
assumed to be spread over 28 years or for a weighted 
average of 9.3 years, while for the United States the 
highest r (+0.857) is for a distribution of the influence 
due to price changes over 20 years or a weighted average 
of 6.7 years.' (1930, p.423) 
Using quarterly data on U.S. commercial paper rates, Fisher found 
that during the period 1915-1927, the highest r was +0.738 for 120 
quarters. In most of the empirical literature, there is often some 
surprise at how long it takes interest rates to adjust fuUy for 
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inflation,!^ but Fisher interpreted the lag as largely representing 
adjustments in real variables such as real interest rates, profits, and 
the volume of trade, and not as a simple measure of the delay in 
expectations formation: 
'It seems fantastic, at first glance, to ascribe to events 
which occurred last century any influence affecting the rate 
of interest today. And yet that is what the correlations 
with distributed effects of [inflation] show. A Uttle 
thought should convince the reader that the effects of 
bumper wheat crops, revolutionary discoveries and 
inventions,...and similar events project their influence upon 
prices and interest rates over many future years even after 
the original casual event has been forgotten...A further 
probable explanation of the surprising length of time by 
which the rate of interest lags behind price changes is that 
between price changes and interest rates a third factor 
intervenes. This is business, as exemplified or measured 
by the volume of trade. It is influenced by price change 
and influences in turn the rate of interest.' (1930, 
pp .428-429) 
Fisher believes that two facts are well established: first, price changes 
influence the volume of trade, and second, the volume of trade 
influences the interest rate. He then says that 
'The evidence for both relationships is not only empirical 
but rational. Rising prices increase profits both actual and 
prospective, and so the profit taker expands his business. 
His expanding or rising income stream requires financing 
and increases the demand for loans.' (1930, p.439) 
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In his summing up of the adjustment of nominal and real interest 
rates. Fisher said 
'The final result, partly due to foresight and partly to the 
lack of i t , is that prices changes do after several years and 
with the intermediation of changes in profits and business 
activity affect interest very profoundly. In fact, while the 
main object of this book is to show how the rate of 
interest would behave if the purchasing power of money 
were stable, there has never been any long period of time 
during which this condition has been even approximately 
fulfilled. When it is not fulfilled, the money rate of 
interest, and still more the real rate of interest, is more 
affected by the instability of money than by those more 
fundamental and more normal causes connected with 
income impatience, and opportunity...' (1930, p.451) 
Quite clearly, then. Fisher rejected any notion that inflation was 
'neutral', that is, real interest rates are certainly not homogeneous of 
degree zero with respect to prices. Thus, under imperfect foresight, 
the real (deflated) rate of interest can be expected to vary inversely 
with inflation. Furthermore, Fisher did not assume a real rate of 
interest determined independently of past inflation rates. It is 
precisely the variations in the real factors, according to Fisher's 
interpretation, which combine to produce the extremely long 
adjustment period for nominal interest rates, quite apart from the way 
in which price expectations are formed. However, what is not so 
clear is that the real (deflated) interest rate can diverge from the 
natural rate of interest during the transition period. Thus, to dispel 
any further misconceptions, namely that both real rates are always 
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equal, the preceding analysis is put into a Wicksellian perspective. 
5.3.3. A Wicksellian perspective 
Before proceeding to analyse the transition period in a 
Wicksellian perspective, it is first necessary to make it clear that the 
analysis will still depend on two assumptions made previously for the 
ful l equilibrium model (see sub-section 5.2.3 above), namely that the 
money stock is exogenously determined ^  ^ ^ and that inflationary 
expectations are formed by all individuals. These assumptions can be 
contrasted with Wicksell's original assumptions that the money stock is 
endogenously determined, and that no individuals expect inflation at 
all. A further assumption, which is closely related to the second 
assumption, is that identical inflationary expectations are formed by all 
individuals. Such assumption has been made by Lutz (1974, p.105). 
However, the way in which this assumption has been presented by 
Lutz is likely to lead to some confusion regarding Fisher's earlier 
distinction between imperfection and inequality of foresight. In order 
to avoid any such confusion, it is important to be able to distinguish 
carefully between the Wicksellian and Fisherian elements in the 
adjustment of interest rates, and this aspect will be discussed in more 
detail as the occasion demands i t . 
The starting point of the following analysis will be that of an 
inflationary equilibrium in which the economy is experiencing a 
constant rate of inflation equal to p/p, the real deflated market rate 
of interest is equal to the natural rate, and the nominal market rate 
exceeds the real deflated market rate by approximately the rate of 
inflation. This starting point is generally applicable, that is to say, it 
is equally applicable to the Wicksellian equilibrium situation as 
characterised by a zero rate of inflation. 
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The adjustment of interest rates can be broken up 
conceptually into two stages: the first stage embodying Wicksell's 
analysis, and the second stage embodies that of Fisher. Consider, 
then, the effects of an increase in the rate of growth in the money 
supply so that its rate of growth now exceeds the original inflationary 
equilibrium rate of growth of n + ir per unit time. This is 
manifested in an increase in the supply of credit by the banking 
system which will lower the real deflated market rate of interest 
below the natural rate. The demand for credit increases until the 
real market rate rises back to its original level. The first stage has 
now been completed. 
If it is assumed that all individuals expect a rate of inflation 
that is less than the new actual rate of inflation, it becomes necessary 
to distinguish between ex ante and ex post real interest rates. The 
former refers to the expected real market rate of interest (i.e. deflated 
by the expected rate of inflation), and the latter refers to the realised 
real market rate of interest (i.e. deflated by the actual rate of 
inflation). Thus, given that all individuals expect a rate of inflation 
less than the actual rate, the ex ante real market rate of interest will 
adjust so that it is equal to the natural rate, and the nominal market 
rate will be higher than the ex ante real market rate by the expected 
rate of inflation. Now, when all individuals realise that the actual 
rate of inflation is higher than expected, the ex post real market rate 
will be less than the ex ante real market rate which is equal to the 
natural rate, so that there is a real transfer of wealth from creditors 
to debtors as noted by Irving Fisher himself (see sub-section 5.3.1 
above). The preceding analysis was based on Figure 2 of Lutz 
(1974) which has an inelastic supply schedule. 
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Now, the assumption regarding the exogeneity of the money 
supply is partly relaxed so that a part of the money supply can be 
endogenously determined. This is reflected in an upward sloping 
supply schedule for credit as shown in Figure 5.1 which depicts a 
market for loanable funds. Referring to this diagram, the initial 
equilibrium is shown by the intersection of the demand and supply 
schedules DD and SS respectively at point 1, with a real market rate 
of interest equal to the natural rate, r*, and the volume of loans 
transacted in the market will be equal to C*. An exogenous increase 
in the money supply is reflected in a parallel shift of the supply 
schedule from SS to S, S, which lowers the real market rate below 
the natural rate. As a consequence of the lower market rate, the 
demand for credit increases (by a rightward shift of the demand 
schedule from DD to D D , ) from C* to a level associated Avith point 
2 of the diagram. An increase in the inflation rate will lead to a 
further rise in the demand for credit which is met in two ways: 
firstly by an endogenous increase in the supply of credit, and 
secondly, by an increase in the market rate back to its original level. 
The volume of credit demanded and supplied is higher than 
previously at C. 
Consider how the inflation premium gets incorporated within 
the interest rate. Attracted to the possibility of profits, borrowers will 
demand more credit as manifested in an upward shift of the demand 
schedule from D D , to D , D , . Now if the ex ante real market rate 
of interest is to be equal to the natural rate, it requires that all 
individuals (i.e. debtors and creditors) have identical inflationary 
expectations. Thus, when creditors expect a rate of inflation similar 
to that expected by borrowers, the supply schedule shifts from S,S, 
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R A T E A 
C R E D I T 
FIGURE 5 . 1 : Combinat ion of the analyses by Vlicksell and 
Fisher in the cont ext of a market for 
loanable funds. 
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to S j S j . The market rate of interest will now rise to R which will 
now include the expected rate of inflation as shown by point 4 of the 
diagram. The volume of credit demanded and supplied remains 
unchanged at C. Such a conclusion can be rationalised when Fisher's 
distinction between imperfection and inequahty of foresight is taken 
into account. Recall, from sub-section 5.3.1 that imperfection of 
foresight produces no change in the volume of credit demanded and 
supplied, whereas inequality of foresight will produce changes in the 
volume of credit. In the case of imperfection of foresight. Fisher's 
conclusion was based on the fact that the volume of credit did not 
change at all, so implying equality of foresight among all 
individuals. 1 9 This conclusion could be extended. If the nominal 
rate of interest rises, but the real volume of credit stays constant, it 
implies that all individuals have indentical inflationary expectations. It 
is only when inequality of foresight exists that the real volume of 
credit demanded and supplied is likely to change as argued by Fisher. 
Thus, for example, if borrowers expect a rate of inflation higher than 
that expected by lenders, borrowers will demand more credit because 
the lenders are still willing to lend at a nominal rate of interest that 
is lower than the nominal rate which borrowers are prepared to pay. 
Thus the real volume of credit demanded and supplied will increase 
beyond C, and the nominal rate of interest will rise to somewhere 
between the level shown for point 5 in the diagram and that level 
consistent with equality of expectations. So, to drive the point home, 
Lutz's assumption regarding identical expectations among all individuals 
is, at best, superfluous when the supply of credit is assumed to be 
completely inelastic, but can play a crucial role if the supply of credit 
becomes more e l a s t i c . F u r t h e r m o r e , confusion could arise out of 
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the way in which the assumption was presented by Lutz. As 
previously argued, it is extremely important to distinguish between the 
Wicksellian and Fisherian components of interest rate adjustment. 
The Wicksellian component involves an increase in the real volume of 
credit demanded and supplied, whereas the Fisherian component, 
assuming identical inflatinary expectations, leads to no further change 
in the volume of credit. But if the assumption of identical 
inflationary expectations is dropped, then the Fisherian component of 
interest rate adjustment during the transition period wiU invariably 
lead to a further change in the volume of credit. In other words, 
the assumption of identical inflationary expectations should be taken in 
the context of interest rate adjustment according to the analysis of 
Fisher. 
As argued by Fisher, the transition period may be 
characterised by the sluggish adjustment of nominal interest rates to 
inflation, and it is real interest rates that bear the brunt of the 
adjustment, that is to say, real deflated interest rates are much more 
variable than nominal interest rates. According to the above analysis, 
if the rate of inflation is not fully anticipated, assuming identical 
expectations for all individuals, then on an ex ante basis, interest 
rates will adjust so that the nominal market rate of interest wiU 
exceed the real deflated market rate by approximately the rate of 
expected inflation, and the ex ante real deflated rate will equal the 
natural rate. On an ex post basis, when the actual rate of inflation 
turns out to be higher than expected, then the ex post real deflated 
rate v^l l turn out to be less than the natural rate. With this in 
mind, from equation [9] above, the transition period may be 
characterised by the following set of two expressions: 
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R = r + TT (ex ante) . . . [ 13a] 
and 
* 
r ^ r (ex post) . . . [ 13b] 
Even if inequality of foresight is assumed such that borrowers tend to 
expect a rate of inflation that is closer to the actual rate than 
expected by lenders, it is possible that the above conclusion would 
still hold. As figure 5.1 shows, if lenders do not expect any increase 
in the rate of inflation, the supply schedule remains as S^S, so that 
the market for loanable funds is described at point 5 of the diagram. 
From the point of view of borrowers, the nominal rate of interest is 
less than the level consistent with equality of expectations (i.e. point 
4 of diagram) so that the ex ante real deflated market rate of interest 
is less than the natural rate. It is possible that another 
Wicksellian-type interest rate adjustment will take place. Sensing a 
further opportunity for making profits, borrowers increase their 
demand for credit which is manifested by a further rightward shift of 
the demand schedule from D , D , to another demand schedule that 
will be parallel to D D , so that the nominal market rate of interest is 
bid up further to R, and volume of credit transactions in the market 
will be higher than the level consistent with equality of expectations. 
Since the nominal market rate of interest has risen to R, the ex ante 
real deflated market rate of interest will still be equal to the natural 
rate, and the nominal market rate will exceed the ex ante real 
deflated market rate by approximately the expected rate of inflation. 
As before, when the actual rate of inflation turns out to be higher 
than expected, the ex post real deflated market rate of interest will 
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still be less than the natural rate. In both cases, the ex post real 
deflated market rate of interest is not equal to the natural rate of 
interest, and thus the discussion above substantiates Gebauer's claim 
made at the beginning of this chapter that it is incorrect to assume 
that the real rate of interest on financial assets is always equal to the 
real rate on real assets. 
5.4. Conclusions 
Two things have been made clear. Firstly, the notion that 
inflation is neutral with respect to real deflated interest rates should 
be firmly rejected for once and all as the empirical evidence 
presented by Fisher himself showed that real interest rates were much 
more variable than nominal interest rates. This implies a total 
rejection of the perfect foresight assumption. In studying the 
transition period, however, the steady-state relationship between 
inflation and interest rates with its assumption of perfect foresight can 
serve as a useful guide as to how far the economy is diverging from 
its steady-state equilibrium path. Secondly, the notion that real 
interest rates on both financial and real assets are always equivalent 
needs to be rejected. By combining the analyses of Fisher and 
Wicksell, the concept of an inflationary equilibrium was brought out 
in which both real rates are equivalent. However, according to the 
analysis in sub-section 5.3.3 above, it was shown that during the 
transition period, the real rates of interest are certainly not equivalent. 
Even if perfect foresight is assumed, there are many good 
reasons why the hypothetical relationship between inflation and interest 
rates may not hold. First, it was demonstrated by Mundell (1963) 
that an inverse relationship between inflation and real interest rates 
could exist. Second, if taxes are introduced into the economy, one 
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would expect that the relevant decision variables will be the after-tax 
rates of return rather than the before-tax rates of return. Both 
aspects are discussed in the next chapter. A further interesting 
dimension is provided by Gebauer (1986) who argues that Tobin's 
^-theory of investment is based on relative changes in both real rates 
of interest. I f , say, the rate of return on financial assets is less than 
that on real assets, the rate of growth in the capital stock will 
become greater than the steady-state growth rate so that there exists 
an actual incentive for investment in additional physical capital. The 
effects of taxation on Tobin's ^-theory of investment will be 
examined when the disequilibrium properties of the model are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
REFINEMENTS OF THE FISHER HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter discusses many of the refinements made to the 
Fisher hypothesis. Some of the early refinements will be briefly 
reviewed in Section 6.1. The earliest refinements made use of static 
analytical techniques to show how and why the nominal interest rate 
may not rise in tandem with the inflation rate. Owing to the 
inappropriateness of static analysis for the study of the effects of 
inflation, a basic neoclassical monetary growth model is set up in 
Section 6.2. In the sections following Section 6.2., the behaviour of 
firms is considered using disaggregated models of the financial sector. 
The main difference between these models lies in the assumptions 
made regarding how firms finance their marginal investment projects. 
The simplest, but unrealistic, model assumes that the marginal unit of 
capital is financed entirely by issues of corporate debt. The inclusion 
of such a model in this thesis can only be justified on the grounds 
that if the simplest cases are considered first, one may find it easier 
to understand the more complex cases which allow for the possibility 
of debt-equity financing. After these disaggregated models of the 
financial sector have been set up, it is necessary to specify the firm's 
demand for capital so as to complete the basic neoclassical monetary 
growth model. This will permit consideration of the effects of taxes 
on the inflation- interest rate relationship. Thus, Section 6.3. derives 
the firm's demand for capital under an all-debt financing model, and 
Section 6.4. discusses the effects of taxes on the inflation-interest rate 
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relationship when all-debt financing is assumed. Then Section 6.5. 
criticises Feldstein's model on the grounds that the predictions 
generated by the model may not hold if the demand for money is 
allowed to be a function of income as well as the net nominal 
interest rate. Section 6.6. then extends the all-debt model to allow 
for equity financing, and Section 6.7. re-examines the effects of 
taxation. Finally, Section 6.8. presents a general equilibrium model 
used by Summers (1983) whose main conclusion is that any 
relationship between inflation and interest rates may exist in the 
short-run, but could take a more definite form in the long-run. 
6.1. The need for refinement 
Owing to the fact that the majority of the empirical literature 
does not show the existence of a relationship between inflation and 
interest rates in the sense that the latter does not rise by as much as 
the former, there is a need to refine the Fisher hypothesis to take 
account of institutional factors that could affect the inflation-interest 
rate relationship. Mundell (1963, p.280) is correct in pointing out 
that "...to attribute the discrepancy between theory and reality solely 
to lack of foresight is to raise doubts about the nature of evidence 
that would be required to reject the theory [of complete 
adjustment]." Mundell re-echoes Keynes' main criticism of Fisher in 
that the discrepancy between reality and theory is not solely due to 
imperfection of foresight. The point being made here is that, if 
perfect foresight even existed at all, there are many good reasons 
why nominal interest rates cannot adjust fully to inflation; and by 
assuming perfect foresight, the subjective question of how inflation 
expectations are formed can be abstracted from for the time being. 
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In this section, early attempts at refining the Fisher hypothesis are 
considered along with their main shortcomings which have given rise 
to the need for further refinement. This discussion will serve as a 
useful prelude to the later sections of this chapter. 
6.1.1. Bailey's analysis 
Although the paper by Bailey (1956) is exclusively concerned 
with the welfare cost of inflationary finance, there are certainly a few 
paragraphs outlining the effect of inflation on interest rates (see 
Bailey (1956). pp.103-4). Bailey's analysis is enshrined in a market 
for loanable funds in which the banks act as intermediaries by 
channelling funds from their depositors to their borrowers. The main 
effect of inflation on interest rates is through money balances 
deposited v^th the banks by the public. At the onset of (hyper-) 
inflation, the banks vnW find it most profitable to create the 
maximum amount of non-interest bearing deposits and lend out the 
funds in the market for loanable funds at high nominal interest rates 
that reflect the extent of competitive bidding for funds. In times of 
hyper-inflation, this phenomenon may become so accentuated that, in 
a competitive banking system, the individual bank may be forced to 
start paying interest on its non-interest bearing deposits in order to 
attract deposits away from other banks. The collective action of the 
banks in competing with one another for more deposits will lead to 
a situation in which the banks would all offer a nominal interest rate 
on deposits "approaching, but not equal to, the rate of inflation." 
(Bailey (1956), p.103) 
This conclusion could be explained by considering how banks 
behave in a banking system in which a reserve ratio requirement is 
operational (as in the case of inter-war Germany during the years of 
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hyper-inflation), and this is the explanation offered by Bailey (1956, 
p. 104). During an inflation "that everyone anticipates perfectly", the 
incentive to substitute interest-bearing bank deposits for currency 
holdings would be so great that, in a reserve ratio system, all 
newly-issued currency would immediately flow into bank reserves so 
that the ful l reserve requirement of c would be met, where c is the 
reserve ratio (proportion of total deposits in the form of currency). 
A n individual bank would only be able to expand its loans by the 
new deposits times (1 - c ) , and so the maximum rate of interest 
that could be offered on all deposits would be the rate of inflation 
times ( i - c) . This analysis is not quite in the spirit of Fisher who 
realised that perfect foresight was not characteristic of the behaviour 
of individuals, but is certainly unusual in that the effect of inflation 
on interest rates is through money balances rather than the more 
orthodox marginal productivity of capital. The main shortcoming of 
Bailey's analysis is that it is static, and in such an analysis, the rate 
of inflation cannot, strictly speaking, be correctly included as a 
variable because it is synonymous to the rate of grov^^h in the price 
level. 
6.1.2. Mundell's analysis 
Mundell (1963) uses a variant of the IS-LM apparatus to 
show that the nominal interest rate will rise (fall) by less than the 
anticipated rate of inflation (deflation). He states that "...Fisher 
found verification for a theory of partial adjustment of money 
interest to inflation and deflation but none for his own theory of 
complete adjustment under foresight." (p.280), and in light of 
Mundell's doubts on the discrepancy between theory and reahty as 
being solely due to lack of foresight, he claims that his theory is 
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more consistent with the empirical findings of Fisher and also with 
Keynes' theory of investment. Amongst Mundell's assumptions, it is 
assumed that wealth is held in the form of money balances and 
equities, and these are held in a proportion which depends on the 
nominal interest rate which may be regarded as the true opportunity 
cost of holding real money balances. It is also assumed that real 
investment depends inversely on the real rate of interest, and that 
real savings depends inversely on real money balances. Overall 
equilibrium occurs when the incentive to invest is matched by the 
desire to save, and when the demand for equities equals its supply, 
and when desired real money balances are matched by the existing 
stock of real money balances. Another feature of this equihbrium is 
that the inflation rate is zero implying that the nominal and real 
interest rates are both equivalent. 
Suppose now that the government expands the money supply 
at a rate which exceeds the economy's natural rate of growth so that 
inflation occurs at a rate which equals the excess rate of growth in 
the money supply. Real money balances (if the growth rate of the 
economy is zero) will be depreciating at a rate equal to the rate of 
inflation, and to this must be added the real return on equities to 
obtain the total opportunity cost of holding real money balances as 
reflected in a higher nominal interest rate. This forces individuals to 
economise on their holdings of real money balances as reflected in an 
increased desire to save. In order that the extra savings may be 
absorbed by additional investment, it is necessary for the real interest 
rate to fall . This leads to Mundell's conclusion that the nominal 
interest rate will rise by less than the rate of inflation. Whilst 
Mundell's analysis is instructive in demonstrating the use of a variant 
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of the IS -LM apparatus in the context of the Fisher hypothesis, it 
cannot be considered any further due to the static nature of the 
analysis. In the next section, a neoclassical monetary growth model 
whose origins can be traced to the inaugural paper of Tobin (1955) 
is set up and considered in the context of the inflation-interest rate 
relationship. 
6.2. A neoclassical monetary growth model 
In this section, a basic neoclassical monetary growth model is 
set up which will serve as the foundation for the analysis of the 
inflation-interest rate relation in later sections. The model presented 
here is a slight variant of the one presented by Feldstein (1976) in 
that it makes use of a consumption function rather than a savings 
function, and has its roots in the inaugural paper of Tobin (1955) on 
dynamic aggregative models. 
6.2.1. The production function 
Firstly, it is assumed that there are m firms in the economy, 
all producing a single good which is appropriated into either 
consumption or investment. It is further assumed that all firms have 
similar production technologies in that each firm is faced with a 
linearly homogeneous production function. The iih firm will employ 
Nf units of labour and Ki units of capital to produce output Yf as 
specified in the following production function: 
= ^i(^i'^i) •••[!] 
where the / subscript on the production function emphasises that it is 
the individual firm's production function. Given certain conditions, 
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the individual production functions can be aggregated to obtain an 
aggregate production function that applies to the economy as a 
whole: ^ 
Y = FiK,N) . . . [ 2 ] 
where it is assumed that both factors of production are both subject 
to positive, but diminishing, marginal products, and that the marginal 
product of capital is assumed to vary directly with employment and 
vice-versa. 
6.2.2. The liquidity function 
In an all-debt financing model, in which all firms finance 
their marginal investment projects entirely by issues of corporate debt, 
there can only be two assets held by households. These two assets 
are real outside money balances^ (M/p) and real corporate debt 
(B/p) and must satisfy the constraint that total real wealth is 
matched by the sum of these two assets: 
W = (M/p) + (B/p) . . . [ 3 ] 
Since outside money balances earn no interest, the ratio of money to 
corporate debt that households will hold is a decreasing function of 
the after tax nominal rate of return (Rn) • In an all-debt financing 
model, it is reasonable to assume that the real value of corporate 
debt is also the real value of the capital stock. Thus, the 
liquidity-preference relation is expressed as 
= L(R^) . . . [ 4 ] 
K 
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with dL/dR^ = Lji < 0. In the long-run steady-state, (M/p)/K 
must remain constant. That is, MlpK remains constant such that the 
rate of growth of the money supply M is equal to the rate of growth 
of the nominal capital stock {pK). 
6.2.3. The consumption function 
In addition to their portfoUo decisions, households also have 
to decide on how fast should their wealth accumulate. Their 
consumption decisions will be influenced by their disposable income 
( y - ^ ) , and by the net real rate of interest (/•«). In Feldstein's 
model, it is assumed that consumption is proportional to disposable 
income.3 Thus, their consumption function is: 
C = C{r^).Y^ . . . [ 5 ] 
where it is assumed that the marginal propensity to consume is 
inversely related to the net real rate of return 
(i .e. dC/dr„ = C j < 0 ) . It is now necessary to define disposable 
income which is gross national income less taxes (T ) less 
depreciation in real money balances: 
yD = Y - T - ir{M/p) 
where T is the anticipated rate of inflation (which must equal the 
actual rate of inflation {pip) in the long run steady state). The 
government uses the proceeds from taxation and the creation of new 
money (M/p) to finance its expenditure (G) so that 
= Y - G + M/p - iriM/p) 
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It is assumed that the rate of inflation is equal to the excess rate of 
monetary growth over the natural growth rate (i.e. ir = MIM - n) 
and that government expenditure is directly proportional to national 
income (i.e. yY). Therefore 
Y^ = Y(l - y) + n(M/p) . . . [ 6 ] 
6.2.4. The national income identity 
Finally, the national income accounting identity is included. 
National income is equivalent to consumption, plus investment ( / ) , 
plus government expenditure: 
y = C + / + G • • • [ 7 ] 
At this point, it would be useful to take a look at some of 
the differences and analogies of the current model with that of 
Feldstein (1976). Firstly, substitution of equation [7] into equation 
[6] gives 
= C + / + n(M/p) 
and given that Y^ - C = S where S is for saving, and that the 
capital stock is growing at an exponential rate of n per unit time (in 
the form of investment), it follows that (not written in per-capita 
form) 
S = nK ^- n(M/p) 
which corresponds to Feldstein's equilibrium condition (1976, p.812)'' 
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Secondly, in common with Feldstein, this model ignores economic 
depreciation on the capital stock. Thirdly, Feldstein makes the 
somewhat heroic assumption that saving is proportional to disposable 
income (1976, p.811) and makes no mention of the demand for 
money as being a function of income. The effects of relaxing such 
assumptions will be examined later on. 
It now remains to specify the firm's demand for capital and 
labour in the context of an all-debt financing model which forms the 
subject matter of the next section. 
6.3. All-debt financing model 
In this section, the firm's demand for capital is derived, but 
before doing so, it is necessary to define the nominal interest rate, 
and consider how a firm might behave in the absence of taxation. 
Fisher (1896) deduced that the relationship between nominal 
and real interest rates took the form (see Section 5.1. of this thesis): 
{1 + R) = (1 + r){l + O 
where R and r are the nominal and real interest rates respectively. 
Expanding and re-arranging gives 
= r + IT + A-TT 
Assuming that there is continuous compounding, the last term of the 
above expression will become negligible (i.e. r-ir « 0) so that by 
definition, 
/? = r + X . • • [8 ] 
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6.3.1. The firm's demand for capital 
Considering the behaviour of the firm now, it is extremely 
important that a distinction be drawn between the short- and 
long-run. In the short-run, the firm has a putty-clay capital stock 
which means simply that there is no ready market available if the 
firm should ever decide to sell some of its capital stock. Only in 
the long-run, is it considered possible to have a putty-putty capital 
stock so that the firm is exactly able to equate the marginal product 
of its capital with its cost. This is the main assumption of this 
model. More about this will be said in Sections 6.6. and 6.8. 
(a) When taxation is absent. Feldstein (1976) assumes that the 
main objective of the firm is to maximise its profits, but it would do 
no harm here to assume that the main objective of the firm is to 
maximise its present value instead, and these two approaches are 
indeed both equivalent. Another point to be made here, is that the 
all-debt financing model can be regarded as a special case of the 
more general debt-equity financing model. Therefore, let e be the 
real rate of return on equity. A more precise definition of e will be 
given in Section 6.6. rather than here because, as wiU be shown 
below, the real rate of return on equity does not enter the 
marginality conditions for the firm in an all-debt financing model. 
Then the nominal rate of return on equity can be decomposed into 
two parts, viz: the capital gain on equity (V^), and dividends paid 
out {Div), so that 
(e + x ) y ( 0 = V{t) + Div{t) 
which can be recognised as a first order differential equation. After 
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imposing the following transversality condition 
Lim Vis) exp-(^ + '^) (^ " 0 = Q 
S oo 
which will guarantee that unstable dynamic behaviour is ruled out, so 
ensuring a stable and unique solution, the solution to the above 
differential equation is 
V{t) = Div{s) exp"(^ + " ^) ds . . . [ 9 ] 
Now, the firm's present value is the discounted value of its future 
net cash flows.^ The firm's cash flow at time s is 
Div(s) = pis)[F{K{s),]Sis))] - w{s)N(s) 
- p{s)K(s)(R - ^) - pi + pi 
The first term represents the firm's gross revenue, and from this, the 
firm must deduct its wage bill (wA^), and the cost of its capital 
which is the real rate of interest that it must pay on its debt. In 
addition, the firm also needs to deduct any gross investment 
expenditure undertaken. But, gross investment is financed entirely by 
corporate debt in this model so that the last two terms cancel out 
each other. After substitution for Div in the solution to the 
differential equation [9] , the present value of the firm at time t can 
now be calculated as 
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V(K,N,t) = [p(s)F[Kis),N{s)] - wis)Nis) - pis)K(s)iR -.)} 
exp 
-{e + .){s - t ) ds . . . [10] 
where it is to be understood that p, w, K, and N are all functions 
of time. Among the necessary conditions for this to obtain an 
extremum are the following Euler equations: ^ 
exp 
-ie + .)is - t ) 
P = 0 
and 
exp 
-(e + .)(s - t ) dF p — - piR - ^) 
dK 
= 0 
for r < 5 < oo. These two Euler equations imply that the marginal 
product of labour must be equated to its real wage, and the marginal 
product of capital must be equated to the real rate of interest, that 
is 
= w/p and F f , = R -
These two conditions describe the firm's demand for labour and 
capital respectively in the absence of t a x a t i o n . [ t can be noted 
that the optimality condition for capital is equivalent to that of 
Feldstein (1976, p.810) who expresses it in per-capita form without 
allowing for depreciation. Note also that the real rate of return on 
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equity (e) is absent from the above marginality conditions. 
(b) When taxation is present. Feldstein then goes on to consider 
how the behaviour of firms might be modified in the presence of 
corporation taxation. The taxation system introduced can either 
discriminate between real and inflationary components of income, or 
remain indifferent between the two components. First, e is redefined 
as the real after-tax rate of return on equity. Then the nominal 
after-tax rate of return on equity can be decomposed as follows: 
(e + x)y(0 = (i - K)V(t) + (1 - e)Div(t) 
where K is the capital gains tax rate, and e is the effective rate of 
tax on dividend income. The solution to the above differential 
equation, after imposing the transversality condition, is 
V(t) = 
(1 - e) f -(e + .) ^ 
Div(s) exp (s - t ) ds 
(1 - K) [ (1 - K) J 
t 
In order to discuss the implications of changing the tax treatment of 
inflation, it will be necessary to specify two different tax rates, each 
tax rate being on the real and inflationary components of the 
nominal interest rate. One of the features of the taxation system is 
that interest paid on corporate debt may be deducted by firms in 
calculating taxable profits while dividends paid on corporate equity 
cannot be deducted. Let r , be the corporation tax rate at which 
the real component of interest payments is deducted, and let r ^  be 
the rate at which the inflationary component is deducted. Thus, the 
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net nominal rate of interest paid by firms is 
( 7 - T i ) r + ( i - T 2 ) i r . In an all-debt financing model, the firm 
deducts f rom its gross revenue its wage b i l l , and its real net interest 
payments on debt. Therefore, at instant s, the firm's net cash flow 
is now 
Div(s) = 
[pF(K,N) - WN]{1 - r^) - pK[(l - r^)r + ( i - r ^ ) . - . ] 
where i t is to be understood that p, w, K, and are all functions 
of t ime. Therefore, after substitution for Div i n the expression for 
V, 
oo 
" {1 - 0 
(1 - K ) 
[pF(K,N) - wN](l-r^) - pK[(l - r^)r - r ]\ M_ ds 
. . . [ 1 1 ] 
where ixg = e x p ( [ - ( e + - K ) ](s - t ) } . The Euler 
equations are now 
(1 - 0 
( i - K ) 
dF 
p — - w 
a/V 
(1 - r , ) = 0 
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and 
( i - 0 
( i - K ) 
r ( i - 7 ) + T X = 0 
iox t i s < CO. These two equations together imply that 
. [ 1 2 ] 
and 
( i - .,)F^ = ( i - -
2 
or 
= r 
1 -
[ 1 3 ] 
It can be noted immediately that corporation taxation has no effect 
on the firm's demand for labour. Equation [13] is now the firm's 
demand for capital i n the presence of taxation. This result can be 
compared wi th that of Feldstein (1976, p.811, equation 4). 
6.3.2. The various after-tax rates of return defined 
It now remains to define the various net rates of return an 
individual w i l l receive on his holding of corporate debt. The interest 
payments received by the individual as personal income are taxed at 
a personal income rate of on the real component, and at on 
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the inflationary component, so that the various definitions of net rates 
of return apply 
[ 1 4 ] 
and 
n n X = {1 - e )r - d IT . . . [ 1 5 ] 
Gathering equations [ 2 ] , [ 4 ] - [ 8 ] , and [12] - [15] , the model is now 
summarised i n Table 6 .1 . 
6.4. Effects of inflation (1) 
The effect of taxes on the inflation-interest rate relationship 
can now be examined by taking the total differentials of equations 
[ I ] - [ X ] i n Table 6 .1 . , and the differential equations are presented 
in Table 6.2. It is clear f rom differenfial equation [x] that 
dR dr 
— = — + i 
d-K dir 
but f rom differential equation [ i i ] 
dr r dK • r dN 1 
dir . dir . . dir . 
+ -
1 
and assuming, as Feldstein (1976, p.810) does, that the labour 
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T A B L E 6 . 1 : A neoclassical monetary growth model with 
all-debt financing. 
[ I ] Fj^ = w/p 
[ I I ] r = FK + [ r , / ( l - r , ) ] . 
[ I l l ] Y = F(K,N) 
[ I V ] M/p = L{Rn)K 
[ Y ] C = C{rn)YD 
[ V I ] y = c + / + G 
vhe r e 
[ V I I ] YD = Y{1 - y) + n{M/p) 
[ V I I I ] r „ = ( i - e j r - e , . 
[ I X ] = ( i - e,)r + ( i -
F i n a l l y t h e nomina l i n t e r e s t r a t e i s d e f i n e d as 
[ X ] = r + X 
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T A B L E 6 . 2 : Total di f f e r e n t ials of all equations in 
Table 6.1. 
[ i ] PmdK + Fjs^^dN = (dw/p) - (w/p)(dp/p) 
[ i i ] dr = FKRdK + F/^d/V + [ r,/(1 - r,) ]d. 
[Hi] dY = F^dK + F^dN 
[ i v ] (dM/p) - iM/p)(dp/p) = KLRdRn + LdK 
[ v ] dC = Y^C^drn + CdY^ 
[ v i ] dY = dC + dl + dG 
vher e 
[ v i i ] dYD = dY{l - y) + n[{dM/p) - {M/p){dp/p)] 
[ v i i i ] drfi = (1 - e^)dr - e ^ dw 
[ix] dRfi = (1 - e,)dr + (1 - e^)dx 
and f i n a l l y , 
[ x ] dR = dr + dir 
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supply grows exogenously at an exponential rate of n per unit time, 
this would imply that (dN/dw) = 0. Then after substituting for 
(dr/div) i n differential equation [ x ] . 
dR 
dir 
dK - 1 - r + r 
d-K 
+ . . . [ 1 6 ] 
1 - T 
1 
6.4.1. Effect on capital intensity 
A t this stage, it is not possible to determine the sign of dR/dv 
unless the sign of dK/dir is determined as wel l . Therefore, substitute 
for all terms of the differential equation [vi] to get 
( i - y)Fj^dK = y^C^dr^ + CdY^ + ndK 
after noting that dl = ndK and dG = ydY and that (dN/dir) is 
still equal to zero. Af ter further substitution and manipulation of the 
preceding expression, an expression for dKld-a is obtained as follows 
q ( i - e ^ ) { r j { l - r^)) + ( i - e^) ]nKL^ 
dK 
d^ (1 - Qil - y)F^ - CnL - n - CnKLj^(l - e ^)F KK 
Afte r including the term (nL - nL) in the denominator of the 
preceding expression, i t can be shown that the following result is 
equivalent to that obtained by Feldstein (1976, p.813, equation 17) 
after letting C = ( i - a ) , and -C^ = a' where a is Feldstein's 
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notation for savings: 
( i - a)[il - e ^ ) { r j { l - T ^ ) ) + (1 - e^) ]nKL^ 
dK - ^ ' ' ' ^ • [ ( ^ - - ^ ) ) - M 
dir o[{l - 7 ) F ^ + nL] - nil + L) - {1 - a)nKLj^{l - e ^)F KK 
. . . [ 1 7 ] 
Feldstein (1976, p.812) has shown that the denominator of equation 
[17] is negative i f saving is a nondecreasing function of the net real 
rate of return, i .e. a \ 0. ff this condition holds, the denominator 
is unambiguously negative when 
a[(l - y)FK + nL] - n(l + L ) ] < 0.^ Thus, the sign of 
dKld-w w i l l be the opposite of the sign of the nummerator. 
Considering the nummerator, i t can be seen that the first term is 
negative since the demand for money is inversely related to the 
nominal rate of interest, i .e. L;^ < 0. Feldstein has argued that i f 
a > 0, the sign of the second term, and therefore the sign of the 
entire nummerator, depends on the nature of the taxation system. 
Therefore, Feldstein (1976, p.813) points out two special cases in 
which the second term is zero. The first case arises when there is 
f u l l indexing of the taxation of interest income, that is, the real 
component of the nominal interest rate is taxed only {e ^ = 0 ) , and 
when corporation tax only allows the deductibility of real interest 
payments {T ^ = 0) • The second case arises when there is no f u l l 
indexing, but the corporation and personal income tax rates are equal 
( 0 ^ = 0 ^ = 7 ^ = 7 2 ) . When these two cases do occur, the second 
term of the nummerator i n equation [17] is zero. Therefore, the 
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nummerator is unambiguously negative, and hence dKldx > 0. 
However, these two cases may not occur in practice. There 
is often less-than-perfect indexing of taxation of interest income, and 
the corporate tax rate is certainly not equal to the personal income 
tax rate. Whilst some form of implicit indexing scheme may operate 
(for example, i n the United Kingdom, tax aUowances have to be 
increased i n line with inflat ion), such indexing is not always perfect. 
As a simplifying assumption, i t is assumed that no f u l l indexing is in 
operation so that e, = = e and T , = = T approximately. 
Consider the case i n which the corporation tax rate is greater than 
the personal income tax rate, i .e. T > e. The effect of inflation on 
equilibrium capital intensity mainly stems f rom the reinforcing effect 
of the increase i n the savings rate on the reduction in liquidity. 
This can be quite easily seen i f equation [ I I ] is substituted into 
equation [ X ] after letting T , = T ^ = r . Then the nominal rate 
of interest is 
jl = r + T = FK+ T/(1 - T ) . . . [ 1 8 ] 
implying that, f rom equation [ I X ] , the net nominal rate of interest is 
R^ = (1 - e)F^ + 
1 - e ^ 
1 - r 
[ 1 9 ] 
Given that Fj^ is a constant, it is clear f rom [19] that the net 
nominal interest rate w i l l rise with inflation, and since liquidity 
preference is a decreasing function of i n (see equation [ IV ] ) , the 
demand for money decreases. H , f rom equation [ V I I I ] the net real 
rate of interest is 
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rn = U - 6)FK + 
1 -
. [ 2 0 ] 
then any rise i n the inflation rate causes the net real rate of interest 
to increase (because T > e). The rise i n r^ causes an increase in 
the marginal propensity to save which reinforces the reduction in 
l iquidi ty. Since savings are composed of money balances and 
corporate bonds (used to finance capital accumulation), any reduction 
i n l iquidity preference implies an increase i n capital intensity. Thus, 
the effect of inflation is to increase dK/dir which is positive. 
Since coming into office i n 1979, the present Government has 
reduced the rate of corporation tax f rom 52 to 35 per cent. Owing 
to this development, i t would be useful to consider the possibility 
that the corporation tax rate may be less than the marginal personal 
income tax rate, that is T < e. The situation is more complex 
since an increase i n the inflation rate w i l l reduce the net real rate of 
return received by savers as can be readily ascertained from equation 
[20] wi th T < e. It is not possible to give an unambiguous a 
priori answer regarding the effect of inflation on capital intensity 
because the final outcome is dependent on the relative strength of 
the savings and liquidity effects. It may be recalled that inflation 
increases capital intensity i f the nummerator of equation [17] is 
negative. With the assumption that there is no indexation in the tax 
system, this would require the nummerator of equation [17] to satisfy 
the following inequality, as shown by Feldstein (1976, p.814) 
( i - a)nkil - e)LR + YD(e - r ) a ' < 0 . . . [ 2 1 ] 
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Af te r some manipulation, [21] is equivalent to 
— > 
r,^ ( i - a ) ( M / p ) 
e - T 
1 - e \ 
R. 
n 
[ 2 2 ] 
where r j^ . — ~^n^R^^ ~ the elasticity of real money balances 
relative to capital with respect to the nominal interest rate, r j ^ = 
r ^ f f ' / a = the elasticity of the propensity to save with respect to the 
net real rate of interest. When T > e, it is certain that inequality 
[22] w i l l ho ld , but may not hold when T < e. It wi l l be more 
likely that dK/dir w i l l be negative if the demand for real balances 
relative to capital is relatively interest-elastic (rji^ is large) and if the 
savings rate is interest-inelastic (175 is small). K the inequality is 
indeed false, then a rise i n inflation wi l l lead to a decrease in 
capital intensity (since the nummerator of equation [17] is positive). 
The effects of inflation on interest rates wi l l now be considered. 
6.4.2. Effect on gross interest rates 
Fisher's relation between inflation and nominal interest rates is 
only valid i n an economy where there is no taxation. However, it 
is clear f rom the preceding equations for the interest rate variables 
that taxation does play an important role in determining the net real 
rate of interest. In an economy without taxation, the nominal 
interest rate, the real interest rate, and the net real interest rate are 
all equivalent, but not so when there is taxation. In the most 
general case, substitution of equation [ I I ] f rom Table 6.1. into [ X ] 
and [ V I I I ] shows that the nominal and net real interest rates are 
respectively 
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R = + 
1 - T + 7 
1 2 
1 -
[ 2 3 ] 
and 
'n = - ^)^/^ + 
( i - e ) r ^ - ( i - 7 J 
i -
[ 2 4 ] 
Now consider the effect of inflation on the nominal interest rate. 
Differentiation of [23] with respect to x (or substitution of differential 
equation [ i i ] f rom Table 6.2. into [x]) gives 
dR 
dl, 
1 - r + T 
2 1 
1 - 7 
+ F KK 
dK 
dir 
. . . [ 1 6 
repeat ed] 
Fisher's conclusion that dRId-w = 1 corresponds to the case when 
there are no taxes, and an interest inelastic demand for m o n e y . i ° 
In the more general case i n which taxes are recognised, the nominal 
interest rate may rise substantially more than the rate of inflation. 
Without f u l l tax indexing, i .e. 7 , = 2 — > [16] becomes 
dR 
dir 
+ F 
1 - KK 
dK 
dir 
[25] 
With no change i n capital intensity, dR/dv = 1/(1 - 7 ) . Thus 
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with a corporation tax of 35 percent, dRIdx — 1.54. That is, the 
nominal interest rate would have to rise by almost one-and-half 
times as much as the rate of inflation. If T > e, dKld% w i l l be 
positive, implying that the second term in [25] wi l l be negative. So 
the nominal rate of interest may rise less than one-and-half times 
the rate of inflation given that T = 0 . 3 5 . Similarly, when T < e, 
dKldx might be negative. In that case, the nominal rate of interest 
may rise by more than one-and-half times the rate of inflation. 
With f u l l tax indexing, i.e. = 0, equation [16] becomes 
dR 
dir 
dK 
dir 
. [ 2 6 ] 
Here, wi th no change in capital intensity, the original conclusion by 
Fisher that dRIdir = 1 holds. It was shown previously that with 
f u l l tax indexing, i .e. = 0^ = 0, dKldir is positive. 
Since Fj(^j(^(dK/dTr) < 0, it follows that the nominal interest rate 
may rise by slightly less than the rate of inflation. So, either in the 
absence of taxation or f u l l tax indexation, this conclusion may be 
loosely compared with those reached by both Bailey (1956) and 
Mundell (1963) which were discussed i n Section 6.1. 
6.4.3. E f f e c t on net interest rates 
It would also be useful to discuss the effect of inflation on 
the net real rate of interest. Differentiation of equation [24] with 
respect to ir (or substitution of differential equation [ i i ] f rom Table 
6.2. into [v i i i ] ) gives 
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dr^ (1 - e )T - (1 - r )e n ^ 1 - ^ 2 ^ 1 ^ 2 
dir 1 -
+ ( i - 0)F 
dK 
dir 
. . [ 2 7 ] 
ff there are no taxes, and the demand for money is interest-inelastic, 
equation [27] implies that dr^ildir — 0 which is i n line with Fisher's 
original conclusion that ( in theory) the real interest rate is unaffected 
by inflat ion. When the effect of inflation on capital intensity was 
discussed previously, two special cases were considered, viz: fu l l tax 
indexing of interest (e ^ = T ^ = 0 ) , and equaUty of corporation 
and personal income tax rates ( T , = T ^ = e, = e 2) • 
Considering these cases, it can be shown that the first term of 
equation [27] vanishes so that dr^/dir only depends on the second 
term (1 - e ^ ) (dK/dir)FxK which is n e g a t i v e . T h e r e f o r e , the 
net real rate of interest may decline slightiy as the inflation rate 
increases (c.f. Mundell (1963)) 
However, i n general, with taxes, inflation can have a very 
substantial (and in some cases, detrimental) effect on the net real 
rate of interest, ff there is no f u l l tax indexing of interest, equation 
[27] becomes 
dr 
n 
dir 1 -
+ (1 - e)F KK 
dK 
dir 
[ 2 8 ] 
If the corporation tax rate exceeds the personal tax rate, the first 
term of equation [28] is positive. Recall that when T > 9, 
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dk/dir > 0. Therefore, the second term is negative. A n 
unambiguous answer concerning the effect of inflation on the net real 
rate of interest cannot be given. The likelihood of dr^/dir being 
negative seems to increase i f the difference between the corporation 
tax rate and personal income tax rate becomes small. U T < e, the 
first term w i l l be negative. Assuming an interest- inelastic demand 
for real money balances, i t is possible that the second term wil l 
become positive. Again it is not possible to give an unambiguous 
answer regarding the sign of dr^ldir, but as the negative difference 
between the corporation tax and personal income tax rates gets 
larger, the hkelihood that dr^ldr w i l l be negative wi l l increase. 
6.5. A critique of Feldstein's model 
The main criticism to be made here of Feldstein's model is 
that i t does not postulate that the demand for money is a function of 
the net nominal interest rate only, and not of income as well . It 
w i l l now be shown that the income elasticity of the demand for 
money plays an important role in deciding whether the sign of 
dK/dir can be determined at a l l . So, i t w i l l be useful to 
re-consider the demand for money in some detail. 
6 .5.1. A re-consideration of the demand for money function 
A l l households desire to allocate their wealth between money 
and corporate debt whose demand schedules are as follows: 
D 
M / p = LiR ,Y,VI) . . . [ 2 9 ] 
n 
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and 
^ i p = B{R^,Y,\1) . . . [ 3 0 ] 
where the superscript D denotes desired quantities, and R^i is the net 
nominal interest rate (to be defined later on). The above two 
demand schedules are constructed such that for all JR ,^ Y , and W, 
they w i l l satisfy the foUowing equation: 
{ } P / p ) + {FP/P) = W . . . [ 3 1 ] 
As pointed out by Tobin (1969, pp.18 - 20), when the sum of real 
assets are constrained to satisfy balance sheet identities, the partial 
derivatives of the above two demand schedules are related in a 
certain way. Thus, taking the total differential of equation [29] and 
adding this to the total differential of equation [30] yields the 
following expression: 
d{{tfi + FP)/P) = ( I ^ + Bj^)dR^ + (Ly + By)dY + ily + 
Subtraction of the total differential of equation [31] from the 
preceding expression yields the following expression 
0 = ( L ^ + B^)dR^ + (Ly + By)dY + (L^ + B^ - l)dS^ 
For this expression to hold at all times, i t is necessary that the 
foUov^dng conditions are satisfied: 
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( L ^ + B^) = 0 , (Ly+ By) = 0, and {L^ + B^) = 1 
It is assumed then that the above conditions characterise the asset 
demand functions of equations [29] and [30]. Notice that Feldstein 
(1976, p.810) argues that in the long-run steady state, the ratio of 
real money balances to the real capital stock must remain constant, 
and such a condition can be quite easily met by assuming that 
Lji = -Bj^ and Ly — By. Portfolio equilibrium requires that 
households be satisfied vvith their allocation of their wealth between 
money and corporate debt, that is 
i f ^ l p = M/p and B ^ / p = B/p 
But notice that [3] ( in Section 6.2.) and [31] together imply that 
either one of the above equations is sufficient to describe portfoUo 
equilibrium; so it is only necessary to require that M^/p = M/p as 
Walras' Law w i l l ensure that demands for both assets are exactly 
matched by their supphes. Therefore, portfolio equilibrium is 
characterised by: 
M/p = }pip = L{R^,Y,M) 
where i t is assumed that L / j < 0, Ly > 0, and L\Y = 0 S O that 
M/p = L(R^,Y) . . . [ 3 2 ] 
which replaces the liquidity preference function i n Table 6.1. 
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6.5.2. Relaxation of more assumptions 
Two further assumptions of Feldstein's model will now be 
relaxed. Firstly, it is assumed that government expenditure is 
exogenously determined so that 
G = G . . . [ 3 3 ] 
where a 'bar' over a variable denotes exogneity. It is still assumed 
that the supply of labour is exogenously determined, in which case 
IS = N . . . [ 3 4 ] 
Secondly, the consumption function is assumed not to be proportional 
to disposable income, in which case 
C = C ( y ^ r ^ ) . . . [ 3 5 ] 
where the marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income 
is positive but less than unity (i.e. 0 < C , < 1, where C , = 
a C / a Y - ^ ) , and < 0. This replaces the consumption function in 
Table 6.1. The revised model is now summarised in Table 6.3. 
6.5.3. Why are liquidity effects a problem? 
The revised model can now be examined by taking the total 
differentials of all equations in Table 6.3., and these differential 
equations are presented in Table 6.4. As before, the sign of dR/dw 
(as expressed in equation [16]) still depends on the sign of d K / d v . 
Therefore, substitution of all terms in the differential equation [vi] 
yields the following expression 
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TABLE 6.3: Revised neoclassical monetary growth model with 
all-debt financing. 
[ I 
[ I I 
[ I I I 
[ I V 
[ V 
[ V I 
vher e 
[ V I I 
[ V I I I 
[ I X 
[ X I 
Fjsi = w/p 
r = F K + [ r , / { l - r J ]. 
Y = F{K,N) 
M/p = LiRn,Y) 
Y = C + I + G 
YD = Y - G + n{M/p) 
N = N 
G = G 
fn = il -
Rn = {1 - e,)r + {1 - e ^ ) ^ 
F i n a l l y the nominal i n t e r e s t r a t e i s de f ined as 
[ X I I ] / ? = / • + X 
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TABLE 6.4: Total differentials of all equations in 
Table 6.3. 
[ i 
[ i i 
[ i i i 
[ i v 
[ V 
[ v i 
vher e 
[ v i i 
[ v i i i 
[ i x 
[ x i 
Fj^f^dK + Fj^i^dN = (dw/p) - { w / p ) { d p / p ) 
dr = FKKdK + F^^dN + [ r ( 1 - r,) ]d. 
dY = FjidK + Fj^dN 
(dM/p) - {M/p)(dp/p) = LRdRn + LydY 
dC = C.dYD + C^drn 
dY = dC + dl + dG 
dYD = dY - dG + n[idM/p) - {M/p){dp/p)] 
dN = dN 
dG = dG 
dr^i = {1 - e^)dr - e ^d% 
dR n (1 - e,)dr + (1 - e^)d^ 
and f i n a l l y , 
[ x i i ] dR = dr + dTT 
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Fj,dK = C dY^ + C dr„ + ndK + dG K 1 2 n 
After further substitution and manipulation, an expression for dK/dir 
is obtained as follows: 
C^nLj^[(l - e^)(r^/U - r ^ ) ) + ( i - e^) ] 
dK + - ^ ) ( ^ / ( ^ - r ^ ) ) - e^]+ (1 - C ^ ) i d G / d . ) 
d . F^ - C^(l + nLy)F^ - (1 - e^)[C^nLj^ + ^ . l ^ K K ' 
but, by assumption, dG/dir = 0, so that 
C^nLj^[(l - e ^ ) { r j { l - r ^ ) ) + {1 - e^) ] 
d_K + C j ( i - e ^ ) { r j { l - r ^ ) ) - . J 
d^ F^ - C / i + nLy)Fj^ - ( i - e^)[CnL^ + F/y^ " « 
. . . [ 3 6 ] 
Considering the sign of the nummerator, it is clear that the first term 
is negative since C , > 0, and Lji < 0. The sign of the second 
term in the nummerator depends on the tax parameters as before. 
With regard to the denominator of [36], the last two terms are 
certainly negative. If the predictions of Feldstein's model are still to 
hold true, it is therefore necessary that the first two terms of the 
denominator satisfy the following inequality: 
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1 
< nLv + i . . . [ 3 7 ] 
C ^ 
The possible magnitude of L y cannot be properly ascertained without 
reference to the income elasticity of the demand for money, which is 
defined a s £ = L y ( y / L ) . I f £ = i , as suggested by the empirical 
evidence ^ ^ ^ then L y = LIY which is the proportion of real money 
balances to income, in which case inequality [37] becomes 
Y 
C 
1 nL + Y 
This inequality states that if the sign of dK/dir is to be determinate, 
it is necessary that the marginal propensity to consume out of 
disposable income be greater than or equal to Y/(nL + Y ) . Now, 
the proportion of real money balances to income is less than unity, 
and most probably nearer to zero than to unity, that is, L is small 
relative to Y. Since the natural growth rate is small, it would 
follow that the ratio Y/{nL + Y) is probably very close to unity. 
By implication, this would require a marginal propensity to consume 
that is close to unity implying that savings were negligible. Such an 
observation would not be supported by empirical evidence. It 
therefore follows that inequality [37] may not be satisfied so that the 
sign of d K / d r remains indeterminate. 
One possible way of overcoming the problem of determining 
the sign of dK/d-w would be to neglect real balance effects, as 
Summers (1983, p.205) has already done, so that all terms containing 
L vanish from equation [36]: 
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dK - - ^ ) ) - ^ ] 
d . (1 - C^)Fj^ - (1 - e^)CF^ - n 
Summers (1983, p.208) then considers the special case in which 
consumption is interest inelastic {C^ = 0 ) . Clearly dK/d-K = 0 so 
that from equation [25], dR/dir = 1/(1 - r ) . 
One further shortcoming of Feldstein's model is that it fails to 
take account of the possibility of equity financing, and this is now 
the subject of the following section. 
6.6. Debt-equity financing model 
6.6.1. Initial assumptions 
The all-debt financing model was considered as a special case 
of a more general model involving both debt and equity finance. It 
was previously assumed that the firm financed its marginal unit of 
capital entirely by issuing corporate debt. That assumption is now 
relaxed so that the marginal unit of capital can also be financed by 
equity. In contrast -with the all-debt model, the real after-tax rate 
of return on equity will enter the marginality conditions which makes 
it necessary to define e precisely. On the one hand, creditors of the 
firm are guaranteed a fixed nominal rate of return on their holdings 
of the firm's debt. On the other hand, equity holders are the last 
to make a claim on the firm's profits, and this makes the rate of 
return on equity variable.'3 Therefore, in order to compensate 
equity holders for undertaking extra risks associated with uncertain 
rates of return on their investments, the firm must pay a risk 
premium (p) over and above the real after-tax rate of return on its 
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corporate debt so that investors may be induced to hold the firm's 
equity. The real after-tax rate of return on equity is 
now defined as e = (1 - e)R - ir + p. 
In order to keep the present analysis within manageable 
proportions, it will be assumed that the tax system is indifferent 
between real and inflationary components of income so that there is 
only one tax rate applied to both components 
(e.g. = ^ 2 - ^ 1 - 2 - '^)- Furthermore, the present 
model will include depreciation on capital, and the taxation system is 
so designed that full allowance is made for depreciation. 
As before, the nominal after-tax rate of return on equity can 
be decomposed into two parts as follows: 
( e + x ) V ( 0 = (1 - K)V(t) + (1 - e)Div(t) . . . [ 3 8 ] 
where K is the capital-gains tax rate, and e is the effective tax rate 
on dividends. 
Now, equation [38] is recognised as a first-order differential 
equation whose solution is 
V ( t ) = 
( i - e) f - ( e + x) 1 
Div(s) exp (s - t ) ds. . .[39] 
{1 - K ) [ (1 - . ) J 
t 
after imposing the transversality condition. 
6.6.2. The installment function 
In defining dividends, it will be assumed that there are some 
adjustment costs for the firm carrying out its marginal investment 
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project. When the firm adjusts its capital stock, either by instalhng 
new capital, or by not replacing existing capital as it wears out, it 
will incur adjustment costs which can be characterised by, for 
example, managerial time and effort, and disruptions to production 
whilst the capital stock is being adjusted. Hayashi (1982, p.215) has 
shovm that such adjustment costs may be introduced into the 
production process by an 'installment function'. This would be a 
function of K as well as / because the cost of installing / units of 
investment goods is likely to depend on the size of / relative to K. 
Letting H{I,K) be the installment function, H will be an increasing 
and convex function of / so that Hj > 0, and 
H j j > 0. This would reflect the presumption that the cost of 
installment per unit of investment v ^ l be greater, the greater the rate 
of investment for any given K . A corollary of the above proposition 
is that if the capital stock increases relative to the rate of investment, 
then the cost of installment would fall at a declining rate 
(i.e. Hjc < 0, and H^K > 0 ) . 
6.6.3. The firm's optimal behaviour 
The firm arrives at its taxable profits by deducting from gross 
revenue, its installment costs (pH), its wage bill (wN), and its 
interest payments on debt which is assumed to form a proportion b 
of the firm's total capital stock. Thus, the firm's interest payments 
amount to pbKR. The profits are then taxed at the corporate rate 
of T to arrive at after-tax profits.'^ 
In each period, the firm carries out its investment project 
which involves a gross investment expenditure of pi. Gross 
investment is defined as net investment (K) plus depreciation (dK) 
where 5 is the economic rate of depreciation so that 
347 
I = jfC + sK. With the existence of debt finance, it is possible for 
the firm to finance a proportion b of its gross investment from 
corporate debt issues. Thus, the net cost of gross investment would 
be (1 - b ) p l . 
Since the value of corporate debt is fixed in nominal terms, 
equity holders stand to gain from inflation because creditors of the 
firm see the real value of their debt falling. The gain that accrues 
to equity holders is pbKir. Furthermore, in the preceding paragraph 
on investment, it was implicit that the firm only allowed for 
depreciation on a proportion (1 - b) of its total capital stock. It is 
therefore necessary to make further allowances for depreciation on the 
remainder of the capital stock which amounts to pb&K. Then the 
total depreciation on the firm's capital stock is equivalent to psK. 
U D is the term for depreciation allowances under a taxation system 
that makes full allowance for depreciation, then D is equal to p5K. 
Following the practice of Feldstein et al (1978, p.S59) and Summers 
(1983, p.206), it is assumed that the firm uses historic-cost and 
first-in first-out (FIFO) inventory accounting conventions so that 
inflation causes depreciation requirements to be underestimated and 
taxable profits to be overstated respectively. Feldstein et al and 
Summers both use a parameter to denote the effect of inflation on 
the tax system which is denoted here by L so that the firm suffers a 
capital depreciation equivalent to p K { n r ) . The firm's dividends at 
instant s can now be defined as 
Div{s) = [pF{K,lS) - p H ( I , K ) - wP^ - pbKR]{l - T ) 
- (1 - b ) p l + D 
+ pbK(ir - 6) - pKi.ir) . . . [40] 
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This definition of dividends can be compared with those supplied by 
Summers (1981, p.121, equation A - 4 ) and Hayashi (1982, p.215, 
equation 2). In the former case, the main difference is that this 
thesis does not assume that installment costs are proportional to the 
rate of investment. Also, the depreciation allowances system here is 
much simpler than those formulated by Summers and Hayashi. 
Furthermore, the definition of dividends here excludes investment tax 
credits, but includes the effects of inflation on historic cost and F I F O 
inventory accounting conventions. Note also that when all-debt 
financing exists, and when there is no economic depreciation so that 
there is no need for depreciation allowances in the taxation system, 
and when there are zero adjustment costs (i.e. b = 1, 
5 = D = H = 0 ) , t h e definition of dividends becomes the one 
supplied in the all-debt model when T , = T ^ = T . 
Equation [40} can then be substituted into equation [39] to 
give the firm's present value 
V(t) = 
1 -
1 - K 
[[pF(K,]S) - pH(I,K) - wJS - pbKR](l - r) 
- (1 - b)pl + pbK 
+ pbK(Tr - 6) - p K ( f K ) ] fi ds [41] 
where it is to be understood that p, w, K, N, and / are all 
functions of time s, and where 
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r -(e + 0 
Before proceeding to derive the marginality conditions, it is 
necessary to set a constraint on capital accumulation such that it will 
equal net investment, that is 
iC = I - dK. Thus the constrained dynamic optimisation problem 
can be set up by introducing a shadow price, x, for the constraint. 
Then equation [41] becomes: 
L ( 0 = 
(1 - e) 
(1 - K ) 
[ [ p F ( K , N ) - p H ( I , K ) - wN - pbKR](l - r ) 
- (1 - b ) p l + PbK + pbK(ir - 6) - p K ( . i r ) ] 
- \ ( K - I + 5K) fi^ ds [42] 
Among the necessary conditions for an extremum are the following 
Euler equations:' ^ 
dL ( i - 0 
(1 - .) 
dF 
p — - w (1 - r ) 0, 
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aL 
a / 
and 
= M 
U - 0 
(1 - K ) 
- p H J l - r ) - p ( l - b ) + X = 0, 
aL d 
dK ds 
aL 
U - 0 
(1 - K ) 
[pF^ - pHj^ - p b R ] { l - r ) + p5 + pb{ir - 5) 
- X6 - [ x [ ( e + x ) / ( i - K ) ] - X = 0 
The above equations all imply that 
. . . [ 4 3 ] , 
[ H j { l - r ) + {1 - b ) ] = - . . . [ 4 4 ] 
{1 - K ) P 
and 
X = X 
{e + .) 
( i - K ) 
+ 5 
{1 - 0 
(7 - K )  ) J 
. . . [ 4 5 ] 
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Equation [43] is the familiar marginal productivity condition for 
labour which is clearly unaffected by the presence of taxes. 
Summers (1981, p.123) interprets equation [44] as characterising an 
implicitly defined investment function linking investment to the real 
shadow price of capital ( \ / p ) , to the tax parameters, and to the 
cost of adjustment. Equation [45] can be recognised as a first order 
differential equation in x. When this equation is solved for x, x 
can be regarded as the present discounted value of additional future 
after-tax profits that are due to one additional unit of investment. 
This can be quite easily seen if investment leads to an increase in 
the capital stock of the firm which would lead to an increase in Ff^, 
and a decrease in (i-e. increase in Hj^ in absolute terms) 
implying increased profitability. This has already been noted by 
Hayashi (1982, p.217). 
6.6.4. Tobin's q-theory of investment under taxation 
It is not too difficult to relate equations [44] and [45] with 
Tobin's ^-theory of investment. Tobin (1969, p. 19) suggests that the 
rate of investment is an increasing function of the ratio of the market 
value of new additional investment goods to their replacement cost. 
By defining marginal-^ as the real shadow price of capital, that is 
q = \ / p , Hayashi (1982, p.217) has made his interpretation of q 
consistent v^th Tobin's ^-theory of investment because of the 
reasonable presumption that the market value of an asset is 
determined by its net discounted present value of future profits as 
defined by x. It is possible to solve equation [44] for / in terms of 
q and K so that 
/ = I(Q)K . . . [ 4 6 a ] 
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where it is assumed that r(Q) > 0, and that the investment 
function is linearly homogeneous in K, and Q is called the 
'modified-^' which is defined as follows 
Q = 
(1 - K ) 
q - (1 - b) 
U - 0 . . . [ 4 7 ] 
Now, in an all-equity financing model without taxation (i.e. 
b = K = € = 0 ) , equation [46a] becomes 
/ = I(q - 1)K 
Tobin's ^-theory of investment postulates that when the market value 
of new additional investment goods is greater than its replacement 
cost (i.e. X > p, implying q > 1), it will be profitable for the 
firm to invest until x = p. The converse also holds true when 
\ < p. It is only when q = 1 that the firm will not undertake 
any investment at all. Another way of putting Tobin's q-theory of 
investment is to regard investment as a function of the difference 
between the real shadow price of the marginal unit of capital and its 
replacement cost. When the firm finances its marginal unit of capital 
entirely by issues of equity in the absence of taxation, Q = q - 1 
because the cost of the marginal unit of capital to the firm is simply 
the cost of obtaining funds by equity issues. The firm v^ dll not 
undertake any investment when the real shadow price of capital 
equals the cost of capital, that is when Q = 0 . 
Equation [47] shows the modified-^ when the firm finances 
its marginal unit of capital both by debt and equity issues in the 
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presence of taxation. In the discussion leading up to the definition 
of the firm's dividends in equation [40], it was argued that the 
existence of debt finance reduced the cost of capital to the firm. In 
contrast with the case of all-equity finance without taxes, the firm 
would have to increase its rate of investment until the real shadow 
price of capital equals its cost, that is 
( i - 0 
q = {1 - b) . . . [ 4 8 ] 
{1 - K ) 
However, there is a small difficulty here. If, as Summers 
(1981, p.84, equation 11) suggests, the firm equates the real shadow 
price of capital to its cost (i.e. Q = 0 ) , then the rate of 
investment would be equal to zero. ^ ^ But do consider the 
shadow price constraint, k = I - bK. This would imply that 
there would be a decumulation of the capital stock equal to bK, and 
if, in the long-run steady-state, the standard assumption of a 
constant capital stock is made, then it would require a gross rate of 
investment of bK per unit time to keep the capital stock intact. In 
order to make this model consistent with that of Feldstein (1976) 
which assumes that the labour force grows exogenously at an 
exponential rate of n per unit time, it is necessary to make some 
modifications. Near the beginning of Section 6.3., an important 
distinction was made between the short- and long-run with regard to 
the firm's capital stock. Due to putty-clay capital in the short-run, 
the real shadow price of capital will deviate from the cost of capital. 
Consider what happens if the labour force grows exogenously at an 
exponential rate of n per unit time whilst the firm does not carry 
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out any gross investment at all. The capital stock v^ll decline 
relative to the labour force so that the capital-labour rafio falls. 
Since it is being assumed that the marginal product of capital varies 
directly with employment, and inversely with the capital stock (see 
equation [2] in Section 6.2.), the marginal product of capital will 
rise whilst installment costs decline. This leads to an increase in x 
so that Q > 0. The firm now has no option but to increase its 
rate of investment until it reaches the point when the rate of 
investment equals the natural rate of growth in the capital stock plus 
the rate of depreciation. Therefore, the long-run steady state 
equilibrium condition for investment is 
/ = (n + 8)K = 7(0) K . . . [49] 
when Q = 0 , and equation [46] is the firm's investment function in 
the short-run. Such an equilibrium condition will now guarantee 
that the capital-labour ratio remains constant in the steady-state. A 
corollary of this observation is that in the long-run steady state, Q 
must remain equal to zero throughout time. Making use of the fact 
that Q = 0, it is possible to derive the firm's demand for capital 
which takes account of both debt and equity finance, and of 
taxation. Now differentiation of equation [47] with respect to time 
gives 
r ( i - K ) . 
Q = [ (1 - e ) 
(1 - r ) 
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implying that, when Q = 0, q = 0 . But since q = \/p, it can 
be noted that 
(J = 
\ 
P 
Substitution for i / p (from equation [45]) into the preceding 
expression gives 
q = q 
(e + O 
(i - K) + 6 -
(i - 0 
(i - K) [ F ^ - - bR]{l - T) + 5 + biir - 5 ) - tir 
after noting that p/p = T in the long-run steady-state. The 
preceding expression can then be solved to obtain another investment 
equation so that there is a set of two simultaneous investment 
equations in [46a] and [46b]. 
/ = / 
(1 - x) 
(1 - e) 
q -
(1 - e) 
q [(e + TT) - ( i - K ) ( i r - 5 ) 
^ 1 
+ ( ( F ^ - bR){l - r ) + 5 + - 5 ) + t x ] ^ • K 
[46b] 
where it is assumed that equation [46b] is also linearly homogeneous 
in X . In the long run steady state, q = 0 , and the expression 
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within the outer brackets should equal zero. This implies that, after 
some re-arrangement, the expression within the outer brackets 
becomes 
(i - e ) [ ( F ^ - bR)(l - r ) + 6 + Z)(x - 6 ) -
Q = 
{e + .) - {1 - K ) ( X - 5 ) 
. . . [ 5 0 ] 
The two conditions for q set out in equations [48] and [50] will 
both guarantee that investment in equations [46a] and [46b] will 
equal the steady-state growth in the capital stock of (n + 5)K. 
6.6.5. The firm's demand for capital in a debt-equity model 
The final step is to derive an expression linking the marginal 
product of capital with the real interest rate and the rate of inflation. 
As explained previously, the firm will be carrying out the optimal 
rate of investment when the real shadow price of capital equals its 
cost which requires that equation [48] must hold. Therefore 
substitution for q from equation [48] into equation [50], and 
re-arrangement gives the firm's demand for capital when the marginal 
unit of capital can be financed both by debt and equity, and when 
there is economic depreciation of which full provision is made for in 
the taxation system: (continued on next page) 
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f U - b)il - e ) ^ 
Fj. = + b r 
f (7 - b)il - e ) J 
+ b - r i T (1 - 0 
I ( i - K)(i - r ) - ^ ) 
f (1 - b) ^ 
(1 - K)(i - r ) 
. . . [ 5 1 ] 
It is clear that when all-debt financing is assumed {b = 1), and 
when there are no effects of inflation on historic cost accounting 
conventions ( i = 0) , equation [51] reduces to equation [13] 
showing the firm's demand for capital when T , = T ^ = T . The 
reason for the existence of the first term within the curly brackets in 
the firm's demand for capital is that the firm finances its marginal 
unit of capital not only by debt, but by equity issues as well. In 
doing so, the firm has to take account of the tax rates on capital 
gains and dividends. For simplicity, it will be assumed that the 
debt-equity ratio, b, is exogenously determined. ^ ^ The effect of 
having introduced equity finance into this model is to reduce the 
firm's demand for capital because the firm now has to strive for a 
higher marginal product of capital before equation [51] can hold. 
For convenience, equation [51] is re-arranged so that 
= aFj^ - - P . . . [52] 
where 
a = [(1 - K)(1 - r ) ]/[ (1 - b){l - e ) + b{l - K)(7 - r ) ] , 
V = 1 - [(1 - - . ) ] / [ { ! - b){l - e ) + b { l - K ) { l - r ) ], 
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and 
p = [(1 - b)/il - b)(l - e ) + b(l - K)(1 - T)]P, and it is 
assumed that dP = 0 . 
Before the revised monetary growth model assuming 
debt-equity finance can be set out, it is necessary to make a few 
minor modifications to reflect changes in the assumptions made 
regarding taxation and depreciation. Since depreciation charges on 
the capital stock reduce disposable income by sK, equation [ V I I ] in 
Table 6.3. is modified accordingly. The definitions of the after-tax 
rates of interest are also modified to reflect the assumption that the 
taxation system is indifferent between real and inflationary components 
of income. The revised model is summarised in Table 6.5 with the 
addition of an investment equation. 
6.7. Effects of inflation (2) 
6.7.1. Effect on gross interest rates 
The model set out in Table 6.5. can now be examined by 
taking the total differentials of all equations which are then presented 
in Table 6.6. As before, equation [xiii] of Table 6.6. shows that 
dR dr 
— = — + 1 
dv dir 
But from equation [i i] , 
dr 
dir KK 
dK 
dir 
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TABLE 6.5: Revised neoclassical monetary growth model with 
debt-equi ty financing. 
[ I ] = w/p 
[ I I ] r = aF]^ - VTT - P 
[ I I I ] Y = F{K,IS) 
[ I V ] M/p = L{Rn,Y) 
[ V ] C = CiYD^m) 
[ V I ] I = (n + 8)K 
[ V I I ] Y = C + I + G 
vher e 
[ V I I I ] YD = Y - G + n(M/p) - 5K 
[ I X ] N = N 
[ X ] G = G 
[ X I ] m = (1 - e)r -
[ X I I ] Rn = (1 - e){r + .) 
F i n a l l y the nominal interest rate is defined as 
[ XI11 ] R = r + T 
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TABLE 6.6: Total differentials of all equations in 
Table 6.5. 
[ i 
[ i i 
[ i i i 
[ i v 
[ V 
[ v i 
[ v i i 
vher e 
[ v i i i 
[ i x 
[ x i 
[ x i i 
Fj^l^dK + Fyv/v^/V = {dw/p) - { w / p ) ( d p / p ) 
dr = a(FKKdK + Fj^dN) - vdit 
dY = FjidK + Ff^dN 
(dM/p) - {M/p)(dp/p) = LRdRn + LydY 
dC = C.dYD + C.drn 
dl = (n + b)dK 
dY = dC + dl + dG 
dYD = dY - dG + n[{dM/p) - {M/p)(dp/p) ] - sdK 
dlS = dN 
dG = dG 
dr^i = (1 - e)dr - edir 
dRn = (1 - e){dr + d x ) 
and f i n a l l y , 
[ x i i i ] dR = dr -^^ dir 
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after assuming that dN/dir = 0 . Thus, 
dR 
diT 
dK 
dir J 
(1 - ") . . . [ 5 3 ] 
It can be seen that the term 2 - is unambiguously positive, and 
that the sign of dRId-w depends on the sign of dK/dir as before. By 
neglecting real balance effects, it can be shown that 
dK -C r ( i - e ) . + e ] 
(1 - C^)Fj^ - C^{1 - e ) a F j ^ - (n + 5) + C^5 
By assuming that consumption is interest inelastic, dK/dw equals zero 
so that dR/dir = 1 - v or 
dR ( i - K ) ( i - 0 
— = . . . [ 5 4 ] 
dir (1 - b)(l - e ) + b{l - K)(7 - r ) 
This equation is different from that derived by Summers (1983, 
p.208, equation 4) because it makes explicit allowance for the 
debt-equity ratio, and capital gains taxes whereas Summers assumes 
that these parameters are subsumed within his definition of tax 
parameters. 1 8 it is therefore possible (and more enlightening) to 
analyse the effects of a change in the debt-equity ratio on dRidir. 
Consider the case in which the firm finances its marginal unit of 
capital by debt only. Then dRIdir = {1 - t ) / ( l - T ) . This 
shows that when inflation starts to have a detrimental effect on 
historic cost and FIFO inventory accounting conventions, the nominal 
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interest rate will rise by less than one-and-half times the rate of 
inflation given that the current corporation tax rate is 35 per cent. 
6.7.2. A comparison with the all-debt model 
In order to examine the effect of introducing equity finance 
on the inflation-interest rate relationship, it is necessary to 
differentiate equation [54] with respect to b. This gives 
d'R ^ -U - - 0 [ ( i - ' < ) ( i - r) - {1 - e ) ] 
d^db {{1 - e ) + b[il - K){1 - T) - {1 - e ) ] ] 
The denominator of the above expression is unambiguously positive, 
and the sign of d^R/dirdb depends on the term in square brackets in 
the nummerator. Given that the current British tax parameters are 
e = 0.29, T = 0.35, and K = 0.3, it follows that the 
nummerator is positive so that d^R/dirdb > 0. Thus, under the 
current tax laws, the introduction of equity finance into the model 
decreases dR/dir. The nominal interest rate will now have to rise by 
less for each point rise in the inflation rate than in the case of 
all-debt finance. Such a prediction is consistent with those 
comments made by Patterson and Ryding (1984, p.302) regarding the 
introduction of equity finance and personal capital gains taxes. 
So far, this thesis has shown that in the long-run 
steady-state, a definite relationship between the inflation rate and the 
nominal interest rate can exist. But, now an important quesfion 
needs to be asked: can the inflation- interest rate relationship hold in 
the short-run? This will have important implications for empirical 
research because if it is shown that no definite relationship exists at 
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all, then any empirical research on the relationship between 
short-term interest rates and inflation rates is unlikely to be fruitful. 
This question is the subject of the following section. 
6.8. The short-run versus the long-run 
The main essential difference between the long-run 
steady-state and the short-run is that the economy is allowed to 
deviate from its long-run equilibrium path in the short-run. So, the 
long-run equilibrium conditions stated in this model may not hold, 
and it is therefore necessary to introduce some modifications. 
First, consider the labour market. It will be assumed that 
wages foflow a time path described by the following equation 
w(s) = w exp ir(s - t ) 
so that the rate of growth in wages is equal to the actual rate of 
inflation (p/p) which equals the anticipated rate of inflation ( i r ) in 
the long-run, that is 
w 
- = ir . . . [ 5 5 ] 
The firms' demand for labour is a function of the real wage rate, 
and it is assumed that the labour supply is exogenously determined 
so that the labour market is described by the following two 
equations: 
N = F~^(w/p) and / V ^ = / V 
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A necessary condition for long-run equilibrium in the labour market 
is that the firms must be able to meet all their labour requirements 
at the going real wage rate, and that households supply all the 
labour they v^ dsh. When the labour market is in equilibrium, there 
is neither excess demand or supply so that 
By introducing the Keynesian assumption that prices and wages are 
inflexible in the short run, it can be postulated that the labour 
market will not be in equilibrium during the short-run so that ?^  
A^ *^ . Thus, the rate of growth in money wages will be determined 
by the expected rate of inflation and also by the ratio of excess 
demand to labour supply in the labour market 
w 
= p 
w 
A 
[56] 
which can be recognised as the short-run Phillips relation as included 
in Summers' model (1983, p.204, equation l i ) . Clearly, when the 
labour market is in equilibrium, equation [56] reduces to equation 
[55]. 
Secondly, a further distinction is made between the short-run 
and the long-run in the context of inflationary expectations. As 
before, it will be assumed that in the long-run steady-state, the 
expected rate of inflation equals the actual rate of inflation so that 
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P 
P 
Summers (1983, p.205) postulates that inflationary expectations are 
formed adaptively. In this monetary growth model, it is assumed 
that expectations are formed of the rate of change in the inflation 
rate so that 
h 
P 
P 
. . . [ 5 7 ] 
where h" > 0. In contrast with Summers' own formulation, the 
preceding expression states that the expected rate of change in the 
inflation rate is an increasing function of the difference between the 
actual rate and expected rate of inflation. Such a formulation will 
permit the existence of a steady rate of inflation to be expected in 
the long-run which is assumed to equal the excess rate of growth in 
the money supply over the natural rate of growth. 
Thirdly, the investment equation set out in equation (VI) of 
Table 6.5. wiH not hold since Q will not be equal to zero. 
Therefore, the short-run investment equation, given in equation [46a] 
is introduced into the model. In order to analyse the model in the 
short-run, it is necessary to know the signs of the partial derivatives 
of Q. The signs of the partial derivatives of Q can be determined 
by taking the total differential of Q, and setting the relevant 
differentials equal to zero. From equations [47] and [50], it can be 
shovm that 
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[ ( i - r)dQ].[(l - e ) R + p - (1 - K ) ( X - 5 ) ] 
+ [(1 - r)Q + (1 - b) ] • [ ( i - e ) d R - (1 - K)d^ ] 
= {1 - K) [ {Fj^dlS + Fj^dK - bdR){l - r ) + (Z) - 0^ ^^  } 
where it is being assumed that db = dp = 0, and that the 
debt-equity ratio is invariant during the short-run. Setting dK = 
dR = dir = 0, the partial derivative of Q with respect to A^  is 
a(2 " "^^KN 
dlS (1 - e ) R + p - (1 - K ) ( X - 5 ) 
ff the sign of Q]\i is to be determinate, it is necessary to make some 
assumptions regarding the parameters in the above partial differential. 
Consider the denominator first: it can be seen that the sign depends 
on the last term of the denominator. For the denominator to be 
unambiguously positive, it is required that the rate of inflation be 
less than the economic rate of depreciation. With such an 
assumption, it is clear that Qjsj > 0. By similar reasoning, it can 
also be shown that < 0. These conclusions can be justified 
when it was explained previously that if the capital stock declined 
relative to the labour supply, Q would increase. This is the reason 
why the long-run equilibrium condition for investment was formulated 
in equation [49]. The signs of the partial derivatives of Q with 
respect to the nominal rate of interest and the rate of inflation are 
much more difficult to determine because it aU depends on the sign 
of q. Considering Qj^ first, it can be shown that 
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_ -{(1 - e ) [ ( l - r)Q + (1 - b) ] + b(l - r ) ( l - K)} 
dR ( i - T ) [ { 1 - e ) R + p - (1 - K)(ir - 5) ] 
But from equation [47], (1 - T)Q + (1 - b) = 
[(1 - K)/(1 - e) ]q, and it follows that Qj^ depends on the sign 
of ^ . ff the capital stock decUnes relative to the labour force, the 
term within the curly brackets in the nummerator will be 
unambiguously positive because q is positive. Thus Qji < 0. 
However, if the capital stock increases relative to the labour supply, 
Q will become negative since the real shadow price of capital will 
now be less than the cost of capital. It is still possible that Qj^ will 
remain negative if the firm carrying out its investment plans is 
rational in the sense that it will not undertake any more investment 
if the nominal shadow price becomes negative. This can be quite 
easily seen if equation [45] is considered again: a firm with a 
disproportionately large capital stock can expect a negative marginal 
product of capital so that it becomes possible that the solution to the 
differential equation will become negative (i.e. x < 0). Thus, as 
long as the shadow price of capital remains positive, it will be 
certain that Qj^ < 0. So, if the nominal interest rate rises, Q will 
decline and thus reduce investment. Such observations are consistent 
with the Keynesian theory of investment. 
It can be shown that the partial derivative of Q with respect 
to the rate of inflation is 
_ ( i - K ) ( [ ( i - r)Q + (1 - b)] + jb - 0) 
dir {1 - T ) { { 1 - e ) R + P - (1 - K)iir - 5 ) ] 
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It can be seen that the sign of the nummerator, and therefore the 
sign of Q^, depends on the last term in the nummerator. Recall 
that the term i stands for the effect of inflation on historic cost 
accounting and FIFO inventory accounting conventions. Feldstein et 
al (1978, P.S68-S69) have given a 'conservative' estimate of the value 
of t as being around 0.2. On that basis, with a relatively high 
debt-equity ratio, the nummerator will be positive so that > 0. 
However, the conclusions are less clear-cut for the case when a 
relatively low debt-equity ratio is assumed so that the nummerator is 
of ambiguous sign. To overcome this difficulty, it will be assumed 
that b > t. Thus, if the inflation rate rises, Q will rise. This is 
not too difficult to see if, ceteris paribus, the inflation rate reduces 
the real interest rate so that investment becomes more worthwhile. 
It win be convenient to vmte the modified-^ in a more 
general form so that 
J Q = Q(K,N,R,r) . . . [ 5 8 
where > 0, QK < 0, QR < 0, and > 0. 
Finally, some stochastic terms are included in the aggregate 
production function, the consumption function, and the liquidity 
preference function (or LM locus). The purpose of these stochastic 
terms is to denote random exogenous shocks to the economy that 
might cause it to deviate from its long-run equilibrium path. Thus, 
letting £ denote the stochastic terms, the relevant equafions are 
modified such that 
Y = F(K,N)[1 + ] . . . [ 5 9 ] 
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C = C ( y ^ r ^ ) + . . . [ 6 0 ] 
M/p + = L{R^>^) . . . [ 6 1 ] 
Gathering all equations, the short-run model which is almost identical 
to that of Summers (1983) is summarised in Table 6.7. 
It has been argued by Summers (1983, pp .206-207) that in 
the short-run, there can be no definite relationship between the rate 
of inflation and the nominal interest rate. His argument rests on two 
examples of exogenous shocks to the economy that might occur in 
the short-run. The first example given is an exogenous demand 
shock brought about by an exogenous change in government 
expenditure, or by the stochastic term £ 3 which could be regarded as 
an exogenous change in consumption habits. The immediate effects 
of such shocks can be analysed by substituting the differential 
equations [vi] and [vii] into equation [viii] of Table 6.8.^9, after 
noting that from equation [ii] 
dN = 
dY - F^dK{l + £^) - Fds^ 
(continued...) 
370 
TABLE 6. 7: Short-run monetary growth model 
[ I 
[ I I 
[ I I I 
[ I V 
[V 
[ V I 
[ V I I 
[ V I I I 
vher e 
[ I X 
[X 
[XI 
[ X I I 
[ X I I I 
[XIV 
P]S = ^Ip 
y = F{K,N)[1 + ] 
N 
+ 
M/p + = L{R^,Y) 
C = 
h 
P 
P 
/ = I{Q).K 
y = C + 7 + G 
y^ = y - G + n{M/p) - 5K 
G = G 
Q = Q{N,K,R,ir) 
= (1 - e ) R 
R^ = (1 - e ) R 
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TABLE 6 .8 : Total d i f f e r e n t i a l s of equations in Table 6.7. 
[ i ] Fj^^dK + Fj^j^dN = (dw/p) - i w / p ) { d p / p ) 
[ i i ] dY = [Fj^dK + F^dN][l + e^] + Fdz^ 
[ i i i ] diw/w) = v^(dN/N^) + dn 
[ i v ] (dM/p) - ( M / p ) { d p / p ) + de^ = Lj^dR^ + LydY 
[ v ] d(7r/7r) = hrd{p/p) - hrdi: 
[ v i ] = C f i y ^ + C d r „ + d£ 
[ v i i ] dl = I-KdQ + IdK 
[ v i i i ] dY = dC + dl dG 
vher e 
[ i x ] = - + nd{M/p) - bdK 
[ x ] d!^ = dN 
[ x i ] dG = dG 
[ x i i ] dQ = Q^dN + Q^dK + Q^dR + j ? / ^ 
[ x i i i ] dr^ = {1 - e)dR - dz 
it 
[ x i v ] = - 0^^^ 
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so that the total differential of the IS locus is as follows 
rKQ 
1 - - nC^Ly 
I S 
dY = 
(1 - C^)dG + [rKQ^ - rKQ^F - C 8 + I ]dK 
+ [ ( 7 - e){nC^Lj^ + C^) + rKQj^]dR 
. . . [ 6 2 ] 
and, f rom equation [ iv] of Table 6.8., the total differential of the 
L M locus is 
d(M/p) + de^ = L ^ ( i - e)dR + LydY . . . [ 6 3 ] 
Taking the partial derivatives of output with respect to G and e^, 
the follovidng expressions show that 
ay ~ ay 1 
— = and — = -
aG y ae^ y 
where y is the coefficient to dY in equation [62]. It was argued 
towards the end of Section 6.5., when criticising the model of 
Feldstein (1976), that the expression comprising the first three terms 
i n y was unlikely to be negative, and that i f the income elasticity of 
the demand for money was equal to unity, the term n C , L y was 
likely to become negligible so that the first three terms in y wi l l 
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closely approximate the marginal propensity to save out of disposable 
income. It can be shown that the last term in y is equivalent to 
the marginal propensity to invest out of national income: 
a/ a/ dQ a/V ^ ' ^ ^ / V 
ay a(2 a/V ay F ^ ( i + 
1 
So, y w i l l be positive as long as the marginal propensity to save out 
of disposable income (approximately) exceeds the marginal propensity 
to invest out of national income. Thus, on the basis of this 
assumption, either an increase i n government expenditure or an 
exogenous shock w i l l raise output as reflected i n a rightward shift of 
the IS locus. Considering the effect on nominal interest rates, it can 
be shovm that the partial derivatives of R with respect to G and e 3 
are both positive, so that an increase i n G or £ 3 wi l l cause nominal 
interest rates to rise. 
The effect of an increase in output on prices can be 
determined by substituting dN into equation [ i ] of Table 6.8. Thus, 
the partial derivative of the price level with respect to output is 
dp ~P'^NN 
ay wFj^il + e , ) 
which is of positive sign. Thus, a rise in output w i l l lead to rising 
prices. The rise i n prices reduces real money balances which pushes 
up nominal interest rates even further. This continues until output is 
restored to its former rate. However, rising prices cause individuals 
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to expect that the inflation rate wi l l begin to rise so that money 
wages w i l l tend to rise faster than the actual rise in prices. This 
leads to an increase i n the real wage rate which reduces the demand 
for labour by firms. The decline in employment causes output to 
decline. As prices decline, real money balances wi l l rise, leading to 
a fa l l in interest rates. On the whole, an exogenous demand shock 
leads to an eventual decline in output, prices and nominal interest 
rates. Notice especially that there is positive correlation between the 
inflation rate and nominal interest rates i n this example. 
Summers then considers a second example in which there is a 
liquidity shock as reflected by an exogenous increase i n real money 
balances or i n the stochastic variable e.^. As can be verified from 
the total differential of the L M locus shown in equation [63], the 
init ial effect of an increase in real money balances is to reduce 
nominal interest rates as prices start to rise. Rising prices reduce 
real money balances so that nominal interest rates start to rise as the 
inflat ion rate begins to f a l l . The economy w i l l ultimately converge 
on to a new equilibrium at the former level of output and nominal 
interest rates, wi th higher prices. In such an example, i t is 
interesting to note that a negative Fisher effect could be observed. 
Thus, Summers concludes his discussion of the above two 
examples i n the following words: 
'As a first approximation, demand shocks wi l l tend to lead 
to a positive relation between [nominal] interest rates and 
inflation while liquidity shocks lead to negative covariation. 
This suggests that there is little reason to expect any stable 
relation between short-term movements i n interest rates 
and inflat ion. ' (1983, p.207) 
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The main implication of such a conclusion is that it wi l l be 
particularly diff icult to analyse the short-run relationship between 
nominal interest rates and inflation owing to the variety of shocks 
that impinge on the economy. One possible strategy suggested by 
Summers (1983, p.215) is to analyse long-run relationships by 
'filtering out' high frequency short-run variations i n the variables by 
using band spectral regression techniques. 
6.9. Conclusions 
This chapter has been largely devoted to a theoretical 
examination of the Fisher hypothesis which, when originally 
formulated, predicted that nominal interest rates would rise (fall) in 
tandem with the inflation rate. However, it was shown that such a 
relationship would not hold i n the presence of taxes. In a model, 
i n which the firm was assumed to finance its marginal unit of capital 
entirely by debt, i t was shown that i n a taxation system which was 
indifferent between real and inflationary components of income, the 
nominal interest rate would have to rise by about one-and-half times 
the rate of inflat ion, given current tax laws. By introducing equity 
finance, it was shown that, for a one point rise i n the inflation rate, 
the nominal interest rate would have to rise by less than in the case 
of all-debt financing. Such relationships between interest rates and 
inflat ion may exist i n the long-run steady state, but not in the 
short-run as shown by Summers (1983). The implication for future 
empirical research on the Fisher hypothesis is that any attempt to 
analyse the short-run movements between nominal interest rates and 
inflat ion may not prove to be f ru i t f u l . Furthermore, the strategy 
suggested by Summers can be carried over i n order to formulate a 
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dynamic steady-state demand for money which took explicit account 
long-run information otherwise ignored in the short-run. Once 
having derived the dynamic steady-state demand for money, it is of 
interest to examine the effect of the Fisher hypothesis on the demand 
for money by including first order grov^h variables in prices and 
income as well as the standard variables. The purpose of the next 
chapter is to show that the steady-state demand for money may turn 
out to be inherently unstable because of frequent changes in tax 
regimes which are parameterised i n the refined Fisher hypothesis, and 
to consider the claim made by Hendry and Mizon (1978) that such a 
dynamic model 'appears to be ful ly consistent with standard economic 
theory statements of the demand for money function. ' (p.562) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
T H E REFINED FISHER HYPOTHESIS 
A N D T H E S T E A D Y - S T A T E D E M A N D FOR M O N E Y 
In a paper on long-run features of dynamic time series 
models, Currie (1981) drew attention to the importance of assessing 
the dynamic long-run properties of estimated equations. Using a 
number of empirical examples, which included the demand for 
money, he showed that the equilibrium value of the dependent 
variable was sensitive to the rates of growth i n the explanatory 
variables, and the magnitude and speed with which these effects were 
transmitted may be such to be of concern when using the equations 
for short- and medium term forecasting. With this in mind, 
Patterson and Ryding (1982) developed a statistical framework in 
which to test the null hypothesis that kth order growth coefficients 
were not significantly different f rom zero. In applying i t to the 
reduced form of the dynamic steady-state demand for money, 
Patterson and Ryding (1984) gave some indication as to possible 
values of the rate of change in the nominal interest rate with respect 
to the inflation rate i n which the hypothesis that the reduced form 
dynamic multiplier on prices is not significantly different f rom zero 
may be rejected. On a theoretical note, Currie (1981) also expressed 
some doubts about whether or not the parameters of the dynamic 
steady-state demand for money have economically sensible values. 
This chapter seeks to address two issues. The first one 
concerns the absence of the rate of change i n the nominal interest 
rate f rom the structural form of the dynamic steady-state demand for 
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money. Whilst Hendry and Mizon (1978) and Currie (1981) assume 
that such a variable is equal to zero, Patterson and Ryding (1984) 
offer an explicit rationale for its absence f rom the structural form of 
the dynamic steady-state demand for money. They believe that the 
Fisher hypothesis has been implicitly used i n making the rate of 
change i n the nominal interest rate term redundant. Thus Section 
7.1 considers the derivation of the dynamic steady-state demand for 
money, and then Section 7.2 demonstrates two uses of the Fisher 
hypothesis. Firstly, the second-order growth rate in prices is related 
to the rate of change in the nominal interest rate, and by explicitly 
incorporating the Fisher hypothesis i n its second order steady state 
f o r m , the structural form of the steady-state demand for money is 
obtained i n which the rate of change in the nominal interest rate is 
absent. Secondly, making use of the fact that the original Fisher 
hypothesis is a first-order steady-state relationship between the rate of 
change in the price level and the nominal rate of interest, the Fisher 
hypothesis is again explicitly incorporated to obtain the reduced form 
of the steady-state demand for money in which the nominal rate of 
interest itself is absent. Then Section 7.3 considers the properties of 
the reduced form dynamic multiplier in prices, and then goes on to 
consider the empirical evidence presented i n the above-cited studies. 
Currie (1981) has suggested that the structural form of the dynamic 
multipliers are not significantly different f rom zero, and therefore 
argues that these can be constrained to zero i n the estimation 
process. However, Patterson and Ryding (1982) show that the 
imposition of such constraints can lead to pervasive results. Thus, in 
both papers, Patterson and Ryding (1982, 1984) show that the 
dynamic multipliers are significantly different f rom zero. In the latter 
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paper, whilst testing the hypothesis that the reduced form dynamic 
multiplier i n prices is not significantly different f rom zero, Patterson 
and Ryding give some indication as to possible values of the rate of 
change in the nominal interest rate with respect to inflation. The 
third section concludes with the proposition that, on the basis of the 
evidence, the reduced-form dynamic steady-state demand for money 
function may be inherently unstable due to frequent changes in tax 
regimes. 
In Section 7.4., the second issue of this chapter is addressed. 
A l l the above-cited studies do not seem to offer any satisfactory a 
priori explanations for the possible magnitudes i n the rate of growth 
variables, and their effect on the dynamic steady-state demand for 
money. Thus, the empirical evidence is also considered in its second 
perspective, that is, with a view to developing a dynamic version of 
the theory of the demand for money. It is noted here with 
particular concern that attempts are being made to construct a theory 
of the dynamic steady-state demand for money on an ad hoc basis, 
whereas the correct approach would be to develop a theory on an a 
priori basis, and then to test such a theory emprically. It is 
concluded that the lack of consensus i n the results regarding the 
magnitudes of the rate of growth explanatory variables should be 
investigated further, and the a priori determination of such 
magnitudes is worthy of future theoretical research. 
7 .1 . The dynamic steady-state demand for money 
In deriving the dynamic steady-state properties of the demand 
for money, Currie (1981, p.705) bases his analysis on a conventional 
autoregressive distributed lag of the form:i 
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M= a + I 
' ° 7=0 
where all variables, except the nominal interest rate, are ente'rfed 
logarithms, ; is the number of periods lagged, and the a's and 7's 
are all constants. The nominal interest rate, R, may either be 
entered without any transformation, or as the logarithm of the level 
plus one. M stands for a definition of money, p stands for the 
price level, and y stands either for income or expenditure. Implicit 
i n the model above, there is an assumption of uniform lag lengths in 
all variables, and such an assumption can be relaxed, as Patterson 
and Ryding (1984, p.21) have already done, by rewriting equation [1] 
so as to allow for different lag lengths i n each variable: 
= a + y ex .p^ . + y a „y, „ 
t 0 7 = 0 ' J ^ ' l n = 0 2 n - ^ f - n 
K L 
+ ^ ""sk^t-k ^ ^ ^ A - ^ • • • [ 2 ] 
Consider now the static steady-state demand for money function; in 
such a state, i t is assumed that all exogenous variables remain 
constant over t ime, that is, for example, pi = p^-j for all t and j. 
Thus, equation [2] reduces to a conventional specification of the 
demand for money: 
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where, for example, /3, = Joi^jl{l - J : Y S I ) -
In order to examine the dynamic steady-state properties of 
the demand for money, it is necessary to crystallise the concept of 
what is meant by kih. order growth rates. When a steady-state is 
said to be of order k, it means that an exogenous variable, say Xi, 
is growing i n such a way that the feth order rate of growth of Xt is 
non-zero and constant over time, while all growth rates of order 
greater than k are zero. That is, AJX^ = 0 for all 7 ) + 7 in 
which case the steady-state is said to be of order k. Therefore, the 
static steady-state refers to the case when k = 0 , and the 
dynamic steady-state to the case when k = 1. The static 
steady-state model of the demand for money can be generalised to a 
dynamic steady-state model by assuming that the first order rates of 
growth i n all exogenous variables remain constant throughout time. 
Currie (1981, p.705, equation (3)) has shown that the first order 
rate of growth i n the dependent variable is related to the first order 
rates of growth i n the explanatory variables as follows: 
. . . [ 4 ] 
where TTp, wy, T / J , and Trj\^ refer to the first order rates of growth 
i n prices, real income, nominal interest rates, and the money supply 
respectively. Now, it can be shown that x^-j = xi - jwx so that, 
for example, p ^ - j = pi; - j-irp, and M ^ - ^ = - H T ^ M - ^^ s^t 
step is to substitute these expressions into equation [2] which then 
reduces to 
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M 
I 7 « 2AZ 
- 1 Jo) U - 1 Jo) 
1 ^Jc 
U - 1 Jo) 
It should be noted that it is not strictly correct to assume that is 
independent of the rates of growth in the explanatory variables owing 
to the existence of a relationship between and the rates of 
growth i n the explanatory variables as shown in equation [4 ] . Thus, 
i n the second step, Currie (1981, p.709, footnote 1) has argued that 
the term becomes redundant when equation [4] is substituted into 
the preceding expression to obtain the dynamic steady-state demand 
for money function: 
= ^ + ^.Pt + ^.yt + P.^t 
1 P 2 y 
. . . [ 5 ] 
where the /3's are the coefficients of the level of the explanatory 
variables which have already been defined i n equation [ 3 ] , and where 
the rp's are the coefficients of the rate of grov^h in the explanatory 
variables, where, for example,^ 
0 - 1 Jo) U - 1 yoV 
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Such coefficients are termed as the structural form of the dynamic 
multiplier i n the explanatory variable. 
It is particularly interesting to note that the term describing 
the rate of change in nominal interest rates is included in the above 
formulation of the dynamic steady-state demand for money whereas 
Hendry and Mizon (1978, p.561, equation (22)) and Currie (1981, 
pp.709-712, equations (9), (11), and (12)) assume that such a term is 
equal to zero, and there apparently seems to be no explanation 
offered by the above-mentioned researchers for its absence. It does 
seem surprising that Currie (1981, p.709, footnote 1) offered an 
explanation on why the term representing the rate of growth in the 
money supply was absent f rom his formulation of the dynamic 
steady-state demand for money, and yet did not make i t clear why 
the term was absent. Patterson and Ryding (1984) have given an 
explanation for the absence of the rate of change in the interest rate, 
and the reason that they give is similar to that given by Currie for 
the absence of the ir][f term; namely that the rates of change in the 
explanatory variables are still not independent because there exists a 
second-order steady-state relationship which is the 'Fisher relation'. 
Thus, the next section explicitly considers the effect of such a 
relationship on the dynamic steady-state demand for money. 
7.2, Incorporation of the Fisher hypothesis 
Patterson and Ryding (1984, p.301) have made a useful 
distinction between the reduced form of a model i n its conventional 
sense, and the steady-state reduced fo rm. Consider a model 
consisting of a system of equations as follows: 
By = r x • • • [ 6] 
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where y is the column vector consisting of jointly dependent 
variables, x is the column vector consisting of predetermined 
variables, and the matrices B and r are the coefficient matrices. [6] 
refers to the structural form of the model, and the reduced form 
may be obtained by pre-multiplying both sides of [6] by the inverse 
of B to obtain 
y = B ^rx • • • [ 7 ] 
The reduced form of the model expresses the jointly dependent 
variables i n terms of predetermined variables only. Patterson and 
Ryding (1984) suggest that it may be necessary to treat the nominal 
interest rate as predetermined because of the difficulty of modelling 
short-run relationships. In the context of the Fisher hypothesis, i t 
was shown i n Section 6.8 that a definite relationship between 
inflation and interest rates may not exist i n the short-run because of 
the variety of shocks impinging on the economy. In particular, it 
was shown by Summers (1983) that, as a first approximation, demand 
shocks led to a positive relationship between inflation and interest 
rates whereas a liquidity shock led to negative covariance. However, 
i n the long-run steady state, as Chapter 6 of this thesis has already 
shown, a definite relationship between inflation and interest rates can 
exist i f real balance effects are neglected. Therefore Patterson and 
Ryding argue that, i n the long-run steady-state, i t is no longer 
legitimate to treat the nominal interest rate as predetermined, that is, 
i t becomes necessary to treat it as a jointly dependent variable. 
Hence, Patterson and Ryding make the distinction between the 
reduced form in its conventional sense and the steady-state reduced 
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f o r m . 
Consider, then, the relationship between inflation and the 
nominal interest rate as exemplifed by the Fisher hypothesis. When 
it was originally stated by Irving Fisher i n 1896, the hypothesis 
postulated a relationship between the inflation rate and the nominal 
rate of interest i n which the latter would adjust pari passu with 
changes i n the inflation rate. As Chapter 6 of this thesis has already 
shown, this relationship between inflation and the nominal interest 
rate is likely to be modified i n the presence of taxes. Given current 
tax law and all-debt financing, the nominal interest rate would have 
to rise by about one-and-half times as much as the inflation rate 
whereas the introduction of equity finance would bring this rate of 
change somewhere between unity and one-and-half. For 
convenience, equations [25] f rom Section 6.4 (after neglecting real 
balance effects and assuming that consumption is interest-inelastic) 
and [54] f rom Section 6.7 are reproduced below: 
dR 
dir 1 -
. . [ 8 ] 
and 
dR 
— = 1 - , . . . [ 9 ] 
dir 
where equation [8] refers to the rate of change in the nominal 
interest rate wi th respect to the inflation rate i n an all-debt financing 
model, and equation [9] refers to the case of a debt-equity model, 
and where f is defined in equation [52] of section 6.6 Now define 
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^ as the parameter incorporating all the relevant tax parameters so 
that equations [8] and [9] can be written as dR/dir = fi. 
Integrating this expression with respect to x gives the following 
relationship between the nominal interest rate and the rate of 
inflation: 
= c + M ^ ^ , , . . . [ 1 0 ] 
where fi » 1.5 in an all-debt financing model, and 1 < n < 1.5 in 
a debt-equity financing model, and the constant, c, refers to the 
marginal productivity of capital (see, for example, equation [18] of 
Section 6.4) It should also be remembered that, in the steady-state, 
it is assumed that the anticipated rate of inflation (irp) is equal to 
the actual rate {pip): such an assumption serves as a useful way of 
abstracting from the subjective question of how inflationary 
expectations are formed, and therefore any empirical tests will not be 
conditioned by the way inflationary expectations are formed. 
Regarding the first use of the Fisher hypothesis, it has been 
suggested by Patterson and Ryding (1984, p.302) that it could be 
assumed that there is zero second order rate of growth in the price 
level so that the rate of change in the nominal interest rate is equal 
to zero: this can be shown by taking the first difference of equation 
[10] so that 
= a V 
Clearly, when A^p = 0, T T ; ^ = 0. They believe that such an 
assumption is justified because it is unlikely that the United Kingdom 
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will experience second order rates of growth. Therefore the term T T ^ 
in equation [5] is now redundant because of the existence of a 
second-order steady-state relationship between the rate of change in 
the inflation rate and the rate of change in the nominal interest rate. 
There is now a system of two equations consisting of the 
dynamic steady-state demand for money and the relationship between 
the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate. Regarding the 
second use of the Fisher hypothesis, the system of two equations can 
be written in matrix form to give the structural form of the model: 
1 
0 
M 
R 0 
d 
P 
y 
where d is a term set equal to unity. Pre-multiplying both sides of 
the preceding expression by the inverse of the left-hand side 
coefficient matrix gives: 
M 1 
R 0 1 
- 1 
0 
d 
P 
y 
whence 
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M ' 
R 0 
d 
P 
y 
and it follows that the dynamic steady-state reduced form of the 
demand for money, taking explicit account of the Fisher hypothesis is 
now: 
M 
[11] 
The coefficient to the rate of change in the price level is termed the 
reduced form dynamic multiplier in prices which is the sum of two 
effects, the first one being termed as the direct effect, i/-,, of a rise 
in the rate of inflation on the steady-state demand for money, and 
the second term as the indirect effect, Q^ji, of a change in the rate 
of inflation on the nominal interest rate. 
7.3. Empirical evidence and analysis 
This section will now consider the empirical evidence 
presented by Patterson and Ryding regarding possible values of the 
rate of change in the nominal interest rate with respect to inflation 
whilst testing the null hypothesis that the reduced form dynamic 
multiplier in prices is not significantly different from zero. 
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In deriving their dynamic steady-state demand for money 
function, Hendry and Mizon (1978, p.560) firstly estimated equation 
[1] above in an unrestricted form for both / = 2 and J = 4, and 
after testing various common root restrictions, the final restricted form 
which they arrived at was: (all variables in logarithmic form) 
A(M/p)^ = 1.61 + O.llAy^ + O.SlAR^ + 0. 26a(M/p) ^_ ^ 
(0 .65) (0 .09) (0 .31) (0 .12) 
- 0.4QAp^ - 0.23{M/py) - 0.61R^_^ + 0.14y^_^ 
(0 .15) (0 .05) ' (0 .21) (0 .04) 
o = 0.0091, R' = 0 . 6 9 • • • [ 1 2 ] 
where the figures in paratheses denote standard errors. Then, 
Hendry and Mizon (1978, p.561) set the rates of change in the price 
level and real disposable income equal to constants, and, of course, 
set the rate of change in the nominal interest rate equal to zero so 
that the preceding equation became 
i-M - V = 1-61 + 0 -21-^ + 0-26(x^ - - 0 .40.^ 
- Q.2?>{Mlpy) - 0.61/? + 0.14;; 
where M stands for nominal sterling M3 balances, y stands for real 
disposable income at 1970 prices, p is the implicit deflator for y, 
and R stands for the yield on consols. Their specification of the 
dynamic steady-state demand for money is, however, not quite 
complete as Currie (1981) has already pointed out. As previously 
discussed in Section 7.1, it is not quite correct to assume that iryy/ is 
independent of irp and vy. Therefore, the structural form of the 
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dynamic steady-state demand for money is obtained by Currie as 
described by equations [2], [4], and [5]. The calculations are 
presented in Table 7.1, and the resulting structural form of the 
dynamic steady-state demand for money is presented as equation 1 
of Table 7.2 which summarises some of the results of studies 
purporting to examine the dynamic steady-state properties of the 
demand for money. No test statistics were given by either Hendry 
and Mizon or Currie for this particular equation. 
In advancing the hypothesis that the coefficients to the rate of 
growth explanatory variable were all not significantly different from 
zero, Currie (1981) estimated a long-run solution whose form is 
given as equation 3 in Table 7.2, and where the variables have the 
same definition as that of Hendry and Mizon. Currie was able to 
reject the joint hypothesis that all coefficients to the level variables 
were not significantly different from zero, and accepted the other 
joint hypothesis that all the coefficients to the rate of growth 
variables (including the rate of change in the nominal interest rate) 
were not significantly different from zero, and concluded that these 
variables 'may be constrained to zero without loss of explanatory 
power.' (p.712). Such a conclusion is viewed with some scepticism 
by Patterson and Ryding (1982, p.22) who estimate a dynamic 
steady-state demand for money function based on an unrestricted 
autoregressive model with uniform lag lengths of two. This is 
reproduced as equation 4 of Table 7.2, where M stands for M l 
balances, y stands for total final expenditure at 1975 prices, p is the 
implicit deflator for total final expenditure, and R is the local 
authority three-month rate. The 
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TABLE 7 . 1 : Solved coefficients from equation [12], and 
summary of calculations leading up to 
coefficients of equation 1 in Table 7 .2 . 
Lag M P y R 
0 - 0. 60 0. 21 0. 81 
1 1. 03 - 0 . 63 0. 02 -0 . 81 
2 - 0 . 26 0. 26 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0. 14 -0 . 61 
T 
0 
T 
I t 
0. 77 1 0. 23 
I « = 
' 0. 37 
l a 
3 -0 . 61 
A 
L 
S 0. 51 -0 . 11 0. 58 -3 . 25 
7. 0 1. 0 ^ = 1- 61 ^^3 = -2 . 65 
- 1 . 74 =-6. 
2 
09 ^ = -20. 01 
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the M l rather than the sterling M3, definition of money was chosen 
'to avoid, as far as possible, complications arising out of the joint 
endogneity of some part of the money supply and the nominal 
interest rate;...' (Patterson and Ryding (1984, p.306). Patterson and 
Ryding (1982) state that they are unable to reject the joint hypothesis 
that all coefficients to the rate of growth variables are not 
significantly different from zero. Then, they imposed a zero 
constraint on the rate of growth in expenditure in order to examine 
the effects on the dynamic steady-state demand for money of 
imposing such a constraint. They note that such a constraint can 
lead to pervasive results since the mean lag on prices and nominal 
interest rates increased from about 3 or 4 years to an implausible 
132 and 16i years respectively (1982, pp.23-24), and Patterson and 
Ryding state that '[the] imposition of the constraint, that a dynamic 
multiplier be set equal to zero, has far-reaching effects which may 
well outweigh the problems associated with non-zero, but 
insignificant, dynamic multipliers.' (p.24) 
Rather than to impose a constraint on dynamic multiphers, 
Patterson and Ryding (1982, pp.24-25) chose to reduce the lag length 
of the model based on equation [2] in Section 7.1, and estimated 
another dynamic steady-state demand for money function which is 
reproduced in their later paper (1984, p.306) and as equation 5 in 
Table 7.2, where the variables also have the same definition as the 
variables in equation 4 of Table 7.2. Note that the price level and 
expenditure have been constrained such that the steady-state (i.e. 
not the short-run) demand for money is linearly homogeneous in 
prices and expenditure. They note that the static multiplier in the 
nominal interest rate, and the structural dynamic multipliers in prices 
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and expenditure are all now significant. However, Patterson and 
Ryding (1984, p.303) argue that testing the null hypothesis that the 
reduced form of the dynamic multiplier in prices is insignificant is 
more appropriate because it also takes into account the effect of a 
change in the rate of inflation on the nominal interest rate. They 
also contend that there is a quite substantial difference in the values 
of the structural form of the dynamic multiplier and its reduced form 
counterpart. As the basis for their argument, Patterson and Ryding 
used Currie's formulation of the dynamic steady-state demand for 
money in its structural form (see Currie (1981, p.712, equation (12)) 
which is reproduced as equation 3 in Table 7.2 In the previous 
section it was shovm that the reduced form of the dynamic multiplier 
in prices was equal to i/-, + p^^. Dependent on the value of n, 
the reduced form of the dynamic multiplier for Currie's formulation 
is therefore (2.5 - 1.17/i). Given the theoretical values of n which 
were derived in the previous chapter, the dynamic multiplier in 
prices will lie somewhere between 0.745 (when n = H ) and 1.33 
(when fi = 1). Other values of the reduced form dynamic 
multiplier in prices, when n = H , are presented in the ninth 
column of Table 7.2 The reduced form dynamic multiplier in prices 
is not calculated for equation 2 of Table 7.2, and the reasons for 
this will become clear later on. It appears, therefore, that the only 
case in which the structural form of the dynamic multiplier in prices 
is unlikely to be different from its reduced form counterpart occurs 
when n = 0 which lies well beyond the range of theoretically 
plausible values. Moreover, it may be noted that in the special case 
when the reduced form dynamic multiplier in prices is equal to zero, 
the direct effect of inflation on the steady-state demand for money is 
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exactly counterbalanced by the indirect effects of inflation on nominal 
interest rates which affect the steady-state demand for money as well. 
Patterson and Ryding, having argued that there is a difference in the 
values of the structural and reduced forms of the dynamic multiplier 
in prices, suggest that the null hypothesis of direct interest should be 
H : \t + 3^ ^ = 0 . . . [13] 
Patterson and Ryding (1982) have shown that testing the hypothesis 
that the kth order grwoth coefficients are zero, either singly or 
jointly, can be carried out using the Wald principle which only 
requires estimation from the unrestricted model. In particular, they 
show that the Wald test statistic is given by (see Patterson and 
Ryding (1982), p. 18): 
VI = h ( 0 ) ' (H(i)H')~^ h{e)' • • • [ 1 4 ] 
where an 'hat' over a variable denotes an unrestricted estimator, 
h ( ^ ) is the vector of constraints on the coefficient vector expressed 
in the form h(d) = 0 , H i s the matrix (a vector if one constraint) 
of derivatives of h(e) with respect to e evaluated at 9 , and Q is a 
consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix of e. Under 
the null hypothesis h(d) = 0, W is distributed asymptotically as 
X^{r) where r is the number of restrictions, that is, the dimension 
of hie). 
The constraint of interest here is the zero constraint on the 
reduced form dynamic multiplier in prices. Now substituting for , 
and into the null hypothesis gives 
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H : h(e) 
0 M 
+ 
1 / a 
- S 7 . ) 
U - 1 lo) 
. . [15] 
where the subscript on h(e) indicates that the hypothesis is 
evaluated conditional on a given value for ^. Since there is only 
one constraint to be tested, the Wald statistic may be simplified to: 
Vl(e) 
(HiH' ) 
. . . [ 1 6 ] 
which is distributed as x ^ ( l ) under H ^ , and where ( H Q H ' ) ^ is a 
consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance, denoted avar, 
of the linear combination ^ , + ^ip ^ conditional on ix, that is: 
^ ( H Q H ' ) ^ = avar{}l^^) + 2 acov{xl,^, 13^)/^ + avar{(3^)^t 
Having laid out the statistical framework for testing the null 
hypothesis that, for a known or assumed value of fi, say /i" ,^ the 
reduced form dynamic multiplier in prices is not significantly different 
from zero, Patterson and Ryding (1984, p.307) calculate the Wald test 
statistic as 
•|" 1 ^ 1 / 't'\2 
Vl(e) + = 
114. 33 + 99. 66M + 21. 72(;i') 
6. 58 - 4. 9 7 / + 2. 1 1 ( / ) ' 
[17] 
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which is distributed as x 2 ( l ) under H ^ . The Wald test statistic 
given in equation 5 of Table 7.2 is for an assumed value of H for 
(I. Conditional on this value of n, the null hypothesis that the 
reduced form dynamic multiplier in prices is rejected at conventional 
significance levels. It is of some interest to calculate the value of 
for the special case in which the reduced form dynamic multiplier in 
prices is equal to zero. The value of ii is given by -^Jp^ which, 
given the value of the estimates in Patterson and Ryding, is about 
-2.29 which may be compared with a value of -2.23 given by 
Patterson and Ryding (1984, p.308). Thus, given that both 4,^ and 
(3^ are of the same sign, it follows that the special case in which the 
direct effects of inflation are exactly offset by the indirect effects of 
inflation on nominal interest rates can only occur for a value of /x 
which is not economically feasible. 
Table 7.3 shows some values for fi given different corporate 
tax rates, and the Wald test statistics are also given. On the basis 
of the figures, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the 
reduced form dynamic multiplier in prices is zero within a range of 
economically feasible values of fi. The corporate tax rates were 
chosen so that the effects of a change in tax regimes can be 
analysed. Prior to 1973, United Kingdom operated a classical 
corporation tax system in which the corporate tax rate was set at 40 
per cent, and in 1973, as a part of the United Kingdom's entry into 
the European Economic Community, she moved into an imputation 
system in which the effects of economic double taxation on corporate 
income are mitigated by imputing a tax credit on dividend income. 
The corporate tax rose to 52 per cent. 3 Since coming into office, 
the present Government has reduced the corporate tax rate from 52 
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per cent to 35 per cent, and at the same time, bringing inflation 
down to low levels, in which case, two inflation rates are given in 
Table 7.3, one reflecting a 'low' rate of inflation, and the other one 
reflecting a 'high' rate of inflation. The last two columns of Table 
7.3 show the estimated elasticity, denoted here by ey 
reduced form dynamic steady-state inverse velocity of money (i.e. 
Mlpy) with respect to the rate of inflation. It is clear from the 
table that increasing the corporate tax rate wi l l , ceteris paribus, 
increase the elasticity (in absolute terms) of the inverse velocity of 
money, and a decrease in the inflation rate will lead to a lower 
elasticity. Thus, on the basis of Patterson and Ryding's estimated 
reduced form steady-state demand for money function, and in. 
accordance with Feldstein's all-debt financing model, it is inferred 
that with a lower corporate tax rate and a lower rate of inflation, 
the elasticity of the inverse velocity of money with respect to the 
inflation rate is now lower than it was in the 1970s. Such evidence 
would be highly suggestive that the dynamic steady-state demand for 
money would be inherently unstable, and if the short-run is 
considered, the lack of a definite relationship between nominal 
interest rates and inflation may tend to exacerbate the instability of 
the demand for money. Such a proposition would need to be 
carefully investigated, of course. 
The foregoing analysis was on the basis that the value of 
was either known or assumed, and it has been shown by Patterson 
and Ryding (1984, pp.309-310) that it is possible to allow for 
uncertainty in the value of yL. One approach, that was ruled out by 
Patterson and Ryding, would have been to estimate a dynamic 
relatinship between nominal interest rates and expected inflation. 
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TABLE 7.3: Values of fi, Vlald test statisties, and 
elasticities of inverse income velocity with 
respect to inflation for key corporat e tax 
rat es. 
Corporate 
tax rate 
Value of Vlald test 
statistic 
ViCe) ' 
e„ when V, % 
TT = 0. 04 ' X = 0. 10 ' 
0 1 63. 36 -0 . 614 - 1 . 535 
0. 35 1. 54 81. 25 -0 . 715 - 1 . 787 
0. 4 1. 67 81. 96 -0 . 739 - 1 . 847 
0. 52 2. 08 77. 38 -0 . 815 -2 . 038 
0. 65 2. 85 60. 16 - 0 . 959 -2 . 397 
Source: Wald test statistics calculated from equation (13) in 
Patterson and Ryding (1984, p.307). 
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There are. of course, two main difficulties inherent in such an 
approach. The first difficulty stems from choosing an appropriate 
proxy for the expected rate of inflation, and any tests carried out 
would be conditional on how (no matter how subjective) inflationary 
expectations are formed. The second difficulty lies in the estimation 
of the parameter n. It is difficult to deny that tax regimes in the 
United Kingdom have been constantly changing. K the value of ^ is 
interpreted in accordance with Feldstein's afl-debt financing model, it 
is not too difficult to be convinced that the value of n has not been 
constant in view of changes in corporate tax rates. When a 
debt-equity model is considered, the situation becomes even more 
difficult in that there are even more tax parameters, not to mention 
the debt-equity ratio, that v^Il also determine the value of n. 
Instead, Patterson and Ryding carried out a sensitivity analysis in 
which uncertainty was introduced by finding the ratio of an assumed 
(or 'estimated') value of to its standard error which is in effect a 
f-statistic whose limits are zero and infinity, the lower limit 
corresponding to the case of perfect uncertainty, and the upper limit 
to the case of perfect certainty. By evaluating the Wald test statistic 
for different values of t, Patterson and Ryding (1984, p.308, figure 2) 
show that the Wald test statistic declines as the value of the 
i-statistic gets smaller. By comparing the values of the Wald test 
statistics with those at conventional significance levels, Patterson and 
Ryding conclude that the results obtained in the case of known or 
assumed values of n 'are not materially altered' by the introduction 
of uncertainty in the value of /.i.(p.310) 
402 
7.4. Consistency with theory 
Having now discussed the empirical evidence regarding possible 
values of / i , it is necessary to consider the claim made by Hendry 
and Mizon (1978) that the dynamic steady-state demand for money is 
consistent with economic theory statements. The basis of the 
argument in this section will rest on the fact that it is possible to 
derive similar dynamic steady-state demand for money functions from 
different models so that it becomes apparent that some future 
theoretical research needs to be undertaken in order to determine the 
a priori effects of a change in the rate of inflation, and of a change 
in the rate of growth of income or expenditure on the steady-state 
demand for money. 
First of all, it can be recalled that the reduced form dynamic 
steady-state demand for money was derived by treating the nominal 
interest rate as a jointly dependent variable which is a function of 
the inflation rate as in equation [10] above, and then substituting it 
into the structural form of the steady-state demand for money so 
arriving at equation [11]. The nominal interest rate is absent from 
equation [11] because the Fisher hypothesis was expHcitly included. 
Consider equation 2 of Table 7.2 which was derived directly from a 
small monetary model developed at the Bank of England by Coghlan 
(1979). The long-run steady-state properties of the model are 
analysed at some length in Currie (1982) from which this discussion 
is derived. Inspection of the equation reveals that the nominal 
interest rate term is absent, and the equation has a structure which is 
quite similar to that of equation [11] above. In particular, Currie 
(1982, pp.68 - 70) derived the dynamic steady-state demand for 
money by using a price-equation reported in Coghlan (1979, p.34, 
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equation B(ii)) which has the following form:^ 
= - 1 . 1 6 2 + 0. 0703p, , + 0.22S3p^ ._ + 0. 2276p, ._ 
+ 0.09SSM^ - 0. 1941W, 
t t-2 
- 0. 6768i'^ + 0.3349>^_^ + 0. 1003>^_^ 
+ 0.1318V, - 0.0561/?, 
+ 0. 2287 (M/py) . . . [ 18 
t-^ 
] 
where all the variables, except for the nominal interest rate, have 
been entered in logarithmic form, and where, 
for example, p^^ = ^n;?^ - ^n/?^-, . M stands for sterling M3 
balances, y stands for private sector total final expenditure at 1970 
market prices, p stands for the implicit deflator for total final 
expenditure, p^ stands for the price deflator for the sterling value of 
imports, and R stands for the interest rate on bank deposits. By 
setting the rate of growth variables in equation [18] equal to zero, 
Coghlan (1979, p.20) derives the implicit long-run static demand for 
money as: 
(M/p) = 5.081 + 0.4237); 
The above static steady-state demand for money function can be 
generalised to a dynamic steady-state demand for money by 
re-arranging equation [18] above so that is placed on the left 
hand side of the equation, and following the same procedure as in 
Table 7.1 above, the following dynamic steady-state demand for 
money function is obtained: 
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M , = 5.08 + + 0. 424y, + 4. 789^^ , - 2.30U^^ , 
y, t K, t 
and by assuming, as Currie (1982, p.69) does, that = and, 
of course, TT^^ = 0, the preceding equation then becomes the 
dynamic steady-state demand for money function as presented in 
equation 2 of Table 7.2. 
The reason for the absence of a nominal interest rate term 
from equation 2 of Table 7.2 can be found by examining equation 
[18] which reveals that there is no term in the present nominal 
interest rate whereas the other steady-state demand functions in Table 
7.2 were chiefly derived from a model, such as equation [2] above 
which included the present nominal interest rate. Now if equation 
2 of Table 7.2 was to be interpreted as the reduced form dynamic 
steady-state demand for money function, it is possible to determine 
the signs of the estimated values of the parameters i / - , and |3 3 by 
considering the cases in which the reduced form dynamic multiplier 
in prices is likely to be positive. One possible case can occur when 
the direct effect of inflation on the steady-state demand for money 
outweighs the indirect effect of inflation on nominal interest rates so 
that the structural form dynamic multiplier in prices for equation 2 of 
Table 7.2, would have positive sign and |3 3 would have negative 
sign. Therefore, on that basis, of all dynamic steady-state demand 
for money functions reported in Table 7.2, two out of five (i.e. 
equations 2 and 3) functions have positive (structural form) dynamic 
multipliers in prices, and only one out of five (i.e equation 2) 
functions has a positive dynamic multiplier in expenditure/income. 
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In discussing possible a priori magnitudes for the rate of 
grov^ 1;h in prices, one needs to look no further than Cagan's 
pioneering study of hyperinflations. According to Cagan (1956, 
p.35), the demand for real balances would be inversely related to the 
expected rate of inflation, which in the steady-state is assumed to 
equal the actual rate. A n increase in the rate of inflation increases 
the opportunity cost of holding money balances so that there is a 
substitution away from monetary assets into real assets. Such a 
justification has already been provided by Currie (1981, p.709). 
Such a relationship may be reinforced by the indirect effect of 
inflation on nominal interest rate: an increase in the rate of inflation 
will lead to a rise in the nominal interest rate which then increases 
the opportunity cost of holding money balances. This a priori 
presumption is confirmed by the results presented as equations 1, 4, 
and 5 of Table 7.2, but not by equations 2 and 3. According to 
the results presented in Table 7.3 for equation 5, it is apparent that 
an increase in the rate of inflation leads to an increase in the 
reduced form elasticity of inverse velocity with respect to inflation. 
This would be consistent with the a priori presumption that at 
higher rates of inflation, the inverse velocity of money would 
increase, and become more responsive to changes in the inflation 
rate. 
With respect to the rate of growth in income/expenditure, all 
above-cited studies are unable to offer any definite explanation for its 
negative sign in equations 1, and 3 to 5 of Table 7.2. Consider, for 
example, the theory of the demand for money as presented by 
Baumol (1952) which was discussed in Chapter Three. One 
implication of the 'square root' formula is that there are economies 
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of scale in holding money balances. If the volume of transactions 
(as proxied by income) rises, Baumol's theory predicts that money 
holdings will rise less than proportionately so leading to economies of 
scale in money balances. However, Currie (1981, p.709) suggests 
that economies of scale may be absent due the fact that as the 
volume of transactions rises, the demand for money rises more than 
proportionately as can be seen from equation 1 of Table 7.2. This 
observation is also reflected in equations 3 and 4. Furthermore, 
given a level of transactions, all equations (except equation 2) of 
Table 7.2 suggest that the demand for money balances is inversely 
related to rate of growth in transactions which is difficult to 
rationalise given the current state of knowledge on the theory of the 
dynamic steady-state demand for money. Apparently, the only 
justification for its inclusion is, as Patterson and Ryding (1982) have 
already noted, that the exclusion of the growth variable in 
income/expenditure may lead to pervasive results. 
7.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has looked at the properties of the dynamic 
steady-state demand for money, and examined the effects of 
incorporating the Fisher hypothesis explicitly within it. It was shown 
that the absence of a growth term in nominal interest rates from the 
dynamic steady-state demand for money function can be explained by 
the assumption that there are zero second-order rates of growth in 
prices so that there would, in effect, be a zero first-order rate of 
growth in nominal interest rates according to the Fisher hypothesis. 
It was particularly noted that the nominal interest rate is best left in 
the short-run demand for money function owing to difficulties in 
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modelling the behaviour of nominal interest rates in the short run as 
demonstrated by Summers (1983) and section 6.8 of this thesis. 
However, in the long-run, it is believed that a steady-state 
relationship exists between inflation and interest rates so that such a 
relationship has to be explicitly incorporated. Thus the long-run 
dynamic steady-state demand for money exhibits the property that it 
is a function of the inflation rate which works through two effects, 
viz: directly, and indirectly via nominal interest rates as the 
reduced-form dynamic multiplier shows. Owing to frequent changes 
in tax regimes, the reduced-form steady-state demand for money may 
turn out to be inherently unstable. 
Regarding the consistency of the dynamic steady-state demand 
for money with theoretical considerations, it was possible to show, 
with the aid of the pioneering work of Cagan (1956), that the 
dynamic steady-state demand for money is inversely related to the 
rate of inflation. However, a major difficulty still remains in 
explaining why the steady-state demand for money is, on the basis of 
the empirical evidence, direcfly related to the rate of growth in 
incomes. This would be a subject worthy of further research. 
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APPENDIX O N E 
A N O T E O N I N D E X NUMBERS 
A N D T H E I R D E S I R A B L E P R O P E R T I E S 
This appendix discusses briefly a few aspects of index 
numbers by defining the concept of exact and superlative index 
numbers. A proof that the Torquinst-Theil Divisia quanity index is 
superlative will be offered. 
Firstly, define the quantity index as Q(pg ,p , ; X Q , X J which 
is a function of a N-dimensional vector of prices in periods 0 and 
1 where p^ > 0^ and p, > Oyy (Oyy is a N-dimensional null 
vector), and of the corresponding quantity vectors x^ > Oyy and 
X , > Of\jJ Similarly define a price index as P(-p^,p^; X ( , , x , ) . 
One important property of index numbers is that, given either a 
price or quantity index, the other function can be defined implicitly 
by the following equation which is the Fisher (1922) weak factor 
reversal test: 
F ( p ,p ;x , x ) Q(p ,p ; x , x ) = p 'x / p 'x . . . [Al ] 
that is, the product of the price index times the quanfity index 
should yield the expenditure ratio between two periods. This is 
known as the 'adding up' property. This is useful for empirical 
work for calculating divisia user cost indices from the divisia 
t Emboldened lower case letters are used to denote vectors, and 
emboldened upper case letters are for matrices. 
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quantity indices and expenditure ratios. 
A n important theorem in index number theory makes it 
possible to use the ideal quantity index in order to calculate the 
exact aggregate. Let p^ > Oyy for periods r = 1,...,R and suppose 
that Xf > O/i/ is a solution to the following problem: 
1 ^ ^ X 
max f ( x ) = ( x ' A x ) ^ = ( X I x.a..x.)' 
i = l j = i I J 
subjec t to p^x < p'^x^ ; x > Oyy . . . [A2] 
where aij = aji (all i,j). Provided that maximisation takes place 
in the region where f (x) is concave and positive, then 
^^^^^ - 12^  ( P „ , P , ; X x ) r = 1,...R ...[A3] 
f ( x ) t 0 r 0 r 
The implication of this theorem is that, given the normalisation 
f(xQ) = 1, the ideal quantity index may be used to calculate the 
aggregate f(x^) = (x{-Ax;-)2 for r = 1,...R. Thus, it is not 
necessary to estimate the unknown parameters of the A matrix. If 
a quantity index Q(Po,p/-; Xg,X;.) and a functional form for the 
aggregator function satisfies [A3], then Q is said to be exact for f. 
Superlative index numbers are only exact for a function that 
can provide a second order approximation to a linear homogeneous 
function. Diewert (1974, p.125) has shown that the aggregator 
function defined in [A2] is capable of providing such an 
approximation, and it is in this context that the ideal quantity index 
may also be regarded as being superlative. It will be shown that 
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the Divisia quanfity index is superlative, but the quadratic 
approximation will be derived since it will prove to be useful in 
this proof. 
First, define a quadratic function of the form 
f ( z ) = a + a' z + ^ z 'Az 
IS /V /V 
= \ + ^i^i + ^ .1^ .1^ ^i^ij^j • • • [ A 4 ] 
where ai, aij are constants, and aij = aji (all i,j). Furthermore, 
z is a N-dimensional vector. Consider the derivation of a quadratic 
approximation to [A4] in which f (z ) is evaluated at z , and z^ so 
that 
f ( Z i ) - f ( Z o ) = a ' z , + i Z ' A Z , - a ' z „ - i z'^Az^ 
= a ' ( z , - z j + i z > ( z , - z j + i z > ( z , - z j 
= M a + Az , + a + A z J ' ( z , - z „ ) 
since A ' = A . But it can be seen from [A4] that 
af = a. + i I a..z. i = 1, . . ./Y 
;=1 'J ^ 
or in matrix notation, 
v f ( z ) = a + Az 
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Thus, 
f ( z , ) - f ( z „ ) = i [ V f ( z , ) + V f ( z j ] ' ( z , - z J . . . [ A 5 ] 
which is the quadratic approximation, and vf(z;-) is the gradient 
vector evaluated at z^. 
It will now be shown that the Tdrquinst-Theil discrete time 
approximation to the Divisia quantity index is superlative. Suppose 
that a homogeneous translog aggregator function is given: 
N N N 
f ( x ) = a + X a. 2n x. + i I X 7 / / x . «n x-
0 I I y ^ l i j I J 
. . . [A6] 
Diewert (1976) has shown that the above function is capable of 
providing a second order approximation to an arbitrary twice-
continuously-differentiable linear homogeneous function. Using the 
parameters given in the translog functional form, define a quadratic 
function such that 
Applying the quadratic approximation [A5], the following expression 
is obtained: 
f * ( z ^ ) - f * ( z ^ ) = i [ v f * ( z ^ ) + v f * ( z j ] ' ( z ^ - z^) 
. . . . [ A 8 ] 
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It is now necessary to relate the function defined in [A7] with the 
translog function as follows 
i f ( z^) ^ a f ( x p ^ 
a z . a jCn X 
a f ( x p 
a . . 
-U-
f ( x , ) 
[A9] 
(and f(z^) = an f ( X f ) , Z j - j = ^n x^j for r = 0,1 and 
j = 1,...N). Substituting [A9] into [A8], the following expression 
is obtained 
i n f i x ) - ^nf(x^) + x ^ ^ l l i ] . ' [ .nx - .nx ] 
—•:r-. ^ n—:r-, r" L i n J ' f ( x ) 
. . . [ A l O ] 
where J S U = [ ^n x^f,...iin xyvr ] and i;- is the vector ^ 
diagonalised into a matrix (r = 0 , 1 ) . 
Assume that x^ is a solution to the following problem 
max f ( x ) s . t . p'^ x = m (m = p'^x^) . . . [ A l l ] 
where f (x) is the translog function. After the elimination of the 
Lagrangian multiplier in the first order conditions, the relations 
p^/p/.x^ = v f (x^) /xrVf (^) (r = 0,1) are obtained. Since f is 
linear homogeneous, x{-vf(x^) may be replaced by f(X;-) in the 
preceding relations. Substitution of these relations into [AlO] leads 
to the following expression 
5n f ( x ^ ) - ^n f ( x ^ ) = ^ X p 1 ^ 1 + 
p 'x 
^ 1 1 
x p 
p 'x 
0 0 
r £n X - jGn X ] 
I- 1 0 J 
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Finally, 
f ( x ) / f ( x ) = n (x J X J 
n=i 
where w^^ = Pm^rnl Vx^r- It has now been shown that the 
Divisia quantity index is superlative for a translog aggregator 
function because of that function's second order approximation 
property. 
415 
APPENDIX T W O 
A N O T E O N A G G R E G A T E P R O D U C T I O N FUNCTIONS 
This note discusses how, given certain conditions, individual 
production functions can be aggregated to form the aggregate 
production function. It is assumed that there are m perfectly 
competitive firms who all use similar production techniques to 
produce quantities of a single good for consumption and investment 
at any instant of time. The production function for the ith firm is 
^i = ^i^^i'^i^ . . . [ A 2 - 1 ] 
where is the output of the single good by the ith firm, Ki is the 
capital stock of the ith firm, and Ni is employment by the ith firm 
per unit time. The firm's production function is characterised by 
positive though diminishing marginal products of capital and labour: 
F ^ , > 0, and F ^ ^ , < 0. 
It is assumed that the production function is linearly homogeneous 
such that a proportionate increase in both capital and employment 
will lead to an equi-proportionate increase in output: 
x F ( / ^ . , / Y . ) = F ( x / i . , x / V . ) 
416 
A corollary of the hnear homogeneity property of the production 
function is that all partial derivatives will be homogeneous of degree 
zero; thus for example 
a F ( / i . , / V . ) BFixK.,xlS.) 
Letting x = llNi, the preceding expression is re-written as 
a F ( K . , / V . ) B F ( K . / N . , 1 ) 
^K. ~ a (K. /yV. ) 
In words, the expression states that the marginal product of capital 
depends only on the ratio of capital to employment. This result also 
holds true for the marginal product of labour. 
Owing to putty-clay technology, it is not possible for firms to 
dispose of their capital stock as there is no ready market available. 
The capital stock represents the accumulation of the single good 
which is appropriated to assist in the production of further output. 
Regarding the labour market, it can be assumed that prices and 
wages are sufficiently flexible such that firms are able to hire all the 
labour they need at the going rate. 
Now, the profits made by the ith firm is the difference 
between its gross revenue, and its costs which comprise the wage bill 
and the cost of capital: 
n . = pF.{K.,lS.) - wN. - (R - . ) K . 
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where (R - x ) is the real rate of interest (return) on capital, and ir 
is the anticipated inflation rate. 
In order to maximise its profits, the firm must employ 
sufficient labour so that the marginal product of labour equals the 
real wage rate: 
an . 
a/V. 
pFj^iK.,N.) - w = 0 
that is, 
Fj^(K.,!S.) = w/p . . . [ A 2 - 2 ] 
Aggregate output is obtained by aggregating over the individual 
outputs of the firms in the economy: 
m m 
Y = 
i 
III t n 
By Euler's Theorem, 
m m 
1 Y = S 
i = 1 ^ 1=1 
It was previously shown that the marginal products of capital and 
labour depend only on the capital-labour ratio. Using this fact, and 
the fact that, because of similar production technologies amongst 
firms, the capital-labour ratio is the same for all firms, it follows 
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that the marginal products are the same for all firms. Therefore, 
m m m 
Since the capital-labour ratio is the same for all firms, it follows that 
the economy's capital-employment ratio, J!f =lKi/Yf =1^1, is the 
same. Thus, 
Y = F^(K/]SJ)K + Fj^iK/N,l)N 
where K = =iKi and N = l"^ =iNi. Finally, by Euler's 
Theorem, 
Y = F(K,?^) . . . [ A 2 - 3 ] 
There is just one final important point to be made about the 
aggregation procedure. The aggregate production function finking Y 
with K and A'^  is only valid for a certain distribution of the Ni 
across the firms. That distribution is given by the marginal 
productivity condition for labour in equation [A2-2]. If this 
condition is not fulfilled, then the aggregation procedure is violated. 
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NOTES 
Chapter One 
1. A n exposition of the IS-LM model can be found in most 
macroeconomics textbooks. 
2. i?2 statistics, used on their own, do not necessarily provide the 
best overall measure regarding the performance of an estimated 
relation. A t best, such statistics only measure the 'goodness-
o f - f i t ' over the sample period. This is further elaborated in 
Chapter Four during the discussion of the definition of money 
by 'best' results. 
3. The other conclusions regarding the possibility of a 
disequilibrium situation can be found i n Artis and Lewis (1976) 
and Gafga (1985b). 
4. A f u l l discussion can be found in Judge (1983). 
5. A n aggregator function is a neutral term used by economic 
aggregation theory to refer to either production or utility 
functions. 
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Chapter Two 
1. See, for example, Podolski (1986), chapter 2, and Silber 
(1975), pp. 63-64. 
2. See especially Schumpeter (1934), chapter 2, and Schumpeter 
(1939), chapter 3. 
3. See Schumpeter (1934), pp.65-66. 
4. For example, see Kamien and Schwartz (1982), p.2, and 
Scherer (1980), pp .409-410. 
5. For a concise theoretical treatment of process innovation, see 
Koutsoyiannis (1979), pp.85-86. 
6. Some care has been taken here to avoid excessive over-
simplification into a two-input type of analysis by collectively 
referring to various inputs as capital- and labour-related inputs 
as the case may demand i t . It must be recalled that the 
marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) is negative so 
any increase i n MRTS represents a decrease i n absolute terms. 
The converse of capital-deepening is 'labour-deepening' in 
which the marginal productivities of labour-related inputs 
increase relative to those of capital-related inputs. 
7. It is interesting to note that the existence of automated dealing 
systems on the stock exchange is not entirely an innovation 
because some dealers prefer the security of direct 
communication with their counterparts when dealing in large 
lots because they feel more secure doing so. For smaller lots, 
they can be transacted via the automated dealing system. 
Therefore, such dealing systems are an innovation to some 
extent i n changing the way small transactions are handled, but 
not quite an innovation for larger lots. For a discussion on 
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technological developments i n the financial sector, see Hamilton 
(1986), Chapter Two , especially p.45). 
8. See Hester (1982), p.43, and Podolski (1986), p . l07 . 
9. See Podolski (1986), p.108. 
10. See Hester (1981), pp.149-151. 
11. ibid, pp.155-161. 
12. Regulation Q was one of the regulations set by the Federal 
Reserve which forbade payment of interest on bank deposits in 
excess of the interest rate ceiling. This was a measure 
designed to counteract the banks' tendency to bid for funds by 
bidding up interest rates. 
13. See Hester (1981), pp.151-155. 
14. Further examples for this category are hsted in Table 1 in 
Kane (1981), p.360. 
15. See Silber (1975), pp.68-69, and Scherer (1980), p.424. 
16. See Scherer (1980), pp.425-426. 
17. The following discussion is based on Scherer (1980), 
pp .426-428. 
18. For example, see Schumpeter (1934), p.65, and Schumpeter 
(1939), p.73. 
19. See Schumpter (1939), p . l l l . 
20. For a survey on the objectives of f irms, see Koutsoyiannis 
(1981), section E. The objectives of financial firms may differ 
f rom those of firms operating in the real sector of the 
economy, and would indeed be worthy of further investigation. 
21 . The discussion need not be confined to regulated firms. It is 
indeed possible for unregulated firms to get involved in the 
sense that they can exploit more economically feasible options 
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created by regulated firms' innovations brought about by a 
desire to avoid regulations. 
22. See Midland Bank (1966), p.3. 
23. For a detailed account of the development of the parallel 
markets, see Grady and Weale (1986), chapter 6. 
24. See Podolski (1986), p.152. 
25. The special deposits scheme is not to be confused with the 
supplementary special deposits scheme introduced in 1973. 
26. See Grady and Weale (1986), pp.48 and 49. 
27. See for example Goodhart (1984), pp.103 and 166. 
28. It is not too difficult to understand why there was a bias 
towards delay i n adjusting the Bank Rate. One does not have 
to look no further than to consider the unfavourable poUtical 
consequences of rising interest rates. 
29. The formula was to add i per cent on the Treasury Bi l l rate, 
and to round up the resulting rate to the nearest i per cent 
giving the M L R . 
30. Useful statistics on calls for SSDs may be found in the 
Appendix to the article on the SSD scheme. Bank of England 
(1982), p.85. 
31 . For instance, see Wilson Committee Appendices (1980, p.507, 
paragraph 3.362). 
32. Other correlation coefficients presented by Goodhart (1984, 
p.156) are as follows: for annual rates of growth i n M l and 
M3 during the 1960s, the correlation coefficient was +0.97, and 
for the 1970s, i t was -0.45; for quarterly rates of growth in 
M l and sterling M3 during the 1960s, it was +0.91, and during 
the 1970s, it was +0.55; for quarterly rates of growth in M l 
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and M3 during the 1960s, it was +0.92, and during the 1970s, 
it was +0.46. 
33. This would be a typical example of regressive expectations: in 
such a model, expectations of a variable tend to 'regress' 
towards the 'normal' value of a variable. See Gafga (1985a), 
Chapter 4, section 2 for more details. 
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Chapter Three 
1. It should be noted that it is being implicitly assumed that 
buying and selling transactions costs are indistinguishable from 
each other. Contrast this with the assumption made by 
Baumol (1952), p.548. 
2. THe only essential difference lies i n the assumption regarding 
transactons costs - see note 1. 
3. This may be shown if the partial derivative of £ ( T r ) in 
equation [27] is taken with respect to such that 
E{r) 
da. 
2k 
Or 
1 - " IT 
ar J 
When £ ( i r ) is at a maxmimum, a jE; (Tr) /da^ = 0. Thus, 
solving for <T^ gives 
1 - 2k 
£(7J 
4. 
The expression within the square brackets must be positive 
since i t is necessary that 2k < E(r). It therefore follows that 
any increase i n uncertainty (a/-) v^U lead to an increase in 
a^. Substitution of into E{Tr) gives the maximum expected 
revenue which is independent of any change in uncertainty. 
Thus the opportunity locus is seen to be shifting f rom OP;, to 
OP, i n Figure 3.5. without any change i n £ ( i r ) j n a x -
From the expression for given i n the previous note, it can 
be seen that as k approaches zero, approaches O}-. 
Attention is being concentrated on the effects of the inclusion 
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of a time-trend variable on the conventional specification for 
the demand for money which includes GNP as a proxy for the 
volume of transactions, and so those specifications containing 
debits as a proxy for transactions are not reported here. 
However, results can be found in Lieberman (1977). 
6. A sketch of the g ( x ) function can be found in Porter and 
Simpson (1980), p.194. 
7. The f u l l regression results that include previous-peak variables 
are not reported i n Porter and Simpson (1980), Table B-6 , 
pp.224-225, and so are not included i n Table 3.2. 
8. The results reported i n Table 3.4. are based on the best 
performing specification that includes a linear-times-log ratchet 
variable, which Porter and Offenbacher (1984, p.92, n.5) say 
has been 'used exclusively'. Other results can be found in 
Porter and Simposn, Table B - 4 , pp.219-220. Note that the 
results reported i n Table 3.5. can be compared with those 
given i n Table 3.3. 
9. See Porter and Offenbacher (1984), p.92, n.8. 
10. Ibid, p.93, n.8. Note that the value of the constant has been 
included explicitly in equation [43]. 
426 
Chapter Four 
1. Note that i f one of the commodities is nominated as a unit of 
account, there is only the need for - 1, and not A ,^ 
exchange ratios since the accounting price of money is set 
equal to unity. 
2. Only a highly eccentric individual would be capable of 
hoarding large amounts of currency such that the main function 
of currency in this example would be that as a store of value. 
There are obvious disadvantages to the hoarding of large 
amounts of currency because one incurs an opportunity cost of 
holding currency which bears a zero nominal rate of interest. 
This opportunity cost is likely to be exacerbated in times of 
inflat ion. Thus, i t may be safely assumed that the proportion 
of currency having the attribute of store of value is so 
negligible that i t can be completely disregarded in the weighted 
monetary aggregate which is to be discussed i n section 4.2.2. 
3. Debit cards are distinct f rom credit cards i n that the former 
may be regarded as both means of payment and mediums of 
exchange whereas the latter is a medium of exchange only in 
that the credit card bi l l has to be settled at some future date. 
Some discussions of EFTPOS technology and other aspects of 
the bank-customer relationship affected by technology can be 
found i n Goodhart (1984), Chapter V , pp.169-180, and 
Hamilton (1986), Chapter 2, especially pp.30-40. 
4. Friedman and Meiselman (1963) chose to regress the level of 
consumption, rather than income, on the money stock and 
autonomous expenditure i n order to avoid as far as possible 
any problems posed by the definition of income which was 
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Y = C + A. If income was used as the dependent variable, 
one would be faced v^dth the situation i n which part of income 
was correlated with itself. 
5. There have also been other contributions to the causality 
debate, and each contribution has tended to use different 
definitions of money in order to determine which particular 
definition of money gives the 'best' results. For example, see 
Crockett (1970) who used quas i -Ml and quasi-M2 definitions 
of money which were based on the London clearing banks 
only. Other contributions stemming f rom the work of Granger 
(1969) who devised statistical methods for measuring causality, 
have used differing definitions of money. For example, see 
Sims (1972), and Williams et al (1976). The latter study used 
the same definitions of money as used by Crockett (1970) but 
the results were very poor in that income seemed to 'lead' 
money rather than the other way around. 
6. See Judd and Scadding (1982), p.993. 
7. In some empirical studies of the demand for money, the 
income elasticity is sometimes constrained to unity reflecting the 
view that there are no economies of scale i n money balances. 
Hence the dependent variable would be (M/Y). Of course, 
one can choose to impose the assumption of no money illusion 
in which case the dependent variable would be (M/PY). 
8. Examples can be found i n Gafga (1985b), Table 3, and Artis 
and Lewis (1976), Table 2, p . 154. 
9. See Chow (1966). 
10. See Laidler (1981), p.4. 
11 . Interest rate differentials have been used by, for example, Lee 
428 
(1967), and Artis and Lewis (1976). 
12. Since the cross-elasticities estimated by Lee (1967) were based 
on interest rate differentials, it was necessary for Feige and 
Pearce (1977) to adjust the reported values so that they would 
be more comparable with the other studies reported which did 
not use interest rate differentials. The values of the cross-
elasticities are based on the mean-values reported i n Table 1(b) 
of Feige and Pearce (1977), pp .453-455. 
13. See Lee (1967), p . l l 7 5 . 
14. See Hamburger (1969), pp.407 and 411. 
15. See Lee (1969), p.417. 
16. A n aggregator function is a neutral term used by economic 
aggregation theory to refer to either a production or a utility 
function. 
17. A discussion of the properties of the CES aggregator function 
can be found i n several mathematical economics texts; see for 
example Silberberg (1978), pp.313-322, Kogiku (1971), p.67. 
18. A 'generalised CES' utili ty function has the property that the 
elasticity of substitution between any two assets is always 
constant. Thus the function takes on the form; 
U = 
n 
i = 0 ^ 
- I I , 
which can be compared with equation [6] i n the main text. 
19. In the strictest sense, this regression model is not really a 
system of asset demand equations. This point is discussed in 
sub-section 4.2.2(c) below. 
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20. Indeed, this is the main reason why the utility function given 
in equation [6] is more appropriately labelled as a VES utility 
function. 
21 . This may be seen i f the different versions of the constrained 
optimisation problem posed by Moroney and Wilbratte (1976) 
can be stated in the most general terms, namely that; 
max imise T = f ( X g , X , , . . . , / „ ) 
n 
s u b j e c t to VI = J / . ( 1 + r . ) 
/• = 0 ^ ^ 
and 
v e r s i o n / 
n 
maximise W = X ^ / / ( l + ^ w ) 
/ = 0 
s u b j e c t t o 7 = f ( / , , / , , . . . , / „ ) 
v e r s i o n / / 
Version / is the correct primal problem, but version / / is not 
the correct dual problem. A theorem in duality theory states 
that i f the utili ty function is maximised subject to a budget 
constraint i n the primal problem, and i f , in the dual problem, 
the, say, expenditure function, is minimised subject to the 
util i ty function which is now a constraint, then one can obtain 
asset demand functions that are identical to each other. For 
both versions of the problem above, the first-order marginahty 
conditions would be 
( a f / a / . ) - x ( l + r.) = 0 
and VI = I / . ( I + r ) 
i = 0 ^ ^ 
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and f o r t h e second v e r s i o n 
( 1 + r.) - n i d f / d X . ) = 0 
and T = f ( X „ , / , , . . . , / „ ) 
for all / = 0,.../i, and where x and fi are the Langrangian 
multipliers for each version respectively. It can be seen that i f 
the first + 1 first-order marginal conditions are solved in 
each version, one would be able to replicate the 
misinterpretation of the duality theorem made by Moroney and 
Wilbratte (1976). It should be clear, therefore, that i f the last 
first-order marginal condition is also used to solve for N + 1 
instead of N asset demand equations such that they were also a 
function of wealth and the anticipated volume of transactions, 
one would obtain a very different set of asset demand 
equations for each version. The correct dual problem would 
be stated as follows: 
n 
m i n i m i s e W = J X .(1 + r .) 
i = 0 * 
s u b j e c t t o 7 = f ( / Q , , / „ ) 
which would be a rather strange thing for households to do! 
There are several discussions of duality theory in many 
mathematical texts; among the best are, for example, Madden 
(1986), chapter 12, especially pp.180-4. 
22. A function is said to be homogeneous of degree r if 
f ( / x ) = t ^ f ( x ) where x is a vector of variables. But if such 
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a function is not homogenous of degree r such that 
f ( f x ) t ^ f ( x ) but i f f ( x ) can be shown to have been a 
monotone increasing transformation of a homogeneous function, 
say g ( x ) such that f ( x ) = h[g{x) ], then f ( x ) is said to be 
homothetic. Thus, i t can be shown that the VES aggregator 
function is not homothetic since pi ?i pj for all / and j , but i f 
Pi = pj for all i and ; , it can be shown that this generahsed 
CES function wi l l be homothetic since a monotone increasing 
transformation of that function w i l l be homogeneous. See 
Madden (1986), pp.240-243. 
23. If so desired, one can adjust the rental price to account for 
taxation such that the adjusted rental price would be; 
p*t{Rt - n t ) i ^ - u ) 
~ ( 1 + R t ) { l - r t ) 
as suggested by Barnett (1981, p.197, equation 7.5). 
24. The GES (generalised elasticity of substitution) utility function 
as defined by Boughton (1981, p.378) posesses the property that 
i t is homothetic with respect to income. 
25. For a simple overview of the Divisia aggregation procedure, see 
Barnett and Spindt (1982) and Barnett et al (1981). More 
technical and systematic expositions can be found in Barnett 
(1980) and Barnett (1981), Chapter 7. The empirical evidence 
regarding the relative performance of Divisia to simple-sum 
aggregates is discussed in section 4.4 below, but the reader may 
like to refer to Barnett (1982), Cagan (1982), and Porter and 
OFfenbacher (1984). 
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26. See Barnett and Spindt (1982), pp.2-3. 
27. See Barnett et al (1981), p.498. 
28. Numerical examples of the computation of Divisia index 
numbers can be found in Barnett (1980), pp .39-43, and 
another example is provided in Barnett and Spindt (1982). 
29. See Barnett (1982), pp.690-691 and Barnett and Spindt (1982), 
p.7. If one refers back to figure 4 .1 . of this chapter, it wi l l 
be seen that a change in relative interest rates could be broken 
up conceptually into a 'substitution effect' and an 'income 
effect'. The former wi l l involve the 'budget' constraint sliding 
along the original indifference curve, and then the latter wi l l 
involve the new 'budget' budget constraint shifting parallel to 
itself to a higher indifference curve which represents higher 
ut i l i ty . This is one thing that simple-sum aggregates cannot 
do: internalise substitution effects. 
30. The current analysis is based mainly on Barnett (1982), 
pp.690-691. 
3 1 . Note that there is an error i n the title of Table 3-14 in Porter 
and Offenbacher (1984), p.88. From the sequence of the 
tables given i n that study, the table should refer to 
conventional aggregates and not to Divisia aggregates. 
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Chapter Five 
1. See Fisher (1896), pp.8-9. 
2. A superscript dot over a variable denotes that it is a time 
derivative, i.e. rate of change with respect to time. Thus, for 
example, p = dp/dt where / stands for time. 
3. The effect of relaxing the assumption of zero 'storage costs' is 
discussed below in sub-section 2.1.2. 
4. This expression is also used to discuss exchange rate arbitrage. 
This was recognised by Fisher (1930), pp .403-407. 
5. This is discussed further i n Section 5.3. 
6. See Thornton (1802, pp.335-336) 
7. See Wicksell (1898, trans. 1936, p.149) 
8. See especially Lutz (1974), pp.102-111 and Sargent (1969), 
pp.130-132. 
9. See Fisher (1896, p.67) and also Fisher (1930, pp.415-416). 
10. See also Fisher (1930, pp .399-400). 
11. See Fisher (1896, pp .76-77). 
12. See Fisher (1911, pp.58-59). 
13. ibid, pp.59-60. 
14. ibid, pp.64-70. 
15. ibid, pp.70-71. 
16. See Fisher (1930, pp.418-420) 
17. For a discussion on the criticism regarding Fisher's "implausibly 
long" lags, see Sargent (1973), Sections I and I I . 
18. See Lutz (1974, p . l 09 ) . 
19. See the quotation f rom Fisher (1896, p.77) given in sub-section 
5.3.1. 
20. Compare Figure 5 .1 . with those of Lutz (1974). 
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Chapter Six 
1. See Appendix 3 for a fuller derivation of the aggregate 
production function. 
2. A distinction was made by Gurley and Shaw (1960) between 
'outside' and 'inside' money. Outside money is money backed 
by assets that do not represent a claim on members inside the 
economy, for example, fiat currency backed by government 
securities, gold, or foreign exchange reserves. The holding of 
fiat currency by members of the economy does not impose any 
offsetting obligations upon them, so money is a net asset. 
Conversely, inside money is money backed by assets that do 
represent a claim on members of the economy: for example 
commercial bank deposits backed by investments and lending to 
the private sector. In this case, money is not a net asset. 
3. This is easily seen if one considers that the definition of 
savings is disposable income minus consumption. Thus the 
statements made in this thesis and by Feldstein (1976) are both 
equivalent. 
4. This result comes about i f investment is considered as the net 
addition to the capital stock per unit time. K Feldstein 
assumes that the labour force grows at an exponential rate of n 
per unit time such that = N^t^t, then, in order to keep 
the capital-labour ratio constant, it would imply that K = 
K^t^t. Differentiating this with respect to time gives I = K 
= nK. 
5. The notation 'D iv ' is used here to emphasise the point that the 
all-debt financing model is indeed a special case of a more 
general debt-equity financing model. In an all-debt financing 
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model, 'dividends' may be equal to zero, or might even 
represent 'retained earnings' in which Feldstein (1976, p.810, 
footnote 3) describes equity profits as 'intramarginal'. 
6. Given an expression of the form: 
g{y,X,X,t) = f f ( y , X , X , t ) dt, 
0 
the necessary conditions for this to obtain an extremum are the 
following Euler equations: 
df 3 / d 
— = 0 and — - — 
dy aX dt 
a / 
dX 
for 0 < f < 00. But if the above expression is not explicitly a 
function of X such that 
8(y,^>t) = J n y , x , t ) dt. 
then, of course, the Euler equations become 
a / 3 / 
— = 0 and — = 0 
dy dX 
For a discussion on the classical 'calculus of variations' 
problem, see Intriligator (1971), Chapter 12. 
7. These two conditions can also be derived if the firm chooses 
to maximise its own profits rather than its present value in 
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which case profits are defined by gross revenue, less the wage 
bill, and less the cost of capital: 
n = pF{K,I^) - w/V - p{R - ir)K 
Differentiation of the preceding expression with respect to TV 
and K leads to the same marginality conditions. 
8. The equivalence of the marginality condition for capital with 
Feldstein's per-capita marginality condition can be demonstrated 
as follows. Utilising the linear homogneity of the production 
function, it follows that 
\Y = F(\K,\N) 
Setting X = 1/N, 
Y = NF(K/N) 
Substitution for Y in the profit function, and then 
differentiating with respect to K gives 
= pl^F^{K/N) (l/IS) - p{R - ^) = 0 
which implies that F^{K/N) = (R - w). 
9. The requirement for the denominator of equation [17] to be 
negative when a" < 0 is that 
'^l - y}^K ~ n(l + L) < 0 
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To show that this inequality holds true, multiply it by K to 
obtain 
o{{l - y)KF^ + nKL] - nK{l + L ) < 0 
Letting ( M / p ) = KL, the above inequality becomes 
o[ {1 - y)KFj^ + n{M/p) ] < nK + n(M/p) 
But Feldstein's equilibrium condition states that (1976, p.812 -
not in per-capita form) 
a [ ( i - y)F(K,lS) + n{M/p) ] = nK + n(M/p) 
Hence, the inequality becomes 
< 7 [ ( i - y)KFj^ + niM/p)] < a[il - y)F{K,N) + n{M/p) 
or equivalently, KFj(_ < F{K,N) which holds. 
10. By considering the nummerator of equation [17], it is clear 
that dK/dir — 0 when 0, = ^ ^ = 7 ^ = ^ ^ = 0 , and when 
= 0. 
11. From equation [17], it can be seen that dK/dr > 0 when 
= 0 2 = 0 or when 0 , = e ^ = 7- , = T 2 - Since Fj^f^ < 
0, it follows that the second term of equation [25] is negative. 
12. For brief surveys of the empirical evidence, see, for example, 
Artis and Lewis (1981, Chapter 2), and Coghlan (1980, 
Chapter 5). 
13. With the exception of cumulative preference shareholders. In 
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this model, they are ruled out for simplicity. 
14. The formulation here is based on the first formulation of 
Hayashi (1982, p.215, equation 4a). 
15. Further to note 6, consider the following constrained dynamic 
optimisation problem: 
f (x , X, t)dt 
0 
max g(x, X, t)dt = 
subjec t to 
z = h ( x , x , 0 
where x = x = and z = { 2 , , . . . 2 „ } . 
The Langrangian function is now defined as 
L{x,k,t,\) = f ( x , x , t ) + x[ z - h ( x , x , f ) ] 
Amongst the necessary conditions for an extremum are the 
following Euler equations 
dL d 
dx dt a x 
= 0 
for 0 < i < oo. See Intriligator (1971), pp.317 - 320 for 
further details. 
16. In deriving equation 11, Summers (1981) draws on the work of 
Hayashi (1982) who demonstrated that in a perfectly competitive 
world, 
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V - A 
(see p.218, equation 14) where V - A is the market valuation 
of the firm net of the present value of tax deductions. In 
comparing Summers' equation 11 with equation [46] of this 
thesis, {V - A)lpK should be replaced by marginal-^. The 
above relationship is useful because it allows the q-theory of 
investment to be tested empirically - hence the theme of 
Summers' paper. 
17. For a model in which the debt-equity ratio is determined 
endogenously, see Feldstein et al (1978). 
18. Note that in Summers' notation, r stands for the nominal 
interest rate, and not the real interest rate as defined in this 
thesis. 
19. It is still being assumed that the labour supply is exogenously 
determined so that dN^ = 0 in equation [iii]. 
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Chapter Seven 
1. The notation used here is different from that of Currie (1981, 
pp .704-705) since it relates specifically to the demand for 
money. 
2. When comparing the coefficients of the first-order rate of 
growth variables given by Currie (1981, p.705) and those given 
by Patterson and Ryding (1982, Table A , p.lO), let H = j + 
1. 
3. See James and Nobes (1983), Chapter 12, especially p.267. 
4. Equation (3) of Currie (1982, p.67) has been erroneously 
reported since some coefficients have been mixed up with those 
of equation B(i) in Coghlan (1979); however, the results 
derived are correct on the basis of equation B(ii). 
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